JUDGMENT A.P. Subba, J. 1. This petition filed by one Mrs. Tina Khongjee, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks to challenge the detention of her husband Shri Mayborn Rapthap, under Section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). 2. Briefly stated, the case of the petitioner is that the detenu was lodged in jail having been arrested in connection with some criminal cases involving non-bailable offences. As he was taken ill during his confinement in the judicial custody, he was removed to Civil Hospital, Shillong, on 4.5.2007 for better medical are and attention. When he was thus admitted in hospital, he was served with detention order on 7th May 2007 followed by the grounds of his detention on the next following day i.e. 8.5.2007. However, no material documents and particulars relied on by the authority while passing the detention order were supplied to him alongwith the detention order. The detenu was merely supplied with the copies of the First Information Reports (FIRs) numbering three lodged in connection with the criminal cases. However, as the order of detention, the grounds of detention and the other relevant documents namely the FIRs being all in English language with which the detenu was not conversant, he was unable to file an effective representation. It was therefore contended that the impugned order of detention was void, illegal and ultra vires being violative of Articles 14, 19, 21 and22 of the Constitution of India and the provisions of the Act, 1995. 3. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the answering respondent No. 4, the averments made by the petitioner that the detention order was first served upon the detenu followed by the grounds of detention one day later was not disputed. It was, however, denied that the grounds of detention served upon the detenu was only in English language. It was asserted that the grounds of detention served were both in English and in Khasi and the same was duly received by the detenue. It was also denied that the copies of the other documents and the FIR annexed with the grounds of detention were not legible. It was asserted that the grounds of detention served were both in English and in Khasi and the same was duly received by the detenue. It was also denied that the copies of the other documents and the FIR annexed with the grounds of detention were not legible. It was, therefore, contended that it was not correct to say that the detenue was not in a position to make any effective representation on account of the fact that the grounds of detention were only in English and the FIRs were not legible. According to the answering respondent, the detenue was duly informed of his right to make a representation pursuant to which he submitted a representation on 16.5.2007 through his mother which was forwarded to the Government in Political Department on 25.5.2007 and the same was placed before the Advisory Board on 12.6.2007. On receipt of the recommendation of the Advisory Board, the order of detention dated 17.5.2007 was duly approved and confirmed by the State Government. It was therefore contended that the impugned detention order has been passed according to law and the same does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 4. Mr. S. Sen assisted by Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned PP representing State-respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and Mr. S.C. Shyam, learned CGC appearing on behalf of respondent No. 5 were heard. 5. Mr. S. Sen, learned Counsel for the petitioner in his submissions before us assailed the impugned order of detention mainly on two grounds, i.e. non-specification of the concerned authority in the grounds of detention to whom the detenue could address his representation and non-application of mind by the detaining authority in arriving at the conclusion that the detention of the detenue was warranted on the grounds of detention placed before him. Taking up the first ground, the learned Counsel submitted that neither in the order of detention nor in the grounds of detention any mention has been made of the Advisory Board as one of the authorities to whom the detenue could address his representation. This, according to him, has resulted in total denial of his valuable right to file representation before such authority. This, according to him, has resulted in total denial of his valuable right to file representation before such authority. As regards the second ground relating to non-application of mind, the contention urged by the learned Counsel is that the fact that the order of detention was communicated on 7th day of May 2007 and served on the detenue on the same day coupled with the fact that grounds of detention was prepared only on 8th day of May 2007 on which date it was supplied to the detenue goes to show that the detaining authority did not apply his mind and did not have the requisite satisfaction as envisaged under Section3 of the Act in making the impugned order of detention. This, according to the learned Counsel, further goes to show that the detaining authority did not apply its independent mind and solely acted on the request made by the sponsoring authority thereby abdicating its power and discretion in favour of the police while making the impugned order. Since the impugned order suffers from such total non-application of mind, it was bad in law and thus liable to be quashed. 6. As against the above contention, Mr. N.D. Chullai, the learned PP submitted that the impugned order was passed by the concerned authority duly following the procedure laid down under the Act and as such no interference of this Court was called for on any of the aforesaid grounds mentioned by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 7. Before we take up the above rival contentions, we find it pertinent to mention that the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the course of his submission before us made it clear that of the two grounds taken by him, the second ground alone would be sufficient for grant of relief sought for by him and accordingly confined his submissions to the second ground alone. In view of this, we propose to take up the second ground alone for our discussion and consideration. 