JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By this common judgment and order, we propose to dispose of both the writ appeals, for, both these appeals have arisen out of the judgment and order, dated 12.12.2006, passed in WP (C) No. 60/2001. 2. For the purpose of appreciating the questions, which have arisen for determination in the present appeals, the material facts giving rise to the present appeals are set out as follows: (i) While serving as an Assistant Teacher in Ramthakur Pathsala Primary Section attached to the Boys' Higher Secondary School, Agartala, which is a privately managed Government aided school, Ranjit Kumar Roy breathed his last, on 26.05.96, leaving behind Smti Chandana Roy as his widow and Sri Kumarjit Roy as his son. Both the legal representatives of the said deceased submitted an application to the Administrator of the said school seeking, on compassionate ground, appointment for Sri Kumarjit Roy aforementioned. The Administrator of the said school forwarded, vide its communication, dated 11.03.97, the said application to the Director of School Education, Government of Tripura. As repeated requests for appointment of Kumarjit Roy aforementioned, under die-in-harness Scheme, failed to yield any favourable result, a writ petition was filed by the said two legal representatives, Smt. Chandana Roy being the Petitioner No. 1 and her son, Kumarjit Roy, being the Petitioner No. 2, their case being, briefly stated, thus: The benefit of compassionate appointment, under die-in-harness Scheme, was, initially, introduced by the Government of Tripura confining the benefit of the said Scheme to the legal heirs of only those teachers, who were working in Government Schools. By memorandum, dated 13.08.96, a comprehensive procedure for providing employment under the die-in-harness scheme was introduced. In the said memorandum, a provision was also made for giving financial assistance of an amount of Rs. 50,000/- if the employment, for reasons mentioned in the said memorandum, was not provided. By yet another memorandum, dated 19.11.97, the benefit of the Scheme of die-in-harness was extended to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed Government aided schools in Tripura. 50,000/- if the employment, for reasons mentioned in the said memorandum, was not provided. By yet another memorandum, dated 19.11.97, the benefit of the Scheme of die-in-harness was extended to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed Government aided schools in Tripura. As the benefit of the Scheme covered by memorandum, dated 13.08.96, aforementioned, has been extended to teachers of privately managed Government aided schools in Tripura, the Government of Tripura ought to have provided employment to the Petitioner No. 2 and as the Government has failed to provide employment to the Petitioner No. 2, the Petitioners sought for issuance of appropriate Writ (s) commanding the Respondents to appoint the Petitioner No. 2 under the said Scheme. (ii) The Respondents resisted the writ petition by contending, inter alia, that the die-in-harness Scheme was, for the first time, introduced, in respect of teachers of privately managed Government aided schools on 19.11.1997, but as Ranjit Roy had died on 26.05.96, i.e., before the said Scheme became applicable to the teachers of the privately managed Government aided school, the writ Petitioners case was neither covered under the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, nor under the memorandum, dated 19.11.97 and, hence, the writ Petitioner No. 2 could not be given any employment under the said Scheme. (iii) In the impugned judgment and order, a learned Single Judge of this Court has concluded that the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, aforementioned covers the cases of those persons too, who were, otherwise, covered by memorandum, dated 13.08.96, and that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Petitioner No. 2 was entitled to be considered for appointment in terms of the said Scheme. While, however, granting relief, the learned Single Judge has held that the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, aforementioned envisaged providing of financial assistance as an alternative to the employment and that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Petitioners were entitled to only financial assistance of Rs. 50,000/-. The learned Single Judge accordingly directed the Respondents to do the needful. Aggrieved by the directions, so given, and contending, inter alia, that the Petitioner No.2 was entitled to be provided with employment and that the directions for providing financial assistance to the Petitioners had been given on misreading of the relevant Schemes in force, the writ Petitioners have filed a writ appeal, which has given rise to Writ Appeal No. 23/2007. Aggrieved by the directions, so given, and contending, inter alia, that the Petitioner No.2 was entitled to be provided with employment and that the directions for providing financial assistance to the Petitioners had been given on misreading of the relevant Schemes in force, the writ Petitioners have filed a writ appeal, which has given rise to Writ Appeal No. 23/2007. Contending, inter alia, that the Petitioners' case was not covered at all by the Schemes, in question, and that the writ Petitioners were not entitled even to financial assistance under the said Schemes, Respondents too have preferred an appeal and this appeal has given rise to Writ Appeal No. 60/2001. 