Judgment :- Common Order The petitioners are owners of different categories of vehicles, registered in the State of Andhra Pradesh. In this batch of writ petitions, they assail the validity of G.O.Ms.No.239, Transport, Roads & Buildings (TR.I) Department, and dated 24.11.2006. Through the impugned G.O., the State ordained that the Light Commercial Vehicles, Goods Vehicles, Maxi Cabs (passenger vehicles), Educational Institution buses, registered in the Districts of Hyderabad, Ranga Reddy, Nalgonda and Chittoor, and such of the vehicles, though registered in other districts, but operating in the districts referred to above, must be fitted with speed governors, limiting the maximum speed at 65 KMs. per hour. It was also directed that the speed governors so fitted shall bear an official seal of the concerned Road Transport Authority, in such a way as not to leave any scope for tampering. The petitioners contend that the G.O. is contrary to Rule 118 of Central Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 (for short “the Rules”), discriminatory in effect, and not supported by relevant material. They submit that Rule 118 is specific about the type of vehicles and not the regions, in which the vehicles are operated or registered. Petitioners submit that leaving aside several types of vehicles, such as, buses, maxi cabs, which are the main source of accidents, the Government has chosen three types of vehicles, without any basis, and thereby accorded discriminatory treatment. On behalf of the State, the Joint Transport Commissioner (Planning) filed a detailed counter affidavit. After referring to the various provisions of the Act and the object underlying them, it is pleaded that the necessity to issue the GO arose, on account of the huge number of accidents that are taking place in the regions mentioned in the order. Reference is made to the statistics collected about the occurrence of accidents in various regions, over the past 5 years. While controverting the plea of writ petitioners, it is stated that the Motor Vehicles Act (for short “the Act”) and the Rules made there under, confer ample power on the State Government, to take traffic safety and other related measures, in public interest. The plea of discrimination is controverter. The deponent of the counter affidavit has also stated that on certain aspects, which had a bearing on the implementation of the impugned GO, clarification and further directions from the government are awaited. The plea of discrimination is controverter. The deponent of the counter affidavit has also stated that on certain aspects, which had a bearing on the implementation of the impugned GO, clarification and further directions from the government are awaited. An additional counter affidavit is also filed, furnishing certain clarifications. Important among them is that the Government intends to implement the fixation of speed governors to different categories of vehicles in a phased manner, and the present one is said to be the first phase. It is stated that in the second phase, the areas covered by Municipal Corporations, and in the third phase, rest of the State, would be brought under the purview. A further submission is to the effect that heavy goods vehicles and heavy passenger vehicles would also be brought under the regime, in course of time. Relevant statistics are also furnished. Arguments on behalf of the petitioners were addressed by Sri Noushad Ali, learned counsel, and supplemented by other counsel. It is contended that Rule 118 of the Rules empowers the State Government, to insist on fitting of speed governors for certain types of vehicles, without any restriction as to area, whereas, in the impugned GO, the insistence is only on certain categories of vehicles, which are registered in the four districts mentioned therein, or registered elsewhere, but plying in those districts. Learned counsel further submits that the GO is ex-facie discriminatory, inasmuch as it not only brings about differential treatment to various categories of vehicles, but also to the same categories of vehicles, depending on the place of registration, or operation. Learned counsel submits that even the statistics that are relied upon by the respondents do not support the impugned action of the government. Sri Sudhir Kumar learned Special Government Pleader, appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the State Government has not only the power, but also the duty to take steps for ensuring road and traffic safety. He contends that the impugned GO accords with the letter and spirit of Section 110 of the Act and Rule 118 of the Rules. It is also his case that the plea of discrimination is untenable, and that it is impossible to conceive of, identical regulatory measures, in respect of all categories of vehicles. He contends that the impugned GO accords with the letter and spirit of Section 110 of the Act and Rule 118 of the Rules. It is also his case that the plea of discrimination is untenable, and that it is impossible to conceive of, identical regulatory measures, in respect of all categories of vehicles. He submits that the government examined the matter, in a very objective manner, duly taking into account the relevant factors, and that no interference is warranted. The Motor Vehicles Act is a comprehensive legislation, which consolidated the law relating to the motor vehicles. The Act contains several chapters, dealing with important aspects, such as, granting of licence to drivers, registration of motor vehicles, control of transport vehicles, control of traffic, settlement of accident claims, involving motor vehicles, offences and penalties, etc. The speed of the vehicles and the density