JUDGMENT D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 8.8.2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court Vth, Giridih in Sessions Trial No. 233 of 1988 whereby the appellants have been convicted under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and, accordingly, sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. 2. Facts of the case, in brief, is that Janki Sao (deceased) resident of village Kharkhari, P.S. Tisri, Distinct Giridih left his house early in the morning of 10.8.1987 at 5.30 a.m. carrying a file containing documents of court litigation and some cash. He was on his way to attend the civil court at Giridih. While he was crossing through a place known as Leduatand, he was ambushed by four persons, one of whom was his brother Moti Sao, while others were his sons Hari Sao, Sahdeo Sao, Bhuna Sao and Pari Sao. All of them were armed with lathis and tangis. Hari Sao gave a lathi blow on Janki Sao thereby felling the victim on the ground. On the exhortation of Moti Sao, his son Sahdeo Sao, appellant No. 2 hit Janki Sao on his leg with the tangi. While Moti Sao himself firmly held both legs of the victim on the ground, Pari Sao (appellant No. 4) tried to crush the victims chest with a heavy stone. At that time, Bhuna Sao, appellant No. 3, wielded a dagger blow on the neck of the victim and when the victim tried to ward off the blow, he sustained the injury on his wrist. Meanwhile, Moti Sao called upon his sons to run away as people were approaching. The assailants thereafter fled away. But before leaving, they snatched away the file containing the documents, besides cash of rupees five hundred belonging to the victim. The assault was made by way of revenge against the victim on account of a previous land dispute and the intention of the assailants was to kill the victim. A little later, sons of Janki Sao namely Nakul Sao, Raju Sao (PW7) came to their paddy land for ploughing and were surprised to see ladies of the family of Hari Sao grazing cattle. They felt suspicious as to why the ladies had come to graze cattle in stead of male members of the house. A little later, sons of Janki Sao namely Nakul Sao, Raju Sao (PW7) came to their paddy land for ploughing and were surprised to see ladies of the family of Hari Sao grazing cattle. They felt suspicious as to why the ladies had come to graze cattle in stead of male members of the house. Almost at the same time, their younger brother Prakash Saw came and informed that their father was beaten and left on the way at Ledwatand. The sons went to the place where they found their father in an injured condition. They sprinkled water on his face and offered water to drink. At the same time, a co-villager Arjun Pandey (PW2) had also chanced to pass by the place while on his way to Dineshwar. He too reached the place of occurrence located nearby in the jungle around Ganga Mati and found Janki Sao lying there in a seriously injured condition. Janki Sao who was yet conscious, stated in presence of his sons and Arjun Pandey (PW2) that Moti Sao, Hari Sao, Sahdeo Sao, Bhuna Sao and Pari Sao had assaulted. A vehicle was arranged immediately on which the injured was taken to the nearest hospital. The doctor who attended the injured advised to take the injured to the Sadar Hospital, Giridih. It was at the State dispensary that the fard beyan of the injured was recorded by the police officer. On the same day, at about 9.30 hours on the basis of the fard beyan of the injured, the case was registered for the offences under Sections 147/148/149/307/34 IPC against all the assailants named in the Fard beyan. Later, in course of medical treatment, the injured succumbed to his injuries at the hospital. Thereafter, the offence under Section 302 IPC was added for investigation. 3. Inquest was conducted by the investigating officer on the dead body of the deceased in presence of witnesses where after the dead body was forwarded to Sadar Hospital for post mortem examination. Autopsy on the dead body of the deceased Janki Saw was held by the doctor (PW1) on 11.8.1987 at about 11.50 a.m. who recorded his observations in the post mortem report (Ext. 1) while conducting autopsy. Autopsy on the dead body of the deceased Janki Saw was held by the doctor (PW1) on 11.8.1987 at about 11.50 a.m. who recorded his observations in the post mortem report (Ext. 1) while conducting autopsy. The doctor had found the following ante mortem injuries on the dead body of the deceased: (i) Three incised wounds over right leg of varying sizes 1"x 2" x 1/2" x 3/4 " muscle deep; (ii) Three incised wounds over right leg of varying sizes 3/4 " x 1" x 1/4 " x 1/2 " x muscle deep; (iii) One incised wound over lower part of the right fore-arm 1" x 1/2" x muscle deep; (iv) Swelling over left side chest 3 1/2 " x 3" (v) Swelling with scratch on scalp 2" x 2" On dissection the following observations were made : (i) Fracture of radius and ulna of left forearm and ulna bone of right forearm; (ii) Fracture of both tibia and fibula of right leg and commuted fracture of tibia of left leg; (iii) 2 nd to 5 th ribs of left side chest and 2nd and 3rd ribs of right side were fractured; (iv) Chest cavity contained blood; left lung was lacerated; heart was empty while stomach contained undigested food stuff like rice and saag. Mucus membrane was normal. Injuries (i) to (iii) in the doctors opinion, were caused by a sharp cutting instrument such as tangi. Remaining injuries were caused by hard blunt substance. The doctor had also opined that injuries on the chest was possible by assault with a heavy piece of stone and also by a single blow of tathi. The doctor opined that the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage on account of the aforesaid injuries and the time elapsed since death till post mortem examination was within twenty-four hours. 