Judgment :- S.K. Krishnan, J. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 16. 2003 passed in A.S. No. 184 of 2001 by the 5th Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, confirming the judgment and decree dated 29. 2000 passed in O.S. No. 2221 of 1997 by the 16th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, the plaintiff has come forward with this second appeal. 2. The facts leading to the filing of this second appeal are as follows: (a) The suit and other properties were originally owned by one Kannabiran Pillai, who is the father of the first defendant and grandfather of the second and third defendants. (b) Some of the properties purchased by the said Kannabiran Pillai were endowed to the plaintiff Sri Ramakrishna Mutt absolutely by way of settlement deeds to perform Puja and Sera in the Mutt reserving life interest for him and his second wife Smt. Kumudammal. The Senior Kannabiran Pillai died on 312. 1956 and after his death, his second wife Smt. Kumudammal was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property by way of collecting rents from the tenants. During her lifetime, she inducted her second step-son K. Narayanasamy Pillai into the suit property as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. In the year 1968, the said K. Narayanasamy Pillai became sick and the first defendant was permitted to look after him and after his demise in the year 1970, the first defendant was allowed to remain in possession of the suit properly as Licencee. The plaintiff also understands that even during the lifetime of the said Kumudammal, the leave and licence granted to the first defendant was revoked. Thereafter, as the said KumudammaI died on 13. 1989, the plaintiff became the absolute owner of the suit property. However, taking advantage of the permissive occupation of the suit property, the defendants are squatting on the suit property without paying any licence fee or any amount by way of damages, for use and occupation of the middle portion consisting of about 700 sq.ft., in the main building and a garage measuring about 150 sq.ft., and the area appurtenant to it as de-scribed in the plaint schedule, to the plaintiff. Though the other tenants, namely. Though the other tenants, namely. Rajasekaran and K. Kittu have attorned tenancies in favour of the plaintiff, since the defendants did not incline to attorn tenancy in favour of the plaintiff or surrender possession of the suit property, the plaintiff revoked the leave and licence granted by the said Kumudammal on 6. 1989. (c) Meanwhile, in the year 1976 at the instigation of the first defendant, the third defendant filed a suit in C.S. No. 261 of 1984, which is pending on the file of this Court, against Sri Ramakrishna Mission Society, Kumudammal (since deceased), K. Mohanakrishnan, and M. Maheswaran for partition and separate possession of the suit properties under the pretext that the suit properties were joint family properties and therefore, the said Kannabiran Pillai had no right to settle them to anybody. The first defendant, Sri Ramakrishna Mission Society filed its written statement stating that the second item of the property referred to as Schedule was settled only in favour of Sri Ramakrishna Mutt and not in favour of Sri Ramakrishna Mission Society and thereafter, the plaintiff herein filed an application for impleading the Mutt as 5th defendant in the said suit. (d) Since the defendants did not attorn tenancy in favour of the plaintiff or surrender possession of the suit property and there is no other go the plaintiff has filed the above said suit in C.S. No. 755 of 1990 for the following relief’s: (1) To direct the defendants 1 to 3 to deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff Sri Ramakrishna Mutt of the suit property more particularly described in the plaint B schedule. (2) To direct the defendants to pay damages for use and occupation of the suit property at Rs.1200/- per month, in all about Rs.3600/- from 16. 1999 to 9. 1989 and future damages for unauthorised use and occupation at Rs.1200/- per month from the date of the plaint to the date of delivery of possession and for costs. (3) On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court dismissed the suit and the appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the first appellate Court. Hence, the present second appeal by the plaintiff. 3. (3) On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court dismissed the suit and the appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the first appellate Court. Hence, the present second appeal by the plaintiff. 3. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: (a) Can the Seniors second wife Kumudammal, for whose marriage there is no evidence and who lived as second wife, when the 1st defendants mother, the first wife was alive, have a pre-existing right as a wife for maintenance, so as to the maintenance right in her favour under Exhibits A-2, A-3 to enlarge into an absolute right under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in terms of the decision in Beni Bai v. Raghubir Prasad AIR 1999 SC 1147 : (1999) 3 SCC 234 and the other decisions? (b) When under Exhibits A-2 and A-4 the Settlor has given his second wife Kumudammal a right to enjoy the rent profits only from suit properties for her lifetime providing for the suit property to vest in Appellant-Mutt after her lifetime, is it not a restricted right created for the first time (there being no pre-existing right as a wife) which would fall under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (not marriage Act succession is correct) only which would not get enlarged into absolute estate in terms of the said decisions? (c) When Kumudammal, the 2nd wife of the Settlor, died issueless and when her right under Exhibits A-2 and A-3 to enjoy rents and profits from the suit property could not get enlarged into an absolute estate, is not the claim of the 1st defendant and his children to the suit house under Section 15(1)(h) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as heirs of Kumudammals husband (Settlor) liable to be dismissed? 