JUDGMENT 1. The appellant is the husband of the respondent. She filed a petition for annulment of her marriage with the appellant on the only ground that the marriage between them could not be consummated owing to impotence of the appellant, aground provided in Section 12(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called as the Act) rendering a marriage voidable. 2. Her petition was allowed by the Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura by judgment dated 21-3-2006 in Title Suit (nullity) 55 of 2003 annulling the marriage by a decree of nullity. Aggrieved, the husband is before us in appeal. 3. In her petition under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act, she averred that her marriage with the appellant, a veterinary surgeon serving under the State Govt. was solemnized on 7-2-2003 by performing all essential Hindu Vedic rites in the house of her parents. On the following day, she came to the house of her husband, the appellant herein. Though they shared the same bed, there was no approach from him for sexual activity on that night. Third day of the marriage being 'Kal ratri', they could not see each other being prohibited by customs. Fourth day of the marriage was 'Subha ratri' (auspicious night) when newly couples are expected to enjoy conjugal bliss by indulging in sexual intercourse. But to her utter surprise the appellant did make no advance for intercourse under the pretext that he was exhausted. On the following day i.e. 11-3-2003, they came to the house of her parents and on that night also, they had no sexual intercourse on the ground, that he was attacked by influenza. 4. There after also, they continued to share the same bed, but the appellant refused to participate in sexual intercourse. He requested her not to disclose to others that he had no sex with her during this period. The respondent wife immediately realized that her husband was impotent. To confirm this, she herself took initiative for sexual intercourse; but with shock and dismay she discovered that there was no impulse or quiver in his penis. His male organ had no erection and rigidity required for penetration. She came to be disappointed and upset with her dream of marital bliss totally collapsed. The appellant, however, tried to persuade her that he would overcome the problem and go for treatment. On 22-2-2003, they together went to Dr. His male organ had no erection and rigidity required for penetration. She came to be disappointed and upset with her dream of marital bliss totally collapsed. The appellant, however, tried to persuade her that he would overcome the problem and go for treatment. On 22-2-2003, they together went to Dr. N. C. Pal, who examined him and prescribed some medicines. On 23-2-2003, she came to her parents' house to spend eight days as per customs known as 'Ath Naiori'. After eight days, she returned to her husband to find there was no improvement in him. They again went to Dr. Pal who advised him to consult Dr. Bhubaneswar Roy, a Psychiatrist. She came back to her parents' house on 18-3-2003 and contacted her sister-in-law and her husband who were the chief negotiators of the marriage and disclosed to them about her husband's impotence. At the instance of the guardians and relatives, the appellant was taken to Dr. Pradip Das, a Gynaecologist; to whom he admitted that he was impotent since before his marriage. None of the doctors could give him any hope of his cure. The relation between the parties thus aggravated. Her only grievance is that knowing fully well that he was impotent, the appellant married her and ruined her life. Though she returned to the appellant's house on 25-5-2003 for a brief period on the request to give him a last chance for recovery by allopathy and Ayurvedic treatment, she left the appellant finally on 30-5-2003 and presented her petition for a decree of nullity on 18-7-2003, within a period of six months from the date of they; marriage. 5. The appellant herein denied the allegation in his written objection that he was impotent or had no sexual intercourse with the respondent-wife. He, however, contended that immediately after marriage, the respondent, proposed to him to live separately from his old parents. Though he rejected the proposal, it caused him severe mental shocks and stresses. As a result, he slept many sleepless nights without any cohabitation with his wife. He admitted that he was ad vised to consult with Psychiatrist for treatment of his mental distress which had nothing to do with the allegation of impotence against him. Though he rejected the proposal, it caused him severe mental shocks and stresses. As a result, he slept many sleepless nights without any cohabitation with his wife. He admitted that he was ad vised to consult with Psychiatrist for treatment of his mental distress which had nothing to do with the allegation of impotence against him. It has also been admitted that the chief negotiator and other relatives had several meetings to persuade her to live with the appellant to give him sometime to make alternative arrangement for separate living, but such meetings had no connection with his treatment of alleged impotence. He contended that though the marriage had been consummated, she had left his house finally when she failed to obtain from him assurance of separate living. 