3. We have heard Mr. Section Deb, learned Counsel for the writ Petitioners-Appellants, and Ms. A.S. Lodh, learned Govt. Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State Respondents. 4. The question, now, is as to whether a legal heir of a deceased employee of a privately managed Government school, who had died before 1st June, 1996, can be held to be covered by the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, read with memorandum, dated 19.11.97? 5. As the controversy, in question, is as to whether the die-in-harness Scheme would be applicable to a teacher of the privately managed Government aided schools, in Tripura, if the teacher had died before 1st June, 1996, it is necessary to look into the history of the Scheme of die-in-harness, in the State of Tripura, leading to all such relevant memoranda or notifications, which the Government has issued from time to time. Our quest for an answer to the question as to how the Scheme came to be introduced brings us to the memorandum, dated 30.03.78. The relevant portion of this memorandum is reproduced hereinbelow: MEMORANDUM The undersigned is directed to state that the Government has decided that while taking people in Government service, the following considerations as decided in the Cabinet Meeting 07.98.77, will be given importance and due weightage- (i) * * * (iii) * * * (iv) * * * (v) * * * (vi) * * * (vii) Dependants of retired Government employees who do not have any earning members and ex-servicemen and dependants Govt. employees Die-in-harness * * * It has also been decided that in the selection of candidates, over all preference will be given to persons coming from the rural areas. The age limit for SC/ST candidates will be 40 years. employees Die-in-harness * * * It has also been decided that in the selection of candidates, over all preference will be given to persons coming from the rural areas. The age limit for SC/ST candidates will be 40 years. All Departments/Heads of Departments will follow the above Employment Policy in the case of direct recruitment to posts in Class-III and Class-IV posts in addition to the provisions incorporated in the Recruitment Rules farmed for posts/grades in each Department. This memorandum supersedes that of even number dated 15.3.78 on the same subject. 6. From a careful reading, as a whole, of the memorandum, dated 30.03.78, and, particularly, Clause (viii) thereof, what transpires is that the Government, vide memorandum, dated 30.03.78, decided that while making appointments in Government service, the Government would give weightage to, amongst others, dependants of the Government employees, who died in harness. 7. Following the memorandum, dated 30.03.78, aforementioned, another memorandum, dated 19.11.79, was published. Clause 2(iv) of this memorandum explained the object of providing employment to one of the dependents of a Government servant, who died in harness, and also clarified that it was not necessary that the dependant would get the same job, which the employee, who died in harness, had held before his death. By memorandum, dated 27.10.83, the Government clarified that appointments under the die-in-harness Scheme, covered by the memoranda, dated 30.03.78 and 19.11.79 (already referred to), would be provided to the dependants of such a Government employee, who has left no other earning member in his family. By way of modification of all the previous instructions issued, on the subject of die-in-harness, the Government, vide its memorandum, dated 08.06.88 made it further clear by Clause 1(vi) thereof that where a Government servant dies in harness, the benefit of employment would be given to one of the members of the family of the deceased employee. The expression family came to be explained by a separate memorandum, dated 08.01.92. Yet another memorandum was issued on the same date, i.e., on 08.01.92. This memorandum read, inter alia, thus: MEMORANDUM Subject: Revised Employment Policy- Clarification thereof. The undersigned is directed to refer to the item (vi) of the Appointment & Services Department Memorandum of even number dated Sill June 198R on the subject mentioned above wherein it has been mentioned that in case when it Government servant dies in harness, one of the dependant of the Govt. The undersigned is directed to refer to the item (vi) of the Appointment & Services Department Memorandum of even number dated Sill June 198R on the subject mentioned above wherein it has been mentioned that in case when it Government servant dies in harness, one of the dependant of the Govt. servant shall be given employment. The appointment should be made straightway by the Department concerned to a son/daughter or a relative who look after the family according to the qualification prescribed in the Recruitment Rules against the vacancies and inform the Employment Exchange. 2. It has been brought to the notice of the Government that claims for employment in die-in-harness cases are being preferred several years after the death of Government servant. In view of this it is clarified that claims for employment in die-in-harness cases should be preferred within one year after the death of the Government Servant. 