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2007 DIGILAW 471 (CAL)

PADMABATI SHAW v. MANABHWATI SHAW

2007-06-29

MAHARAJ SINHA, PRABUDDHA SANKAR BANERJEE

body2007
MAHARAJ SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against a judgment and decree dated 31st July, 1998 passed in Title Suit No. 1957 of 1989 by the learned Trial judge, 9th Bench of the City Civil Court, at Calcutta. ( 2 ) BY the above judgment and decree under appeal the above suit of the plaintiff/appellant (appellant, in short) for eviction of the respondents or rather for a decree for recovery of vacant possession of the suit property and other incidental reliefs on account of rent in arrears and for mesne profits etc. was dismissed with costs. ( 3 ) THE learned Trial Judge, it appears, in dismissing the above suit of the appellant merely relied on a clause of the lease deed in question, namely, Clause (v) thereof, and held that by virtue of such clause the respondents became tenants (the original lessee was the father of the respondents) under the provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and since no notice under Section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956 was issued by the appellant for terminating the tenancy before the institution of the suit the appellant was not entitled to any decree for eviction and for recovery of possession of the suit premises against the respondents. ( 4 ) BEFORE I proceed to consider the merits of the appeal or rather the correctness of the judgment under appeal of the learned Trial Judge, i must say that when the hearing of this appeal commenced, we (I and My lord, Justice P. S. Banerjee) did not quite know that our task of deciding the appeal would be much easier by virtue of the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court to which I shall shortly refer, as we came to know of the decision of the Supreme Court only after a few days of hearing of the appeal. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, since in my opinion, the said recent decision of the supreme Court squarely covers the only issue and the question raised before us in this appeal decisively and in no uncertain terms, I do not think I need to spend much time on the earlier decisions of this Court where similar or identical question as involved in the present appeal had to be dealt with and answered. In other words, since the recent Supreme court decision is a direct authority on the question with which I am concerned in this appeal I think that the appeal should unhesitatingly be allowed and the suit of the appellant which was dismissed by the learned trial Judge should be decreed in favour of the appellant. ( 6 ) THE facts of this case, I find, are short and practically not in dispute. ( 7 ) THE husband of the appellant, one Judhisthir Mohan Shaw, since deceased, purchased the suit premises at 74a, Bhupendra Bose Avenue, calcutta-700 004 from one Smt. Suprava Dutta, the wife of one Rabindra nath Dutta in the year 1969. At the time when the said purchase took place, the lease in question, namely, dated 24th January, 1969 was in existence. The said lease was granted by the said Smt. Suprava Dutta, the previous owner of the suit premises, in favour of the original defendant, sitaram Farmania, since deceased for a period of 21 years and the commencement of the said lease took effect from 1st November, 1968 at a monthly rental of Rs. 770/- payable according to English Calendar. ( 8 ) THE said lease covered the entire first floor of the suit premises, one store room, one kitchen and two garages on the ground floor and also two rooms (meant for domestic helps) on the Mezzanine floor. ( 9 ) NEEDLESS to mention that by virtue of the said purchase of the suit premises, firstly, the husband of the appellant and after the death of the husband the appellant herself became the lessor by virtue of the Will left by the husband of the appellant, the said Judhisthir Shaw, of which the appellant is the sole executrix and the sole beneficiary. The lease for 21 years admittedly expired on the last day of October 1989. ( 10 ) THE appellant by a letter of her Advocate dated 2nd June, 1989 requested the original defendant, namely, the said Sitaram Farmania to defiver the possession of the demised premises immediately upon the expiry of the said lease on 31st October, 1989. The original defendant duly received the said notice but he neither vacated the suit premises nor handed over the possession thereof to the appellant. The original defendant duly received the said notice but he neither vacated the suit premises nor handed over the possession thereof to the appellant. The appellant, therefore, had to institute the above suit in the City Civil Court, at Calcutta, for recovery of possession of the suit premises and the rent in arrears, mesne profits etc. The suit, it appears, was instituted in December 1989, to be precise on 7th December, 1989 and as during the pendency of the said suit the original defendant, Sitaram Farmania, died, his heirs and legal representatives, namely, his sons and daughters were duly substituted as defendants in the pending suit of the appellant. ( 11 ) THE chief ground or rather the only ground on which the suit was contested by the defendants/respondents (respondents in short) at the trial was that since the said lease provided for an "option" "on the part of'both the lessor and lessee for the early determination of the lease", the expiry of the lease by efflux of time, namely, after completion of 21 years from the date of commencement of the lease had no significance or rather was of no effect in view of the amended provisions of Section 3 of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and the respondents continued to be