4. Charge was framed for offences under Sections 302/34 IPC against all the accused persons, including these appellants, for committing murder of the deceased Janki Sao. In addition, charge for offence under Section 147 IPC was framed against Hari Sao, Pari Sao and co-accused Moti Sao and for the offence under Section 148 IPC against Sahdeo Sao and Bhuna Sao. It may be mentioned here that in course of trial, co-accused Moti Sao died and therefore the trial proceeded only against these four appellants. 5. In addition, charge for offence under Section 147 IPC was framed against Hari Sao, Pari Sao and co-accused Moti Sao and for the offence under Section 148 IPC against Sahdeo Sao and Bhuna Sao. It may be mentioned here that in course of trial, co-accused Moti Sao died and therefore the trial proceeded only against these four appellants. 5. The appellants had denied the charge pleading not guilty and claiming their false implication in the case at the behest of the police officer in connivance with the sons of the deceased Moti Sao, who bore grudge and malice against these appellants on account of previous land dispute. 6. As many as 10 witnesses were examined by the prosecution at trial. The witnesses include the doctor (PW1) who had conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, the two sons of the deceased, namely PWs 3 and 7. The doctor (PW9) had initially examined at Tisri State Dispensary the injuries of the injured/deceased while he was yet alive and the witness (PW2) in whose presence the deceased had made his oral dying declaration. The police officer who had recorded fard beyan of the deceased and the investigating officer of the case were, however, not examined by the prosecution. Four defence witnesses examined by behalf of the appellants emphasized the fact that there were series of litigations from before between the appellants and the deceased on account of land dispute. 7. On considering the evidence of these witnesses, the learned trial court placed reliance on the testimonies of Kedar Sao (PW3), Raju Sao (PW7) (sons of the deceased) and also on the testimony of Arjun Pandey (PW2) who had claimed that the deceased had made a dying declaration narrating the cause of his injuries and disclosing the names of all the five assailants who had assaulted and caused injuries to him. The trial court considered the fard beyan of the informant/deceased as being his dying declaration and reading the testimonies of the witnesses together with the fard beyan and the evidence of the doctor along with the post mortem report, recorded his findings of guilt against all these four appellants for offences under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial court considered the fard beyan of the informant/deceased as being his dying declaration and reading the testimonies of the witnesses together with the fard beyan and the evidence of the doctor along with the post mortem report, recorded his findings of guilt against all these four appellants for offences under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. However, finding the evidence deficient for offence under Sections 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code, the trial court acquitted all the four appellants of the aforementioned two charges. 8. Mrs. Anjana Prakash, learned Counsel representing the appellants has assailed the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence of the appellants on several grounds, prominent amongst them are : (i) that the learned trial court has committed a serious error by not appreciating the evidences on record in proper perspective and the findings of guilt as recorded by the trial court is therefore misconceived; (ii) that the learned trial court has erred in placing reliance on the testimony of PW3 who, on the date of occurrence was only 13 years of age, and on the testimony of PW7, despite the fact that both these witnesses, being the sons of the deceased and inimical towards the appellants, were highly interested witnesses; (iii) that the learned trial court has erred in accepting the testimonies of PWs. 2, 3 and 7 on the point of oral dying declaration of the deceased, although the evidences of all these three witnesses on the alleged oral dying declaration is general and omnibus in nature without containing the specific words, if any, spoken by the deceased regarding the cause of his injuries and without any reference in the alleged statement of the deceased as to the kind of weapons used by the assailants causing the specific the injuries; (iv) that the injured had given his earliest statement regarding the occurrence at the police station before the police officer as claimed by his son (PW3). Yet, the prosecution has suppressed the earliest version of the occurrence and has not produced the station diary entry containing records of the earliest statement of the injured and in stead, has produced a document purported to be the fard beyan of the