JUDGMENT D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 1. This appeal Is directed against the judgment dated 27.11.1995 and its corresponding decree dated 7.12.1995 passed by the Sub-Ordinance Judge, 1st Dhanbad in Title Suit No. 42 of 1975, whereby the suit was decreed in part on contest with cost against the defendants 1 to 5 (appellants herein) for a sum of Rs. 2,62,926,25 paise with interest pendente lite and future till the realization. 2. The suit before the learned Court below was filed by the respondent No. 1 /plaintiff namely, the Central Bank of India against the respondent No. 1 (defendant No. 1) Bastacolla Colliery, a private limited company and its directors for decree for realization of a sum of Rs. 13,91,670.68 paise which was claimed as outstanding dues, payable by the defendants to the plaintiff bank. The basis of such claim is that a current account was opened in the plaintiff-bank at Jharia Branch on 14th May, 1959 in the name of defendant No. 1 and cash credit/overdraft facilities were also allowed to the defendants in the said account. The relevant documents including the demand promissory note and letters of hypothecation relating to coal supply bills and letters of guarantee were executed on behalf of defendant No. 1 by its directors namely, defendant Nos. 2 to 5. The plaintiff-bank advanced various sums of money to the defendant No. 1 against the guarantee for hypothecation of the coal supply bills. The defendant No. 1 had authorized the plaintiff bank by virtue of irrevocable power of attorney for collection of amount from the coal supply bills during the period between 26th May, 1959 and 22nd December, 1972. A sum of Rs. 11,24,288.75 was the outstanding amount payable by the defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff-bank. Later, on 23rd October, 1973, on the request of the defendants and on their executing demand promissory note for a sum of 12.00 lakhs along with other documents including the letter of guarantee, the amount of overdraft facilities were extended up to Rs. 12.00 lakhs and the defendant No. 1 had availed the facilities by drawing various amounts from time to time and till August 1975, the total outstanding dues payable by the defendants to the plaintiff-bank stood at Rs. 13,91,670.68. 12.00 lakhs and the defendant No. 1 had availed the facilities by drawing various amounts from time to time and till August 1975, the total outstanding dues payable by the defendants to the plaintiff-bank stood at Rs. 13,91,670.68. It is stated that the management of the defendant No. 1 colliery was taken over by the Central Government on 31st January, 1973 under the Coal Mines Taking Over the Management Ordinance, 1973, which was subsequently replaced by the Coal Mines (Taken Over Management) Act, 1973, the colliery of the defendants was nationalized on 1st of May 1973. Pursuant to the taking over of the Management under the earlier ordinance, the management of the colliery of defendant No. 1 was taken over by the defendant No. 6 namely, Coal India Limited and later, by defendant No. 7 namely, Bharat Coking Coal Limited and since Bastacolla Colliery had vested on and from 1st of May in the defendant Nos. 6 and 7, the plaintiff-bank has explained that though the Coal Supply Bills of the defendant No. 1 were hypothecated to the bank, but on account of the statutory provisions in the Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1973, the plaintiff-bank was prevented from realizing the amounts of the hypothecated coal supply bills amounting to Rs. 10,07,585.98 from the various debtors. The plaintiff-bank had issued notices followed by advocates notice to the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 for the payment of the outstanding dues, but they had failed to pay the amount and hence the suit. 3. The suit was mainly contested by the defendant Nos. 2 to 5 by filing the written statement on the ground that the suit was not maintainable in its present form and was barred by law of limitation and also by the principle of res judicata. It was also pleaded that ever since the Nationalization of the Coal Mines, the defendant No. 7 was appointed as the custodian of the colliery of the defendant No. 1 by the Central Government and the entire set of documents, which were earlier executed by the defendant Nos. 2 to 5 on behalf of the defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff-bank, had lost their force after taking over the Management of the Bastacolla Colliery by the Central Government. 2 to 5 on behalf of the defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff-bank, had lost their force after taking over the Management of the Bastacolla Colliery by the Central Government. Pointing out lapses on the part of the plaintiff, the contesting defendant had pleaded that since the coal supply bills of the defendant No. 1 was hypothecated in favour of the plaintiff-bank authorizing the bank to realize the amount of coal bills from the various debtors, it was the responsibility of the bank to realize the amount of the coal bills and defendants could not be liable for the payment of the amounts of coal bills on account of banks own negligence and inaction. It was further pleaded that in any case, since the management of the colliery was taken over by the defendant Nos. 6 and 7, it was their liability to pay the dues of the bank from the amount later realized by the defendant No. 7 against the hypothecated bills and the plaintiff-bank having failed to take any legal action restraining the defendant Nos. 6 and 7 from appropriating the amounts of hypothecated coal bills, the defendants could not be thrust with any liability to pay the dues. Further pleadings of the contesting defendants was that the plaintiff-bank has filed his claim before the Commissioner of Payments in accordance with the provisions of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972 and, therefore, the bank could not simultaneously resort to filing its claim by way of civil suit. 4. On the basis of the rival pleadings, the trial Court framed following issues. 