( 1 ) THE petitioner has prayed for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus commanding upon the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 5 to pay the dues of the petitioner and also to refund the amounts said to have been wrongly deducted and to pay pension to him under the Railway Claims Tribunal Rules together with interest thereon. The petitioner has also prayed for a declaration declaring section 10 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 as being ultra vires the constitution of India. ( 2 ) THE case of the petitioner is that while he was posted as an additional District and Sessions Judge, 3rd Court, Nadia at Krishnanagar, he applied for voluntary retirement. By a Notification dated 20th March, 2003, the judicial Department of the Government of West Bengal notified that the governor of West Bengal had been pleased to allow the petitioner to retire voluntarily from service with effect from 21. 3. 2003 for joining the post of member (Judicial), Railway Claims Tribunal, Kolkata Bench under the Ministry of Railways, Government of India. Thereafter by an Order dated 25. 3. 2003, the Deputy Secretary (D)/ Railway Board, Government of India, Ministry of railways issued the Appointment Letter intimating, inter alia, that the President had been pleased to appoint the petitioner as Member (Judicial), Railway claims Tribunal at Kolkata against an existing vacancy and that the tenure of service would be for a period of 5 years from the date of assumption of charge or the date on which he attained 62 years of age, whichever was earlier. It was further ordered that salaries and allowances payable to the petitioner as well as his conditions of service, will be governed in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members) Rules, 1989 as amended from time to time. The petitioner assumed charge on and from the forenoon of 26. 3. 2003. ( 3 ) THE aforementioned facts would be evident from reading the notification dated 20. 3. 2003, the Order dated 25. 3. 2003 as well as the charge report dated 26. 3. 2003 brought on record by the petitioner between pages 25 to 27 of the Writ Petition. ( 4 ) MR. 3. 2003. ( 3 ) THE aforementioned facts would be evident from reading the notification dated 20. 3. 2003, the Order dated 25. 3. 2003 as well as the charge report dated 26. 3. 2003 brought on record by the petitioner between pages 25 to 27 of the Writ Petition. ( 4 ) MR. Dinesh Chandra Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection and has submitted that this writ Petition is not at all maintainable before this Court because the petitioner is governed by the terms and conditions of his service under the Ministry of railways, Government of India. He submits that admittedly, the petitioner was holding a "civil post" under the said Ministry of Railways and therefore, his case is covered under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. ( 5 ) MR. Chaudhuri has submitted that the question of jurisdiction of this Court was not raised at the first opportunity on 17. 5. 2006 when this court, after having heard the parties, had given liberty to the respondents to file their Affidavits. He submits that thereafter Affidavit-in-opposition was also filed but the point relating to jurisdiction was not taken. Mr. Chaudhuri submits that after receiving the copy of the Affidavit-in-reply the respondents suddenly took this point relating to jurisdiction in one of the Affidavits filed the Assistant registrar of the Railway Claims Tribunal. Mr. Chaudhuri submits that the point of jurisdiction having been raised in a supplementary Affidavit-in-opposition and having not been taken earlier, should be dismissed. ( 6 ) THE aforementioned objection of Mr. Suniti Chaudhuri is of no consequence. In a writ proceeding, a party is entitled to raise a point of law as well as a point of jurisdiction before the Court at any point of time. Moreover the question and/or the objection and/or the point of maintainability that the respondents have raised through Mr. Dinesh Chandra Roy, goes to the root of the jurisdiction of this Court qua The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and therefore, the said preliminary objection, must be decided so that none of the parties are prejudiced. In that view of the matter, this Court now proceeds to deal with the said preliminary objection first. ( 7 ) IT is evident that on and from 21. 3. 2003, the petitioner became member (Judicial), Railway Claims Tribunal under the Ministry of Railways, government of India. In that view of the matter, this Court now proceeds to deal with the said preliminary objection first. ( 7 ) IT is evident that on and from 21. 3. 2003, the petitioner became member (Judicial), Railway Claims Tribunal under the Ministry of Railways, government of India. It is also evident that the letter and/or order of Appointment dated 25. 3. 2003 was issued from the Office of the Railway Board, Ministry of railways, Government of India, notifying inter alia, that the President had been pleased to appoint the petitioner as a Member (Judicial) of the said Railway claims Tribunal. ( 8 ) UNDER the provisions of Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals act, 1985, the Central Administrative Tribunal is the exclusive forum, except the Supreme Court, in relation to disputes relating to service disputes in an All india Service or to a Civil Service of the Union or to a civil post under the union. Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act 1985 reads as follows :- "14. Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act 1985 reads as follows :- "14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative tribunal- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (except the Supreme court) in relation to- (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filed by a civilian ; (b) all service matters concerning-i) a member of any All-India Service ; or ii) a person [not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c)] appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil post under the Union ; or iii) a civilian [not being a member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (c)] appointed to any defence services or a post connected with defence, and pertaining to the service of such member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the Government ; (c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the Union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) of clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by a State Government or any local or other authority or any corporation [or society] or other body, at the disposal of the Central Government for such appointment. [explanation-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that references to "union" in this sub-section shall be construed as including. references also to a Union territory. ] [quoted Verbatim] ( 9 ) MR. [explanation-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that references to "union" in this sub-section shall be construed as including. references also to a Union territory. ] [quoted Verbatim] ( 9 ) MR. Suniti Chaudhuri then submits that none of the ingredients as laid down under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunate Act can be made applicable because he was not a holder of a civil post nor was he in Civil service under the Union of India and that there was no direct relationship of master and servant between him and the Union of India. He further submits that his service in the Railway Claims Tribunal was an independent Judicial service and therefore he has rightly approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that the Respondents have raised the point of jurisdiction only for harassing him and for delaying the disposal of the Writ petition after having withheld his legal dues. ( 10 ) NOW under Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, it has been provided that on and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers, and authority becomes exercisable by a Tribunal under the said Act in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any Service or post or service matters concerning members of any Service or all persons appointed to any Service or post, no Court, except the Supreme Court or the Industrial tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law, shall have jurisdiction in relation to such matters. ( 11 ) THIS Court has no hesitation in rejecting the aforementioned contentions of Mr. Chaudhuri because from a perusal of the three documents referred to in para-3 above, it is absolutely clear that the Petitioner was holding a civil post having been appointed to a Civil Service of the Union by the president on the basis of a letter of appointment issued from the Government of India, Ministry of Railways. ( 12 ) IT is true that the words "civil post" has not been defined either in the Constitution or under the Administrative Tribunals Act. ( 12 ) IT is true that the words "civil post" has not been defined either in the Constitution or under the Administrative Tribunals Act. Since the words "civil Post" has not been defined under the Administrative Tribunals Act, it is always safe to look into the provisions Of Article 311 of the Constitution of india which refers to these words while contemplating that a person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an All India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Article 311 refers to civil post and obviously since it does not refer to a military post, the definition of the word "civil Post" as used in Prem's Judicial Dictionary which was produced by Mr. Dinesh Chandra Roy, learned Counsel for the respondents is therefore worth taking note of. Mr. Dinesh Chandra Roy filed a "written Notes of Arguments" in which the photocopy of the relevant portion of prem's Judicial Dictionary has been enclosed. In Prem's Judicial Dictionary (Vol-1) 1992 Edition, the word "civil post" has been described to mean as follows :- "civil post-The word "civil" used before the word "post" in S. 240 (1)Government of India Act, is clearly meant to distinguish posts in the defence Forces. The words "civil post" cannot be confined to merely to posts which are borne on the cadre of any regularly constituted service. All posts held by any public servant, if the posts did not belong to the military department or the defence, forces, must be deemed to be civil posts under the Crown. " [quoted Verbatim] similarly in the Law Lexicon by Justice T. P. Mukherjee and K. N. Singh 1989 edition, the word "civil post" has been defined to mean, on the basis of judgments referred to therein, as under :- "civil POST-The words 'civil post' are not