ABHAY GOHIL, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANTS, being aggrieved with the award passed by First Additional Motor accident Claims Tribunal, Gwalior in Claim case No. 29/2002 on 30th October, 2002, have filed this appeal under Section 173 of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for enhancement of compensation. ( 2 ) FACTS of the case lie in a narrow compass as under: deceased Aman Sharma, aged about 4 years, was the only child of the appellants. On 13th October, 2001 he had gone to K. G. Children Public convent School, Morar. While returning back to his house alongwith cousin sister on foot, on Mal Road, near the Circuit House boundary one Tempo no. MP-07-T-1511, which was being driven by its driver rashly and negligently came and dashed deceased aman. As a result of this accident, he sustained injuries in the head. He became unconscious on the spot. The intimation of the accident was given to the parents of the child and he was taken to J. A. Group of Hospitals and during treatment he succumbed to the injuries. The respondent No. 1-driver ran away from the spot along with tempo but the number was noted by the persons those who were present on the spot. Crime was registered at P. S. Morar, matter was investigated and chargesheet was filed. The claimants those who are the parents have also filed petition under Section 166 of the motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation of Rs. 9,82,000/ -. ( 3 ) IT was pleaded that Aman was the only child of the appellants. The appellants were having lot of expectations from his son that he will serve them in the old age. He will also earn money and maintain the parents. In reply, the claim was contested and respondent No. 1-Narayan Singh, who was driver of the vehicle, denied even the fact of accident from the tempo and had not filed any written statement. The Insurance company took stand that the said tempo was not involved in the accident. Aman was only aged about 3 years and the expectations cannot come as imaginary one. The driver was driving the tempo contrary to the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and the claimants are not entitled for any compensation. The Insurance company took stand that the said tempo was not involved in the accident. Aman was only aged about 3 years and the expectations cannot come as imaginary one. The driver was driving the tempo contrary to the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and the claimants are not entitled for any compensation. ( 4 ) AFTER considering the evidence on record, learned Tribunal found that the accident took place because of rash and negligent driving by the driver of the tempo and has also found that deceased Aman died on account of the injuries received in the accident. Tribunal also found that the insurance Company has failed to prove that the driver was driving the vehicle in violation of the terms and conditions of the policy, and awarded total compensation of Rs. 75,000/-; against which the appellants have filed this appeal. ( 5 ) SMT. Meena Singhal, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants assailed the award and submitted that the Tribunal has not awarded just and proper compensation and has also not adopted proper approach while determining the amount of compensation. She has placed reliance on decision in the cases of Nekram Sharma and another v. Asharam Batham and others; Chhannu lal Anant and another v. Badri Prasad Kashyap and others; and, also a decision of the Supreme court in the case of New India Assurance Co, ltd. v. Satender and others, and pleaded that the just and proper compensation should be awarded to the claimants. In reply, learned counsel for the respondents supported the award. ( 6 ) HEARD the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the findings recorded by the Tribunal as well as the decisions of the supreme Court. Recently in the case of Santosh kumar and another v. Jagdish Prasad and others, division Bench of this Court after considering the various judgments has held that in a case of child of 9 years, the multiplier system mentioned in Second Schedule appended to Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles act, 1988 is applicable in such cases. ( 7 ) IN the case of General Manager, Kerala state Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma thomas and others, the Supreme Court has held as under: "6. In a fatal accident action, the accepted measure of damages awarded to the dependents is the pecuniary loss suffered by them as a result of the death. ( 7 ) IN the case of General Manager, Kerala state Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma thomas and others, the Supreme Court has held as under: "6. In a fatal accident action, the accepted measure of damages awarded to the dependents is the pecuniary loss suffered by them as a result of the death. "how much has the widow and family lost by the father's death? The answer to this lies in the oft-quoted passage from the opinion of Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries ltd. , which says: "the starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase. That sum, however, has to be taxed down by having due regard to uncertainties, for instance, that the widow might have again married and thus ceased to be dependent, and other like matters of speculation and doubt. " ( 8 ) THERE were two methods adopted for the determination and for calculation of compensation in fatal accident actions, the first the multiplier mentioned in Davies v. Powell Duffryn associated Collieries Ltd. , (1942) AC 601 and the second in Nance v. British columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd. The multiplier method involves the ascertainment of the loss of dependency or the multiplicand having regard to the circumstances of the case and capitalizing the multiplicand by an appropriate multiplier. The choice of the multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased (or that of the claimants, whichever is higher) and by the calculation as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual interest. In ascertaining this, regard should also be had to the fact that ultimately the capital sum should also be consumed up over the period for which the dependency is expected to last. In ascertaining this, regard should also be had to the fact that ultimately the capital sum should also be consumed up over the