4. Heard both sides. 5. The learned senior counsel Mr. T.R. Mani would vehemently contend on the sub-stantial question of law that whether, on a proper construction of the settlement deeds, the restricted interest reserved for the second wife of the Settlor will enlarge into an absolute estate so as to obliterate the vested right of the plaintiff/Settlee. 6. 4. Heard both sides. 5. The learned senior counsel Mr. T.R. Mani would vehemently contend on the sub-stantial question of law that whether, on a proper construction of the settlement deeds, the restricted interest reserved for the second wife of the Settlor will enlarge into an absolute estate so as to obliterate the vested right of the plaintiff/Settlee. 6. Further, the learned senior counsel would vehemently contend that when the second wife was not the Settlee, but was given only restricted interest to utilize the income alone from the property without any power of alienation or encumbrance, that restricted right is not an interest created over the property, but only a personal right of enjoyment of the income during her lifetime and therefore, the personal right cannot be equated to or treated as a `life interest or a right to enjoy the property for her maintenance and in such circumstances, such a restricted right will only fall under the scope of Section 14 (2) of the Act and there is no scope for the application of Section 14(1) of the Act and hence, this second appeal may be allowed, setting aside judgments and decrees of the Courts below. 7. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel relied on the following decisions: .(a) G. Krishna Das v. V. Venkavya AIR 1978 SC 361 : (1978) 1 SCC 67 ; .(b) A. Venkatraman v. S. Rajalakshmi AIR 1985 Mad. 248 : (1985) 1 MLJ 232 ; .(c) K. Satyanarayana v. G. Sithaya AIR 1987 SC 353 : (1986) 4 SCC 760 ; .(d) V.V. Subba Rao v. Chatlapalli Seetharamaratna Ranganayakamma AIR 1997 SC 3082 : (1997) 5 SCC 460 ; .(e) Ramkishorelal v. Kamalanarayan AIR 1963 SC 890 ; .(f) Bhura v. Kashi Ram AIR 1994 SC 1202 : (1994) 2 SCC 111 ; .(g) Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai AIR 1991 SC 1581 : (1991) 3 SCC 410 ; .(h) Vijay Pal Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation AIR 1996 SC 146 ; .(i) Beni Bai v. Raghubir Prasad (supra) .(j) Palchuri Hanumayamma v. Tadi Kamalla Kolngam 2001 (4) CTC 556; .(k) Rain Vishal v. Jagan Nath (2004) 9 SCC 302 . 8. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would contend on the first question that merely because Exhibits A-2 to A-4 have been held to be valid, it does not mean that the appellant automatically gets an interest in the suit property. 9. It is also contended that the right granted to Kannabiran Pillais second wife was a declaration of the pre-existing right of Kannabiran Pillais second wife for being maintained out of the income from the Suit schedule property and after the enactment of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 her right got enlarged into absolute ownership. .10. In support of his contention, the learned counsel strongly relies on the following principle laid down by the. Supreme Court in V. Tulasannna v. V Sash Reddy AIR 1977 SC 1944 : (1977) 3 SCC 99 : ."That the widows claim to maintenance is undoubtedly a tangible right though not an absolute right to property so as to become a fresh source of title. The claim or maintenance can, however, be made a charge on the joint family properties, and even if the properties are sold with the notice of the said charge, the sold properties will be burdened with the claim for maintenance." 11. Further, the learned counsel contended that by virtue of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act. 1937 the claim of the widow to maintenance has been crystallized into a full-fledged right and any property allotted to her in lieu of maintenance would be enlarged into an absolute title by virtue of the provisions of the Act, 1956. .12. The learned counsel would submit that Section 14(2) applies only to cases where grant is not in lieu of maintenance or in recognition of pre-existing rights but confers a fresh right or title for the first time and while conferring the said title certain restrictions are placed by the grantor, however, where the grant is merely in recognition or in implementation of a pre-existing right to claim maintenance, the case falls beyond the purview of Section 14(2) and falls squarely within the explanation of Section 14(1). 13. 13. Refuting the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that no right in the property was given to Settlors second wife Kumudammal but what was given was merely a right to maintain herself out of income from the property which would not enlarge into full ownership, the learned counsel would contend that the rights granted to the wife under Exhibits A-2 to A-4 were enlarged into full ownership right on account of enactment of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 14. In support of his contention, he strongly relied on the following decisions: .