8. As already noted above, the second ground urged by the teamed Counsel relates to non-application of mind resulting in absence of subjective satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority while passing the detention order. In view of this, we propose to take up the second ground alone for our discussion and consideration. 8. As already noted above, the second ground urged by the teamed Counsel relates to non-application of mind resulting in absence of subjective satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority while passing the detention order. As would be clear from what is narrated above, it is not disputed that the detention order in the present case was served on the detenue on 7th of May 2007 while the grounds of detention was communicated to the detenue one day later i.e. on 8th of May 2007. The specific contention urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard is that the very fact that the grounds of detention were communicated one day later than the service of detention order suggests that the grounds of detention were not framed as they were not in existence before the order of detention was issued. We find considerable force in this submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Admittedly, the grounds of detention were communicated only on 8th May 2007 i.e. one day later after the detention order was communicated. We see no reason as to why the grounds of detention if the same was ready before the issue of the order of detention could not have been communicated earlier than it was done. This is however not to suggest that the grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenue simultaneously with the order of detention. The words 'as soon as may be' occurring in Section 8 of the Act which provides for disclosure of the grounds of the detention to the person detained have been interpreted in a number of decisions both of the High Courts and the Apex Court to mean 'without unavoidable delay'. Thus, if the requirement of law is that such grounds of detention must be communicated without unavoidable delay, we fail to understand as to why the same could not have been communicated on the very day when the detention order was served. That apart, the important question that falls for consideration in the circumstances of the case is whether the grounds of detention were in existence on the day the detaining authority took the decision to pass the impugned order of detention. That apart, the important question that falls for consideration in the circumstances of the case is whether the grounds of detention were in existence on the day the detaining authority took the decision to pass the impugned order of detention. The learned Public Prosecutor appearing before us was not in a position to show us any material from the record to support any conclusion that the grounds of detention were framed before hand and were in existence and available to the detaining authority for consideration while passing the impugned order of detention. We find it hardly necessary to observe that the grounds of detention are the reasons which should weigh with the detaining authority at the time of making the order. Thus, such grounds, as held by the Apex Court in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram, 1951 CriLJ 373 must be in existence when the detention order is made. In the present case however, we find it difficult to repel the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the possibility of non-existence of the grounds of detention in the present case cannot be ruled out. It is well settled that the satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of the grounds of detention is a condition precedent for making an order of detention. It has been held by the Apex Court in Rameswar Lal Patwari v. State of Bihar, [1968] 2 SCR 505 that if a ground which is mentioned in the order was not in existence when the order was made, the order would be struck down as malafide or ultra vires. 9. Thus, on a consideration of the materials on record in the light of law laid down in the decisions cited above, we find ourselves in agreement with the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind and is thus malafide. 10. Even though the above is sufficient to dispose of the matter, it would not be out of place to take notice of some of the other infirmities referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 11. 10. Even though the above is sufficient to dispose of the matter, it would not be out of place to take notice of some of the other infirmities referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 11. It was also one of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there was inordinate delay in consideration and disposal of the representation of the detenue by the detaining authority/State Government and/or Central Government and such delay vitiated the continued detention of the detenue. As per the averments in para 11 of the counter affidavit filed by the answering respondent, the detenue submitted his representation on 16.5.2007 through his mother. The said representation was forwarded to the Government in Political Department on 25.5.2007. The same was then placed before the Advisory Board held on 12.6.2007. The case of the detenue was then referred by the Government on 21.5.2007. This goes to show that the representation was neither considered nor any decision was taken by the State Government before it was forwarded to the Advisory Board. According to the learned PR, this amounts to sufficient compliance of the requirement of law. In support of his submission the learned PP took us through Section 11 of the Act and contended that the representation made, if any, by the person detained is required to be placed before the Advisory Board alongwith the ground on which the order was made within three weeks from the date of detention of the person. 