Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 502 (CAL)

INDIAN CRAFT VILLAGE. TRUST v. CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

2007-07-09

JYOTIRMAY BHATTACHARYA

body2007
( 1 ) TO save the Trust Property, a Public Charitable Trust has come before this Court with an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by challenging the illegal termination of the lease by the Kolkata Municipal corporation (hereinafter referred to as KMC) and its demand for possession of the petitioners' leasehold property from the petitioners. ( 2 ) ADMITTEDLY by a registered lease deed dated 31 st May, 1994, KMC demised 19. 6 acres of land at J. B. S. Haldane Sarani to the petitioner No. 1 being a Public Charitable Trust (hereinafter referred to as the Trust) for a period of 30 years for setting up a craft village in the said premises, on the terms and conditions as contained in the said deed. ( 3 ) THE physical possession o1 the said premises was handed over by KMC to the said Trust on 28th September, 1997. Subsequently by another supplementary Indenture dated 9th July, 1999 executed between the KMC and the Trust, it was clarified that an area of 18. 11 acres of land at the said premises was demised in favour of the Trust instead of 19. 6 acres, as mentioned in the earlier deed dated 31 st May, 1994. ( 4 ) THE terms and conditions ccf the said lease were settled between the KMC and the Trust under the mediation of the State Government with its high dignitaries including the therr Chief Minister of West Bengal. Apart from the lease rent which was agreed to be paid by the Trust to the KMC, the State Government also assured payment of compensation to the tune of Rs. 2. 20 crores to be made to the KMC in advance as balance cost for acquisition of land by the State Government. ( 5 ) EVEN after grant of such lease, KMC created obstruction at the time when the Trust was constructing a boundary wall to protect its leasehold property and thereby giving rise to a writ petition being W. P. No. 1696 of 2001. On 28th August, 2001, an order was passed by a learned Single judge of this Court in the said writ petition giving liberty to the Trust to erect the boundary wall less than three meters in height with prior intimation to the KMC. On 28th August, 2001, an order was passed by a learned Single judge of this Court in the said writ petition giving liberty to the Trust to erect the boundary wall less than three meters in height with prior intimation to the KMC. ( 6 ) SUBSEQUENTLY by the impugned notice dated 19th December, 2001 issued by the Chief Valuer and Surveyor-l of the KMC, the Secretary of the trust was intimated about the decision of the Mayor dated 24th August, 2001 and MIC resolution dated 24th august, 2001 regarding cancellation of the petitioners' lease by KMC on the ground of forfeiture. By the impugned notice, the petitioners were also requested to hand over the possession of the said land immediately upon receipt of the said notice. ( 7 ) THE reason for invocation of the power of termination of the lease on the ground of forfeiture has not been disclosed to the Trust. Even, the decision which was taken either by the Mayor or by the members of the mic on 24th August, 2001 as referred to in the impugned notice, was not supplied to the Trust. ( 8 ) CHALLENGING the legality of termination of the lease by KMC as well as the legality of demand for immediate possession, the Trust and its secretary filed instant writ petition, inter alia, praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to forthwith recall, rescind, withdraw and/or cancel the impugned notice dated 19th December, 2001 and also the resolution of the MIC and the order of the Mayor both dated 24th August, 2001 and also to desist the respondents from giving effect to and/or further effect to the impugned notice, the said resolution of the MIC and the said order of the Mayor and further to desist the respondents from dispossessing the petitioners from the said leasehold property except by complying with due process of law. ( 9 ) AN interim order was passed by Justice Barin Ghosh (as His lordship then was) on 4th February, 2002 whereby it was directed that without leave of this Court, let the petitioners' possession be not interfered with in respect of the leasehold premises in question of which lease has been cancelled without due process of law. ( 9 ) AN interim order was passed by Justice Barin Ghosh (as His lordship then was) on 4th February, 2002 whereby it was directed that without leave of this Court, let the petitioners' possession be not interfered with in