(a) Maharaja Pillar Lakshmiammal v. Maharaja Pillai Thillanavakom Pillai and An-other (1988) 1 SCC 99 : (1988) 1 SCR 780 . .(b) Gulwant Kaur and Another v. Mohinder Singh and Others AIR 1987 SC 2251 : (1987) 3 SCC 674 . 15. In Maharaj Pillai Lakshmiammal v. Maharaja Pillai Thillanavakom Pillai and Another (supra), during the life time of Maharaja Pillai, his wife was residing in the house allotted to her husband. She was maintained by her husband. After the death of her husband, she was in exclusive possession of the A Schedule property. She was taking income from the properties. She had a right to utilize the income for her maintenance. The Supreme Court in such circumstances held that the property possessed by the widow fairly and squarely fall under Section 14(1) of the Act. 16. Similarly in the ease of Gulwant Kaur and Another v. Mohinder Singh and Others (supra), the husband, by a letter to his wife, inter alia entrusted her a land by stating "its produce lease money etc., will fetch you a minimum of Rs.1200/- annually i.e. Rs.100/-per month for maintenance." He also promised to pay Rs.100 every month for maintenance. But subsequently. her husband sold the land to the respondent despite her protests. The purchaser- respondents thereupon instituted a suit for an injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with their possession. But subsequently. her husband sold the land to the respondent despite her protests. The purchaser- respondents thereupon instituted a suit for an injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with their possession. Though the high Court held that the first appellant was merely allowed to receive the proceeds of the and in order to meet her day-to- day expenses, that the land was not Intended to he given away to the first appellant completely and as such she did not acquire any such right to interest in the property as could be termed `limited ownership as to permit her to take the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, the Supreme Court allowing the appeal held that the question was not whether the husband in-tended to give away the land absolutely to his wife but whether the land was given to her in lieu of maintenance and therefore, when the husbands letter clearly established that the land was given in lieu of maintenance, the wife was not required to further establish her title to the land and the distinction made by the High Court between day-to-day expenses and maintenance was unwarranted. 17. In such circumstances, it is clear that the rights granted to the wife under Exhibits A2 to A-4 were enlarged into full ownership rights on account of enactment of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 18. Litigation between the vested remainder and the legal heirs of the Settlor. The Settlor Kannabiran Pillai acquired properties by self-acquisition, more specifically, the suit properties. He had two wives. Through his first wife, he had two sons, one namely, the 1st defendant and another one Narayanasamy. Narayanasamy had no issues. 19. Further, Kannabiran Pillai had another wife, namely, Kumudammal. It is learnt that Kannabiran Pillai executed a settlement deed dated 20.10.1938 which was later modified on 3. 1939 and ultimately on 27. 1943. They are respectively Exhibits A-2, A-3 and A-4. In Exhibits A-3 and A-4, the Settlor Kannabiran expressed his intention that the property de-scribed in the settlement deed has to be enjoyed by himself and by his second wife for their life and thereafter, to vest with Ramakrishna Mutt, namely, the plaintiff. In the settlement deed, the said Kumudammal was provided with property in lieu of her maintenance. 20. In Exhibits A-3 and A-4, the Settlor Kannabiran expressed his intention that the property de-scribed in the settlement deed has to be enjoyed by himself and by his second wife for their life and thereafter, to vest with Ramakrishna Mutt, namely, the plaintiff. In the settlement deed, the said Kumudammal was provided with property in lieu of her maintenance. 20. In view of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937, even the second wife has a right of maintenance as against her husband and his property. One step further. even the concubine has a right of maintenance against paramour in Bai Nagubai v. Bai Monghihai and Others 1953 IA 153. Hence, Kumudammal has a right of maintenance against her husband. 21. The present appellant/plaintiff claims the properly as a vested remainder. In the present case, T doubt very much whether the plain-tiff can sustain his claim in view of Section 14(l) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Admittedly, the 1st defendant is the son and the defendants 2 and 3 are the grandsons of Late Kannabiran. The plaintiff, admittedly the vested remainder, can claim the right over the property which remains after the lifetime of the vested holder, namely, Kumudammal. In the present case, in view of introduction of Hindu Succession Act in the year 1956 and the application of Section 14(1) enlarges the right of Kumudammal and during her lifetime, she becomes the absolute owner of the property. Since she becomes absolute owner of the property, after her death issueless, the property reverts back to her husband and her husbands heirs under the Hindu Succession Act. 22. The learned senior counsel for the appellant was vehemently relying upon the leading case of V. Thulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddi (supra) and contended that only for the first time, as per Exhibits A-2 and A-3, the second wife Mrs. Kumudammal was vested with the property and hence Section 14(1) has no application, rather Section 14 (2) alone is applicable. 