monthly tenant and were entitled to enjoy all protections against eviction under the said Act. ( 12 ) THEREFORE, according to the respondents the suit for eviction against them could not be maintained solely on the ground that the lease in question had spent its force with the expiry of 21 years but only upon proving the ground or grounds for their eviction under Section 13 of the said Act of 1356 (in short, the Act ). ( 13 ) THE respondents also denied that they committed any default in payment of rent or rents and said that since the appellant refused to accept rent or rents the respondents were compelled to deposit the rents in the office of the Rent Controller. The respondents also denied that the appellant was entitled to mesne profits as claimed. ( 14 ) THE clause of the said lease on which the entire defence, or the only ground on which the defence of the respondents in the suit was based is Clause (v), namely the last clause of the said lease. The respondents also denied that the appellant was entitled to mesne profits as claimed. ( 14 ) THE clause of the said lease on which the entire defence, or the only ground on which the defence of the respondents in the suit was based is Clause (v), namely the last clause of the said lease. ( 15 ) SINCE, in my opinion, the present appeal can be decided only on the construction or interpretation of the said clause of the lease deed, i will refer to the same shortly. ( 16 ) HOWEVER, the learned Trial Judge having found that the respondents had admitted the title of the appellant to the suit premises and that the probate was duly granted by this Court in favour of the appellant as the executrix of the Will of her deceased husband, the said judhisthir Mohan Shaw, went straight to consider the effect of the said clause (v) of the lease deed and found that though the period of 21 years of the said lease had, in deed, expired and as such the suit for eviction on the ground of "efflux of time" was maintainable, in view of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act, however, the expiry of 21 years of lease could not be the valid ground for ejectment of the lessees, namely, the respondents herein, even after the expiry of the lease by efflux of time. Thus, the learned Judge said that he was constrained to hold that the respondents became tenants under the provisions of the said 1956 Act and since no notice under Section 13 (6) of the said Act was served the appellant was not entitled to any decree for eviction against the tenants/ lessees and for recovery of possession of the suit premises and, as aforesaid, on that ground alone dismissed the suit of the appellant against the respondents with costs. ( 17 ) AT this stage, for the sake of convenience the said Clause (v) of the lease deed is set out below: - "notwithstanding anything herein contained the lessee may at any time before the expiration of the term hereof surrender this lease upon giving to the lessor two calendar months' previous notice in writing therefore and upon payment to the lessor of all her dues for rents or otherwise under these presents upto the date of the lessee delivering vacant possession of the demised premises to the lessor and the lessee executing and registering at his own costs a proper Deed of Surrender therefore and in the event of any such surrender as aforesaid the lessee shall not be liable to pay to the lessor any damages for the unexpired portion of the said term," ( 18 ) AS I said before that when the hearing of this appeal commenced both the learned Counsel namely, the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Sudhis dasgupta for the respondents and Mr. Jaharlal Oe for the appellant tried to demonstrate as to what should the proper construction of the above clause be, needless to mention, Mr. Dasgupta for the respondents sought to support the judgment of the learned Trial Judge and said that Clause (v) of the lease deed made it quite certain that under the said clause the lessees had an option to terminate the lease in question before its expiry, namely, 21 years. Although the word 'surrender1 was used in the said clause (v) of the lease deed, the said expression surrender submitted mr. Dasgupta, should be equated with the expression terminable as used in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act and in support of this he referred to Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, (page 1444 ). ( 19 ) FOR the sake of convenience the word surrender as defined in the Black's Law Dictionary referred to above in the context of landlord-tenant relationship, need, I think, be quoted. The definition says: - "in landlord-tenant law, surrender exists when the tenant voluntarily gives up possession of the premises prior to the full term of the le. ase and the landlord accepts possession with intent that the lease be terminated. The definition says: - "in landlord-tenant law, surrender exists when the tenant voluntarily gives up possession of the premises prior to the full term of the le. ase and the landlord accepts possession with intent that the lease be terminated. It differs from "abandonment", as applied to leased premises, inasmuch as the latter is simply an act on the part of the lessee alone; but to show a surrender, a mutual agreement between lessor and lessee that the lease is terminated must be clearly proved. " ( 20 ) ON the above basis the learned Trial Judge contended Mr. Dasgupta, was absolutely right in holding that though the period of lease was for a fixed period of 21 years, the same could not be treated as a long lease of 21 years in view of the provisions made in sub-section (2)of Section 3 of the Act and since the lease in question was admittedly entered into after the commencement of the West