3. All Departments/Heads of Departments including Appointing Authorities are now requested to ensure that the above instructions are followed in letter and spirit. 8. A microscopic reading of the memorandum, dated 08.01.92, clearly reflected the Government's resolve to provide employment to one of the dependants of every Government servant, who died in harness. Notwithstanding such resolve, this memorandum indicates that having been confronted with the claims for employment made by the dependants of Government servants, who may have died in harness many years before the Scheme was introduced, the Government clarified that in order to avail of the scheme of die-in-harness, a claim for employment must have been preferred within a period of one year from the date of the death of the Government servant. 9. By, however, another memorandum, dated 31.05.95, all previous memorandum with regard to the Scheme of die-in-harness stood superseded and the Government, once again, clarified, vide Clause (4) of this memorandum, that the employment, under the die-in-harness Scheme, would be provided to one of the dependants of the deceased Government servant provided that there is no other earning member in the family. What is, now, of immense, importance to note is that while superseding all the previous memoranda on the subject of die-in-harness, the memorandum, dated 31.5.95, aforementioned did not specify any time limit for appointment under the said Scheme. This memorandum, dated 31.05.95, was followed by another memorandum, dated 13.08.96, which forms the subject of controversy in the present appeals. What is, now, of immense, importance to note is that while superseding all the previous memoranda on the subject of die-in-harness, the memorandum, dated 31.5.95, aforementioned did not specify any time limit for appointment under the said Scheme. This memorandum, dated 31.05.95, was followed by another memorandum, dated 13.08.96, which forms the subject of controversy in the present appeals. This memorandum, dated 13.08.96, was, it may be noted, in partial modification of the earlier memoranda on the subject. The relevant portions of the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, are reproduced hereinbelow: "MEMORANDUM Dated Agartala the 13th August, 1996 Subject: Assistance in the event of death of the State Government employees while in service (Die-in-harness cases) In partial modification of previous instructions on the subject mentioned above, the Governor is pleased to order that the following procedure should be observed in providing employment/assistance to an eligible member of the family of an employee, who dies while in service. (1)(i) * * * (2)(i) * * * (ii) * * * (iii) * * * (3)(i) Financial assistance should be paid to the family in cases where no (persons) could be provided employment due to absence of eligible (persons). In such cases an amount of Rs. 50,000/- will be provided as financial assistance and will be kept in fixed deposit with a post office and interest from which can be earned by the family. (ii) The financial assistance as mentioned above will be paid by the Department to which the employee of who died-in-harness belonged. In the case of the Government employee of the Secretariat, S.A. Department will make the payment. II. This shall be effective from 1st June, 1996, but will be extended to all pending cases where employment has not been provided so far. 10. From the contents of the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, it is clear that no new rights have been created by this memorandum; rather, what this memorandum, dated 13.08.96, has done is that it has, for the first time, laid down the procedure for making appointments under the die-in-harness Scheme. This memorandum also clarifies that the procedure, which the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, has prescribed, shall be applicable to all the pending cases, under the Scheme of die-in-harness, where the Government has not yet provided employment. This memorandum also clarifies that the procedure, which the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, has prescribed, shall be applicable to all the pending cases, under the Scheme of die-in-harness, where the Government has not yet provided employment. All the subsequent memoranda, which followed the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, relate to merely procedural aspects of the appointments to be made under the die-in-harness Scheme and had not create any substantive right or withdrawn any substantive right. 11. From the contents of Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Clause 3, what also clearly transpires is that the financial assistance was to be made available to such a family, who had no eligible person to receive employment. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the financial assistance is an alternative remedy for those, who are, otherwise, covered by the Scheme, in question, and entitled to receive appointment, but could not be provided with employment; rather, financial assistance has to be made available to only such persons, who are, otherwise, covered by the Scheme, but have no person eligible to receive such appointment. 