defined in the Constitution. It would appear from Art. 310 of the Constitution that a civil post means a post other than a post connected with defence. The words 'civil post' in clause (1) of Art. 311 would, therefore, mean a post other than a post connected with defence. It would appear from Art. 310 of the Constitution that a civil post means a post other than a post connected with defence. The words 'civil post' in clause (1) of Art. 311 would, therefore, mean a post other than a post connected with defence. A person holding a 'civil post' would accordingly mean a person 'serving under the Government of a State in a civil capacity'. R. Christopher v. Exevutice Engineer, Irrigation Workshop, izatnagar, Bareily, AIR 1936 All. 97 at 98: (1966) 1 Lab. L. J. 799. A "civil post" is an office held by an officer and the fact that he is a member of the Indian Civil Service could not be understood to mean that a member of the cadre of a service could not hold a "civil post". [k. M. Rajagopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad. 1155 at 1162: (1954)2 m. L. J. 254. The term 'civil Post1 is not defined in the Constitution, but in appears to have been used as distinguished from a 'defence post' having regard to Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution. It has been so held in Mangal sain v. State of Punjab, [air 1952 Punj. 58], in which Harnam Singh J. has observed : "now, the expression 'civil Post' is not defined in the Constitution of india, reading, however, Arts. 310 and 311 together, the conclusion is inescapable that the expression 'civil Post' as used in Art. 311 means 'a post or office on the civil side of the administration' as distinguished from 'post connected with defence. " the words "civil Post" cannot be confined merely to posts which are borne on the cadre of any regularly constituted service. All posts held by any public servant if the posts did not belong to the Military Department or the Defence Forces, must be deemed to be civil posts. [s. Mohan v. P. and E. P. States Union, AIR 1954 Pepsu 136 at pp. 139, 142]. " [quoted Verbatim] ( 13 ) THE petitioner having been appointed under the authority of the president by an Order issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Railways and not being the holder of a post under the Military Department or under the defence Forces, he must therefore be deemed to be a holder of a civil post. ( 14 ) THE contention of Mr. ( 14 ) THE contention of Mr. Chaudhuri to the effect that he being a member (Judicial) under the Railway Claims Tribunal was the holder of an independent Judicial Service and therefore cannot be equated with the holder of a service under the Union of India cannot, also be accepted. ( 15 ) THE Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 was created for deciding claims against the Railway Administration for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to it to be carried by Railway or for the refund of fares or freight or for compensation for death or injury to passengers occurring as a result of railway accidents (or untoward incidents) and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. ( 16 ) IN other words, the Railway Claims Tribunal concerns itself exclusively with claims for damages qua the railways. Under Section 3 of the railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, such a Claims Tribunal, known as a Railway claims Tribunal can be constituted only by the Central Government. Similarly under Section 4 the Claims Tribunal is to consist of a Chairman, 4 Vice-Chairmen and such number of Judicial Members and Technical members as the Central Government may deem fit. ( 17 ) IN other words, it cannot be said that the petitioner was holding a post which was of an independent judicial nature. His very existence in the body of the Tribunal depended upon how the Central Government deemed fit. In this context, the Judgment of the Supreme Court passed in the case of the state of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. S. Thangavel reported in (1997)2 SCC 349 attains significance. In Para 6 of the said judgment, it has been held as follows :- "in view of the respective contentions, the question that arises for consideration is whether the view taken by the Tribunal is correct in law? We have come across a number of judgments of various administrative Tribunals in the country treating their orders to be "a judgment and order" obviously under Section 2 (9), CPC. The view seems to be not correct in law. A judgment means a statement given by a Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. Section 2 (8) defines "judge" to mean the presiding officer of a civil Court. The view seems to be not correct in law. A judgment means a statement given by a Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. Section 2 (8) defines "judge" to mean the presiding officer of a civil Court. An officer, therefore, is appointed to preside and to administer the law in a Court of justice and clothed with judicial authority. Judgment is the decision of a Court of justice upon the respective rights and claims of the parties to an action in a suit submitted to it for determination. The word "judgment" denotes the reasons which the Court gives for its decision. The members of the tribunal cannot be considered to be Judges and their statement cannot be treated to