1. Whether the suit, as framed, is maintainable? 2. Whether the plaintiff has got cause of action for the suit? 3. Whether the suit is bared by law of res judicata, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence? 4. Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for? 5. On considering the evidences adduced by the defendants and the acknowledgement made by the plaintiff, it was found that subsequent to the date of filing of the suit, a cheque for the sum of Rs. 11,28,744.43 paise was paid to the plaintiff-bank against the outstanding dues which stood in the account of the defendant No. 1. The plaintiff-bank had acknowledged before the trial Court about the part satisfaction of the dues amount leaving the balance of Rs. 11,28,744.43 paise was paid to the plaintiff-bank against the outstanding dues which stood in the account of the defendant No. 1. The plaintiff-bank had acknowledged before the trial Court about the part satisfaction of the dues amount leaving the balance of Rs. 2,66,926.25 as the amount remaining payable by the defendants. 6. On the issue relating to the limitation, the trial Court had taken note of the letter of acknowledgement (Ext. 6), whereby the defendant Nos. 2 to 5 had acknowledged their liability of payment of a sum of Rs. 9,72,001.27 paise against the total amount of Rs. 13,91,670.68 paise and had requested the plaintiff-bank to absolve them from payment of interest on the outstanding amount. On the basis of the acknowledgement of debt by and on behalf of the defendant No. 1 vide various letters (Exts. 3, 5 and 6), the trial Court had recorded its finding that the suit was not barred by law of limitation. 7. On the issue as to whether the suit is -ed by law of res judicata, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence, the trial Court on considering the fact that the plaintiff-bank had also proved his claim before the Commissioner of Payments for the realization of the outstanding dues payable by the defendants, had observed that the selection of the forum before the Commissioner of Payments, does not deprive the plaintiff-bank from filing its claim before the civil Court. It was also observed that in the claim preferred before the Commissioner of Payments, guarantors were not made necessary parties and furthermore, since the full amount of claim, owed to the plaintiff-bank, was not satisfied by the amount of compensation awarded to the plaintiff-bank, therefore, the plaintiff- bank was entitled to pursue its claim for the outstanding dues against the defendants before the civil Court. On these discussions, the trial Court had recorded its finding that the suit is not barred by law of res judicata, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. On the remaining issues of cause of action for filing suit and also on the issue relating to maintainability and entitlement of the plaintiff for the relief (s) claimed, the trial Court had recorded its finding in favour of the plaintiff and on the basis of such finding, the suit was decreed in part in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 8. 8. The appellants (defendants No. 1 ) have assailed the impugned judgment of the Court below on the ground that the learned Court below had committed serious error of law in misconstruing and misreading the provisions of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act and that the learned Court below had failed to frame relevant issue on the basis of the pleadings of the parties including the issue of question of jurisdiction of the Court in view of the provisions of the Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, and further, that the trial Court has committed error in recording its finding that the suit is not barred by the principle of res judicata without considering the fact that the plaintiff-bank had elected to prefer the claim for the entire amounts before the Commissioner of Payments and the claim was satisfied entirely and there being no appeal against the order of Commissioner of Payments, the plaintiff-bank was debarred under the provisions of Section 11, CPC from claiming the self-same amount from the defendants by the instant suit. Further fault has also been pointed out in the findings of the issue relating to res judicata, as recorded by the trial Court, on the ground that the learned trial Court had committed a serious error in failing to take into consideration the law of precedent under which, the lower Court was bound to rely on the latest judgment of the superior Courts which deals with all relevant issues, and in