12. In the predecease, there is no dispute that the Petitioner No. 2 is eligible to receive Government employment if his case is found covered by the memorandum, dated 13.08.96. To the extent, therefore, that the learned Single Judge has held the remedy of financial assistance, conceived under the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, is an alternative remedy for persons, who are not given employment, is not entirely correct. Whether the case of the Petitioner No. 2 is covered by the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, and whether he is entitled to receive Government employment is a question which remains open to challenge and needs to be, now, answered in the present appeals. 13. While considering the question as to whether the case of the Petitioner No. 2 is covered by the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, it is worth pointing out that though the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, has come into effect from 1st June, 1996, the memorandum has made it clear that this memorandum would also stand extended to all 'pending cases', where employment has not been provided so far. The meaning to be attributed to the words 'extended' and 'pending', appearing in the memorandum, dated 13.08.1996, aforementioned has been of serious controversy in the writ petition and the meaning to be attributed to the word 'extended' and 'pending', which occur in the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, has also been a subject of intense debate in the present appeals. 14. Let us, therefore, determine as to what the two expressions, namely, 'extended' and 'pending', contained in the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, convey. 15. Black's Law Dictionary, (5th Edition), gives meaning of the word 'extended' as follows: Extended--A lengthening out of time previously fixed and not the arbitrary setting of a new date. Stretched, spread, or drawn out. 16. The above definition of the word 'extended', given in Black's Law Dictionary, has been relied upon by the Apex Court in Provash Chandra Dalui and Anr. v. Biswanath Banerjee and Anr., reported in 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 487. In fact, the Supreme Court, in Provash Chandra Dalui (supra), has pointed out that 'to extend' means to enlarge, expand, lengthen, prolong, to carry out further than its original limit. 17. Since 'extended' means lengthening out of time previously fixed, it clearly follows, as has been correctly held by the learned Single Judge, that the word 'extended" means extension of a pre-existing benefit and has to be, therefore, read to mean that though the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, has been made effective from 1st of June, 1996, the benefit of the provisions, contained in the said memorandum, stand extended to all 'pending' cases, where employment has not been provided so far. 18. The word "pending" has been defined in the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary as under: (1) A legal proceeding is "pending" as soon as commenced and until it is concluded, i.e., so long as the Court having original cognizance of it can make an order on the matters in issue, or to be dealt with, therein. Similar are the observations of Jessel M.R. in re Clagett's Estate, Fordham v. Clagett (1882) 20 Ch.D. 637: What is the meaning of the word "pending"? In my opinion, it includes every insolvency in which any proceeding can by any possibility be taken. That I think is the meaning of the word "pending"...A cause is said to be pending in a Court of justice when any proceeding can be taken in it. That is the test. 19. In my opinion, it includes every insolvency in which any proceeding can by any possibility be taken. That I think is the meaning of the word "pending"...A cause is said to be pending in a Court of justice when any proceeding can be taken in it. That is the test. 19. From the definition of the word 'pending' as given in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, it becomes clear that the expression "pending cases", appearing in the memorandum, dated 13.08.06, would mean those cases, which have come into existence, but have not been concluded. In the context of the scheme of 13.08.96 aforementioned, 'pending case' would, thus, mean, cases, where applications for employment have been made, but employment have not been provided. 20. If the meaning attributable to the words 'extended' and 'pending' are kept in view, there is no difficulty in concluding, and we do conclude, that though the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, have come into force on 1st of June, 1996, the benefit, contained in the said memorandum, have been made available to all those cases, where applications for compassionate appointment under die-in-harness Scheme of the State Government have been made, but employment have not been provided so far. 21. Bearing in mind what is indicated above, when we turn to the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, aforementioned, we notice that while extending the benefit of die-in-harness Scheme to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed Government aided schools in Tripura, the memorandum read, inter alia, as under: ...It has also been decided that the benefits under the die-in-harness Scheme shall be extended to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed Government aided schools in Tripura. All Departments/Heads of Departments are requested to follow the above guidelines rigidly to regulate the cases of die-in-harness Scheme. 