6. The rival contentions set out above would show that the respondent made no other allegation of physical or mental torture against her husband or other in-laws. According to her, the appellant was impotent since before marriage and remained so until filing of the petition for annulment of marriage. According to the appellant, the allegation of his importance is false, She had left his house when her proposal to live in separate house was not accepted by him. Thus, the husband also has no other allegation against the respondent except that she deserted him on demand of separate living. 7. To prove her contention, the respondent examined herself (P.W. 1), her mother, Smt. Lila Bhattacharjee, (P.W. 2) and her maternal uncle, Sri Tapan Chakraborty, (P.W. 3). The only allegation made by her that the appellant was impotent since before their marriage and continued so till filing of the petition has been corroborated by her mother. She stated that her daughter for the first time informed her on 13-2-2003 that the appellant had no impulse or sign of penile rigidity for sexual intercourse. Later on 23-3-2003, she told her that she along with the appellant visited Dr. N. C. Pal for his treatment. On 18-3-2003 she told her that there was no response or improvement after the appellant had taken the medicine prescribed by Dr. Pal. Later Dr. Bhubeneswar Roy and Dr. Prabir Das were also consulted who also could not give any hope of recovery. She had to finally return to her parents. 8. N. C. Pal for his treatment. On 18-3-2003 she told her that there was no response or improvement after the appellant had taken the medicine prescribed by Dr. Pal. Later Dr. Bhubeneswar Roy and Dr. Prabir Das were also consulted who also could not give any hope of recovery. She had to finally return to her parents. 8. Her statement has been supported by P.W. 3, who came to know from his sister (P.W.2) and niece (P.W. 1) that the appellant was impotent. 9. The appellant examined himself as D.W. 1 to deny the allegations and contended that she had herself left the marital home only when she had failed to obtain assurance from him that they would live separately. To support his contention, he examined two more witnesses, namely, Smt. Gita Roy Sarkar (D.W. 2) and Smt. Manisha Chakraborty (D.W. 3). Smt. Gita Roy Sarkar (D.W. 2) is a neighbour who claimed that she had occasions to visit the house of the appellant when she witnessed that the respondent wife was altercating with the appellant over her demand for separate living. Smt. Manisha Chakraborty (D.W. 3) is also a neighbour who deposed in the same breath about altercation and demand for separate living 10. The only ground for annulment of the marriage being impotence of the appellant, the family Court framed an issue on this point and directed the appellant and the respondent to appear before the Medical Board for test about the impotence of the appellant. Accordingly, they appeared before the Medical Board where the respondent wife identified the appellant. The Board then directed the appellant to go through several tests and appear again before the Board with all the reports. But on the date so fixed for the tests, the appellant did not appear. The Board reported the matter to the Court. 11. Then upon intervention of the Court, he appeared again before the Board for tests. Finally the Board opined that two more tests would be required for final opinion. As facility for such tests were not available in the State, the Medical Board advised that the appellant should present himself before the SSKM Hospital, Kolkata for those tests. But the appellant refused to go there on the ground that he could not afford to visit Kolkata. As facility for such tests were not available in the State, the Medical Board advised that the appellant should present himself before the SSKM Hospital, Kolkata for those tests. But the appellant refused to go there on the ground that he could not afford to visit Kolkata. Though the Family Court made it very clear that adverse inference would be drawn if the, appellant failed to present himself for the medical test, the appellant chose not to visa, the SSKM Hospital. Thus without any opinion of the medical expert on the question, for which the appellant was held to be responsible, the learned Family Court proceeded to decide the issue on the basis of other materials on record including oral testimony and adverse inference drawn for non-appearance of the appellant in SSKM Hospital, Kolkata and allowed the petition of the respondent by passing the decree of nullity - of the marriage. 12. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 13. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior Counsel for the appellant has made his first submission on the adverse Inference drawn by the learned trial Court against the appellant herein for his failure to attend SSKM Hospital, Kolkata for medical tests following the direction of the said Court. It would appear from the records of the learned Trial Court that the appellant made a prayer for providing fund to undertake his journey to Kolkata as he could hardly afford to bear the expenditure in connection with the said tests, but this prayer was rejected by Court Drawing our attention to Chapter VI of the Tripura Family Court's Rules, 2002, Mr. Bhowmik further submits that there is a clear provision in Rule 18(3) that the expenses incurred in obtaining opinion of any such expert or the expenses incurred in examining such experts shall be borne by the Family Court from the fund allocated by the State Government. The said provisions is quoted below: 18(3). The expenses incurred in obtaining the opinion of any such expert or the Expenses incurred in examining such experts shall be borne by the Family Court from the fund allocated by the State Government. According to Mr. The said provisions is quoted below: 18(3). The expenses incurred in obtaining the opinion of any such expert or the Expenses incurred in examining such experts shall be borne by the Family Court from the fund allocated by the State Government. According to Mr. Bhowmik, as the prayer of the appellant was rejected by the learned trial Court ignoring the above provision, the appellant was unable to go to Kolkata to attend SSKM Hospital for two more tests suggested by the Medical Board of the State. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant did not intentionally attend the SSKM Hospital, Kolkata for the tests and this being the position, no adverse inference should have been drawn against him that he was avoiding the tests as he knew the results there of would prove that he was impotent. 14. we are not impressed. We are of the view that the expenses incurred in obtaining opinion of expert as provided in Rule 18(3) do not include the expenses of the parties for undertaking journey to appear before the expert. It is the expenses which may be incurred in examining the expert for obtaining opinion. In other words, if the expert is required to attend the Court, all the expenses would be borne by the Court from the fund allocated by the State Government. There is, however, a rider below Rule 18(3), which provides that if the expert is a public servant, the Family Court shall issue a court certificate as issued by other Courts to official witnesses. The experts already in the Government service shall not, however, be entitled to get any remuneration for their opinion and they shall be duty bound to help the Family Court. Thus, a plain reading of the said provision would give an impression that the appellant who was directed to appear before the expert in the SSKM Hospital was not entitled to the expenses for undertaking journey to Kolkata. His prayer for fund from the Family Court was rightly rejected. 15. The plea of the appellant that he could not afford to go to Kolkata due to financial reason was also rightly rejected by the learned trial Court for the reason that the appellant being a Class one gazetted officer is earning a handsome salary. Therefore, such a plea of financial predicament was not acceptable. 15. The plea of the appellant that he could not afford to go to Kolkata due to financial reason was also rightly rejected by the learned trial Court for the reason that the appellant being a Class one gazetted officer is earning a handsome salary. Therefore, such a plea of financial predicament was not acceptable. This conduct of the appellant indicates that he was not interested to clear the charge coming from his own wife that he was sexual impotent. What is of material significance is that such charge came within few days after the marriage. The learned trial Court also noticed that the appellant tried to avoid tests even in the G.B. Hospital after his initial appearance before the Board. Only upon intervention of the Court, he had to appear later for the tests in the said hospital. According to the Medical Board two more tests by the expert of the SSKM Hospital, Kolkata were necessary to finally decide about the impotency and the reasons thereof. Taken together his reluctance for going through the tests in the GB Hospital and deliberate non-appearance before the expert in the SSKM Hospital, the learned trial Court has correctly drawn the adverse inference. The appellant was trying to avoid all such tests. As a result thereof, the decision of the trial Court went against 16. The next submission of Mr. Bhowmik is that without medical opinion about sexual impotency of the husband, learned trial Court should not have rendered a decision on the basis of the oral testimony of the wife only if considered from the facts pleaded by the appellant husband that the relation with the wife had been strained following her demand immediately after marriage to live separately. Mr. Bhowmik further argued that after the Medical Board opined two more tests in the SSKM Hospital necessary to determine sexual potency of the appellant, the learned Trial Court should not have rendered the decision without obtaining such expert opinion even though the appellant was reluctant to bear the costs of undertaking journey. It was possible for the learned trial Court to persuade him to face the tests after making a mutual arrangement between the husband and wife with regard to the expense likely to be involved. 