of the traffic at a given area, usually lead to accidents, resulting in death of, or injuries to human beings, apart from damage and losses of other categories. Chapter VIII of the Act is devoted to the control of traffic. Under Section 112 of the Act, various authorities are conferred with the power to prescribe the speed limits, and to take other safety measures. Other provisions of the chapter provide for ancillary measures, in this regard. In addition to indicating the measures referred to in chapter VIII, the Act conferred power, on the State and Central Governments, to take regulatory measures, through the process of subordinate legislation. Section 110 of the Act, empowers the Central Government to make rules, on several aspects, including the one, to direct the fitting of speed governors (clause (f). In exercise of powers, conferred under Section 110 of the Act, the Central Government framed the rules. Rule 118 thereof reads as under: “118. Section 110 of the Act, empowers the Central Government to make rules, on several aspects, including the one, to direct the fitting of speed governors (clause (f). In exercise of powers, conferred under Section 110 of the Act, the Central Government framed the rules. Rule 118 thereof reads as under: “118. Speed Governor: (1) On and from the commencement of this Rule, such transport vehicles as may be notified by the State Government in the Official Gazette shall be fitted by the operator of such transport vehicle with a speed governor (speed controlling device) conforming to the Standards AIS:018, as amended from time to time"] the Bureau of Indian Standards, in such a manner that the speed governor can be sealed with an official seal of the State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority in such a way that it cannot be removed or tampered with without the seal being broken. (2) The speed governor of every transport vehicle shall be so set that the vehicle is incapable of being driven at a speed in excess of the maximum pre-set speed of the vehicle except down an incline.” This rule empowers the State Government, to notify category of transport vehicles that must be fitted with speed governors. The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued the impugned G.O, in exercise of power under this Rule. The text of the G.O is briefed and it is reproduced hereunder. “In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Central Act 59 of 1988) read with Rule 118 of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the Government of Andhra Pradesh hereby order that Education Institution buses, Light Commercial Vehicles (goods vehicles), and Maxi Cabs (Passenger Vehicles) on the rolls of Hyderabad, Cyberabad area of Ranga Reddy, Nalgonda and Chittoor Districts and the vehicles of these categories from outside operating in the above areas shall be fitted by the operators of these vehicles with speed governors limiting maximum speed at 65 kilo meters per hour except down an incline from the date to be notified by the Transport Commissioner. The speed governor shall be sealed with an official seal of the Regional Transport Authority concerned in such a way that it cannot be removed or tampered with, without the seal being broken.” From a reading of the GO, it becomes clear that the three categories of vehicles are covered by it, viz; Educational Institution buses (as defined under Section 2(11) of the Act), Light Commercial Vehicles, which answer the description of goods carriage (Section 2(14) and Maxi Cabs (Section 2(22). Had the G.O notified that the vehicles of the above categories must be fitted with speed governors; there would not have been any serious controversy. However, the insistence on fitting of speed governors to the said category of vehicles is restricted to those that are on the rolls of Hyderabad, part of Ranga Reddy, Nalgonda and Chittoor Districts, or registered in other places, but operating in the said districts. The effect of the G.O is that; a) The vehicles of the three categories mentioned above, registered in the four districts, whether or not they ply in the same districts, or outside; and b) Vehicles plying in the four districts, irrespective of the place of their registration; are required to be fitted with speed governors. The state may be clear in its object, in issuing the G.O, viz; to curtail and control the occurrence of accidents, in the places referred to above. Statistics are furnished to support the action. The petitioners strenuously contended that the statistics furnished by the State do not support the G.O, particularly in view of the fact that the places, where the occurrence of accidents is more, have been excluded, and artificial division within some districts was made to exclude certain places from the purview of the restrictions. Assuming that there is truth and strength in the contention of the petitioners, this factor by itself does not vitiate the G.O. The reason is that the power of the state to impose the restrictions under Rule 118 is almost absolute. This, however, does not put an end to the controversy. On a plain reading of Rule 118, particularly the expression ‘such transport vehicles’, a strong, if not clear, view emerges that it is ‘type’ or ‘category’ specific, than ‘place’ specific. The expression ‘transport vehicles’, occurring in Rule 118, is very wide in its purport. This, however, does not put an end to the controversy. On a plain reading of Rule 118, particularly the expression ‘such transport vehicles’, a strong, if not clear, view emerges that it is ‘type’ or ‘category’ specific, than ‘place’ specific. The expression ‘transport vehicles’, occurring in Rule 118, is very wide in its purport. It is