informant/deceased, recorded much later. Yet, the prosecution has suppressed the earliest version of the occurrence and has not produced the station diary entry containing records of the earliest statement of the injured and in stead, has produced a document purported to be the fard beyan of the informant/deceased, recorded much later. Suppression of material information, therefore, leads to an adverse presumption against the prosecution; (v) that the fard beyan of the injured/deceased cannot be considered to be a genuine and reliable document as it was recorded subsequent to commencement of the investigation under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, the document is inadmissible in evidence since it is barred under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the purported fard beyan of the deceased is not a genuine document since it does not bear signature of any attesting witness and there is no convincing proof adduced on behalf of the prosecution to confirm that the purported thumb impression appearing in the fard beyan is the actual thumb impression of the deceased; (vi) that there are several contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses which cut at the very root of the prosecution case regarding the identities of the assailants and also regarding the actual time when the fard beyan was recorded; (vii) that non examination of the investigating officer and the police officer who had recorded fard beyan and the police officer who had prepared the inquest report on the dead body of the deceased, has caused serious prejudice to the appellants in their defence; (viii) That the appellant Pari Sao was a juvenile, being, below 18 years of age on the date of occurrence and his trial jointly with other appellants was impermissible in law; 9. Elaborating each of the grounds, learned Counsel for the appellants has argued that the entire case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence and there is no direct evidence as to the assault made by the deceased and cause of injuries sustained by him. The circumstantial evidence, as categorized by the learned trial court, are that the deceased was found lying in a seriously injured condition by his sons and a co-villager at the place of occurrence. He told them that his brother Moti Sao and his four nephews had assaulted him. Later, at the Sadar Hospital, his purported fard beyan was recorded by the police officer. He told them that his brother Moti Sao and his four nephews had assaulted him. Later, at the Sadar Hospital, his purported fard beyan was recorded by the police officer. Subsequently, on the next day, the injured succumbed to his injuries at the sadar hospital. The trial court has therefore considered the purported fard beyan of the deceased as his dying declaration and has unhesitatingly accepted the testimonies of PWs 2, 3 and 7 as being the supportive evidence in the form of oral dying declaration made by the deceased before the witnesses. Learned Counsel argues that before accepting the testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses, the learned trial court ought to have considered as to whether the testimonies of these witnesses are credible and reliable and whether they inspire confidence for acceptance. Learned Counsel explains that even according to the prosecution case, it was PW4 Janki Mahato who was the first person to see the injured at the place of occurrence in seriously injured condition and he had immediately rushed to the house of the deceased and Informed PW. 6 about the condition of the injured. PW6 Suruchi Devi, the daughter in law of the deceased, admits that it was Janki Mahato (PW4) who came to her house and informed about her injured father-in-law. According to her, PW4 came and told that somebody had assaulted Janki Sao (deceased). PW7 has deposed that it was Suruchi Devi who came and informed that some body had assaulted her father-in-law and on such information, he along with his brother, went to the place of occurrence where they found his father in an injured condition. He also claims that his father had named Pari Sao, Bhuna Sao, Sahdeo Sao and Moti Sao as the persons who had assaulted him. Learned Counsel continues to explain that though the statement of PW3 is, more or less, similar to the statement of his brother PW7, but with slight variation, in as much as he claims that it was his younger brother Prakash Sao who came to the paddy field and informed that his father had been assaulted and cast away by the side of the road. Though he too claims that his father stated the names of his assailants, but he adds one more name i.e. the name of Hari Sao as also being one of the assailants allegedly mentioned by his father. Though he too claims that his father stated the names of his assailants, but he adds one more name i.e. the name of Hari Sao as also being one of the assailants allegedly mentioned by his father. On the other hand, PW 4 Janki Mahato who, though was declared hostile by the prosecution says that when he had left home for ploughing his paddy field, he approached near Ghaghara where he saw Janki Sao (deceased) groaning. He approached near Janki Saw and found him in a seriously injured condition. Janki Sao told him to go and inform his family members. Learned Counsel points out that this witness apparently being the first person to have reached the place of occurrence and