Judgment :- The copy of sale deed No.5295/1994 dated 17-10-1994 of SRO, Puthencruz produced by the petitioner along with a memo dated 13-7-2007, following the order dated 3-7-2007, is taken on record marked as Ext.XI by the Court. 2. An extent of 14.976 cents belonged absolutely to the first petitioner on the strength of sale deed No.3578/1983 of Puthencruz Sub Registry. By sale deed No.150/1986; she transferred one half of that property to her father-in-law, late V.M. Kuriakose. The first petitioner and late V.M. Kuriakose put up structures in their independent holdings in a manner that the space in between the two structures in the two properties can be utilized for providing a common staircase to the first floor and to the terrace of the building. The said structures were treated as separate buildings and Exts.P2 and P2 (a) assessment orders were issued under the provisions of the Kerala Building Tax Act, hereinafter referred to as the “B.T. Act”. The first petitioner and late V.M. Kuriakose paid tax accordingly under that Act. Thereafter, in 1994, as per Ext.XI sale deed No.5295/1994, the second petitioner and late V.M. Kuriakose transferred one third of the title to the lands held by each of them independently in terms of the aforesaid document and the right to construct on the entire terrace of the existing structures, to the third petitioner, the son of the first petitioner. The said sale is by Ext.XI registered document. By that document, the third petitioner was also given the right to use the staircase, as his right of way, to the top of the first floor of the two structures that belonged to the first petitioner and late V.M. Kuriakose. Constructions were thereafter made above the first floor of the existing structures and thereupon the assessing authority issued Ext.P5, assessing the newly constructed portion as a separate completed building. That assessment order was issued on 4-1-1999. The tax assessed as per that assessment order was duly remitted. 3. Thereafter, Ext.P6 notice dated 25-10-2000 was issued by the assessing authority invoking Section 15 (1) of the B.T. Act for rectification of mistakes. That assessment order was issued on 4-1-1999. The tax assessed as per that assessment order was duly remitted. 3. Thereafter, Ext.P6 notice dated 25-10-2000 was issued by the assessing authority invoking Section 15 (1) of the B.T. Act for rectification of mistakes. The objections of the assessee were overruled and the impugned order, Ext.P7, issued taking the three structures, that is, the structures put up by the first petitioner, late V.M. Kuriakose and the new construction made by the third petitioner as one building and the tax is accordingly re-assessed and fixed and balance demanded. 4. On behalf of the petitioners, it is argued that the assessing authority had acted in excess of authority under Section 15(1) of the B.T. Act, and that even if it were to be treated that there was enough power in that provision, the treatment of the entire structure as a single building is wholly illegal and therefore without jurisdiction and vitiated. The impugned Ext.P7 is thus contended to be arbitrary. 5. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader for Taxes argued that the provision in Section 15(1) for rectification of mistakes can be invoked in the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly when, the proceedings were initiated on the basis of objections noticed by the Accountant General’s office, to the assessment made as per Ext.P5. It is further contended that, even going by the petitioners’ pleadings, the entire structure looks as if it is a single building and therefore, the structure has to be treated as a single building and if the petitioners have to sustain the plea under Explanation 2 to Section 2(e) of the B.T. Act, the necessary ingredients as to separate inflow of cost of construction and the severable nature of the flat or apartment and the joint interest in the land has to be established in terms of that provision and that such materials not being available, it has to be taken that the entire structure standing on the extent of 14.976 cents is a single building. 6. Ext.P5 assessment order issued on 4-1-1999 is issued stating the plinth area of the structure, which was being assessed as 446.77 M.sq. The fact that the portions that belonged to the first petitioner and late V.M. Kuriakose were assessed, under Exts.P2 and P2 (a), much earlier, is not in dispute. 