respect of the leasehold premises in question of which lease has been cancelled without due process of law. Subsequently when the said writ petition came up for hearing before His Lordship, an adjournment was sought for by the parties for sorting out the disputes between them out of court. An adjournment was also granted by His Lordship by taking note of such submission of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. ( 10 ) THE parties, in fact, with the participation of very high dignitaries of the State including the then Chief Minister of the State and the then mayor of the KMC, worked out a scheme for settlement of the disputes. The State Government being desirous of setting up a permanent trade fair complex on the said plot of land, introduced West Bengal Trade Promotion organization (hereinafter referred to as WBTPO), a proposed company limited by share, for implementation of the said project on the said plot of land. ( 11 ) ULTIMATELY it was unanimously resolved by all the trustees that the Trust will surrender 14. 16 acres'of land out of 18. 41 acres of land at the said premises to KMC as KMC, in consideration of such surrender, has agreed to allot a plot of land measuring about 2. 75 acres more or less adjacent to the land measuring about 3. 95 acres more or less to be retained by the trustee after making surrender of the said 14. 16 acres of land. Thus, in lieu of such surrender, the Trust will enjoy an allotment of land measuring about 6. 70 acres of land. ( 12 ) SINCE the area of allotment of the Trust will be reduced, it was decided by the Government and the Municipal authorities that the proportionate share of the balance cost of acquisition of land with regard to the Trust payable by the Government will be reduced proportionately. Thus, the liability of payment of Rs. 2. 20 acres by the State Government to KMC which was initially settled, as aforesaid, stood reduced to Rs. 75. 20 lakhs. Thus, the liability of payment of Rs. 2. 20 acres by the State Government to KMC which was initially settled, as aforesaid, stood reduced to Rs. 75. 20 lakhs. It was further agreed upon that even if the State Government commits any default or causes any delay in payment of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 75. 20 lakhs to KMC, still then the lessor will mot hinder the lessee from setting up the craft village by withdrawing any sanction on the ground of non-payment of the said amount by the State Government. ( 13 ) THE terms on which the said 14. 16 acres of land will be settled by KMC to WBTPO for selling up a permanent trade fair complex therein were also settled between the KMC and the WBTPO. The proposed lessee being WBTPO also agreed to sub-lease 0. 80 acres of land out of the land to be surrendered by the Trust, to the Trust, as aforesaid. The said WBTPO also agreed to share the entire frontage of the plot on Park Circus Connector with the petitioners' Trust on 50:50 basis. The KMC also agreed to refund a sum of rupees eight lakhs which the petitioners spent towards rehabilitation expenses of the encroachers of a portion of the land to be surrendered together with interest to be calculated on the nationalised bank interest basis to the Trust within 30 days from the date of execution of the necessary documents. ( 14 ) ON the basis of such settlement, several deeds/documents were executed amongst the parties, viz. , KMC, the Trust, and the proposed lessee on the same day and in one sitting on 10th October, 2003. Those deeds and/or documents are as follows :- (i) A deed of modification and surrender was executed on 10th october, 2003 between the KMC and the Trust incorporating therein the terms and conditions as mentioned above, on which the Trust agreed to surrender 14. 16 acres of land from the demised plot of land in favour of the KMC. (ii) A memorandum of agreement was executed on 10th October, 2003 between the KMC and the WBTPO, wherein KMC agreed to hand over the advance and permissive possession of land measuring 18. 41 acres more or less which is inclusive of the land agreed to be surrendered by the Trust in favour of KMC to wbtpo on or before 31st October, 2003. 41 acres more or less which is inclusive of the land agreed to be surrendered by the Trust in favour of KMC to wbtpo on or before 31st October, 2003. KMC agreed to execute a formal lease deed in favour of WBTPO after its incorporation. It is also provided therein that WBTPO will be permitted to sublease a part of the land to the Trust. (iii) A memorandum of agreement was executed on 10th October, 2003 between WBTPO and the Trust, wherein the WBTPO agreed to sub-lease 0. 