had met the injured, has not claimed that the deceased had stated the name or identity of any of his assailants. Learned Counsel next refers to the evidence of PW 3 and PW6 both of whom consistently claim that the injured was first taken to the police station where the statement of the injured was recorded by the police officer and thereafter he was forwarded to the State dispensary where the police had visited later on. Learned Counsel adds that in the light of the consistent assertion of these two witnesses, the clear indication is that the informant had made disclosure about the occurrence first in point of time at the police station. The prosecution has intentionally suppressed the earliest statement of the injured. Learned Counsel argues that a reasonable inference can be drawn therefore from such suppression that the earliest version given by the injured does not contain name(s) of any of his assailants. The purported fard beyan of the informant, therefore is rendered suspicious and unreliable not only because of the suppression of the earliest statement of the deceased, but also on account of the fact that it did not contain the signature or the thumb impression of the attesting witnesses and neither has the scribe of the purported fard beyan come forward to depose and testify as to under what circumstances, did he happen to record the statement of the injured. Learned Counsel adds further that the purported fard beyan of the deceased cannot therefore be acceptable as his dying declaration primarily on account of the fact that the endorsement of any of the PWs in whose presence the dying declaration was made, is conspicuously absent. Learned Counsel adds further that the purported fard beyan of the deceased cannot therefore be acceptable as his dying declaration primarily on account of the fact that the endorsement of any of the PWs in whose presence the dying declaration was made, is conspicuously absent. Learned Counsel in this context refers to the judgments of the Supreme Court, one reported in AIR 1995 SC 135 and another in AIR 2003 SC 1014 . Learned Counsel further argues that since no reliance can be placed on the purported fard beyan of the deceased and neither can it be accepted as his dying declaration, the only evidence which remains to be considered is the testimonies of PWs 2, 3 and 7 and their claim of oral dying declaration made by the deceased. Learned Counsel argues that these witnesses also cannot be relied upon since they are highly interested witnesses and their statements regarding oral dying declaration are general and vague in nature, without any specific details, save and except containing the names of the appellants. Their testimony cannot be believed also because of the fact that PW4 who was the first person to arrive at the place of occurrence and met the injured, does not claim that the injured had made any oral dying declaration before him. Learned Counsel refers next to the non examination of the investigating officer and the prejudice caused thereby to the defence claiming that several exaggerations and embellishment made in the testimonies of the witnesses could not be elicited by reference to their previous statement recorded by the investigating officer. Learned Counsel argues next that the appellant Pari Sao was a juvenile, below 18 years of age on the date of occurrence. Referring in this context to the age of the aforesaid appellant recorded by the learned trial court on the date of his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., learned Counsel explains that the appellant was examined on 13.7.2002 and on that date, his age was assessed as 30 years. The date of occurrence is claimed to be 10.8.1987 meaning thereby that on the alleged date of occurrence, the appellant Pari Sao was less than 16 years of age and therefore, he could not have been tried jointly with other co-accused, nor could he be convicted and sentenced by the learned trial court in the same manner along with the other co-accused/appellants. 10. 10. Learned Counsel for the State, on the other hand, while refuting the grounds urged on behalf of the appellants contends that each of the grounds is totally misconceived and misleading and are liable to be dismissed. Learned Counsel explains that the genuineness of the fard beyan of the deceased cannot be doubted or disputed merely because it does not contain the signature of any of the attesting witnesses. It is not disputed that the deceased even though had suffered serious injuries had survived for more than 24 hours after sustaining injuries and during this period, his statements were recorded by the police officer by way of his fard beyan. There is no reason elicited from the witnesses in their respective cross-examination that the informant/deceased was influenced by any person in any manner and it is improbable that a person who had sustained such grievous injuries and was almost on the verge of death, would falsely implicate persons other than his actual assailants. Learned Counsel argues further that the evidence of PWs 3 and 7 cannot be brushed aside merely because they are sons and near relations of the deceased, and neither can they be treated as interested witnesses in absence of any such evidence to suggest that they had definite motive to implicate the appellants falsely with intent to secure their punishment. Learned Counsel adds that the evidence