Bengal Premises tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1965, the above sub-section was clearly attracted and the respondents had a complete defence to the claim of the appellant for recovery of suit premises on the ground of expiry of the lease by efflux of time. ( 21 ) MR. De, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, however, sought to argue that firstly, the word 'surrender used in the said clause (v) of the lease deed could not be equated with the expression 'terminable' used in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act and in this connection he had drawn our attention to Section 111 of the transfer of Property Act in particular Clause (e) thereof. Secondly, and more importantly, even though the lease in question provided such a clause, the lessees or rather the respondents could not, in any event, take the advantage of the said clause after the lease itself had spent its force, meaning thereby after the expiry of the lease in question by efflux of time. Mr. De also pointed out that since during the subsistence of the lease the appellant never even tried to terminate or put an end the relationship of lessor and lessee, the question of taking advantage of the said Clause (v) of the lease could not, therefore, arise at all. ( 22 ) MR. Mr. De also pointed out that since during the subsistence of the lease the appellant never even tried to terminate or put an end the relationship of lessor and lessee, the question of taking advantage of the said Clause (v) of the lease could not, therefore, arise at all. ( 22 ) MR. De submitted further that the word 'surrender in Clause (v)in the lease deed could never be equated with the word 'termination' or rather 'terminable' as used in the proviso sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act of 1956 as it would be implied in every tenancy or lease that a tenant might voluntarily surrender the lease of the tenancy by providing a particular manner of surrender. In the present case by providing a particular manner of surrender of lease neither the lessor nor the lessee ever intended to make the lease a shorter lease than 21 years as even without that clause the lessee could surrender the lease after the commencement of the lease period any time before its expiration of 21 years. Clause (e)of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act expressly recognized such right of a lessee. What the parties namely, lessor and lessee really meant was that if the lessee, after the commencement of the lease or rather during the subsistence of the lease, surrendered the lease in the manner provided in Clause (v) thereof, then and in that event, lessee would not be liable to pay to the lessor any damages for the unexpjred portion" of the lease or rather for not allowing the lease to last its full term. Mr. De, however, emphasized that in every grant of tenancy it would be implied that a tenant could surrender the tenancy or the lease as the case might, be, at its own volition or voluntarily. Therefore, according to Mr. De the only difference is that when the claim for lease itself provides for surrender by the lessee, then the lessor cannot seek damages against the lessee in case of such surrender takes place as both the lessee and lessor expressly recognize such right to surrender before the expiry of the full-term or the fixed-term of the lease in a given case. A plain reading of Clause (v) of the lease deed in question would make the above position absolutely clear, submitted Mr. De further. A plain reading of Clause (v) of the lease deed in question would make the above position absolutely clear, submitted Mr. De further. ( 23 ) IT is, however, purely academic today to consider whether the respondents would have been able to take shelter under the said Clause (v) if during the subsistence of the said lease the lessor had tried to terminate the lease in question on any plea to deprive the lessees of the enjoyment of the full term of the lease, i. e. , 21 years. I think, today the said question is academic as the suit was admittedly filed by the appellant only after the expiry of 21 years for obtaining vacant possession of the suit premises and simply by virtue of the period of duration of the lease in question the appellant said that the appellant was entitled to obtain vacant possession of the suit premises as the appellant gave notice to the lessors (in this case the notice was served upon the original lessee, Sitaram farmania, and he was the sole defendant as he was alive when the suit was instituted) saying that the respondents should deliver the vacant possession of the suit premises as the lease had expired by efflux of time. ( 24 ) I must say that when the above point was taken by Mr. De that the lessees, in any event, could not take the advantage of the said clause of the lease deed since the lease in question had spent its force or expired and that the clause perished as the lease in question which contained such clause itself perished by efflux of time, I did not quite conceive or rather appreciate then that the point taken by Mr. De would be the deciding factor in this appeal. However, as the hearing of this appeal proceeded, i realized or could fully appreciate that the above point raised by Mr. De should be the deciding factor as far as the present appeal was concerned. ( 25 ) IN Pabitra Kumar Roy and Anr. v. Alita D'souza, reported in 2006 (8) SCC 344 the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider a long lease for 21 years which contained a clause "permitting the parties to terminate the lease prior to its expiry with notice from either side" (See Paragraph-2 of the judgment at page 347 of the report ). v. Alita D'souza, reported in 2006 (8) SCC 344 