80 acres of land out of 18. 41 acres of land which was agreed to be demised by KMC in favour of wbtpo. It was also agreed between the parties that the frontage along the Park Circus Connector (H. B. S. Haldane Avenue) will be shared exactly on 50:50 basis between ICVT and WBTPO. (iv) Certificate was granted by the managing trustee of ICVT acknowledging receipt of delivery of possession of 0. 80 acres of land from WBTPO on 10th October, 2003. ( 15 ) BY referring to the deed of modification and surrender dated 10th october, 2003, the respondents claim that simultaneously on execution of the said deed on 10th October, 2003, the Trust surrendered the lease by giving up possession of an area of 14. 16 acres of land from the said property in favour of KMC. To support such claim, admission made by the Trust regarding surrender of lease in various parts of the said documents was referred to by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. ( 16 ) THE petitioners, however, dispute such claim of the respondents regarding surrender of lease and/or giving delivery of possession of 14. 16 acres of land to KMC. The petitioners claim that though they agreed to the scheme for settlement of the dispute between them on the terms and conditions, as mentioned in the said deed, but in fact they neither surrendered their interest in the leasehold property nor delivered possession of any part thereof in pursuance of the said deed. The petitioners further claim that they were dispossessed forcibly from the entire leasehold property on 2nd March, 2003 in violation of the injunction order passed on 4th february, 2002. ( 17 ) SUBSEQUENTLY on 20th March, 2006 lease deed was executed between the KMC and the WBTPO by letting out 18. The petitioners further claim that they were dispossessed forcibly from the entire leasehold property on 2nd March, 2003 in violation of the injunction order passed on 4th february, 2002. ( 17 ) SUBSEQUENTLY on 20th March, 2006 lease deed was executed between the KMC and the WBTPO by letting out 18. 41 acres of land, as particularly mentioned in the schedule of the said deed, in violation of the interim injunction passed by this Court on 4th February, 2002, as aforesaid. ( 18 ) A dispute of new dimension between the parties was evolved from this juncture when the Municipal authority without fulfiling the reciprocal promises made by KMC in the deed of modification and surrender dated 10th October, 2003 allegedly dispossessed the petitioners from the said property by force and leased out a part of the said property together with the other plot of land in favour of WBTPO on 20th March, 2006 in violation of the interim order passed by this Court, as aforesaid. Though there was a dispute between the parties with regard to the actual date of dispossession of the petitioners and/or delivery of possession of the said 14. 16 acres of land by the petitioners, but fact remains that status quo with regard to possession as on the date of passing the interim order, i. e. , as on 4th february, 2002 was altered without the leave of the Court and in violation of the said order of injunction. ( 19 ) THEREAFTER when the pendente lite transferee, viz. , the WBTPO made an attempt to raise construction on the said land and the CESC authority disconnected the supply of electricity of the petitioners therein, the petitioners filed an interlocutory application claiming the following interim orders against the CESC Ltd. and V//btpo without impleading those organisations as parties in the writ petition :- " (a) Leave to serve CESC Limited having its office at CESC House, 1, Chowringhee Square, Kolkata. (b) Leave to serve West Bengal Tirade Promotion Organisation having its office at 5, Council House Street, Kolkata. (c) A mandatory Interim order directing the CESC Ltd, to immediately restore the electricity connection to the separate meter of the office of the petitioner No. 1. (b) Leave to serve West Bengal Tirade Promotion Organisation having its office at 5, Council House Street, Kolkata. (c) A mandatory Interim order directing the CESC Ltd, to immediately restore the electricity connection to the separate meter of the office of the petitioner No. 1. (d) An order of injunction restraining the respondent authorities and wbtpo from interfering with the possession of the leasehold land of the petitioner in any manner whatsoever, which may amount to a violation of the indenture of lease dated 9th July, 1999. (e) An order of injunction restraining the respondent authorities and wbtpo from undertaking any further construction or civil work either temporary or permanent on the entirejplot of land of 18. 