Judgment 1. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner was a Driver in the respondent Road Transport Corporation. He was dismissed in the year 1991. This order of dismissal was referred to the Industrial Tribunal at Patna for affirmation under Sec.33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial Tribunal, Patna registered Misc. Case No. 117/91. The matter was heard and the final order of the Tribunal was rendered on 25.2.1997. The Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal finally records in his order that he is unable to accord approval to the Corporation as sought for so the approval of the action of the Corporation in dismissing the opposite party is withheld and is not accorded. The application was dismissed, meaning thereby that the Industrial Tribunal exercising statutory power did not put its seal of approval to the action of the respondents of dismissing the employee in question. Since 1997 this petitioner has been running from pillar to post as well as invoking the powers of this High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. This was so because the respondent authorities refused to accept his joining on the plea that the order of the Industrial Tribunal is such that it cannot be implemented. Their basic contention is that since the order of termination has not been set aside by the Industrial Tribunal, the respondent authorities cannot take the petitioner back in the organisation. 3. The petitioner approached this High Court earlier in C.W.J.C. No. 109 of 2001. The Court disposed of the matter on 11.1.2001 without deciding the issue because at the relevant time the case of Jaipur Zila Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. vs. Ram Gopal Sharma, was pending decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. Thereafter a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court rendered its decision vide order dated 17.1.2002 reported in (2002)2 SCC 244 . 4. Learned counsel for the respondent Transport Corporation submitted that in view of an earlier decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. vs. Suresh Chand, (1978)2 SCC 144 , the authorities could not take the employee back in employment. The decision of the Supreme Court in such a case was that the employee had to further invoke the jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act to seek a final relief in the matter. The decision of the Supreme Court in such a case was that the employee had to further invoke the jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act to seek a final relief in the matter. Mere turning down the approval by the Industrial Tribunal to an order of dismissal will not entitle the employee to be taken back on the job. 5. The case of Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. (supra) came to be considered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (supra) and the Court after examining the entire issue came to hold as under :- "14. Where an application is made under Sec.33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if the order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Sec.33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of the employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Sec.33-A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Sec.33-A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Sec.33-A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightaway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Sec.33-A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Sec.33-A and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of the statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Sec.33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of p roviso to Sec.33(2)(b), Sec.33-A would be meaningless and futile. The said section has a definite purpose to serve, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted." 6. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court there is no confusion that if a dismissal order has not been approved by an Industrial Tribunal the natural corollary is that the employee goes back to his employment as if the decision taken by the employer has had not intervened in between. The order of dismissal becomes non est and the employee is entitled to be reinstated with all back wages and consequential benefits. The order of the Industrial Tribunal was passed on 25.2.1997 and the respondent authorities have refused to accept the joining of the petitioner on one pretext or the other and specially on the ground that the earlier decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. (supra) is occupying that field. The order of the Industrial Tribunal was passed on 25.2.1997 and the respondent authorities have refused to accept the joining of the petitioner on one pretext or the other and specially on the ground that the earlier decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. (supra) is occupying that field. That could have been so earlier but after the Supreme Courts Constitution Bench judgment passed on 17.1.2002 there was no occasion for the Road Transport Corporation not to accept the joining of the petitioner. The Constitution Bench had overruled the Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. case (supra) and had categorically declared the position with regard to the law on the issue, which came to be crystalysed in paragraph 14 of the judgment which has been quoted above. 7. The second round of the writ application was filed by the petitioner on 20.10.2003 after the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. This matter could only be taken up thereafter on 11.3.2005. On that date this Court recorded in its order on the submissions made by the parties specially the respondents as to the steps which the respondents wanted to take for implementation of the order of the Tribunal. Unfortunately, for the petitioner this case after March 2005 could only be taken up in February 2007. On 15.2.2007, a learned senior counsel of this Court appeared before me and he prayed for two weeks time to apprise the Court of the action taken with regard to the implementation of the award as well as the order dated 11.3.2005. Today another counsel on behalf of the respondent Road Transport Corporation appears and has tried to make his submission taking me to the root of the matter and tried to prevail upon the Court that in the given facts and circumstances the law prevalent, the respondent authorities were actually helpless in implementing the orders of the Industrial Tribunal. This submission before this Court is not only totally misplaced but also lacks bona fides. As already taken note above that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court as far as in January 2002 has settled the legal position and, therefore, there was no ambiguity with regard to the law of the land on such issue. This submission before this Court is not only totally misplaced but also lacks bona fides. As already taken note above that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court as far as in January 2002 has settled the legal position and, therefore, there was no ambiguity with regard to the law of the land on such issue. If the Tribunal had refused to accord its approval to the termination order passed by the respondents, the respondents had no option but to accept the employee back in employment, reinstate him and grant him the benefits to which he was entitled to. The respondent authorities have intentionally tried to delay implementation of the order of approval on one pretext or the other to the detriment of a hapless employee in clear breach of law. 8. This Court would not like to record anything further with regard to the conduct of the respondent Corporation and their attitude in accepting the verdict of the Court except that their conduct and bona fide is wanting. 9. Keeping in view the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in mind this Court has no option but to direct the respondent Road Transport Corporation to accept the joining of the petitioner, reinstate him in service as if the so-called order of dismissal was never passed against him. He would be deemed to be in continuous service since the year 1991. The reinstatement of the petitioner will also entail that the petitioner shall be entitled to all his back wages with all consequential benefits to which he would have been entitled to by virtue of his continuance in service as if his service was never cut short or brought to an end in the year 1991. The respondent authorities shall accept the joining of the petitioner forthwith and work out the other liabilities of the petitioner thereafter within another eight weeks. Steps shall be taken for payment of his legal entitlements thereafter. 10. This writ application is allowed with the above directions and relief.