22. A cool and dispassionate reading of the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, makes it clear that the benefit of the die-in-harness Scheme has been extended to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed Government aided schools in Tripura. All Departments/Heads of Departments are requested to follow the above guidelines rigidly to regulate the cases of die-in-harness Scheme. 22. A cool and dispassionate reading of the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, makes it clear that the benefit of the die-in-harness Scheme has been extended to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed Government aided schools in Tripura. In view of the fact that the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, does not state that the benefit of die-in-harness Scheme shall apply to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed Government aided schools, in Tripura, with effect from 19.11.97, it will be incorrect to suggest that the benefit of die-in-harness Scheme has been made applicable to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed Government aided schools with effect from 19.11.97 only. In other words, it will be incorrect to suggest, in our firm view, that the benefit of the die-in-harness Scheme shall, in the light of the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, stand extended to teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed Government aided schools, in Tripura, with effect from 19.11.97. While dealing with this aspect of the case, it is of paramount importance to note that while extending the benefit of the Scheme, in question, to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed government aided schools in Tripura, the Government has not given any cut-off date. Since the word 'extended' means, as already discussed above, lengthening out of time previously fixed, it logically follows that in terms of the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, benefit of the Scheme of die-in-harness, as conceived under the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, has become applicable to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the privately managed Government aided schools, in Tripura, with effect from 13.08.96 and not with effect from 19.11.97. 23. In short, thus, by Clause (3) of the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, the benefit under the die-in-harness Scheme has been extended to the employees (both teaching and non-teaching) of the privately managed Government aided schools. What is, now, of utmost importance to note is that the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, aforementioned did not mention the date from which this memorandum would come into effect. What is, now, of utmost importance to note is that the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, aforementioned did not mention the date from which this memorandum would come into effect. The reason is obvious and the reason is that since the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, is a case, whereby a benefit, which was already available to some, has been extended to a larger group of (i.e., teaching and non-teaching employees of privately managed schools), the Government has, while issuing the memorandum, consciously omitted to give the date on which this memorandum would take effect. 24. In the backdrop of the development of the die-in-harness Scheme, from time to time, in the State of Tripura, what becomes glaringly noticeable to the eyes is that the deliberate omission to mention the date of bringing into effect the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, would mean that the extension of the Scheme of die-in-harness to the teaching and non-teaching employees of privately managed Government aided schools, in Tripura, is not from 19.11.97, but from the anterior date, i.e., from the inception of the Scheme of die-in-harness. There is no other way in which the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, can be construed or interpreted. 25. The above discussion, now, brings us to yet another memorandum issued by the Government on the subject, in question. This memorandum is dated 20.02.99. Clause (3) of this memorandum states: 3. It is, therefore, clarified that old cases would also be considered for die-in-harness facility provided that application was submitted by a candidate, otherwise eligible, within one year, complete in all respects, from the date of death of the concerned Government servant. 