11 acres demised to the petitioner No, I through the registered indenture of lease dated 9th july, 1999. (f) Ad interim order in terms of prayers above. (g) Pass any other order or orders and/or direction or directions as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper. " ( 20 ) THE said application was registered as G. A. No. 2196 of 2006. Pending disposal of the said application, this Court by an order dated 27th september, 2006 directed the parties Jo maintain status quo with regard to possession as well as nature and character of the land measuring about 7. 50 acres of land (i. e. 3. 95 acres which the petitioners were allowed to retain in terms of the deed of modification and/or surrender dated 10th october, 2003 and the plot of land measuring about 2. 75 acres which was agreed to be allotted in favour of the petitioners by the Municipal authority in terms of the said deed of modification and/or surrender as well as the land measuring about 0. 80 acres, the possession of which was claimed to have been given by WBTPO to the petitioners aggregating to 7. 50 acres of land) till 7th December, 2006 or until further order, whichever is earlier. ( 21 ) IT was also mentioned in the said order that the construction which will be made by WBTPO on the land in dispute measuring about 14. 16 acres of land which was alleged to have been surrendered by the petitioners in terms of the said deed of modification and/or surrender, will abide by the result of the said applications. 16 acres of land which was alleged to have been surrendered by the petitioners in terms of the said deed of modification and/or surrender, will abide by the result of the said applications. ( 22 ) KMC also filed an application being G. A. No. 2255 of 2006, inter alia, praying for an order for disposing of the writ petition finally by passing no order thereon and/or to pass such appropriate order as will bring the said litigation to an end by taking mote of the subsequent events, as mentioned above. ( 23 ) ANOTHER front of the litigation was emerged when three of the trustees of the petitioners' Trust, viz. , ICVT filed an application being G. A. No. 2254 of 2006, inter alia, seeking the following reliefs :- "a) A writ petition being W. P. No. 140 of 2002 and the application made therein being G. A. No. 2196 of 2006 be dismissed as withdrawn and all orders passed therein be vacated ; b) Stay of all the proceedings in connection with the writ petition being W. P. No. 140 of 2002 and applications therein pending disposal of the present application ; c) Revocation of the authority of the writ petitioner No. 2 or any other persons to continue or proceed with the W. P. No. 140 of 2002 and/or any application therein d) Ad interim order in terms off prayers as above ; e) Such further or other order or orders be made and/or directions be given as this Hon'ble Court may (teem fit and proper. " ( 24 ) LOOKING at the said petition, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the trustees are now divided in iits decision regarding continuation of the writ petition in the altered situation. The majority trustees are in favour of continuation of the proceeding. The minority group consisting of three ex-officio trustees does not want to proceed with the writ petition any further due to changes occurred during the pendency of the writ petition, as aforesaid. The majority trustees are in favour of continuation of the proceeding. The minority group consisting of three ex-officio trustees does not want to proceed with the writ petition any further due to changes occurred during the pendency of the writ petition, as aforesaid. ( 25 ) IN the application filed by three of the trustees being G. A. No. 2254 of 2006, the locus of the petitioners to continue the proceeding has also been challenged as the petitioner No. 2 who was the Secretary of the said Trust at the time of filing of the writ petition ceased to be the Secretary of the said Trust during pendency of this writ petition. Thus, the competence of the petitioner No. 2 to represent the petitioner No. 1 and to continue the writ petition have been seriously challenged by the three co-trustees in the said application. ( 26 ) WBTPO, the pendente lite transferee has also challenged the maintainability of this writ petition and the application for interim relief filed by the writ petitioners being G. A. No. 2196 of 2006 by alleging that in view of the altered situation caused to have been occurred by the parties including the writ petitioners during the