23. Section 14(1) and 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act reads as follows: "Section 14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property: (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. 23. Section 14(1) and 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act reads as follows: "Section 14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property: (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation: In this sub-section, “property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after the marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of the Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, Will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." .24. In the present case, Exhibit A-2 recites as follows: ."This instrument witnesses that in consideration of the premises above said, the Settlor doth hereby convey transfer and as-sign in favour of the Mission the properties described in Schedules A and B hereunder subject to the life interests created herein below and the Mission shall be entitled to enjoy subject as aforesaid the properties. The Settlor shall be entitled during the period of his life to enjoy the income from the properties set out in Schedules A and B hereto, the Seniors wife Kumudammal after the Settlors lifetime be entitled to utilize for herself the income only from the proper-ties described in Schedule A hereto and shall have no right to the property set out in Schedule B hereto. On the death of the Settlor the Mission shall take possession of the property set out in B Schedule hereto and enjoy the same with full powers of ownership after the lifetime of both the Settlor and his second wife aforesaid, the Mission shall take possession of the property set out in Schedule A hereto and enjoy the same with full rights of ownership." .25. Exhibit A-3 recites as follows: ."I have decided to confer an immediate interest in the Schedule mentioned properties in favour of my second wife Kumudammal at her request and with a view to domestic peace and whereas no other provision has been made for the maintenance and convenient enjoyment of my second wife the said Kumudammal ... I hereby declare, create. and convey a present interest in favour of the said Kumudammal my second wife that she shall immediately possess and en-joy the Schedule mentioned properties during her lifetime and utilize the rents and profits for her own benefit without let or hindrance but without any power of alienation and after her lifetime the said proper-ties shall pass to the Ramakrishna Mission…” .26. From the above said recital, it is evident that the property is settled in favour of Kumudammal only in lieu of maintenance. 27. Section 14(1) gives scope for enlargement only as and when the property is being settled in favour of the female in lieu of hermaintenance, prior to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. If the female has no right of maintenance, and if right Is created for the first time in the deed of settlement. Section 14(2) alone is applicable. 28. In the present case, as stated above, Kumudammal has a right of maintenance as against the properties of Kannabiran Pillar. Hence, in the present case, I am of the view that Section 14(2) has no application. 29. Further, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon K. Satyanarayana v. G Sithaya and Others (supra). The facts of the case in this case is not as that of the present one. It is true that properties settled on a female would revert hack to the Settlor if the right over the property is created for the first time under the settlement deed. Hence the above said citation referred to is not directly applicable. 30. The appellants counsel further relies upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in A.1 Venkatraman v. Rajalakshmi and Others (supra). In the above said reported case, the property was settled in favour of the eldest daughter who was not a destitute. She had no right of maintenance as against her fathers property. Hence Their Lordships have ultimately held that Section 14(2) alone would come into play. In the present case, the said Kumudammal has a pre-existing right of maintenance. In the above said reported case, the property was settled in favour of the eldest daughter who was not a destitute. She had no right of maintenance as against her fathers property. Hence Their Lordships have ultimately held that Section 14(2) alone would come into play. In the present case, the said Kumudammal has a pre-existing right of maintenance. Hence, her limited interest vested in Exhibits A-2 and A-3 is enlarged. 31. Further, the learned senior counsel Mr. T.R. Mani relied upon Bhura and Others v. Kashiram (supra) and stressed the point that the intention of the Settlor should be determined by reading the settlement deed as a whole. But in the said reported judgment, in para 6, it is held as follows: "It is settled law that the Courts must make all efforts to determine the real intention of the testator by reading the Will as a whole and giving effect to the intentions of the testator. Construction, which would advance the intention of the testator has to be preferred and as far as possible, effect is required to be given to every disposition con-tained in the Will unless the law prevents such effect being given to it…" 32. In the above case, Their Lordships have held that the Will has to be read as a whole and full effect have to be given, unless the law prevents such effect being given to it. Here in the present case, the Hindu Succession Act Section 14(1) prevents and enlarges the rights of limited life estate-holder, namely, Kumudammal. Hence in view of the above judgment, the full effect to the settlement cannot be given since Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act intervenes. 33. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents relied upon Palchuri Hanumayamma v. Tadikamalla Kolingam (supra) wherein Their Lordships have held as follows: "Thus, it is clear from recitals that though the testator has not used the words in lieu of maintenance, he has certainly intended that the properties settled under the Will were left for the enjoyment of Ramamma during her lifetime towards her maintenance….” 34. In the present case, from the evidence available, it is learnt that the Settlor Kannabiran Pillai settled the property in favour of Kumudammal for life. And only after her life, the remainder vests with the plaintiff. Ramakrishna Mutt. In the present case, from the evidence available, it is learnt that the Settlor Kannabiran Pillai settled the property in favour of Kumudammal for life. And only after her life, the remainder vests with the plaintiff. Ramakrishna Mutt. As stated above, Section 14(1) enlarges the right of Kumudammal and nothing remains to vest with for the plaintiff 35. Further, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent relies upon Raghubir Singh and Others v. Gulab Singh and Others AIR 1998 SC 2401 : (1998) 6 SCC 314 . Their Lordships have held in paras 24 and 30 as follows: "24. Accordingly, we hold that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife and that the right in the case of a widow "a pre-existing right," which existed under the Shastric Hindu Law long before the passing of the 1937 or the 1946 Acts. Those Acts merely recognized the position as was existing under the Shastric Hindu Law and gave it a `statutory backing. Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she had a right to be maintained out of it and she is entitled to retain the possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance. 30. The impugned judgment of the learned single-Judge of the High Court suffers from a misconception about the nature of the `pre-existing right of a Hindu widow. The opinion of the learned single Judge that there would be no `pre-existing right vesting in Smt. Janak Dulari because of the non-applicability of the 1937 Act in Reva State is clearly erroneous. Her right to maintenance existed under the Shastric Hindu Law and was not created by the 1937 or 1946 Act. Those Acts merely gave statutory hacking to her existing rights." 36. In para 26 of the reported judgment, Their Lordships have expressed their view that in view of Section 14(1) of the Act, the widows limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right, notwithstanding any restriction placed under the document or the instrument. So far as sub-section (2) of Section 14 is concerned, it applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc.. which create an independent or a new title in favour of the female for the first time. So far as sub-section (2) of Section 14 is concerned, it applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc.. which create an independent or a new title in favour of the female for the first time. It has no application to cases where the document declares or recognizes or confirms her share in the property or her preexisting right to maintenance out of that property. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act. 37. In the present case, Kumudammal had pre-existing right of maintenance and it is not for the first time, under Exhibits A-2 and A-3 that her right is conferred on her. Hence, I am of the view that Section 14(2) has no application in the present case. 38. The respondent counsel relied upon the cases reported in (2005) 15 SCC 131, (2005) 12 SCC 270 and (2005) 12 SCC 470 for the purpose of Section 100 C.P.C. In all the cases cited, it is held that the well-known proposition once laid, cannot be re-agitated. The substantial question of law must be debatable. One which has not been settled earlier by statute or binding precedent, must have a bearing on the outcome of the case. 39. In the present case, since the law is well settled, and under Section 14(1) the right of Kumudammal gets enlarged, and ultimately, as per Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the property reverts back to the legal heirs of Kumudammal, namely, her husbands son and grandsons i.e., the defendants 1 to 3. 40. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff cannot claim any right in the suit property. Hence, nothing war-rants to interfere with the well-considered judgments of both the Courts below. Hence, the second appeal has no merit and is liable to he dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree of the Courts below. No costs.