of PW2 also cannot be brushed aside merely by branding him as a chance witness. Rather, his presence at the place of the occurrence is natural and he being an independent witness, not connected with family of the deceased, his testimony does inspire confidence and reliability. As regards non examination of the investigating officer, learned Counsel explains that non examination of the investigating officer does not cause any dent in the prosecution case, since the defence has not elicited any such material from the evidence of the witnesses in their respective cross examination to suggest that the defence has suffered any prejudice on account of non examination of the investigating officer. As regards the claim of the appellant Pari Sao that he was minor on the date of the occurrence, learned Counsel explains by reference to the lower court records that at the time of his remand to custody, the learned CJM had recorded his satisfaction that the appellant had attained the age of 18 years and further more, the plea of the appellant being juvenile was never taken by him at any stage of the trial. 11. Before considering the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, it would be necessary to record certain facts which have not been controverted. These facts are : (i) that the deceased Janki Sao had suffered fatal injuries on his person in the morning of 10.8.1987 and was removed to the hospital for treatment of his injuries where he died in course of his treatment. The evidence of the doctor (PW9) lends proof to the fact that the deceased was found in seriously injured condition by the doctor who had examined the injured at Tisri State dispensary in the morning of 10.8.1987. The evidence of PW1 Dr. B.C. Singh read with the post mortem report (Ext 1) corresponds to the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased by PW9 Dr. Jagdish Prasad. The post mortem report containing observations of the doctor (PW1) who had conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, also confirms that the deceased had suffered serious ante-mortem injuries which subsequently resulted in his death. Likewise, as per the testimonies of the witnesses, the place of occurrence is an open but lonely spot situated at a place known as Ledwatand within Tisri Police Station. This place of occurrence is about 30 kms from Tisri Police Station. No controversy has been raised by the defence regarding the location of the place of occurrence. 12. From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, description of the place of occurrence given by the witness namely Pws 2, 3, 4 and 7, the place of occurrence is at a little distance from the house of the deceased and it was a lonely place, not likely to be frequented by people at early hours in the morning. From the evidence of PWs 3 and 7, it appears that the deceased had left his home at dawn intending to visit civil court at Giridih. From the evidence of PWs 3 and 7, it appears that the deceased had left his home at dawn intending to visit civil court at Giridih. In absence of any evidence suggesting that any person had accompanied the deceased at that time from his house or on the way, the inference is that at the time of the occurrence the deceased was alone. From the evidence of PW2 Arjun Pandey, it would appear that the deceased was found in an injured condition within the jungle situated within mouza Ranga Mati. His visit to the place of occurrence was after more than half an hour of the alleged time of occurrence. Prior to his arrival at the place of occurrence, members of the family of the deceased had already arrived. He specifically mentions names of persons present there naming the daughter-in-law of the deceased (PW6), one Sanichar Sao and his wife Janki besides the sons of the deceased namely Raju Sao and Nakul Sao and another person Kishun Chamar. Out of these persons, Sanichar Sao who was examined as PW5 does not specifically slate that the deceased while in his injured condition, had made any oral dying declaration. Though PW6, the daughter-in-law of the deceased claims that when she reached the place of occurrence along with other members of her family, the deceased had stated that his brother Moti Sao and his four sons had assaulted him, but such statement does not appear in her previous statement given by her to the police. Significantly, she does admit that Janki Mahato (PW4) had visited her house in the early hours of the morning and informed her that her father-in-law was lying serious injured. She further admits that she had found her father in law lying in an injured condition at a distance of about 250 yards west of her house. This suggests that the deceased who had left his house at dawn had travelled only 250 yards away from his house and when he was crossing the jungle area, he was ambushed by the assailants. PW6 also confirms that there was long standing hostility and enmity between her father-in-law and brother of the deceased Moti Sao on account of land dispute and likewise, PWs 3 and 7 also confirm that series of litigations were being contested between his father and uncle (Moti Sao) and his family members. 13. PW6 also confirms that there was long standing hostility and enmity between her father-in-law and brother of the deceased Moti Sao on account of land dispute and likewise, PWs 3 and 7 also confirm that series of litigations were being contested between his father and uncle (Moti Sao) and his family members. 