pendency of the writ petition, the relief which was sought for in the writ petition initially has now been rendered infructuous. ( 27 ) WBTPO also claims that since the WBTPO is a bona fide transferee and since they have already taken steps for implementation of the project of setting up a permanemt trade fair complex on the land in question in an altered situation to which the petitioners were also consenting parties, the right of the WBTPO in the land in question, cannot be disturbed and/or affected by any order to be passed by this Court in the pending applications, particularly when WBTFO has not been impleaded as a party in the writ petition though all reliefs which have been sought for by the petitioners in the supplementary affidavit filed by them in connection with the writ petition, are against the WBTFO on the basis of the allegations made against WBTPO. ( 28 ) THE learned Counsel, appearing for the respective parties as well as the learned Counsel, appearing for the pendente lite transferee and the CESC authority made elaborate submission in support of their respective clients in this proceeding. ( 28 ) THE learned Counsel, appearing for the respective parties as well as the learned Counsel, appearing for the pendente lite transferee and the CESC authority made elaborate submission in support of their respective clients in this proceeding. ( 29 ) BEFORE indicating various submissions made by the Counsel appearing for the respective parties as well as of the transferee pendente lite and CESC authority in great details, this Court considered it fit to deal with the objection regarding maintainability of this writ petition first, inasmuch as, such a question has not only been raised by the respondents and the transferee pendente lite but also been raised by three of the co-trustees of the petitioner Trust. ( 30 ) ON consideration of the said objection, if it is found that the writ petition is still maintainable, then this Court will consider the other objections of the respondents as well as of the subsequent transferees which practically relate to the effect and/or consequences of the documents admittedly executed between the KMC, ICVT and WBTPO on 10th October, 2003, as referred to above, during the pendency of this writ petition. ( 31 ) LET me now first of all consider the objection regarding the maintainability of this writ petition hereunder. Re : Maintainability of this Writ Petition. ( 32 ) MR. Anindya Mitra, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of three of the trustees of ICVT being the ex-officio trustees submitted that the Trust has no legal entity. Mr. Mitra, however, initially did not dispute the competence of the Secretary of the Trust to file this writ petition representing the said Trust, as according to him, the Trust can no doubt be represented by the Secretary. The petitioner No. 2 who was the Secretary at the time of filing this writ petition, according to Mr. Mitra, was competent to file the writ petition by representing the Trust. As a matter of fact, Mr. Mitra moved the writ petition initially on behalf of the Trust and obtained the interim order on 4th February, 2002. ( 33 ) THOUGH Mr. Mitra, was competent to file the writ petition by representing the Trust. As a matter of fact, Mr. Mitra moved the writ petition initially on behalf of the Trust and obtained the interim order on 4th February, 2002. ( 33 ) THOUGH Mr. Mitra did not challenge the initial locus of the petitioner No. 2 to represent the Trust and to file the writ petition, but still then, he contended that since during the pendency of this writ petition, the petitioner No. 2 ceased to be a trustee of the said Trust, the further proceeding of the writ petition, canned be continued by the petitioner No. 2. ( 34 ) BY referring to the various provisions of the Trust deed being annexure 'a' to the said application, Mr. Mitra pointed out that the management and control of the Trust vested in the managing trustee who will act in consultation with the other trustees and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions mentioned in the said Trust deed, the trustees shall, with the prior concurrence of the managing trustee, be entitled to exercise and execute and do all or any of the powers, acts and deeds as mentioned in clause (vii) of the said deed including to initiate defend, adjust, settle, compromise, compound and refer to arbitration all actions, suits, claims, demands and proceedings regarding the Trust properties and assets. ( 35 ) BY referring to the said provisions, Mr. Mitra submitted that trustees must act jointly as the