26. From a reading of Clause (3) of the memorandum, dated 20.02.99, it becomes clear that the Government's intention in issuing the memorandum, dated 20.02.99, is to clarify that all the other cases, which were, otherwise, covered by the Scheme of die-in-harness Scheme, would remain open for consideration subject to the condition that the application, seeking appointment, has been made by the candidate, who is, otherwise, eligible, within one year from the date of death of the Government servant, whose death has given rise to the right to seek such appointment. This memorandum further shows that this memorandum was made applicable to all pending cases, where employment had not been provided so far. This memorandum further shows that this memorandum was made applicable to all pending cases, where employment had not been provided so far. This memorandum, dated 20.02.99, aforementioned, encompasses all previous claims, where benefit of employment has not been extended subject to the condition that the claim has been laid within one year from the date of death of the Government servant. 27. What also emerges from the notification, dated 20.02.99, is that stipulation of the period of one year for availing the Scheme applies exclusively to the Government servants dying-in-harness. 28. Thus, when the memorandum, dated 20.02.99, is read in the light of the memorandum, dated 13.08.96 and 19.11.97, what becomes transparent is that the Scheme of die-in-harness has been extended to the teaching as well as non-teaching employees of privately managed Government aided schools, in Tripura, irrespective of the date of death of the employee concerned provided that the application for appointment has been made within one year from the date of death of the employee, who had died in harness. 29. In the case at hand, since it is not in dispute that the application for appointment was made by the writ Petitioners within a period of one year from the date of death of Ranjit Kumar Roy, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the case of the writ Petitioners was covered by the die-in-harness Scheme. In such circumstances, the State Government was bound to consider the case of the writ Petitioner No. 2 under its Scheme of die-in-harness. 30. What logically follows from the above discussion is that the findings reached by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the Scheme of die-in-harness covers the case of the writ Petitioners suffers from no infirmity, factual or legal. While, however, granting relief, the learned Single Judge has treated the provisions for financial assistance, contained in the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, as an alternative to the providing of employment. This reading of the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, is, in the light of what we have already discussed above, misconceived inasmuch as the question of financial assistance, under this memorandum, arises only when there is no person eligible to receive employment in the family of the person, who has died in harness. 31. This reading of the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, is, in the light of what we have already discussed above, misconceived inasmuch as the question of financial assistance, under this memorandum, arises only when there is no person eligible to receive employment in the family of the person, who has died in harness. 31. In the present case, since the Petitioner No. 2 is eligible to receive Government employment, the provisions for financial assistance made in the memorandum, dated 13.08.96, were not attracted. To the extent, therefore, that the impugned judgment and order hold the writ Petitioners entitled to receive, and direct the State Government to provide, an amount of Rs. 50,000/- as financial assistance in lieu of providing of employment under die-in-harness Scheme, the impugned judgment and order apparently suffer from misreading of the memoranda aforementioned. 32. We may, at this stage, point out that faced with the insistence by Ms. A.S. Lodh, learned Government Advocate, that the Scheme of die-in-harness became applicable to the teachers of privately managed Government aided schools from the date of publication of the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, only and as Ranjit Roy, whose death had led to the claim for compassionate appointment, had died on 26.05.96, his dependants were not covered by the memorandum, dated 19.11.97, Mr. S. Deb, learned Counsel for the writ-Petitioners-Appellants, has sought to invoke Heydon's Rule for the purposed of construction of the memorandum, dated 19.11.97. While dealing with this aspect of the case, it may be pointed out that though common law is regarded as judge-made law, the fact remains that the evolution of common law is based on customary law and since the customary law, at times, caused hardship, it gave rise to courts of equity. In course of time, the deficiencies or mischief caused by common law were sought to be remedied by legislation. The interpretation of statute, thus, became apart of judicial process and it was, often, found that the words in a statute or the provisions of a statute were capable of two different interpretations. How to resolve such a controversy was decided in Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. at page 7b. In course of time, the principle laid down in Heydon's case, which came to be popularly called mischief rule, became a sound rule of construction of a statute. How to resolve such a controversy was decided in Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. at page 7b. In course of time, the principle laid down in Heydon's case, which came to be popularly called mischief rule, became a sound rule of construction of a statute. Heydon's