13. Testimonies of PWs 3, 6 and 7 certainly come within the category of interested witnesses not only because of the fact that they are near relations of the deceased, but also because of the hostility between the two families and grudge on account of the admitted fact that earlier, the accused Moti Sao had instituted a criminal proceeding against the deceased and also against the sons of the deceased the trial of which is pending vide Sessions Trial No. 82 of 1987 in the court or sessions. There is reason to infer that the sons and other members of the family of the deceased did have animosity against the appellants. This admitted fact appears in the testimony of PW3 at paragraph 13 of his cross-examination. Even though the testimony of this witness cannot be totally brushed aside, but deserves to be scrutinized cautiously. From the testimony of this witness on the point of oral dying declaration of the deceased, it would appear that the statement pertaining to the oral dying declaration mentions only that the deceased had told that he was assaulted by his brother Moti Sao and his sons, all of whom have been named. However, on perusal of the statement of PW7, it would appear that while PW3 refers to the name of all the four sons of Moti Sao, PW.7 does not mention the name of one of the sons namely that of Hari Sao. PW6 refers only to the name of Moti Sao specifically and not the names of sons of Moti Sao. As already pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellants, the oral dying declaration of the deceased as claimed to have been made by this witness does not contain any details of specific reference to the weapons used for alleged assault on the deceased or the identity of the specific accused/appellant who had inflicted the particular injuries found on the body of the deceased. It also does not indicate as to the manner of occurrence. It also does not indicate as to the manner of occurrence. It appears as if the witnesses had felt satisfied to know the identity of persons who had purportedly assaulted the deceased without any desire to know about further details of the occurrence from the injured. The absence of the name of one of the assailants i.e. of Hari Sao in the testimony of PW7 assumes significance since his evidence purports to constitute oral dying declaration of the deceased. This inconsistency when read with the evidence of PW4 Janki Mahato and that of PW6 assumes importance. Admittedly, Janki Mahato (PW4) was the first person who arrived at the place of occurrence and had seen the deceased in an injured condition. It was natural expectation both for Janaki Mahato to inquire from the injured as to how he sustained injuries and likewise, it was a natural expectation that the injured would have narrated the occurrence or at least mentioned names of his assailants if he had seen and identified them at the time of assault. The information which PW4 had given to PW6 at her house namely that "somebody had assaulted and cast away Janki Sao at Ledwatand", therefore assumes considerable significance, since the names and identities of the assailants of the deceased were not particularly known to the members of the family of the deceased. Though the evidence of PW3, 6 and 7 on the point of oral dying declaration of the deceased is sought to be corroborated from the testimony of PW2, but his evidence is almost a parrot like repetition of the statement of other three witnesses, in as much as except mentioning names of the persons allegedly revealed by the injured to be his assailants, the evidence of PW2 does not contain any further details. 14. The question which arises for consideration is when these witnesses were examined by the investigating officer and when was the purported fard beyan of the deceased prepared? There is no consistent evidence of the witnesses regarding the actual time of recording of their respective statements by the police officer except that their statements were recorded on the same day i.e. on 10.8.1987. The relevancy of this aspect of the evidence may be considered at a later stage considering the controversy regarding the genuineness of the fard beyan. There is no consistent evidence of the witnesses regarding the actual time of recording of their respective statements by the police officer except that their statements were recorded on the same day i.e. on 10.8.1987. The relevancy of this aspect of the evidence may be considered at a later stage considering the controversy regarding the genuineness of the fard beyan. The appellants have challenged the genuineness of the fard beyan on the ground that it is a document which is hit under Section 162 Cr.P.C. since it was the subsequent statement of the informant and that it may not be considered as a dying declaration of the deceased, in as much as the endorsement of any witness on the document is absent. Referring in this context to the evidence of PWs 2, 3, 7 and even of PW6, their consistent claim is that the deceased was first taken to the police station where he gave his statement narrating the details of the occurrence to the police officer who, in turn, had recorded the statement of the injured and thereafter had forwarded the injured to the hospital for his medical treatment. In the light of such emphatic assertions of the witnesses, there is reasonable ground for