power of management vested in the trustees as a whole and not in the managing trustee alone. Mr. Mitra, thus, submitted that when the trustees are divided here in their decision regarding continuation of the said writ petition the writ petition should not be allowed to be continued at the instance of some of the trustees. In support of such submission, Mr. Mitra relied upon the following decisions of different High courts :- (i) AIR 1984 Del 145 (Dull Chand v. M/s. M. P. T. C. Charitable trust) (ii) (2004)1 Cal LJ (Cal) 283 (Numazar Dorab Mehta and Ors v. The assam Co. Ltd. ). In support of such submission, Mr. Mitra relied upon the following decisions of different High courts :- (i) AIR 1984 Del 145 (Dull Chand v. M/s. M. P. T. C. Charitable trust) (ii) (2004)1 Cal LJ (Cal) 283 (Numazar Dorab Mehta and Ors v. The assam Co. Ltd. ). ( 36 ) IN both the aforesaid cases, it was held that a suit by one of the co-trustees on the basis of a resdlution passed unanimously by all other co-trustees authorising the said trustee to file the suit would not be maintainable as the position of trustees is exactly the same as of any other co-owners who must necessarily join together to file a suit. Those decisions uniformly declare that some of the co-trustees cannot maintain an action in a Court of law in the absence of the other cotrustees. ( 37 ) MR. Mitra further submitted that even the managing Trustee did not initially come forward by taking the cause of the Trust. Mr. Mitra further argued that since the Trust surrendered 14. 16 acres of land out of its leasehold interest in the land in question in favour of KMC during the pendency of this writ petition, the petitioner has no subsisting right and/or interest in respect of the land so surrendered and as such the petitioner cannot claim any relief in respect of the said land in the altered situation. ( 38 ) MR, Mitra further submitted that even the subsequent changes have not been brought on record by way of amendment of the writ petition by the petitioners. According to Mr. Mitra, unless the changes which occurred during the pendency of the writ petition are brought on record by way of amendment, the Court cannot grant any relief to the petitioner even by moulding the prayer in an altered situation. Mr. Mitra further argues that when the subsequent changes have no nexus with the initial reliefs claimed in the writ petition on the basis of the cause of action existed as on the date of filing of the writ petition, subsequent events as mentioned in the supplementary affidavit, cannot be taken note of by this Court and no relief can be granted by this Court on the basis of such subsequent events. ( 39 ) THUS, on the grounds, as aforesaid, Mr. ( 39 ) THUS, on the grounds, as aforesaid, Mr. Mitra representing the ex-officio trustees, prayed for dismissal of this writ petition by treating the same as withdrawn. ( 40 ) MR. Mitra further submitted that the application for interim relief should also be dismissed as the said application which was not affirmed by either of the trustees or by any person duly authorised by the trustees, cannot be regarded as a competent application. Mr. Mitra submitted that uddalak Ghosh who affirmed the said affidavit was not authorised by his clients and as such he cannot affirm any affidavit representing the Trust. Accordingly, Mr. Mitra prayed for dismissal of the said application also. ( 41 ) MR. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioners, refuted the said submission of Mr. Mitra by submitting that legality of initial filing of the writ petition by the Trust represented by its secretary, cannot be challenged by Mr. Mitra who himself appeared for the cause of the Trust representing the said Trust and obtained the interim order therein. ( 42 ) MR. Mukherjee further submitted that if the initial filing of the writ petition by the Trust represented by its Secretary, is not challenged, then continuation of the writ petition by the said Secretary even after he ceased to be a trustee during the pendency of this writ petition, cannot be challenged in view of Order 22 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code which authorises the person who initiated the proceeding legally to continue the said proceeding even after change and/or devolution of his interest in his successor occurred during the pendency of this writ petition. ( 43 ) BY referring to Order 22 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, mr. Mukherjee submitted that if the successor upon whom the interest of the original plaintiff devolves during the pendency of the suit, wants to