Judgment :- This Revision Petition is directed against the Order in I.A. 549 of 1998 in O.S.No. 1553 of 1995 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Coimbatore, declining to condone the delay of 766 days in filing the application to set aside the exparte decree. 2. The Respondent/Plaintiff Temple filed O.S.No. 1553 of 1995 seeking for an order of eviction, for recovery of possession and for damages. The Revision Petitioner/Defendant is a tenant in the Temple premises. The Plaintiff Temple has alleged that contrary to the terms and conditions of the lease, the Petitioner/Defendant is preparing non- vegetarian food and hence sought for eviction. According to the Petitioner/Defendant, he was not served with any suit notice and he came to know about the same only when the Court Amin came to the premises along with the warrant of delivery ordered in E.P.No. 130 of 1997 in O.S.No. 1553 of 1995. According to the Petitioner, the Petitioner has further contended that he is running the shop through out the day and he was not served with the summons. The Petitioner filed an application in I.A.No. 549 of 1998 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 766 days in filing the Petitioner under Or.IX, R.13 C.P.C. 3. Finding that the reason for the delay is not satisfactorily explained and that there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay, the trial Court has dismissed the application. 4. Placing reliance upon the decision reported in S. Mohan – Vs. Cruz Mary and another (2006 (1) C.T.C.191) and N. Balakrishnan – Vs. - M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 (2) C.T.C. 533, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the Petitioner was not at all served with the notice and reason for non appearance has been satisfactorily explained; but without assigning any reason, the lower Court has dismissed the application. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the Respondent. Certain grave allegations are levelled against the Petitioner that in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease, he is preparing non-vegetarian items in the Temple premises. Admittedly, the Petitioner/Defendant is a Tenant in the Temple premises and he is said to be running a Tea Stall therein. The Petitioner has categorically stated that he was not served with the suit notice and hence, he could not appear in the suit proceedings. Admittedly, the Petitioner/Defendant is a Tenant in the Temple premises and he is said to be running a Tea Stall therein. The Petitioner has categorically stated that he was not served with the suit notice and hence, he could not appear in the suit proceedings. Though the delay is a long range of delay, no negligence or inaction or lack of bonafide could be attributed to the Petitioner for his non appearance and non filing of the application under Or.IX, R.13 C.P.C. within time. 6. It is well settled that the words sufficient cause must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delay is be condoned in the interest of justice where no negligence nor inaction nor want of bonafide is not imputable to the petitioner. 7. In State of West Bengal – Vs. - Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972) 1, S.C.C.366: ( AIR 1972 SC 749 ) and G. Ramegowda, Major V. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (1988) 2 SCC 142 : (AIR 988 SC 897) this Supreme Court observed has held as follows:- "The expression "sufficient cause" in S.5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delay be condoned in the interest of justice where gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide is not imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. Law of limitation has been enacted to serve the interest of justice and not to defeat it". 8. In N. Balakrishnan – V. - M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 ): (1998 AIR SCW 3139) : AIR 1998 SC 3222 ), the Supreme Court held as follows:- "acceptability of explanation for the delay is the sole criterion and length of delay is not relevant. In the absence of anything showing malafide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactics, the Court should normally condone the delay. However, in such a case the Court should also keep in mind the constant litigation expenses incurred or to be incurred by the opposite party and should compensate him accordingly. In that context the Court observed: "(9) It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. In that context the Court observed: "(9) It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refused to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court". 9. In the present case, the Petitioner tried to explain the delay in filing the application for setting aside the exparte decree in the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act accompanied by his own affidavit. His conduct on the whole does not warrant to castigate the Petitioner as irresponsible litigant. 10. The Petitioner has averred that he was not served with the suit summons. There is no proper exercise of discretion by the Court below in declining to condone the delay. While giving opportunity to the Revision Petitioner, the right accrued to the temple is also to be kept in view. In that view of the matter, a balance has to be struck. Interest of justice would be met in allowing the application on condition that the Revision Petitioner shall pay a sum of Rs.2000/- to the Respondent Temple. 11. For the forgoing reasons, the order dated 7. 2001 passed by the District Munsif, Coimbatore, in I.A.No. 549 of 1998 in O.S.No. 1553 of 1995 is set aside and the Revision Petition is allowed. 11. For the forgoing reasons, the order dated 7. 2001 passed by the District Munsif, Coimbatore, in I.A.No. 549 of 1998 in O.S.No. 1553 of 1995 is set aside and the Revision Petition is allowed. The delay of 766 days in filing the Application to set aside the exparte decree in O.S.No. 1553 of 1995 would be condoned on payment of cost of Rs.2000/- (Rupees two thousand only) to the Respondent Temple within a period of six weeks from the date of this Order. On payment of such costs the learned District Munsif, Coimbatore is directed to number the Application under Or.9, R.13 C.P.C. and allow the same. Thereafter the learned District Munsif, coimbatore is directed to proceed with the Suit in O.S.No. 1553 of 1995 in accordance with law.