S. S. NIJJAR, C. J. ( 1 ) THESE appeals (FMA Nos. 672 of 2004 and 671 of 2004)have been filed by the State of West Bengal (hereinafter referred to as "the State")and Bengal Peer less Housing Development Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the Bengal Peerless") against the judgement of the learned Single Judge dated 18. 5. 2004 passed in W. P. No. 10051/2002/2004 whereby the learned single Judge has disposed of the writ petition by setting aside the land acquisition proceedings being L. A. Case No. 4/14 of 2000-2001 initiated by the state in respect of the land owned by the respondents. FMA No. 790 of 2006 has been filed by Smt. Krishna Majumdar and others. This common judgment will dispose of all the aforesaid three appeals, as the facts and the law involved are common. ( 2 ) TWO facts as called out from the judgement of the learned Single Judge and the pleadings of the parties are as under: respondent Nos. 1 to 4 claim to be owners of 6. 78 acres of land. According the respondents, they purchased the aforesaid land with a view to develop the same by construction of an International School, a Cultural Centre, I. T. Park and Housing Complex. They had been in negotiations with the West Bengal housing Board (hereinafter referred to as "the Housing Board" ). However, before any project could be finalised, notification under section 4 (1) of the Land acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was issued on 12. 12. 2000 seeking to acquire the land measuring 5. 9275 hectares (12. 67 acres)for implementation of a Housing Scheme. The respondents were given to understand by the officers of the Housing Board that in the event, they did not prefer any objection to the Notification, the Housing Board would be inclined to sanction the project of the respondents and also allow them to participate in the same. The respondents, therefore, filed only a token reply on 8. 3. 2001 (Annexure P-2 to the writ petition) but did not seriously object to the proposed acquisition proceedings. Thereafter, declaration under section 6 (1) of the Act dated 29. 11. 2001 was published in the "asian Age" on 4. 12. 2001. The respondents, therefore, filed only a token reply on 8. 3. 2001 (Annexure P-2 to the writ petition) but did not seriously object to the proposed acquisition proceedings. Thereafter, declaration under section 6 (1) of the Act dated 29. 11. 2001 was published in the "asian Age" on 4. 12. 2001. Subsequently, the respondents came to know that the land had been acquired for the purpose of handing over the same for development and implementation of a Housing scheme by the Housing Development Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the bengal Peerless" ). Thereafter, the respondents also came to know that the collector had passed an award, L. A. Case No. 4/14 of 2000-2001 on 22. 9. 2003. The respondents came to know about it when notice was received by them on 16. 2. 2004. Through this notice, respondent Nos. 1 to 4 were informed that since the actual ownership and names of awardees could not be ascertained, the compensation amount has been deposited under section 31 (2) of the Act with the learned Special L. A. , Judges' Court, Alipore. These respondents, therefore, filed Writ Petitionno. 10061 (W) of 2004 challenging the acquisition proceedings. In the writ petition, it has been pleaded that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed by efflux of time. It was pleaded that the declaration under section 6 of the Act had been published on 29. 11. 2001 and the award has been made on 22. 12. 2003. Since it was beyond a period of two years, entire acquisition proceedings have lapsed by operation of section 11a of the Act. It was also the pleaded case of the petitioners that the declaration was not published in the locality as required under section 6 (2) of the Act. Therefore, the date of declaration will be deemed to be 4. 12. 2001 at the latest, when the same was published in the newspaper. Since the acquisition proceedings had lapsed by operation of law, the question of the petitioners withdrawing the compensation amount or challenging the same does not arise. However, without prejudice to their rights and conditions in the writ petition, the petitioners have been advised to file by way of abundant caution applications under section 18 of the Act. Since the acquisition proceedings had lapsed by operation of law, the question of the petitioners withdrawing the compensation amount or challenging the same does not arise. However, without prejudice to their rights and conditions in the writ petition, the petitioners have been advised to file by way of abundant caution applications under section 18 of the Act. It has been pleaded that under the garb of "public purpose", the authorities have acquired the lands for private purpose and for the benefit of the Bengal Peerless. In the land acquisition proceedings, the nature of the proposed housing scheme has not been specified. Therefore, it cannot be said to be a valid public purpose. In any event, the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 had evinced similar, if not, better interest for development of the land. Since the implementation of the project by Bengal peerless is commercial in nature, there is no difference between the projects that were submitted by respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and the Bengal Peerless. The purported acquisition of land is colourable exercise of power. This according to respondent Nos. 1 to 4 is evident from the fact that the name of Bengal Peerless, was not mentioned in the Notifications under sections 4 and 6. It was mentioned for the first time in Notification under section 9. This has deprived them of their valuable right to file objections under section 5a of the Act. Neither the state nor the Bengal Peerless had filed any affidavit-in-reply. However, the entire record of the land acquisition was produced before the learned Single judge who has proceeded to decide the writ petition on the basis that "all the allegations made in the writ petition have been deemed to be treated as denied". On examination of the record, the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that the Notification under section 4 of the Act, was duly made on 4. 12. 2000 and published in two newspapers i. e "the Asian Age" and "ganashakti" on 8. 12. 2000 and 10. 12. 2000, respectively. It has also been held that declaration under section 6 of the Act has been published in the Calcutta Gazette on 29. 11. 2001 and two daily newspapers in English and Bengali i. e. "the Asian age" and "ganashakti" on 4. 12. 2001. 12. 2000 and 10. 12. 2000, respectively. It has also been held that declaration under section 6 of the Act has been published in the Calcutta Gazette on 29. 11. 2001 and two daily newspapers in English and Bengali i. e. "the Asian age" and "ganashakti" on 4. 12. 2001. It is further observed that the substance of the declaration was given publicity in the locality on 11. 1. 2002. Furthermore, the survey has been completed under section 8 and notice under section 9 had been given in the locality on 3. 7. 2002 and 4. 7. 2002. It is further noticed by the learned Single Judge that in the initial declaration made under section 4 of the act in the very first line, it has been stated that the land is likely to be needed for a public purpose viz. for implementation of a housing scheme. The learned single Judge concludes that it appears from the Notification that the government wanted to take the land for "public purposes". The learned Single judge has further come to the conclusion that it was necessary for the government to comply with the provisions of both the Land Acquisition Act and the West Bengal Housing Board Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1972 Act" ). It is accepted by the learned Single Judge that the Government used to acquire land and construct residential complex in and over such land through the Housing Board. However, since the amendment in the Housing board Act in the year 1993 by introduction of section 27a, the Government can also entrust a Joint Sector Company to execute a housing scheme with the previous approval of the State of Government. On perusing the record, the learned Single Judge observed that the proposal for the Housing Scheme has been initiated at the instance of the Bengal Peerless. Neither an approval of the Government was taken for the purpose of entrustment of the Scheme for exeqution not it appears from the file that the Government was satisfied or the housing Board was satisfied that for public interest, the land is to be entrusted with the Joint Sector Company i. e. Bengal Peerless to execute the Scheme. The Government also failed to prepare any budget for the execution of the scheme. The Government also failed to prepare any budget for the execution of the scheme. The Scheme also does not disclose as to how many units/flats would be constructed and out of the said flats, how many are meant for LIG and MIG sectors. It is concluded by the learned Single Judge that the provisions of the 1972 Act were not at all followed. It is further held that it appears from the record that the intention of the Government is to arrange for profit of the Bengal peerless. Therefore, the acquisition was not for a public purpose. Learned Single judge has held that the whole process of acquisition is mala fide as it appears from the record. ( 3 ) AT this stage, it may be noticed that W. P. No. 10002 (W) of 2002 was also filed by some other owners of the land challenging the same acquisition. The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge (Justice chattopadhyay) on 16. 9. 2003. Therein it has been held that the land has been acquired for a public purpose in accordance with the provisions of law. It has been categorically observed that the acquisition proceedings are not vitiated on the ground of colourable exercise of power. It has been categorically held that the State was not seeking to acquire the land in question for a company. This judgment was brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. It has, however, been distinguished by the learned Single Judge on the ground that certain correspondence between the Bengal Peerless and the Housing Board was not brought to the notice of Justice Chattopadhyay. The learned Single judge further observed that from the judgment, it appears that the Counsel for the petitioners conceded that the land is being acquired for public purpose. ( 4 ) LEARNED Advocate General appearing in both the approach has submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in law by not following the judgment of justice Chattopadhyay. Even otherwise the main ground on which the writ petition had been filed was that the entire acquisition proceedings had lapsed as the award had not been announced within a period of two years of the notification under section 6. He submits that a bare perusal of the relevant record would show that there is no infringement of section 11a of the Act. He submits that a bare perusal of the relevant record would show that there is no infringement of section 11a of the Act. He points out that the Notification under section 6 was issued on 11. 1. 2002. The award was given by the Collector on 22. 12. 2003. According to the learned advocate General the relevant date for the purposes of section 11a in this case would be 11. 1. 2002, when the notification under section 6 was published in the locality. In support of this submissions, learned Advocate General has made a reference to a letter dated 20. 3. 2002 written by the Deputy Secretary to the collector with regard to the issuance of order under section 7 of the Land acquisition Act in respect of acquisition of 12. 67 acres of land in Mauza barakhola, Jurisdiction list No. 21, P. S. Kasba, Distict South 24-Parganas. This precisely was the land that was acquired. In this communication, it is mentioned that declaration under section 6 of the Act dated 29. 11. 2001 was published in the Calcutta Gazette on 29. 22. 2001 followed by the publication in two newspapers on 4. 12. 2001 and in the locality on 11. 1. 220. Therefore, the award cannot be said to be beyond the period prescribed under section 11a. A perusal of the judgement of the learned Single Judge would show that although the submissions with regard to the lapsing of the acquisition proceedings have been noticed but no firm finding has been recorded thereon. However, the learned Single Judge has clearly noticed that the substance for the declaration was given publicity in the locality on 11. 1. 2002. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the submission of the learned Advocate General merits acceptance that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act had been complied with and acquisition proceedings could not be said to have elapsed. The learned Advocate general next submitted that since the writ petition was based only on the submission that the acquisition proceedings has lapsed in view of section HA of the Act, it deserved to be dismissed. We are unable to accept this submission. We have noticed the pleadings earlier and it is quite clear that the acquisition proceedings were challenged on a number of grounds. We are unable to accept this submission. We have noticed the pleadings earlier and it is quite clear that the acquisition proceedings were challenged on a number of grounds. Learned Advocate General further submitted that the writ petition itself was not maintainable as the petitioners had filed references under section 18 of the Act. The writ petition was filed on 9. 3. 2004 and the reference under section 18 had been made on 13. 3. 2003. The fact that the respondents had made reference under section 18 of the Act is apparent from the pleadings. It has been categorically stated in the writ petition that although the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed, the petitioners had been advised to file references under section 18 of the Act. Once the petitioner had filed the references under section 18 of the Act, the land acquisition proceedings could not have been challenged. In support of this submission, learned Advocate General has relied on the judgement of the supreme Court in the Govt. of A. P. and Ors. vs. Kolluti A Obi Reddy and Ors. , 2005 (6) SCC 493 and Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Anr. vs. Shah Hyder beig and Ors. , 2000 (2) SCC 48 . We are of the opinion that the submissions of the learned Advocate General merit acceptance, in view of the clear enunciation of law, by the Supreme Court. ( 5 ) IN the case of Shah Hyder Beig (supra), it has been held as follows: "17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. Padma vs. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T. N.) this Court observed as below: (SCC p. 628, para 4) "4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act") in GOR no. 1392-Industries dated 17. 10. 1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichod Chemicals India Limited, Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30. 04. 1964. 10. 1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichod Chemicals India Limited, Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30. 04. 1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Lts. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cent of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership was transferred in GOMs no. 816-Industries dated 24. 03. 1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd. , the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs No. 439-Industries dated 10. 5. 1985. In GOMs No. 546-Industries dated 30. 03. 1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GOMs no. 1392-Industries dated 17. 10. 1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the Notification. Thus, the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed. " 18. Similar is the view in an earlier decision of this Court in the case of municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay vs. Industrial Development Investment co. (P) Ltd. Incidentally, the decision last noted was also on land acquisition and requisition under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and in para 29 of the Report this Court observed: (SCC p. 520) "29. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The high Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 to quash the notification under section 4 (1) and declaration under section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third-party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercise by the learned Single judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches". ( 6 ) IN the case of Kolluti A. Obi Reddy (Supra), it has been observed as under: "5. We shall first deal with the plea relating to the maintainability of the writ petition filed after long passage of time. In a catena of decisions this court has held that the High Court should not entertain writ petitions when there is delayed challenged to the Notification under section 4 (1) and declaration under section 6 of the Act (See Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, state of T. N. vs. L. Krishnan and Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay vs. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. ). 6. The High Court was moved in these matters by writ petitioners long after section 4 (1) notification and section 6 declarations were made. On that ground alone the writ petitions should not have been entertained. Additionally, the respondents clearly accepted that references in terms of section 18 were pending. The High Court has not even indicated any reason as to why the writ petitions were being entertained when the references in terms of section 18 were pending. On that score also the High Court's judgement becomes unsustainable. " ( 7 ) THE aforesaid observations make it abundantly clear that the writ petition is not maintainable. It ought not to have been entertained. On that score also the High Court's judgement becomes unsustainable. " ( 7 ) THE aforesaid observations make it abundantly clear that the writ petition is not maintainable. It ought not to have been entertained. ( 8 ) LEARNED Advocate General thereafter submitted that the award could not be said to be mala fide in the absence of proper pleadings in the writ petition. Again there is merit in the submission made by the learned Advocate General. It is a settled proposition of law that allegations of mala fide have to be clearly pleaded and proved. The burden of proof lies heavily on him who seeks to avoid an order or action of the competent authority on the grounds of mala fide or colourable exercise of power. Therefore, in our opinion in the absence of the pleadings, the learned Single Judge erred in law in holding that the whole process of acquisition is mala fide. The learned Single Judge has wrongly held that male fide is apparent from the record. In fact, the attention of the learned single Judge has not been drawn to a number of vital documents which were on record and would clearly go to show that all the provisions of both the Land acquisition Act as well as the Housing Board Act have been complied with. It has been wrongly held by the learned Single Judge that the Housing Scheme was not prepared with the approval of the Government. The findings are clearly erroneous in view of the documents which have been placed on record. The housing Scheme has been appended and placed on record with the FMA No. 671/04 (MAT No. 2180 of 2004) CAN No. 5973 of. 2004 seeking stay of the operation of the judgement of the learned Single Judge. This document was on the record, but has not been adverted to by the learned Single Judge. A perusal of the Scheme clearly shows that the Single Judge has wrongly held that the scheme is not for a public purpose as no amount of compensation has been paid by the Government. On the contrary, the State has been very transparent in all the proceedings. The public purpose has been mentioned in the Notification under section 4 as well as in the Notification under section 6. On the contrary, the State has been very transparent in all the proceedings. The public purpose has been mentioned in the Notification under section 4 as well as in the Notification under section 6. Even otherwise the notifications need not have mentioned the public purpose as there is no requirement under any of the provisions of the Act. Merely because the name of the Bengal Peerless was mentioned for the first time in the Notification under section 9, would not lead to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings are a colourable exercise of power. The entire history of the acquisition proceedings has been accurately set out by the appellants in the application for the stay of the judgment. A perusal thereof shows that the 1972 Act enacted for the establishment of a Housing Board with a view to solve the acute of shortage of housing. Section 2 (8) of the Act defines a Housing Scheme to mean a Scheme made under the Act which includes any Housing Scheme entrusted to the Board by the State Government under section 17 (2) of the 1972 Act. The Housing board is a body corporate as provided under sections 3 and 5 of the 1972 Act. All members of the Board are appointed by the State Government and the chairman is the Minister-in-charge of the Housing Department of the State government. Sections 17 to 27 of the 1972 Act provides for powers and duties for the Board to undertake Housing Schemes. Under section 17 (2), the government may entrust to the Board the framing and execution of any Housing scheme. Sections 19 to 23 enable the Board to prepare budgetary provisions for execution of the Housing Scheme and to submit the same for approval of the State Government. Thereafter, the Scheme is to be published. Section 27a of the 1972 Act inserted in the Act by Amendment Act of 1993 it was inserted to assist the Housing Board in execution of the Housing Scheme as the Housing board was facing tremendous financial crunch. This section enables the Housing board to entrust the execution of a Housing Scheme to a joint venture company. Joint Sector Company is defined under section 2 (8) (A) of the 1972 Act as amended by the Amendment Act of 1993. This section enables the Housing board to entrust the execution of a Housing Scheme to a joint venture company. Joint Sector Company is defined under section 2 (8) (A) of the 1972 Act as amended by the Amendment Act of 1993. This section defines the Joint Sector company to mean a company in relation to which 50% of Directors of the Board of Directors is nominated by the State Government. The Bengal Peerless was incorporated as Joint Sector Company to execute building Schemes in collaboration with the State Government. On 13. 