proceed with the suit, he can do so only if leave is granted by the Court in favour of such successor to continue the proceeding. Thus, unless such leave is granted in favour of the successor, the successor cannot continue the proceeding. ( 44 ) MR. Thus, unless such leave is granted in favour of the successor, the successor cannot continue the proceeding. ( 44 ) MR. Mukherjee, thus, submitted that Order 22 Rule 10 has made it clear that the right to continue the suit and/or any action by the party who initiated such suit and/or proceeding is not defeated merely because of change of his interest during the pemdency of the litigation. ( 45 ) IN support of such submission, Mr. Mukherjee relied upon the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court :- (i) AIR 2001 SC 2552 (Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Joyprakash university) (ii) AIR 2002 SC 2180 (Jaskirat Datwani v. Vidyavati ). ( 46 ) BY referring to the resolution adopted by the majority members on 3rd August, 2006 being annexure 'x' to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the writ petitioner in connection with the application being G. A. No. 2254 of 2006, Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that the majority members resolved in the said resolution that the writ petition being W. P. No. 140 of 2002 filed by indian Craft Village Trust should be prosecuted to its logical end by all legal means available and the said application being G. A. No. 2254 of 2006 being ex facie against the interest of the Trust, ought not to have been pressed before the Hon'ble High Court on behalf of the applicants/ex-officio trustees. ( 47 ) BY referring to the said resolution, Mr. Mukherjee submitted that though the minority group of trustees may not agree with the majority decision and even if they dissented to the majority decision, still then they cannot act against the decision of the majority trustees. Mr. Mukherjee further argued that a trustee cannot act against the interest of the Trust. The prayer which has been sought for by three ex-officio trustees in their application being G,a. No. 2254 of 2006, is absolutely against the interest of the Trust, inasmuch as, in the event such prayer is allowed, the Trust will lose its right in the Trust property. In effect Mr. Mukherjee submitted that trustees cannot act against the interest of the Trusti. ( 48 ) MR. Mukherjee further submitted that the decisions which were cited by Mr. Mitra reported in AIR 1984 Del 145 and in (2004) 1 Cal LJ 283, have no application in the facts of the instant case. Mr. In effect Mr. Mukherjee submitted that trustees cannot act against the interest of the Trusti. ( 48 ) MR. Mukherjee further submitted that the decisions which were cited by Mr. Mitra reported in AIR 1984 Del 145 and in (2004) 1 Cal LJ 283, have no application in the facts of the instant case. Mr. Mukherjee argued that in case of private trust, individual trustee cannot maintain any suit on behalf of the Trust. The principles which were so laid down in the above decisions, cited by Mr. Mitra, have no application in case of a Public charitable Trust, inasmuch as, the provisions of the Trust Act do not apply to Public Charitable Trust in view of Section 1 of the Trust Act. ( 49 ) MR. Mukherjee further submitted that in case of religious endowment and/or Public Charitable Trust, anyone of the trustees and even the worshipper and/or beneficiary under the Trust, can maintain a suit to protect the Trust property of a Public Charitable Trust and/or of the deity. Mr. Mukherjee went a step further by submitting that even the Court itself acting as a representative of the sovereign, can protect the interest of a public Charitable Trust whenever the Court finds that the interest of the public Charitable Trust is endangered. To strengthen such submission, Mr. Mukherjee relied upon the following decisions :- (i) AIR 1959 SC 951 Para 6 (Ram Saroop Dasji v. S. P. Sahi ). (ii) AIR (33) 1946 Privy Council 34 (Ram Dularey v. Ram Lal and Ors.), (iii) (2005)1 SCC 172 Paragraphs 11, 17, 24 and 25 [j. P. Srivastava and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. ]. ( 50 ) LASTLY, Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the question of locus of the petitioner in case of public interest litigation, has a different meaning than that of the locus of the petitioner in a private interest litigation. According to him, when in a case of private interest litigation, public interest is involved, concept of locus of petitioner will be identical to the concept of locus in case of public interest litigation. .