12. Section 8 of the Act referred to by the learned PP is to the following effect: 11. Reference to Advisory Board-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act where a detention has been made the State Government shall within three weeks from the date of detention of the person, place before the Advisory Board the ground on which the order was made and the representation, if any, made by the person detained and, where the order has been made by a District Magistrate or by the empowered officer, also the report made by such District Magistrate or Officer under sub-section (3) of Section 3. 13. It is true, as contended by the learned PP that the provision contained in the above section does not say that the State Government should consider and dispose of the representation before referring it to the Advisory Board. In S.K. Abdul Karim and Ors. 13. It is true, as contended by the learned PP that the provision contained in the above section does not say that the State Government should consider and dispose of the representation before referring it to the Advisory Board. In S.K. Abdul Karim and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, 1969 CriLJ 1446, where a similar submission was urged saying that in a case where a reference has to be made to the Advisory Board, it was not necessary for the State Government to consider the representation, the Apex Court rejected the argument as fallacious and observed as follows: It is manifest that the right under Article 22 to make representation has been guaranteed independent of the duration of the period of detention and irrespective of the existence or non-existence of an Advisory Board. The constitution of an Advisory Board for the purpose of reporting whether a person should or should not be detained for a period of more than three months is a very different thing from a right of consideration by the State Government whether a person should be detained even for a single day. The obligation of the detaining authority to consider the representation is different from the obligation of the Advisory Board to consider the representation later on at the time of hearing the reference. It follows, therefore, that even if reference is to be made to the Advisory Board under Section 9 of the Act, the appropriate Government is under legal obligation to consider the representation of the detenue before such a reference is made. The Apex Court in Ranjit Dam v. State of West Bengal in AIR 1972 SC 1753 has held that, the very fact that Article 22 of the Constitution enjoins the detaining authority to afford the detenue the earliest opportunity to make the representation must impliedly mean that such a representation must, when made, be considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible. Bhagawati J. (as he then was) in John Martin v. State of West Bengal, 1975 CriLJ 637 has observed that Article 22 of the Constitution does not say which is the authority to whom the representation shall be made or which authority shall consider it. It has, however, been the consistent view of the Supreme Court that the representation of the detenue must be considered by the State Government. It has, however, been the consistent view of the Supreme Court that the representation of the detenue must be considered by the State Government. Enunciating four principles which ought to be followed in regard to the representation of the detenue, Ray J (as he then was) in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal, 1970 CriLJ 743 laid down as follows: First, the appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenue to make a representation and to consider the representation of the detenue as early as possible. Secondly, the consideration of the representation of the detenue by the appropriate authority is entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board including the consideration of the representation of the detenue by the Advisory Board. Thirdly, there should not be any delay in the matter of consideration. It is true that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the measure of time taken by the appropriate authority for consideration but it has to be remembered that the government has to be vigilant in the governance of the citizens. A citizen's right raises a correlative duty of the State. Fourthly, the appropriate government is to exercise its opinion and judgment on the representation before sending the case alongwith the detenu's representation to the Advisory Board…. 14. It is thus manifest that the State Government must consider the representation of the detenue and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. Of course, as held in Ranjit Dam's case (supra) no rigid limit of time can be fixed within which the Government must consider the representation and the question always requires determination on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, any unreasonable delay must be explained by the detaining authority. Any unexplained delay in considering the representation renders the detention invalid. 15. In the next place, it was also contended that there was violation of the provisions contained in Section 11 of the Act in so far as the State Government failed to place the grounds on which the order of detention was passed, the report made by the detaining authority and the representation submitted by the detenue within three weeks from the date of passing the order of detention with the result that there was inordinate delay in final consideration of the representation. It is now a settled position of law that any inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the State Government to consider the representation renders the detention illegal. As already noted above, the representation submitted by the detenue on 16.5.2007 was placed before the Advisory Board only on 12.6.2007. It thus appears that the time limit of three weeks was not adhered to while forwarding the relevant materials before the Advisory Board. 16. In view of the foregoing discussion, it thus follows that the impugned order suffers from more than one infirmity and is thus not sustainable in the eye of law. We are thus of the view that a case is made out for interference of this Court. 17. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of detention is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to release the detenue forthwith, if not required in any other case. Let a writ of habeas corpus be issued accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed