Secretary to Govt. of Orissa, Urban Development Department v. Sachidananda Mohanty
2007-01-04
A.S.NAIDU
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. — The State of Orissa and its officers who were defendants in Money Suit No.204 of 1989 of the Court of the 2nd Addl.Civil Judge (SD), Cuttack have filed this Miscellaneous Appeal challenging the order dated 4.5.2000 passed by the said Court dismissing a petition filed by them under Section 5 of the Limitation Act accompanying a petition filed under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC and consequently dismissing the petition filed under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC. 2. The respondent as plaintiff had filed the aforesaid Money Suit for realization of damages from the defendant-appellants at the rate of Rs.300.00 per day with effect from 1.4.1988 for their unauthorized occupation of his building in spite of termination of their tenancy from the said date. The defendant-appellants appeared in the suit and filed their written statement.During pendency of the suit the plaintiff-respondent filed a petition with a prayer to amend the plaint, which having been allowed the Court below permitted the defendant-appellants to file their additional written statement, if any. But for reasons best known to the defendant-appellants neither filed any additional written statement nor did contest the suit thereafter. Consequently the suit was decreed ex parte on 10.7.1995. 3. Then in the year 1996 the defendant-appellants filed a petition under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC with a prayer to set aside the ex parte decree. To condone the delay of 535 days in filing the said petition, they filed another petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and tried to explain the delay stating that the concerned Government Pleader who was looking after the suit could not inform them about passing of ex parte decree in the suit. They further stated that the concerned Assistant who was in charge of the suit had been transferred during the relevant time and as such the defendant-appellants were not aware of such ex parte decree. They came to know about the ex parte decree for the first time when the same was sought to be executed in E.C. No.199 of 1996 where-after they filed the petition under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC along with a petition under Section 5 of the Limita¬tion Act to condone the delay. In support of their stand, the defendant-appellants got one witness examined.
In support of their stand, the defendant-appellants got one witness examined. The trial Court disbelieving the plea taken by the defendant-appellants refused to condone the delay and dismissed the petition in that regard as well as the petition for setting aside the ex parte decree. 4. Mr. S. S. Das, learned Addl.Govt.Advocate, reiterating the stand taken by the defendant-appellants submitted that though each day's delay was not explained by the defendant-appellants before the Court below, but then the facts narrated in the peti¬tions and the evidence adduced clearly revealed that there was no deliberate laches on their part and the delay was caused due to certain inadvertent reasons over which they had no control. 5. The submissions of Mr. Das are strongly repudiated by Mr. Ray, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff-respondent. He submitted that enough materials are there on record to reveal that the plea taken by the defendant-appellants was a cock and bull story. The defendant-appellants had utterly failed to substantiate their plea by adducing cogent evidence. At the other hand as would be evident from records there was delib¬erate laches on the part of the defendant-appellants in the suit for which the same was decreed ex parte. He further submitted that a delay cannot be condoned for asking and the concerned party has to explain each day’s delay and convince the Court that non-filing of the petition within the prescribed period of limi¬tation was due to reasons beyond his control. In the case at hand, according to Mr. Ray, the defendant-appellants had utterly failed to satisfy the Corut below about their plea and the im¬pugned order being just and proper may not be interfered with by this Court. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the materials on record. It is a fact that there was a delay of 535 days in presenting the petition under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC. In the said petition the defendant-appellants had taken a stand that the then Government Pleader who was looking after the suit did not inform them about passing of the ex parte decree in the suit and further the concerned Dealing Assistant had been transferred during the relevant time. 7. Fact remains, both the aforesaid pleas were not accept¬ed by the Court below.
7. Fact remains, both the aforesaid pleas were not accept¬ed by the Court below. It has been repeatedly held by Courts that a mistake committed by a lawyer is a good ground for condoning the delay. Law is also well settled that a delay can be condoned if a party is able to satisfy the Court that there was sufficient cause for which a particular petition could not be filed in time. The doctrine of “sufficient cause” cannot be construed to be an iron-tight jacket, and rather it should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice. The question of existence of sufficient cause is one which has to be inferred from the facts of a particular case. All that is necessary is that a party should show justiciable and sufficient cause to excuse the delay. It is rather difficult to define precisely the meaning of “suffi¬cient cause” or “sufficient reasons”. A rigid interpretation would frustrate the judicial power and discretion which the Legislature has left undermined and unfettered. Thus while deter¬mining “sufficient cause” the circumstances of each case has to be considered in isolation. Failure of Court to do so would vitiate the intention of the Legislatures. 8. This Court in an earlier decision, 92 (2001) CLT 505 (Food Corporation of India v. Jugal Kishore Agrawal) while deal¬ing with the question of condonation of delay, held as follows : “The power to condone delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merit. The Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anant¬nag v. Mst.Katiji, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , held that the expression “sufficient cause” employed by the Legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts.” In the decision reported in AIR 2000 SC 2306 (State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh) the Supreme Court had also held :- “It is common knowledge that most of the cases filed by the State or instrumentalities of the State are barred by limitation. This Court generally adopts liberal approach while considering the question of condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the lis on merits ......
This Court generally adopts liberal approach while considering the question of condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the lis on merits ...... If the petitions brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is the public interest.” 9. Considering the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court in the case reported in 92 (2001) CLT 505 (supra) observed that litigants do not stand to benefit by re¬sorting to delay. In fact they run serious risk. It is well set¬tled law that when substantial justice and technical considera¬tions are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for other side cannot claim to have vested right for the injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay. 10. Apart from what discussed above, this Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the State and its functionary are manned by human agency. Therefore this Court feels that for any negligence and/or inaction of the persons in charge of the case, the State is not to suffer and that it is a fit case where the delay in presenting the petition under Order 9, Rule 13 should be condoned and the petition should be disposed of on merit. 11. Accordingly, this Court allows this Miscellaneous Appeal, sets aside the impugned order dated 4.5.2000 however subject to payment of cost of Rs.15,000.00 (fifteen thousand) to the plaintiff-respondent within four weeks hence to mitigate the prejudice caused to him. After the cost is paid, the Court below shall hear the petition filed by the defendant-appellants under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC and dispose of the same in consonance with law. The Miscellaneous Appeal is thus disposed of. M.A. disposed of.