case laid down, as noted by the Apex Court in Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma (Smt.) v. K. Devi, reported in (1996) 4 SCC 76 , four things to be discerned and considered: (1) What was the common law before the making of the Act, (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide; (3) What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, and (4) The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy.... 33. In short, the mischief rule, which has its origin in Heydon's case requires the Judges to look at the common law before the statute is interpreted and determine as to what mischief of the common law is intended to be remedied by the statute and, then, the statute shall be construed in such a way as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. 34. Heydon's Rule, observes the Supreme Court, in Kalliani Amma (supra), is, generally, invoked where the words in the statute are ambiguous and/or are capable of two meanings. In such a situation, the meaning, which avoids the mischief and advances the remedy, specially in the case of a beneficial statute, shall be adopted. There is, points out the Supreme Court in Kalliani Amma (supra), some controversy whether Heydon's Rule can be invoked in any other situation, specially where the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous. In CIT v. Sodra Devi AIR 1957 SC 832 , it was indicated that the rule in Heydon's case is applicable only when the words, in question, are ambiguous and capable of more than one meaning. That is what was expressed by Gajendragadkar, J., too, in Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan AIR 1957 SC 90. In CIT v. Sodra Devi AIR 1957 SC 832 , it was indicated that the rule in Heydon's case is applicable only when the words, in question, are ambiguous and capable of more than one meaning. That is what was expressed by Gajendragadkar, J., too, in Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan AIR 1957 SC 90. In Maunsell v. Olins (1975) 1 All 16 at p. 29, Lord Simon, in fact, explained this aspect by saying that the rule, in Heydon's case, is available at two stages: first, before ascertaining the plain and primary meaning of the statute and, secondly, at the stage, when the court reaches the conclusion that there is no such plain meaning. 35. In the well known case of Smith v. Hughes, reported in (1960) 1 WLR 830, it was, for instance, held that prostitutes, who attracted the attention of passers by from balconies or windows were soliciting "in a street" within Section (1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959. "For my part," said Lord Parker C.J. (at p. 832), "I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes." Viewed in that way, the precise place from which a prostitute addressed her solicitations to somebody walking in the street became irrelevant. 36. In Government of India and Ors. v. Indian Tobacco Association, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 396 , the Supreme Court has noted that the doctrine of fairness is also a relevant factor for the purpose of construing a statute. In a case, wherein certain benefit is sought to be extended by keeping in view that such benefit was already available to a class of people, it would be appropriate to interpret the document extending the benefit to another class of people with reference to the doctrine of fairness. Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute, the subsequent statute relates back to the time, when the prior enactment was passed. 37. The Mischief Rule came to be known, in course of time, as the principle of purposive interpretation of statute, and in Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Anr. 37. The Mischief Rule came to be known, in course of time, as the principle of purposive interpretation of statute, and in Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Anr. reported in (2003) 4 SCC 524 , the Supreme Court has held: 9...In construing a provision of a social beneficial enactment that to dealing with disabled persons intended too give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act. Language of Section 47 is plain and certain casting statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee acquiring disability during service. 38. In the present case, we do not find that there is any ambiguity in the memoranda, which we have considered in this appeal. As there is no ambiguity, we do not think that to a case of present nature, we need to take the help of the Mischief Rule in order to correctly interpret the various memoranda, in question. 39. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we hold that the appeal preferred by the State Government, namely, Writ Appeal No. 34/2007, is wholly without merit and needs to be dismissed, but the appeal preferred by the writ Petitioners, namely, Writ Appeal No. 23/2007, needs to be allowed. 40. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, Writ Appeal No. 23/2007 is allowed and the State Respondents are hereby directed to consider the case of the Petitioner No. 2 in terms of the die-in-harness Scheme and do the needful in accordance with law. As far as Writ Appeal No. 34/2007 is concerned, the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. 41. No order as to costs. Appeal allowed