defined under sub-section (47) of Section 2 of the Act, as under: “Transport vehicle” means a public service vehicle, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a private service vehicle;” Each of the expressions employed in this definition are, in turn, defined in various provisions, as to include several categories of vehicles. Inasmuch as the expression ‘transport vehicle’ is wide in its purport, the word ‘such’ would qualify the species of vehicles picked up from the genus ‘transport vehicles’. In other words, the notification issued by the State Government, under Rule 118, need not necessarily be, for the entire category of transport vehicles, but such class of vehicles, as may be identified. Therefore, the notification issued under this provision must be, with reference to ‘such category of transport vehicles’, as the State Government chooses. The rule does not further empower the State Government, to confine the purport of the requirement arising out of the notification, to any particular area in the state. It is possible to argue that the expression ‘such transport vehicles’ can be employed, to connote the transport vehicles as are registered, or operating in a particular area in the state, and that the focus of the word ‘such’ would be on the areas, in addition to the types of transport vehicles. Howsoever grammatically, or etymologically it may be feasible to take such a view, in the context of implementation of restrictions, on the operators of motor vehicles, on this premise, it becomes somewhat difficult. It would bring about ambiguity and uncertainty of serious proportions. A clear distinction is to be maintained between the necessity to control the speed of a vehicle at a particular place, on the one hand, and the need to disable the vehicle itself from running beyond a stipulated speed, on the other. The former is achieved by taking various steps under Chapter VIII, whereas, the latter is accomplished through a notification issued under Rule 118. The former is achieved by taking various steps under Chapter VIII, whereas, the latter is accomplished through a notification issued under Rule 118. In the former category of cases, the guiding factors are occurrence of accidents at a particular place, or region, safety on roads and bridges, etc. In the second category, the predominant object is to ensure that the vehicle as such, does not become a traffic hazard, even if it is traveling on a fairly good road, without any traffic congestion. In a given case, the restriction imposed under Rule 118 may sub-serve the dual purpose. However, if it is resorted to check the traffic hazards alone, that too at some limited places, the restrictions are prone to become unreasonable. It can be illustrated by the following examples. Place “A”, spread over 100 Sq. kilometers, may have witnessed frequent accidents, through a particular category of vehicles. Various steps contemplated under Chapter VIII, may be sufficient to restrict the speed of vehicles passing through that place. However, if speed governor, in the manner provided for under Rule 118, is to be fitted to every vehicle of a particular category passing through the area, serious disadvantage has to be suffered by the vehicle, when it travels in other parts of the state, as well as the places outside the State, if it is otherwise permitted to operate. Therefore, the enforcing authority has to be clear in its object and careful in choosing the course of action. The State Government itself was conscious and mindful of these restrictions. In paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit, it is stated as under: “…It is a fact that a vehicle may start in one district and proceed to any other district or outside the State in its operation. It is also a fact that vehicles, which are not on the rolls of the above districts, may also pass through them by way of transit. Since restriction has been imposed by a statutory notification in the interest of road safety, vehicles of the above three categories born on the rolls of the above four districts shall be fitted with “speed governors”. The notification issued by the State Government is neither arbitrary nor irrational. Since restriction has been imposed by a statutory notification in the interest of road safety, vehicles of the above three categories born on the rolls of the above four districts shall be fitted with “speed governors”. The notification issued by the State Government is neither arbitrary nor irrational. However, as regards the similar category of vehicles, which are on the rolls other districts and passing through the above four notified districts, the matter is under consideration of the Government to exempt them from fitment of “speed governors.” In paragraph 8, it is stated that the Transport Commissioner had addressed letters to the Government, seeking clarification as regards; 1) Light Goods vehicles whose maximum speed would not exceed the speed limit prescribed in the notification issued under section 112 of M.V.Act, as certified by the manufacturers and tested by the testing agencies. 