09. 1993, a Memorandum of understanding was entered by and between the Board and the Bengal Peerless for the purpose of incorporation of the Joint Sector Company. It was agreed that the Joint Sector Company would undertake Housing Construction under the guidance and control of the State Government and the Housing Board. The bengal Peerless was duly incorporated as a Joint Sector Company on 20. 05. 1994. It was provided that the Housing Board and the Bengal Peerless will have equal share capital of 49. 5% and balance 1% will be held by the public. This company is run by an independent Board of Directors. The Board of Directors consists of 9 Directors, out of which five are nominated by the State Government. Chairman of the Board of Directors is nominated by the State Government and thereby the State Government has the majority number of Directors in the board and as such the State Government has full and complete control over the management and functions of the Bengal Peerless. As noticed earlier a substantial amount of the compensation amount has been paid by the Housing board. In view of these facts, in our opinion, it would not be open to the petitioners to argue that the land has been acquired to benefit a purely private limited company. In support of his submissions, learned Advocate General relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat and Anr. vs. Sankalchand Khodidas Patel (Dead), 1977 (4) SCC 590 . In this judgment, it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court as under: 9. It appears that the High Court arrived at its finding about the abandonment for the further reason that the agreement Ex. vs. Sankalchand Khodidas Patel (Dead), 1977 (4) SCC 590 . In this judgment, it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court as under: 9. It appears that the High Court arrived at its finding about the abandonment for the further reason that the agreement Ex. 104 was executed by the co-operative society concerned on June 17, 1960, it is however not disputed before us that the agreement was obtained under the impression that the land had been acquired for a company under Part VII of the Act. But this was not so because it had been made quite clear in the notification ex. 58, which was issued under section 4 of the Act, that the acquisition was for a "public purpose" namely, for the construction of houses for New sarvodaya Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and there was nothing to show that the acquisition was for any company. The notification under section 6 of the Act for any company. The notification under section 6 of the Act was also to the same effect, and in that notification it was stated at four important places that the land was needed for the "public purpose" specified in Column 4 thereof. There was therefore nothing in the two notifications to show that the notification was for a company, and there was no justification for arriving at a contrary decision merely because of the execution of agreement Ex. 104 by the Society under a mistaken impression. 10. The High Court has gone on to state that as the words "or at the expense of a local body or corporation or company as the case may be" were not scored off from the notification under section 6 of the Act, the language of the notification supported its finding that the acquisition was for a company, and not for a public purpose. It is true that the unnecessary words were not scored off, but the very fact that it was stated at as many as four places in that very notification that the acquisition was inadvertent and could not justify the finding that the land was not acquired for a public purpose but for a company. It is true that the unnecessary words were not scored off, but the very fact that it was stated at as many as four places in that very notification that the acquisition was inadvertent and could not justify the finding that the land was not acquired for a public purpose but for a company. ' ( 9 ) WITH regard to the payments, the learned Advocate General has pointed out that before issuance of the notification under section 6 of the Act, the Land acquisition Collector issued a letter to the Housing Department of the government of West Bengal on 13. 11. 2001 for placement of Rs. 3. 00 crores or 50% of that amount for acquisition of land. The aforesaid memo was forwarded by the Government to the Board for placement of funds with a note in the letter that the land was proposed for acquisition with the initiative of the Bengal peerless. This note, according to the learned Advocate General, has been misconstrued by the learned Single Judge. In fact the purpose of the note was merely to emphasize that the necessary funds be made available as the publication of the Notification under section 6 would be held up due to the non-deposit of the funds. It has, therefore, been emphasized that necessary action be taken to see that the proposal be not lapsed for non-deposit of fund in time. On 23. 11. 