17. It was possible for the learned trial Court to persuade him to face the tests after making a mutual arrangement between the husband and wife with regard to the expense likely to be involved. 17. He further submitted that if the case is remanded back to the learned trial Court with a direction to obtain expert opinion from SSKM Hospital, Kolkata and to dispose of the suit afresh after taking into consideration the expert opinion, the appellant shall appear before the expert and bear the expenses of undertaking journey to Kolkata. It is the submission of Mr. Bhowmik that more important than annulment of the marriage is adjudication of the dispute between the parties on merit, which has not been done in the present case. The allegation being that there was absolutely no cohabitation between the parties, in the absence of the experts' opinion, adjudication of the dispute by the Court cannot be said to be on merit, he submits. 18. Mrs. Guha, learned Counsel for the respondent wife on the other hand made a strenuous argument to bring home her first point that it is explicit from the record itself that the appellant tried to avoid the tests in the G.B. Hospital, which unmistakably shows his disinclination to such tests. He being a highly educated person and a class one gazetted officer of the Government, it is unbelievable that he could not bear the expenses to visit Kolkata for the tests. Her further submission is that in such a case where a newly married wife makes an allegation that her husband is impotent, owing to which marriage could not be consummated,-the husband is expected to be eager and willing to take immediate initiative to face all necessary tests to disprove the allegation of the wife, if he is not really impotent. He would undoubtedly be slow, unwilling and disinterested to such tests if he is really impotent." Her next submission is that the allegation of the wife that her husband was impotent since before the marriage gets corroboration from the above conduct of the appellant himself showing his clear reluctance to face such tests. He would undoubtedly be slow, unwilling and disinterested to such tests if he is really impotent." Her next submission is that the allegation of the wife that her husband was impotent since before the marriage gets corroboration from the above conduct of the appellant himself showing his clear reluctance to face such tests. This conduct is bound to confirm the allegation of the wife respondent that because of the failure of her husband to perform any sexual act, not to speak of perfect coitus, she remained virgin which has been proved by the tests undertaken by the Medical Board of the G.B. Hospital, though copies of such reports are not readily available with her. 19. Mrs. Guha further submits that in a case, such as this where only allegation of a newly wed bride is that the marriage could not be consummated owing to impotence of the husband, there cannot be any other direct evidence except oral testimony of the wife herself. The oral testimony coming from a bride soon after the marriage would itself have inherent strength and credibility for the reason that no newly married bride would make such an allegation if her husband is really capable of sexual intercourse. Her utter disappointment forced her to approach the Court after she painfully discovered that in spite of her taking initiative for coitus, there was no impulse or quiver in the penis of the appellant. As there was no rigidity or erection which is necessary for penetration, she understood that her husband was impotent since before her marriage and when all the medical experts consulted thereafter opined that there was no hope of his cure, her all dreams were shattered. 20. We appreciate above submissions of Mrs. Guha that impotency of the husband being the only ground for seeking annulment of the marriage, oral testimony of the wife is the only material evidence which alone can be the basis for a decree if the same inspires confidence and there is no good reason to discard the same. Two other witnesses examined by her are her mother and maternal uncle who could not provide any direct corroboration except saying that immediately after marriage, the respondent had disclosed to her mother that her husband was impotent. The maternal uncle learnt from his sister only about this. Two other witnesses examined by her are her mother and maternal uncle who could not provide any direct corroboration except saying that immediately after marriage, the respondent had disclosed to her mother that her husband was impotent. The maternal uncle learnt from his sister only about this. A newly married daughter would not tell her mother anything about her husband which she knows to be false. The normal human conduct cannot approve a situation when a newly married wife would tell her mother that her husband is impotent, if the fact was really otherwise. 