the appellants to agitate that the statement of the injured recorded at the police station first in point of time, or at least Station Diary Entry which was supposed to be made on the basis of the information given by the injured at the police station, has been deliberately suppressed by the prosecution. The prosecution apparently is not in a position to deny that the statement of the injured was recorded at the earliest point of time at the police station and is also not able to explain as to why the recorded statements were not produced and not acted upon as the First Information Report (FIR) by the police. The answer to this question could possibly have been given by the investigating officer or at least the police officer who had recorded the fard beyan of the injured almost four hours later at the dispensary. But neither of these police officers were produced at the trial by the prosecution. The answer to this question could possibly have been given by the investigating officer or at least the police officer who had recorded the fard beyan of the injured almost four hours later at the dispensary. But neither of these police officers were produced at the trial by the prosecution. From the cross examination of each of the witnesses, particularly the relatives of the deceased, it appears that a consistent suggestion was put to each of the witnesses that the appellants have been implicated falsely at the behest of the police officer. The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that, in all probability, the deceased was ambushed by some unknown assailants and was attacked all of a sudden and before he could see and identify them, the assailants had escaped. The injured was therefore not in a position to name any of his assailants or to mention the identities of any of his assailants to PW4 Janki Mahato who was the first person to reach the place where the injured was found lying in a seriously injured condition. The arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the purported fard beyan of the injured is a concocted document and it was prepared only after consultation with the family members of the deceased and was ante timed and created subsequently, is not altogether baseless. It may be noted that each of these witnesses namely PWs 3, 6 and 7 claim that they had accompanied the injured/deceased to the police station where statement of the injured was recorded by the police officer and they were also present at the State dispensary when the police officer had recorded statement of the injured. But none of these witnesses had attested the fard beyan or had endorsed their signature/left thumb impression (LTI) as witness to the recording of the document. In absence of any endorsement of any witness to the purported fard beyan and in absence of any evidence of any witness as to the actual statement purportedly made by the injured as his fard beyan, the only person who could testify regarding the contents of the fard beyan and the genuineness of the document was the scribe who had written the document. The scribe of the aforesaid document is claimed to be a police officer who has not been produced by the prosecution. The scribe of the aforesaid document is claimed to be a police officer who has not been produced by the prosecution. No explanation has been offered as to why the purported statement of the injured which is sought to contain details of the cause of fatal injuries sustained by the injured, was not recorded in presence of any doctor at the hospital or in presence of any witness and if there was any witness present, then why the endorsement of the witness on the document was not obtained? The above circumstance when read as a whole certainly creates a doubt regarding the genuineness and reliability of the purported fard beyan. The learned trial court has treated the fard beyan as the dying declaration of the deceased, but it appears that the learned trial court has merely accepted the document as genuine without considering the attending circumstances in which it was brought on record. From the injury report (Ext 5) proved by the doctor (PW9), it would appear that the doctor had found the injured in an extremely serious condition and had therefore advised to remove him promptly to Sadar Hospital for proper treatment. On the reverse of the injury report contains the observation as to the injuries found by the police officer on the person of the injured. This document indicates firstly that the injured was first seen by the police officer who thereafter referred the injured to the doctor for medical treatment. Secondly, the document indicates that the doctor had found serious injuries on the body of the injured necessitating immediate proper treatment at the Sadar Hospital. It is therefore unlikely that the person attending the injured at that hour would waste any time and make delay in reaching the injured to the Sadar Hospital for saving his life. The nature of the injuries as found by the doctor (PW9) and later by the doctor who had conducted post mortem examination, suggests that the injured had sustained serious injuries and it is doubtful as to whether in such a condition he was in a position to speak at all and to give any detailed narration of the occurrence. The nature of the injuries as found by the doctor (PW9) and later by the doctor who had conducted post mortem examination, suggests that the injured had sustained serious injuries and it is doubtful as to whether in such a condition he was in a position to speak at all and to give any detailed narration of the occurrence. It is significant to note that there is no testification of the doctor (PW9) who had examined the injured at the Sadar hospital before recording of the purported fard beyan that despite such serious injuries sustained by the injured he was able to make any statement. If, on the other hand, the prosecution claims that the condition of the injured was not serious or that in spite of the injuries, he was found otherwise fit to make statement and there was no imminent danger to the life of the deceased at that point of time, then it was incumbent upon the police officer to secure the services of a Magistrate for recording of statement of the injured which, in the instant case, was not done. Further more, there is no explanation from the prosecution as to why the attending doctor at the hospital was not called upon to bear witness to the statement of the injured at the time of its recording and why was none of the near relations of the injured who claimed to be present at the hospital, called upon to bear witness to the recording of the purported fard beyan. It is further significant to note that peculiarly, when the witnesses claim to have arrived at the place of occurrence almost within one hour of the assault made on the victim, the alleged oral declaration of the deceased does not contain any details regarding the nature of attack on him or the nature of weapons used, except an alleged general statement that all the accused persons had attacked the injured. Yet, after about more than four hours of the injuries sustained by him, his purported fard beyan claims to reveal the manner of occurrence with full details not only mentioning the names of the assailants, but also the role played by each individual accused and the weapon used by each of them. Yet, after about more than four hours of the injuries sustained by him, his purported fard beyan claims to reveal the manner of occurrence with full details not only mentioning the names of the assailants, but also the role played by each individual accused and the weapon used by each of them. If the evidence of the doctor (PW9) is to be believed, then it would be a reasonable inference that the condition of the victim continued to deteriorate further with passing of each minute and the condition of the injured was such that the doctor was prompted to advise for the immediate removal of the injured to the Sadar Hospital, Giridih for urgent necessary medical treatment. These circumstances suggest that the injured could not possibly be in a fit condition, physically and mentally, to make any detailed statement about the occurrence. A certificate of the attending doctor about the mental and physical fitness of the injured to make such a detailed statement as is claimed by the prosecution to have been made by him, was all the more necessary and the endorsement of the doctor that the statement was made by the injured in his presence and was recorded by the police officer in his presence, was essentially required to lend credibility to the genuineness of the purported fard beyan. The document cannot, therefore, be used as a dying declaration of the deceased, since it suffers from serious defects, as pointed out above. It is highly doubtful as to whether, in fact, a statement in the nature of the purported fard beyan of the deceased was ever recorded by the police officer during the life time of the deceased. This doubt is created on account of the fact that though PWs. 3 and 6 claim that the deceased had died at the hospital on the next day after the occurrence i.e. on 11.8.1987, but the inquest report (Ext.2) declares that it was prepared at 18.15 hours on 10.8.1987. This date is mentioned not only in column 1 of the inquest report, but also in column 3, below the signature of the police officer who had prepared the report. It is a well settled law that for dying declaration to provide basis for conviction, the same has to be beyond any reproach. This date is mentioned not only in column 1 of the inquest report, but also in column 3, below the signature of the police officer who had prepared the report. It is a well settled law that for dying declaration to provide basis for conviction, the same has to be beyond any reproach. Learned trial court has apparently failed to advert to the above noted discrepancies, both in the evidence of the witnesses on the point of oral dying declaration of the deceased and also before accepting the purported fard beyan of the deceased as the dying declaration of the victim. The two circumstantial evidences on which the prosecution has relied and which constitutes the basis for conviction of the appellants cannot be relied upon and in absence of any other evidence, the appellants cannot be linked with the murder of the deceased. 15. For the reasons discussed above, we find merit in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence of the appellants for offences under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code in Sessions Trial No. 233 of 1988 as passed by the learned trial courts here by set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charge and are directed to be released forthwith from custody, if not required in connection with any other case(s).