the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider a long lease for 21 years which contained a clause "permitting the parties to terminate the lease prior to its expiry with notice from either side" (See Paragraph-2 of the judgment at page 347 of the report ). ( 26 ) AT the very outset, it is to be pointed out that the clause regarding prior determination or termination of the lease in the lease deed in the above case before the Supreme Court was much wider in its expression than Clause (v) in the present lease. The said clause in the lease deed before the Supreme Court fitted in exactly with the expression used in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act unlike the present clause by which the lessee could only surrender the lease in the manner provided in the said Clause (v) of the lease deed. However, as I will explain that even the difference in expressions in two clauses of the lease deed, namely, the lease before the Supreme Court and the present lease, after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Pabitra Kumar Roy's case (supra) hardly makes any difference today and I will shortly explain why i say this. The above judgment of the Supreme Court begins with the following observations:- "the appeal raises an interesting question of law relating to the interpretation of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1956 act") which does not appear to have been considered earlier for its full scope and effect. The question relates to the applicability of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the 1956 Act to leases which were executed for periods of over twenty years but containing a clause allowing prior determination at the instance of either the lessor or the lessee. Prior to 1956, the said section was comprised only of one section which is now numbered as sub-section (1 ). Sub-section (2) was added by amending Act, 29 of 1956. Since we shall be considering the provisions of Section 3 in this appeal, at some length, the same as it stands, after amendment is reproduced here inbelow for reference:" "3. Prior to 1956, the said section was comprised only of one section which is now numbered as sub-section (1 ). Sub-section (2) was added by amending Act, 29 of 1956. Since we shall be considering the provisions of Section 3 in this appeal, at some length, the same as it stands, after amendment is reproduced here inbelow for reference:" "3. Certain provisions of the Act not to apply to certain leases, (1) The provisions relating to rent and the provisions of Sections 31 and 36 shall apply to any premises held under a lease for residential purpose of the lessee himself and registered under the Indian registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), where (a) Such lease has been entered into on or after 1. 12. 1948, and (b) Such lease is for a period of not more than 20 years and save as aforesaid nothing in this Act shall apply to any premises held under a lease for a period of not less than 15 years. (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sub-section (1) but subject to sub-section (3) of Section 1, this Act shall apply to all premises held under a lease which has been entered into after the commencement of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1965: provided that if any such lease is for a period of not less than 20 years and the period limited by such lease is not expressed to be terminable before its expiration at the option either of the landlord or of the tenant, nothing in this Act, other than the provisions relating to rent and the provisions of Sections 31 and 36, shall apply to any premises held under such lease. " (See first Paragraph at page 347 of the report) ( 27 ) I have already mentioned that the clause regarding termination of the lease in the Pabitra Kumar Roy's case (supra), which was a lease for 21 years as well, was absolutely unambiguous and the words used in the said clause for earlier termination of the lease exactly fitted in with the words used in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. ( 28 ) THE Supreme Court, however, having considered the relevant authorities on the point and the respective submissions made on behalf of both the lessors and lessee was pleased to construe sub-section (2) of section 3 of the 1956 Act as follows: - "the intention of the legislature in amending Section 3 appears to have been to prevent landlords from using long-term leases as a camouflage for excluding them from the protection of the 1956 Act and yet retaining the right of prior determination. Sub-section (2)appears to have been enacted to prevent such abuse, inasmuch as, once the lease was determined before the fixed period, it attracted the proviso thereof. " (See Paragraph-15 at page 350 of the report) ( 29 ) ON the basis of the above construction of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, the Supreme Court dealt with the effect of a clause of prior determination in a long lease, namely 20 years or more. His Lordship justice Kabir speaking for the Division Bench in the above case was pleased to pronounce the effect of such clause for early determination of long lease in a clear terms. His Lordship said: - "as was indicated by the Calcutta High Court in Mahindra and mahindra case a lease for a fixed period does not cease to be so by the inclusion of a clause entitling either the lessor or the lessee to determine the lease prior to its expiry unless such option is actually exercised. In the impugned judgment under appeal, the High Court went wrong in holding that it had been found that the lease in question was governed by Section 3 (2) of the 2956 Act. To the contrary, both the trial Court and the first Appellate Court held that the deed of lease was not governed