21. Impotency can be due to physical or psychological reason. There is no rule of law requiring that in a petition under Section 12(1)(a), the evidence of the petitioner must receive independent corroboration. The evidence of the petitioner alone can be accepted as sufficient to justify passing of a decree. Quality not quantity would determine sufficiency of evidence as provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act. It is only to be seen in the present case whether the evidence of-the respondent wife inspires confidence. If, there is no collusion between the husband and the wife and if there is nothing to show that they were on bad terms, the sole testimony of the respondent wife cannot be discarded for want of corroboration. 22. Corroboration may also come from the oral testimony of the husband who is also competent witness for such purpose under Section 120 of the Evidence Act. It would be seen from the written statement of the appellant husband that he spent several sleepless night which had forbidden him to cohabit with the wife following her proposal for separate living. No other member of the family of the appellant has been examined to prove that the newly married wife made a proposal for separate living soon after her marriage which caused such mental suffering and disturbances in him that he could not have coitus with her. It is difficult at the very first blush to believe that a newly married wife immediately after marriage would place such a proposal without waiting for the fragrance to die. Even if there is such a proposal, it cannot be enough in our view to forbid him from cohabitation if the proposal was not dragged to serious acrimony. It is difficult at the very first blush to believe that a newly married wife immediately after marriage would place such a proposal without waiting for the fragrance to die. Even if there is such a proposal, it cannot be enough in our view to forbid him from cohabitation if the proposal was not dragged to serious acrimony. Again a bride soon after her marriage would never charge her husband with false allegation unless there exists extreme situation for doing so. Time is so important in the present case. No evidence has been brought on record to show that the proposal of the wife for separate living snow-balled into serious discord among the family members of the husband. Any way, facts remain that the appellant admitted that he had no cohabitation with his wife for a considerable period after he received from her proposal for separate living immediately after the marriage. Such conduct on the part of a young husband does not appear to us at all usual. 23. Another admission of the appellant is that he had gone to a psychiatrist for consultation though for separate reason. He also admitted that the guardians of both the parties had several meetings for settlement of the dispute between the appellant and respondent wife. The dispute is a proposal only for separate living. Thus the facts traversed by the respondent wife in her petition regarding consultation with Doctor and meeting of the guardians have been admitted by the appellant. 24. A conspectus of the above would be that according to the appellant, his wife left his house finally on 18-3-2003, less than one and half month after marriage only because of her proposal for separate living was not accepted by him. Nothing more has been stated how such a proposal culminated into' a final split. Without any reliable corroboration, such an allegation cannot be accepted at its face value. Thus, the admission of the appellant that due to her proposal for separate living, he could not have sexual intercourse with her for a considerable period and that he had to consult a psychiatrist would provide corroboration to her allegation. We have noticed that he claimed to have sex with her only on two occasions during a period of 40 days. We have noticed that he claimed to have sex with her only on two occasions during a period of 40 days. Even if it is true, having intercourse only twice with a new young wife in a period of forty "days is extremely unusual. 25. It is trite law that there is no minimum standard of proof necessary in such a case. Even uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner is sufficient if it can be believed. The learned trial Court found sufficient corroboration to her allegation from the pleadings and the deposition of the appellant himself and his own conduct. Though expert opinion about impotency is important in such a case, it is not always mandatory if other sufficient evidence are on record. 26. Impotence is lack of ability to perform sexual act which must be a complete Sexual intercourse. 'Potency in case of male means power of erection of the male organ plus discharge of healthy semen containing living spermatozoa. Though the appellant stated that on 12th February and 13th February, only he had sexual intercourse with his wife, he has stated nothing, except her proposal for separate living, why in such an long period of 40 days he had sex twice only. Inherent weakness in the pleadings coupled with unwillingness to face essential tests by experts prompted the trial Court to take the view that the evidence of the respondent wife alone inspired confidence and, therefore, the same was enough for accepting the petition for nullity of the marriage. 