ORDER 1. Heard. 2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 21-07-1988 passed by the Court of Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Labour Court, Bilaspur, M.P. (hereinafter referred to as the lower Court) in case No.99-WC-Fatal/85 awarding compensation of Rs.27,165-60 along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of accident till deposit. 3. Brief facts are as under: The applicant Fagua Sai being the father of the deceased Dhaneshwar Sai filed an application before the lower Court for compensation. Pleading in para-1 of the application is as under:- 4. The appellant/non-applicant submitted the following reply to para-1 is as under:- 5. Recording that there was no dispute on facts, the lower Court framed the sole question of law as under:- 6. Taking into consideration the admitted fact that the deceased was under employment under the appellant herein, the lower Court placing reliance on a decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1933 PC 225 held that where a workman while being under employment dies due to vis major i.e. a natural calamity like lightning, the employer is liable to pay compensation. 7. Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in order to succeed in a claim for compensation in case of death resulting from injury, it has to be established that personal injury resulting in death was caused to the workmen by accident arising out of and also in the course of his employment . No material was placed by the claimant/non-applicant to show that the act of lightning was an act which arose out of the employment, and therefore, the appellant was not liable to pay compensation. No other point was urged in this appeal by learned counsel for the appellant. 8. Having considered the submission of Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant, I have perused the record. Section 3 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 reads as under: "3. No other point was urged in this appeal by learned counsel for the appellant. 8. Having considered the submission of Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant, I have perused the record. Section 3 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 reads as under: "3. Employer's liability for compensation- (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, (underlined by me)his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: It is thus clear that in order to succeed in a claim for compensation in case of death resulting from the injury, the applicant has to prove that not only the accident arose out of his employment but was also in the course of his employment. 9. Lightening is an act of god i.e. vis major. In Divisional Controller, KSRTC vs. Mahadeva Shetty and another (2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 197, the Apex Court described an act of God as under:- "The expression "act of God" signifies the operation of natural forces free from human intervention, such as lightning, storm etc. It may include such unexpected occurrences of nature as severe gale, snowstorms, hurricanes, cyclones, tidal waves and the like. But every unexpected wind and storm does not operate as an excuse from liability, if there is a reasonable possibility of anticipating their happening. An act of God provides no excuse unless it is so unexpected that no reasonable human foresight could be presumed to anticipate the occurrence, having regard to the conditions of time and place known to be prevailing. For instance, where by experience of a number of years, preventive action can be taken, Lord Westbury defined the act of God (damnum fatale in Scotch Laws) as an occurrence which no human foresight can provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to recognize the possibility. This appears to be the nearest approach to the true meaning of an act of God. Lord Blancaburgh spoke of it as "an irresistible and unsearchable providence nullifying our human effort". 10. This appears to be the nearest approach to the true meaning of an act of God. Lord Blancaburgh spoke of it as "an irresistible and unsearchable providence nullifying our human effort". 10. In Margaret Brooker vs. Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia), Ltd. A.I.R. 1933 Privy Council 225, the standard of proof required to establish liability of the employer to compensate in a case of injury by natural force i.e. lightning their Lordships of the privy council observed as under: " Whether an accident arises out of the employment depends on the particulars facts. If a workman is injured by some natural force such as lightning, the heat of the sun, or extreme cold, which in itself has no kind of connexion with employment, he cannot recover compensation unless he can sufficiently associate such injury with his employment. This he can do if he can show that the employment exposed him in a special degree to suffering such an injury. But if he is injured by contact physically with some part of the place where he works, then, apart from questions of his own misconduct, he at once associates the accident with his employment and nothing further need be considered. So that if the roofs or walls fall upon him, or he slips upon the premises,there is no need to make further inquiry as to why the accident happened." 11. In State of Rajasthan vs. Ram Prasad and another (2001) 9 Supreme Court Cases 395 while considering the claim made under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 for compensation in respect of death due to lightning, the Apex Court held as under:- "The accident, it is stated, took place on account of lightning. The contention put forth on behalf of the appellant is that the mishap of death of Smt. Gita due to lightning is an act of God and, therefore, it is not liable to pay compensation. This contention has been rejected not only by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation but also by the learned Single Judge in appeal and thereafter by a Division Bench in a further appeal. The view taken is that the concept of the liability under the Act is wide enough to cover a case of this nature inasmuch as death had taken place arising as a result of accident in the course of employment. The view taken is that the concept of the liability under the Act is wide enough to cover a case of this nature inasmuch as death had taken place arising as a result of accident in the course of employment. It is, no doubt true that accident must have a casual connection with the employment and arise out of it. If the workman is injured as a result of natural force such as lightning though in itself has no connection with employment, she can recover compensation by showing that such employment exposed her to such injury. In this case the finding is that the said Smt. Gita was working on the site and would not have been exposed to such hazard of lightning striking her had she not been working so. 12. In Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation and another vs. Francis De costa and another (1996) 6 Supreme Court Cases 1, the Apex Court was considering the provisions contained in the section 2 (8) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 which reads as under: " 2. (8) ` employment injury' means a personal injury to an employee caused by accident or an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, being an insurable employment, whether the accident occurs or the occupational disease is contracted within or outside the territorial limits of India; " In the case of Dover Navigation Co. Ltd. vs. Isabella Craig [1940 AC 190: (1939) 4 ALL ER 558 HL], it was observed by Lord Wright that- "Nothing could be simpler than the words `arising out of and in the course of the employment'. It is clear that there are two conditions to be fulfilled. What arises `in the course' of the employment is to be distinguished from what arises `out of the employment'. The former words relate to time conditioned by reference to the man's service, the latter to causality. Not every accident which occurs to a man during the time when he is on his employment- that is, directly or indirectly engaged on what he is employed to do - gives a claim to compensation, unless it also arises out of the employment. Hence the section imports a distinction which it does not define. The language is simple and unqualified." 13. Hence the section imports a distinction which it does not define. The language is simple and unqualified." 13. The Apex Court laid down the following principles- upon proof of which a employee can succeed in a claim for compensation in case of injury resulting from accident, it was held that in order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment and (3) the accident must have been suffered in the course of employment. The words "arising out of and in the course of his employment" used in section-2(8) of the Employee State Insurance Act, 1948 are in pari materia with the provision contained in the section-3(9) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and, therefore, the principles laid down by the Apex Court can be applied to the present case also. 14. Applying the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council as also by the Apex Court, I find that it is an admitted fact that Dhaneshwar Sai was working in the course of his employment when lightning struck at 4 P.M. Since Dhaneshwar Sai was working in the open field while it was raining, the nature of employment exposed Dhaneshwar to such hazards of lightning. The concept of liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is wide enough to cover a case of this nature since the accident had causal connection with the employment and also arose out of it because if he had not been working in the open while it was raining the lightning could not have struck him. 15. In this view of the matter, no illegality or manifest error of law is seen in the impugned order. 16. In the result, the appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed. 17. Copy of this order be sent forthwith to the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Labour Court, Bilaspur for releasing the amount of compensation deposited by the appellant, in favour of the claimants. 18. The valuable assistance rendered by Shri P.S.Koshy, learned counsel, who appeared as amicus curiae as also by Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant is acknowledged.