the earlier judgments of the parent High Court or of the other High Courts. The further ground in this appeal are that the learned Court below ought to have considered that admittedly, the bank had failed to recover the dues which had accrued during the period prior to the taking over the Management of the colliery of the defendant No. 1, on the basis of hypothecated coal bills and as such, the defendants could not be made liable for the payment of such dues. Furthermore, the learned Court below had failed to consider that since after the nationalization of the colliery, management was taken over by the custodian namely, respondent No. 3, who had realized more than Rs. 9.00 lakhs during the period of management under him and the plaintiff-bank have directed its claim against the respondent No. 3 and not against the present appellants. 9. 9.00 lakhs during the period of management under him and the plaintiff-bank have directed its claim against the respondent No. 3 and not against the present appellants. 9. Issue which arise for determination in this appeal on the basis of grounds advanced by the appellants, are: 1. Whether the suit, as filed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 against the defendants (appellants herein), was barred by principle of res judicata. 2. Whether the suit was not maintainable against the present appellants (defendant Nos. 1 to 5) on the ground that the plaintiff-bank having been authorized to adjust payment against the amount realizable from the hypothecated coal bills, had failed and neglected in doing so prior to the taking over the management of the colliery of the defendant No. 1 and also on the ground that since after the taking over the management, it was the Custodian General namely, respondent No. 3 appointed under the Nationalization Act and who under his management, had realized more than Rs. 9.00 lakhs, was solely liable for the payment of the dues claimed by the plaintiff-bank? 10. In course of argument, learned Counsel for the appellants admits that as against the total amount claimed by the plaintiff- bank, a sum of Rs. 11,28,744.43 paise was paid by the defendants to the plaintiff-bank, but adds that appellants should not be made liable for the payments of the balance amount on the ground that it was the defendant No. 7 (B.C.C.L.) under whom the colliery of the defendant No. 1 had vested, is liable to pay the dues to the plaintiff- bank after the taking over the management. 11. On the issue relating to the liability of the present appellants to pay the dues, as claimed by the plaintiff-bank, it would appear from the pleadings of the plaintiff that the plaintiff have claimed dues accrued till the date prior to the taking over the management of the colliery of defendant No. 1 under the Nationalization Act. It also appears from the documents adduced by the plaintiff-bank which have been admitted by the defendants, that the defendant Nos. 2 to 5 are the directors of the defendant No. 1 Bastacolla Colliery and they were also guarantors and in their personal capacity, had executed a promissory note as well as letters of guarantee acknowledging their liability to pay the dues to the plaintiff-bank. 2 to 5 are the directors of the defendant No. 1 Bastacolla Colliery and they were also guarantors and in their personal capacity, had executed a promissory note as well as letters of guarantee acknowledging their liability to pay the dues to the plaintiff-bank. Such liability of the guarantors had devolved upon the heirs and legal successors who have been added as necessary parties to the suit. Thus, defendant Nos. 2 to 5 being the debtors, even under the letter of guarantee executed by them, they continued to remain liable for the, debt, owed by the company (defendant No. 1) as its directors. 12. Furthermore, under Section 7 of the Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1973, every liability of the Owner, Agent, Manager, or Managing Director of a coal mine, in respect of any transaction prior to the appointed day, shall be the liability of such Owner, Agent, Manager or Managing Director, as the case may be, and shall be enforceable against him and not against the Central Government or the Government Company. Under the Act, the "appointed day" has been specified as the first day of January 1973. The suit as filed by the plaintiff-bank is for the realization of the dues which had accrued prior to the "appointed day". As such, it was the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 who were entirely liable to pay the outstanding dues to the plaintiff-bank and the claim could not have been preferred against the appointed custodian of the colliery of the defendant No. 1. For the same reasons, the claim of the appellants that since after the management of the colliery of the defendant No. 1 was taken over by the defendant Nos. 6 and 7, the claim could have been preferred by the plaintiff- bank against the defendant Nos. 6 and 7, is not acceptable. 13. For the same reasons, the claim of the appellants that since after the management of the colliery of the defendant No. 1 was taken over by the defendant Nos. 6 and 7, the claim could have been preferred by the plaintiff- bank against the defendant Nos. 6 and 7, is not acceptable. 