by the provisions of the 1956 Act under section 3 (2) and such finding was reversed by the High Court on a mis-application of the decision in Savita Dey's case. The law is dear that lease deeds for periods of twenty years or more would stand excluded from the operation of the 1956 Act except in matters relating to Sections 31 and 36 thereof, unless the same were terminable before their expiration at the option either of the landlord or of the tenant. The law is dear that lease deeds for periods of twenty years or more would stand excluded from the operation of the 1956 Act except in matters relating to Sections 31 and 36 thereof, unless the same were terminable before their expiration at the option either of the landlord or of the tenant. In other words, if such a lease is terminated before its fixed period expired, the proviso to Section 3 (2) would be attracted as a defence against eviction. If, however, the lease was allowed to run its full course, both the lease and the conditions contained therein would come to an end and would cease to be operative and the clause for prior determination would no longer be available as a defence against eviction. " ( 30 ) AFTER the above pronouncement of the Supreme Court, there is in my opinion, no scope for any doubt as to the effect of a clause in a long lease namely, a lease for 20 years or more. Since in the present case the respondents being the lessees, had the advantage of enjoying the full-term of the lease, namely, 21 years, as there was no occasion of its early determination by the appellant and the suit was instituted for eviction only after expiry of the period of lease, the defence that was taken by the respondents successfully at the trial on the basis of Clause (v) of the lease deed in question should no longer be treated as good defence at all and since that was the only defence of the respondents set up against the claim for eviction of the respondents on the ground of expiration of lease by efflux of time, the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge should, be set aside. ( 31 ) INCIDENTALLY, it is to be pointed out, that though the appellant instituted the suit little more than one month after the period of lease in question had expired, namely, on 7th December, 1989 by the time the judgment was pronounced by the learned Trial Judge which was a judgment in favour of the respondents, the respondents had the benefit of enjoying the suit premises for nearly 10 years more as the judgment, it appears, was pronounced on 31 st July, 1998, and by the time we are able to pronounce our judgment today sitting in appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge, another nine years have passed. ( 32 ) THE respondents, therefore, by now have enjoyed the suit premises for a further period of nearly 20 years even after expiry of the said lease and even after the institution of the suit for obtaining possession of the suit property just after the expiry of the lease in question. By virtue of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pabitra Kumar Roy's case (supra), the respondents, in my opinion, cannot enjoy the suit premises for indefinite period any more. ( 33 ) THE other point, namely, the point of estopple which was considered by the Supreme Court in Pabitra Kumar Roy's case (supra)against the lessee need not be mentioned here as in that case the lessor-had determined the lease before the expiry of its full term and the lessee decided to contest the proceeding against him by the lessor and had, in fact, obtained the benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act without taking the point that the lease deed in question, in fact, contained a clause for early determination of lease and as such, it attracted the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the 1956 Act. ( 34 ) HOWEVER, it is the admitted position that in the present case the respondents or rather the original lessee, namely, the father of the respondents (the original defendant), had the benefit of enjoying the full term of the lease of 21 years without any interruption at all. ( 34 ) HOWEVER, it is the admitted position that in the present case the respondents or rather the original lessee, namely, the father of the respondents (the original defendant), had the benefit of enjoying the full term of the lease of 21 years without any interruption at all. ( 35 ) THE true ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pabitra kumar Roy's case (supra) is that if a lease for 20 or more years contains clause for its early determination or termination then such clause can only be effective, if the lease itself is determined or terminated before the expiry of its full term or its fixed period. The lessee in that case can invoke the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. When, however, the full term of the lease has expired and the same had not been determined or terminated during its subsistence, then such a clause giving "option" to either the lessor or the lessee to terminate the lease before the fixed period of twenty years or more "would no longer be available as a defence against the eviction". ( 36 ) IN trying to spell out the true ratio of the judgment of the Supreme court in the above case, I have no doubt borrowed the expression of the supreme Court as made in Paragraph-22 of the said judgment. ( 37 ) THEREFORE, in my opinion, in the instant case since the lease was allowed to run its full course and there was no question of prior termination or determination of the lease in question by the lessor/ appellant during the subsistence of the period of lease, Clause (v) of the lease deed or any other clause, if there be any, regarding its prior determination, could not and cannot have any