27. Mrs. Guha has another submission that after filing of the suit about five years have lapsed with every precious moment of her life wasting for no fault of her., She is in her prime youth, deceived by a man marrying her, knowing well he was incapable of sexual act for complete coitus. All her dreams of a happy conjugal life was thus destroyed by him. But time waits for none, She has already lost precious five years distancing gradually her hopes of a fresh marital life after the present one is annulled. If the case is again remanded back to the trial Court only for taking expert opinion from Kolkata which would definitely go against the appellant, she would be the worst sufferer. Mrs. But time waits for none, She has already lost precious five years distancing gradually her hopes of a fresh marital life after the present one is annulled. If the case is again remanded back to the trial Court only for taking expert opinion from Kolkata which would definitely go against the appellant, she would be the worst sufferer. Mrs. Guha fervently urged that the materials on record are enough to support a decree of nullity of marriage without any medical opinion and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 28. We are also of the considered view, that the conduct of the appellant as well as his pleadings provides strong corroboration to the allegation of the wife. Without medical opinion it has been well proved that the marriage could not be consummated owing to impotence of the appellant. We do not find any good reason to interfere with the decision of the learned Family Court passing the decree of nullity of marriage. The question of remanding the case does not at all arise. 29. The next question which confronts us is about the direction of the trial Court to the appellant to pay Rs. 5 lakhs as compensation and Rs. 4,000/- per month as alimony from 1-3-2006 till the date of death of the respondent wife or till she gets remarked whichever is earlier. 30. Mr. Bhowmik submitted that there is no provision in the Hindu Marriage Act to pay compensation or permanent alimony in a case where marriage becomes nullity. Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that any Court exercising under this Act, may at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant for her maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, and the income and other property of the applicant, it may seem to the Court to be just. The provision does not say that in a case of nullity of marriage, such permanent alimony and maintenance cannot be given. 31. In Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga Vs. The provision does not say that in a case of nullity of marriage, such permanent alimony and maintenance cannot be given. 31. In Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga Vs. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga reported in the Supreme Court has taken the view that Section 25 enabling the Court to exercise Jurisdiction under the Act cannot be restricted only to decree of judicial separation under Section 10 or divorce under Section 13, When the legislature has used such wide expression as "at the time of passing of any decree", it encompasses within the expression all kinds of decrees such as restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9, judicial separation under S. 10, declaring marriage as null and void under Section 11, annulment of marriage as voidable under Section 12. 32. There is, therefore, no difficulty for us to reject the contention of Mr. Bhowmik that Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not empower the Court to direct permanent alimony and maintenance. But it is to be noticed at the same time that Section 25 provides that maintenance and support shall be such a gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant. The word "or" being disjunctive, the Court may either direct a gross sum or monthly or periodical sum as permanent alimony and maintenance. But in the judgment impugned, the learned trial Court has directed to pay both the gross sum of Rs. 5 lakhs and a monthly maintenance of Rs. 4,000/- which do not appear strictly in terms of Section 25. That apart, there is also no such prayer by the respondent wife. We, therefore, inclined to interfere with the said direction by providing that the marriage having been annulled, it would be appropriate for the appellant to pay to the respondent wife Rs. 5 lakhs as a gross sum within a period of six months from today which would put an end to the entire episode freeing the parties from any sort of lingering liability. 33. For the reasons and discussions aforementioned, this appeal, subject to the modification about alimony and maintenance made above, has no merit and, therefore, the same is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own cost.