13. As regards the issue that the defendants cannot be made liable for the lapses on the part of the bank to adjust the outstanding dues by promptly realizing the money from the hypothecated coal bills, it would appear that on and from the "appointed day" i.e. the 1st day of January, 1973, the management of the colliery of the defendant No. 1 had vested in the Central Government and after such vesting, the entire properties of the colliery including the movable and immovable as well as balance reserve fund and investment in so far as other related colliery and also any money lawfully due to the owner of such mines in respect of any period prior to the "appointed day" had vested in the Central Government. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff-bank was debarred from realizing the amount on the basis of hypothecated coal bills. Under such statutory bar, it would be futile to claim that the bank was negligent to realizing the money on the basis of hypothecated coal bills and, therefore, can not make any claim for dues from the defendants. 14. As regards the ground that the suit is barred by res judicata, the stand of the appellants is that since the plaintiff-bank had elected the forum before the Commissioner of Payments for realizing its dues payable by the defendant No. 1 and since the order of Commissioner of Payments being a final order and not appealable, the plaintiff-bank could not have resorted to filing the suit before the civil Court for the self same claim. The appellants would explain that the principle of res judicata is applicable even to quasi judicial body and since the Commissioner of Payments constitutes such quasi judicial body, the same principle would apply against the plaintiff-bank in the instant case. This plea of the appellant is also not tenable. 15. The appellants would explain that the principle of res judicata is applicable even to quasi judicial body and since the Commissioner of Payments constitutes such quasi judicial body, the same principle would apply against the plaintiff-bank in the instant case. This plea of the appellant is also not tenable. 15. Section 23 of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972 contains provisions wherein parties having any claim against the erstwhile owner of a coal mine which has vested under the provisions of Nationalization Act, may prefer a claim before the Commissioner of Payments and the Commissioner of Payments, if the claim is allowed, shall pay keeping in view the provisions of that section, to the claimants out of compensation which was deposited by the Central Government with the Commissioner of Payments in respect of coal mines in question, The section has classified different debts in different classes. Some classes of debts will have priority over the other classes of debts. The amount deposited as compensation in respect of the colliery in question may be even insufficient to meet all the debts in full or in part.Thus, for the purpose of recovery of any money allowed by the Claims Commissioner, a claimant cannot pursue any property other than the compensation deposited with the Commissioner of Payments. The Nationalization Act neither directly nor by necessary implication takes away the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to entertain suits against ex-owner of the collieries nationalized and particularly so in respect of the claims arising before the appointed day i.e. May 1st, 1973. Sections 20 and 23 merely lays down the procedure for having certain claims admitted and adjudicated upon by the Commissioner of Payments at the instance of the creditors to be realized out of compensation monies in the hands of the Government payable to such owners. The Act does not prescribe any forum against the ex-owners of the colliery for such claims. The right to recover debt by the creditors is protected under the general law. There is no provision in the Nationalization Act which expressly or by necessary implication, oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court. To reiterate Section 23 of the Nationalization Act. it is only an additional forum. Reference may be made in this regard to the case of Gupteshwar Prasad Singh v. Allahabad Bank and Ors. reported in 1988 PLJR 886. 16. There is no provision in the Nationalization Act which expressly or by necessary implication, oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court. To reiterate Section 23 of the Nationalization Act. it is only an additional forum. Reference may be made in this regard to the case of Gupteshwar Prasad Singh v. Allahabad Bank and Ors. reported in 1988 PLJR 886. 16. It is held therefore that in the instant case, the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the provisions of Section 11, CPC is not attracted. It further needs to be clarified that if a claim under Section 23 of the Nationalization Act is accepted, the creditors in a suit cannot claim against that amount that he may receive from the Commissioner of Payments. In the instant case, learned Court below has rightly considered the payment already received by the respondents from the Commissioner of Payments and has rightly decreed the suit in part of the balance of dues as payable by the appellants/defendants. 17. For the above reasons, I do not find any merit in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, parties shall bear their own cost(s).