effect whatsoever as the said Clause (v) in the instant case perished as the lease in question for 21 years itself perished with the expiry of its duration, namely, 21 years. ( 38 ) THE view that I have taken, I do not think the other decisions cited by the learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant need be considered or dealt with in detail and the Supreme Court in Pabitra Kumar Roy's case (supra) in fact, had the occasion to consider one of such decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant, namely, Savita De v. Mr. Nageswar Majumdar and Anr. , 1995 (6) SCC 274 . ( 39 ) HOWEVER, it must be mentioned that the other decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant, namely, the decisions- (1) In Punalur Paper Mills Limited v. Central Bank of India, reported in 1995 (1) Cal LJ at page 324, (2) In Smt. Shyamali Mitra and Ors. v. Manindra Nath Chatterjee, reported in 2004 (1) Cal LJ (Cal.) at page 103, and (3) In Wachel Mollah and Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Vithalbhai Private Limited and anr. , reported in 2006 (3) SCC at page 542, also support the case made out by the learned Counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal. ( 40 ) THE learned Senior Counsel, however, in reply to the above case of the Supreme Court, namely, Pabitra Kumar Roy (supra) referred to two decisions, namely, State of Orissa and Ors. v. Md. Illias, 2006 (1)SCC 275 and the other, Union of India and Anr. v. Mujbahadur Singh, 2006 (1) SCC 368 . ( 41 ) I think the above two decisions were cited by the learned Senior counsel on behalf of the respondents only for the sake of citing decisions and as such I need not spend much time in dealing with them. In any event, the observations made in the above two decisions on the concept of judicial precedent and ratio decidendi, in fact, fully support the approach that I have made in deciding the appeal on merits. [see the observations of the Supreme Court in the State of Orissa and Ors. (supra), Paragraph-12 at Page 28 of the Report]. ( 42 ) IN Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1073 , speaking for the Bench, Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji (as his Lordship then was) was pleased to observe:- "the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. (supra), Paragraph-12 at Page 28 of the Report]. ( 42 ) IN Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1073 , speaking for the Bench, Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji (as his Lordship then was) was pleased to observe:- "the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it". (See Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 AC 495 ). ( 43 ) KEEPING the above in mind, I again repeat that the task of deciding the present appeal became much easier by virtue of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pabitra Kr. Roy (supra ). ( 44 ) I must say that the approach of the learned Trial Judge in deciding the suit or rather in pronouncing his judgment in favour of the defendants, the respondents herein, was little more than mechanical and casual. Firstly, the learned Judge did not consider the relevant sections of the Transfer of Property Act in particular Section 111 thereof and the effect of the provisions of such section on the clause in question, namely, Clause (v)of the lease deed. The learned Trial Judge also did not consider the relevant decisions on the point including the decision of the Supreme Court in Savita De (supra), nor did he consider the decision of the Calcutta High court in Mahindra and Mahindra v. Smt. Kohinoor Devi, 1988 CHN 1 which were, as mentioned above, considered by the Supreme Court in Pabitra kumar Roy's case (supra ). Perhaps the learned Trial Judge did not have the occasion or rather opportunity to consider those cases as those decisions were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge by the learned counsel who conducted the case at the trial of the suit. ( 45 ) THUS, the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge dated 31 st July, 1998 is set aside and the suit is decreed as claimed in prayer/ claim (a) of the plaint. ( 46 ) HAVING considered the claim for rent in arrears there will also be a decree for rent in arrears as claimed in prayer/claim (b) of the plaint. ( 46 ) HAVING considered the claim for rent in arrears there will also be a decree for rent in arrears as claimed in prayer/claim (b) of the plaint. ( 47 ) SINCE the suit was filed way back in the year 1989, to be precise on 7th December, 1989, the claim made by the original plaintiff for mesne profits was rather too low. However, on the basis of the claim for mesne profits in the plaint there will be a decree for mesne profits for Rs. 100/-per day payable from the month of November 1989 till the appellant obtains possession of the suit property. ( 48 ) HOWEVER, the appellant will be entitled to withdraw the rents deposited by the respondents in the Office of the Rent Controller, if any, and if such withdrawal is made then the amount or amounts so withdrawn as rent in arrears will be adjusted against the decree for rent in arrears and mesne profits as passed herein to the extent possible. ( 49 ) HOWEVER, it is made clear that the decree passed herein for mesne profits, will not prevent the appellant from initiating proceedings including suit for further mesne profits against the respondents if the appellant so chooses or is so advised. ( 50 ) THE respondents, however, are granted time to vacate the suit premises and make over vacant possession thereof to the appellant positively within the period of three months which will commence from the date of the judgment, i. e. 29th June, 2007. The appeal is, thus, allowed. There will be no order as to costs.