period for which the dependency is expected to last. ( 9 ) THE considerations generally relevant in the selection of multiplicand and multiplier were adverted to by Lord diplock in his speech in Mallett v. Mcmonagle, where the deceased was aged 25 and left behind his widow of about the same age and three minor children. On the question of selection of multiplicand Lord Diplock observed: "the starting point in any estimate of the amount of the 'dependency' is the annual value of the material benefits provided for the dependents out of the earnings of the deceased at the date of his death. But,. . . . . . there are many factors which might have led to variations up or down in the future. His earnings might have increased and with them the amount provided by him for his dependents. They might have diminished with a recession in trade or he might have had spells of unemployment. As his children grew up and became independent the proportion of his earnings spent on his dependants would have been likely to fall. But in considering the effect to be given in the award of damages to possible variations in the dependency there are two factors to be borne in mind. The first is that the more remote in the future is the anticipated change the less confidence there can be in the chances of its occurring and the smaller the allowance to be made for it in the assessment. The second is that as a matter of the arithmetic of the calculation of present value, the later the change takes place the less will be its effect upon the total award of damages. " ( 10 ) IN regard to the choice of the multiplicand the Halsbury's Laws of england in Vol. 34, para 98, states the principle thus: " (98) Assessment of damages under the fatal Accidents Act, 1976:- The Courts have evolved a method for calculating the amount of pecuniary benefit that dependents could reasonably expect to have received from the deceased in the future. First, the annual value to the dependents of those benefits (the multiplicand) is assessed. 34, para 98, states the principle thus: " (98) Assessment of damages under the fatal Accidents Act, 1976:- The Courts have evolved a method for calculating the amount of pecuniary benefit that dependents could reasonably expect to have received from the deceased in the future. First, the annual value to the dependents of those benefits (the multiplicand) is assessed. In the ordinary case of the death of a wage-earner that figure is arrived at by deducting from the wages the estimated amount of his own personal and living expenses. The assessment is split into two parts. The first part comprises damages for the period between death and trial. The multiplicand is multiplied by the number of years which have elapsed between those two dates. Interest at one-half the short-term investment rate is also awarded on that multiplicand. The second part is damages for the period from the trial onwards. For that period, the number of years which have elapsed between the death and the trial is deducted from a multiplier based on the number of years that the expectancy would probably have lasted; central to that calculation is the probable length of the deceased's working life at the date of death. " As to the multiplier, Halsbury states:"the calculation depends on selecting an assumed rate of interest. In practice about 4 or 5 per cent is selected, and inflation is disregarded. It is assumed that the return on fixed interest bearing securities is so much higher than 4 to 5 percent that rough and ready allowance for inflation is thereby made. The multiplier may be increased where the plaintiff is a high tax payer. The multiplier is based on the rate of wages at the date of trial. No interest is allowed on the total figure. However, the multiplier is a figure considerably less than the number of years taken as the duration of the expectancy. The multiplier may be increased where the plaintiff is a high tax payer. The multiplier is based on the rate of wages at the date of trial. No interest is allowed on the total figure. However, the multiplier is a figure considerably less than the number of years taken as the duration of the expectancy. Since the dependents can invest their damages, the lump sum award in respect of future loss must be discounted to reflect their receipt of interest on invested funds, the intention being that the dependents will each year draw interest and some capital (the interest element decreasing and the capital drawings increasing with the passage of years), so that they are compensated each year for their annual loss, and the fund will be exhausted at the age which the Court assesses to be the correct age, having regard to all contingencies. The contingencies of life such as illness, disability and unemployment have to be taken into account. Actuarial evidence is admissible, but the Courts do not encourage such evidence. " ( 11 ) IT is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically sound and legally well-established. There are some cases, which have proceeded to determine the compensation on the basis of aggregating the entire future earnings for over the period he life expectancy was lost, deducted a percentage therefrom towards uncertainties of future life and awarded the resulting sum as compensation. " 8. In State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, it was held by the Supreme Court as under: " (7) It has to be kept in view that the tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which is to be in the real sense 'damage' which in turn appears to it to be 'just and reasonable'. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be 'just' and it cannot be a bonanza' not a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be 'just' and it cannot be a bonanza' not a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The Court and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be 'just' compensation is the vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing the compensation has to be considered in the background of 'just' compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression which appears to it to be must' a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression 'just' denotes fairness, equitability and reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. If it is not so it cannot be just. (See Helen C. Rebello v. Marashtra state Road Trans. Corpn. , (1999 ACJ 10 : 1999 (1) TAC 1 (SC ). " 9. Recently, again the Supreme Court after considering various judgments, reiterating the aforesaid principle in the case of New india Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satender and others (supra), has held as under: " (i) There are some aspects of human life which are capable of monetary measurement, but the totality of human life is like the beauty of sunrise or the splendour of the stars, beyond the reach of monetary tape-measure. The determination of damages for loss of human life is a extremely difficult task and it becomes all the more baffling when the deceased is a child and/or a non-earning person. The future of a child is uncertain. Where the deceased was a child, he was earning nothing but had a prospect to earn. The question of assessment of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer. The figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. The future of a child is uncertain. Where the deceased was a child, he was earning nothing but had a prospect to earn. The question of assessment of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer. The figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents are claimants, relevant factor would be age of parents. (ii) In the case of death of an infant, there may have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by the parents during the child's lifetime. But this will not necessarily bar the parent's claim and prospeclive loss will find a valid claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. This principle was laid down by the House of Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rly. Jenkins, (1913) AC 1 and Lord Atkinson said thus; ". . . all that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who sues, it is quite true that the existence of this expectation is an inference of fact - there must be a basis of fact from which the inference can reasonably be drawn; but I wish to express my emphatic dissent from the proposition that it is necessary that two of the facts without which the inference cannot be drawn are, first, that deceased earned money in the past and, second, that he or she contributed to the support of the plaintiff. These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only pieces of evidence and the necessary inference can I think, be drawn from circumstances other than and different from them. " [see Lata wadhwa v. State of Bihar. (iii) In cases of young children of tender age, in view of uncertainties abound, neither their income at the time of death nor the prospects of the future increase in their income nor chances of advancement of their career are capable of proper determination on estimated basis. The reason is that at such an early age, the uncertainties in regard to their academic pursuits, achievements in career and thereafter advancement in life are so many that nothing can be assumed with reasonable certainty, therefore, neither the income of the deceased child is capable of assessment on estimated basis nor the financial loss suffered by the parents is capable of mathematical computation. " 10. This Court in Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (supra), while computing compensation made distinction between deceased children falling within the age group of 5 to 10 years and age group of 10 to 15 years. " 11. In India the Supreme Court has followed various decisions of English Courts where common law is prevailing and has analysed the principle of Lord Diplock regarding the approach to be adopted by the Courts in calculating the damages. We have accepted the multiplier method and the Parliament has made it as a part of section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles act, 1988 as Second Schedule. It was argued that the aforesaid multiplier method is not a correct method and several other facts have not been considered while inserting the same. Many a times, the same was criticized. The Supreme Court has held that the multiplier method may not be binding on the Courts but as we have consistently held that multiplier system is logically sound and it is a good guide to the courts, therefore, the same is being followed by and large and the claim cases are being decided on the basis of the aforesaid multiplier method. ( 12 ) LEARNED Tribunal has not applied the multiplier system in this case and has computed the compensation on lump sum basis but as we have held in case of Santosh kumar (supra) that in such cases the multiplier system is applicable and the compensation can be computed on the basis of the aforesaid multiplier. In case of Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) the Supreme Court has also considered the compensation in the case of a child between the age group of 5 to 10 upto rs. 2 lacs as a reasonable compensation. ( 13 ) OBVIOUSLY, accepting multiplier method, the income of a non-earning person as Rs. 15,000/- per annum has been mentioned in the Second Schedule which can be considered as the income of the deceased on the principle of notional income and the dependency as Rs. 10,000/-per annum. In this case on applying the multiplier of 15 the amount of compensation would come to s. 15,000/- x 10 = Rs. 1,50,000 / -. The appellants shall also be entitled for a further sum of Rs. 10,000/- in the various heads like loss of love and affection, funeral expenses, etc. etc. Thus, compensation of rs. 10,000/-per annum. In this case on applying the multiplier of 15 the amount of compensation would come to s. 15,000/- x 10 = Rs. 1,50,000 / -. The appellants shall also be entitled for a further sum of Rs. 10,000/- in the various heads like loss of love and affection, funeral expenses, etc. etc. Thus, compensation of rs. 1,60,000/- in a case of a child of four years would be just and proper compensation under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the principles of law discussed above. ( 14 ) THUS, we allow this appeal, enhance the compensation from Rs. 75,000/- to rs. 1,60,000/ -. The enhanced amount shall carry interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of filing of the appeal. The entire enhanced amount is liable to be deposited in the nationalized bank in the name of appellant No. 2 - mother for a period of seven years and the appellant No. 2-mother shall be entitled for yearly interest thereon. ( 15 ) CONSEQUENTLY, this appeal is partly allowed as indicated above. Counsel's fee rs. 1,000/ -. .