6. Ext.P5 assessment order issued on 4-1-1999 is issued stating the plinth area of the structure, which was being assessed as 446.77 M.sq. The fact that the portions that belonged to the first petitioner and late V.M. Kuriakose were assessed, under Exts.P2 and P2 (a), much earlier, is not in dispute. The assessing authority has no case that the structure put up after Ext.x1 document had any plinth area in excess of 446.77 M.sq. The identity of the building, subjected to assessment as per Ext.P5, is not in dispute. The rate of tax applied is not in dispute. The classification of the building as “other building” is also not in dispute. Even if I were to take that any among those four indicie is one, which would have enabled a rectification under Section 15(1) of the B.T. Act, none of those grounds exist. Proceeding further, it can be seen that, what has now been undertaken in the form of the impugned Ext.P7, is essentially a re-assessment. For that purpose, the buildings covered by Exts.P2, P2 (a) and P5 assessment orders issued at different points of time have been taken as a composite structure to be called “A building” and the entire plinth area of those three structures are put together to determine the assessable plinth area for the purpose of the B.T. Act. Such an exercise is wholly away from the scope of the authority for rectification of mistakes conferred as per Section 15(1) of the Act, which provides that, the assessing authority may rectify any mistake apparent from the record of the assessment or order. Profitable reference in this context can be made to the decisions of this Court in Lakshmanan v. Tahsildar (2002 (2) K.L.T.SN 22), Shajahan v. Tahsildar (2000 (3) KLT 143), Karunakaran Nair v. Tahsildar, Changanacherry (2000 (2) K.L.T. 705), Shoukathaili v. Tahsildar (2000 (2) K.L.T. 512), Kurian George v. Tahsildar (1995 (2) K.L.T.457 D.B). It has also to be noticed that there is no provision in the B.T. Act for reopening an order of assessment and substitute it with a fresh order on a different basis. (See Gopalakrishnan v. Tahsildar (1995 (2) K.L.T. 37). For the aforesaid reasons, the purported rectification done as per Ext.p7 order is without the authority of law and is therefore void. 7. (See Gopalakrishnan v. Tahsildar (1995 (2) K.L.T. 37). For the aforesaid reasons, the purported rectification done as per Ext.p7 order is without the authority of law and is therefore void. 7. Having regard to the facts of the case, the nature of the building and the rights of parties flowing out of the construction in question, it is necessary that the same needs to be considered to finally answer all the contentions raised. 8. Going by the facts and the nature of transactions between the first petitioner, late V.M. Kuriakose and the third petitioner, as noticed above, in so far as the land is concerned, the entire parcel of 14.976 cents belonged absolutely to the first petitioner in the first instance. She sold the western one half of that parcel to late V.M. Kuriakose in 1986. It was after the construction of the two storied structures in the two different parcels that Ext.X1 was executed in 1994 by the first petitioner and late V.M. Kuriakose in favour of the third petitioner. At that time, the structures that then existed in the land belonging to the first petitioner and in the land that belonged to late V.M. Kuriakose were completed buildings with a staircase in between, which was used by both of them as common passage to the first floor. What was sold to the third petitioner in 1994 as per Ext.X1 is one third of the rights of the first petitioner and late V.M. Kuriakose on the whole land, that is, 14.976 cents and the right to build above the first floor with the rights of way through the staircase. The right to build over the first floor is essentially the right to title to the roof top of the existing building which is “immovable property” for the purpose of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, hereinafter referred to as the “T.P. Act.” Section 6 of the T.P. Act provides inter alia that property of any kind may be transferred, except as otherwise provided by that Act or by any other law for the time being in force. Section 8 of the T.P. Act provides that unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee, all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof, which incidents include, the various things enumerated in that Section. The transfer as per Ext.X1 is therefore a transfer of property in terms of the T.P. Act and the third petitioner has thereby obtained the exclusive title to the immovable property as described in that document. So much so, the erroneous concept that has crept into the file by way of the objections of the Accountant General’s office that structures in the entire 14.976 cents of land have to be treated as a single building for the purpose of the B.T. Act and the stand of the department that the only way out for the petitioner is to show that the piece belonging to him is only an apartment or a flat and is therefore entitled to coverage only in terms of Explanation 2 to Section 2(e) are misconceived. 9. Though not directly applicable to the facts of the case in hand, I may also note that this Court had, in Bhattathiripad v. Tahsildar (1994 (1) K.L.T. 790), dealt with a row of buildings belonging to owners of land lying in a stretch and held that such a structure was to be treated as different buildings for the purpose of the B.T. Act. 10. Therefore, on facts also, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. In the result, this writ petition is allowed quashing the impugned Ext.P7 and the consequential demand notices. Any amount paid under the said assessment orders shall be refunded with interest at 12% from the date of remittance till date of refund. No costs.