2001, the Board requested the Bengal Peerless to arrange Rs. 1. 70 crores for payment to the Land Acquisition Collector. Therefore, a cheque for an amount of Rs. 1. 67 crores was sent by the Bengal Peerless to the Land acquisition Collector through the Housing Board. Thereafter, the Government requested the Housing Board through Memo No. 611 dated 30. 10. 2003 to place balance compensation amount of Rs. 82,04,134/- by forwarding letter dated 04. 11. 2003. The Housing Board duly sent a cheque for the balance compensation amount to the Housing Department. In our opinion, the aforesaid facts would make it apparent that the compensation has been duly paid by the Housing board and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge that no amount has been paid by the Housing Board is against the record. In our opinion, the aforesaid facts would make it apparent that the compensation has been duly paid by the Housing board and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge that no amount has been paid by the Housing Board is against the record. Since a substantial amount of compensation has been paid by the Board, the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, has wrongly come to the conclusion that the amount of compensation has not been paid from the public funds. This view of ours will find support from the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of sankalchand Khodidas Patel (supra) and the case of Pratibha Nema and Ors. vs. State of M. P. and Ors. , 2003 (10) SCC 626 . We have already reproduced reproduced paras 9 and 10 of the judgment rendered in the case of Sankalchand Khodidas patel (supra ). In the case of Pratibha Nema (supra), it has been held as follows: 9. We may not advert to section 6. It provides for a declaration to be made by the Government or its duly authorized officer that a particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a company when the Government is satisfied after considering the report, if may, made under section 5a (2 ). It is explicitly made clear that such declaration shall be subject to the provisions of Part VII of the Act which bears the chapter heading "acquisition of Land for companies". Thus, section 6 reiterates the apparent distinction between acquisition for a public purpose and acquisition for a company. There is an important and crucial proviso to section 6 which has a bearing on the question whether the acquisition is for a public purpose or for a company. The second proviso lays down that - "no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. " Explanation 2 then makes it clear that where the compensation to be awarded is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of the public revenues. " Explanation 2 then makes it clear that where the compensation to be awarded is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of the public revenues. Thus, a provision for payment of compensation, wholly or partly, out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority is sine qua non for making a declaration to the effect that a particular land is needed for a public purpose. Even if a public purpose is behind the acquisition for a company, it shall not be deemed to be an acquisition for a public purpose unless at least part of the compensation is payable out of public revenues which includes the fund of a local authority of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State. However, it was laid down in Somawanti case that the Notification under section 6 (1)need not explicitly set out the fact that the Government had decided to pay a part of the expenses of the acquisition or even to state that the Government is prepared to make a part of contribution to the cost of acquisition. It was further clarified that the absence of a provision in the budget in respect of the cost of acquisition, whole or part, cannot affect the validity of the declaration. The majority Judges of the Constitution Bench also clarified that a contribution to be made by the State need not be substantial and even the token contribution of Rs. 100 which was made in that case satisfied the requirements of the proviso to section 6 (1 ). The contribution of a small fraction of the total probable cost of the acquisition does not necessarily vitiate the declaration on the ground of colourable exercise of power, according to the ruling in the said case. Following Somaiuanti, the same approach was adopted in Jaga Ram vs. State of Haryana. The contribution of a small fraction of the total probable cost of the acquisition does not necessarily vitiate the declaration on the ground of colourable exercise of power, according to the ruling in the said case. Following Somaiuanti, the same approach was adopted in Jaga Ram vs. State of Haryana. The question, whether the contribution of a normal amount from the public exchequer would meet the requirements of the provision to section 6, had again come up for consideration in Manubhai Jehtalal Patel vs. State of Gujarat D. A. Desai, J. after referring to Somawanti, speaking for the three-Judge Bench observed thus: (SCC p. 555, para 4) "it is not correct to determine the validity of acquisition keeping in view the amount of contribution that the motivation for making the contribution would help in determining the bona fides of acquisition. Further in Malimabu case contribution of Re. 1 from the State revenue was held adequate to hold that acquisition was for public purpose with State fund. Therefore, the contribution of Ee. 1 from public exchequer cannot be dubbed as illusory so as to invalidate the