be a decree: it may be construed to be only an order for the purpose of decision arrived at by the Tribunal under the Administrative tribunals Act. Under these circumstances, we must hold that the tribunal's order cannot be treated to be a judgment or decree but they should be only an order. " [quoted Verbatim but emphasis by underlining is by this Court] ( 18 ) THUS, even the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Members of a Tribunal cannot be considered to be Judges and at best, their reasoning can only be considered to be Orders or Decisions. Consequently, this Court is not inclined to accept the argument that the petitioner was the holder of an independent judicial Service because his inclusion in the Bench itself depends on the Central Government in terms of Section 4 of the Railway Claims Tribunal act, 1987 which provides that the "claims Tribunal Shall consist of a Chairman, four Vice-Chairman and such number of Judicial Members and Technical members as the Central Government may deem fit and, subject to the other provisions of this Act, the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Claims tribunal may be exercised by Benches thereof" [bold fonts added for emphasis] ( 19 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the Judgment referred to by Mr. Chaudhuri being the case of Union of India v. K. B. Khare and Ors. Chaudhuri being the case of Union of India v. K. B. Khare and Ors. reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 502 cannot be said to have any application because the point that was involved in that case was the clubbing together of the services rendered under the said Judicial Service with that of the Central Administrative tribunal and not as to whether the person concerned was the holder of a civil post or not. The petitioner's service is limited only to the extent of deciding claims qua the Railways and therefore, he cannot be equated with a Judge who can, if called upon to do so, give a judgment either in personam or in rem on a subject that is beyond the Railways. Thus, even if he holds the post of a judicial Member, even then, that by itself cannot be said to be a factor by which he can say that he is not the holder of a civil post. ( 20 ) FOR the foregoing reasons and for the reasons as enunciated in the case of L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1997)3 SCC 261 , this Court comes to the conclusion that the Central Administrative Tribunal is the proper forum before which the Petitioner should have first moved before approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Paragraphs 93 and 99 of the said Judgment reads as follows :- "93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. 99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2 (d) of article 323-A and clause 3 (d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and this Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5 (6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated. " ( 21 ) MR. Chaudhuri then submitted that he has challenged the vires of section 10 of the Railway Claims Tribunal as being ultra vires Article 13 (2) of the Constitution and for a consequential declaration that the petitioner should be deemed to be eligible for further employment either under the Government or under the local bodies or under other authorities. ( 22 ) IN the opinion of this Court, the said point can also be argued before the Central Administrative Tribunal because in paragraph 93 of L. Chandra kumar's case supra, it has been held that the Tribunals will have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations but they shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their Parent Statute. In the instant case, it is not the vires of the Central Administrative tribunal Act that the petitioner wants to challenge but he wants to challenge the vires of an Act which can be scrutinised by the central Administrative Tribunal in terms of paragraphs 93 and 99 of L. Chandra kumar case quoted above. ( 23 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, this Court refuses to enter into the other aspects and/or other claims of the Writ Petitioner and leaves him to agitate the matter before the Central Administrative tribunal which will proceed to deal with the case independently and on its own merits without being influenced by any of the observations made herein. ( 24 ) AS a consequence of what has been held above, this Court holds that this Writ Petition is not maintainable at this stage. It is accordingly dismissed, but only on the ground of want of jurisdiction at present and not on merits. ( 24 ) AS a consequence of what has been held above, this Court holds that this Writ Petition is not maintainable at this stage. It is accordingly dismissed, but only on the ground of want of jurisdiction at present and not on merits. ( 25 ) LET it be recorded that in terms of the Order dated 3. 5. 2067, this court had directed Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta to assist the Court amicus Curiae in view of the points involved in this case. Mr. Sengupta has very ably assisted this Court and therefore this Court records its appreciation for Mr. Sengupta. ( 26 ) UPON appropriate Application (s) being made, urgent Xeroxed certified copy of this Order, may be given/issued expeditiously subject to usual terms and conditions.