2) Vehicles of the above categories registered in other districts but would pass through the above notified districts in course of their business; and that the matter is pending decision with the government. Let it be assumed that the G.O, in its present form, is otherwise valid, notwithstanding the fact that it is made applicable only to vehicles that are registered, or operating in the places mentioned therein. Still, the ambiguity and uncertainty, in the matter of implementation, would loom large. If the intention of the G.O is to curb the accidents, in the places mentioned therein, the mere fact that a vehicle is registered in those places couldn’t become a determining factor. Though registered in one of the districts mentioned in the G.O, the vehicle may, in fact, be plying in other parts of the state, or the country. So far as the vehicles registered in the districts, other than those mentioned in the G.O, are concerned, even a mere entry into such places would bring them under the obligation to be fitted with speed governors. Further, the insistence on fitting of speed governors to the vehicle is at the time of issuing fitness certificate to a vehicle. Take for instance, a school bus registered in Guntur District. The restriction does not apply to it, and accordingly, it can be issued a fitness certificate, without insisting on installation of speed governor to it. Further, the insistence on fitting of speed governors to the vehicle is at the time of issuing fitness certificate to a vehicle. Take for instance, a school bus registered in Guntur District. The restriction does not apply to it, and accordingly, it can be issued a fitness certificate, without insisting on installation of speed governor to it. However, if it passes through any of the four districts by chance, may be for the purpose of excursion, or study tour for the students, the requirement under the G.O, becomes applicable to such vehicles also. The G.O. is not clear about the nature of ‘operation’ of the vehicles, in the places mentioned in it. The word ‘operation’ is also not defined under the Act, or the Rules. Therefore, it makes little difference whether the vehicle registered outside, entered the four districts, per chance, or on a solitary trip, or is being operated on a regular basis. It becomes clear that an absurd situation arises, at least in the context of the vehicles registered outside, but entering the districts mentioned in the G.O. May be weak, but the ambiguity in a provision or absurdity, resulting out of its implementation, are grounds for interference by the courts. If the provision of a legislation is capable of being construed only in one manner, and such an interpretation leads to uncertainty or absurdity, the provision itself can be set aside. Where, however, it is capable of being construed, in many ways, one of which leads to uncertainty or absurdity, the provision can be kept intact, but the construction leading to uncertainty or absurdity must be avoided, or rejected. The principle was stated by the House of Lords in SHANNON REALITIES LTD. v. ST.MICHEL (VILLE DE) [1], as under: “Where words of a statute are clear, they must, of course, be followed but in their Lordships’ opinion, where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system.” Difficulty arises, when legislature resorts to syllepsis, i.e. application of one word, to govern or modify the other, in different senses, though it agrees grammatically with only one of them. In such cases, the provision cannot be treated, or branded as ambiguous. However, when an alternative meaning emerges, on account of the operation of the syllepsis, and that meaning leads to absurdity, or ambiguity, the principle laid down by the House of Lords comes into play. In the instant case, the word ‘such’ occurring before the expression ‘transport vehicles in Rule 118, is understood at least by the State, as governing two situations, viz; a) Transport vehicles of a particular make or use; and b) Transport vehicles registered, or being operated at a particular place. While there cannot be any qualms for enforcing the provision, vis-à-vis the category of vehicles, serious ambiguity, or absurdity, would certainly emerge, when it is employed to connote the place of registration, or area of operation. It has already been demonstrated as to how the latter course is opposed to the very object underlying the provision, or the scheme of the Act. Therefore, the impugned G.O. cannot be sustained in law. It is not as if the Act and the Rules are not helpful to impose restrictions on the speed of the vehicles in particular areas. The Act contains fairly good number of sections in Chapter-VIII, devoted to control of traffic. Section 112 provides for limiting of speed at public places. Different authorities are conferred with the power to place the speed restrictions, in the interest of public safety, or convenience, or in road, bridge, etc. The method of enforcing these restrictions is stipulated in other sections in the chapter. Though strenuous contentions are advanced on behalf of the petitioners, alleging discrimination, this court is not impressed by the same. It cannot be gain said that motor vehicles of different sizes and of different categories couldn’t be treated alike. Depending on their seize, utility and other similar factors, the State has to take relevant steps, to ensure public and road safety. In fact, the Act itself maintains clear distinction between several categories of vehicles, from the purview of the registration, licensing, regulation, etc. The contention that the impugned G.O is not supported by relevant material is equally unacceptable. Once the State Government is conferred with the power under Rule 118 to notify the categories of transport vehicles for installation of speed governors, it is not necessary that there must be factual background for resorting to that power. The contention that the impugned G.O is not supported by relevant material is equally unacceptable. Once the State Government is conferred with the power under Rule 118 to notify the categories of transport vehicles for installation of speed governors, it is not necessary that there must be factual background for resorting to that power. The presumption is that the statutory power is exercised properly. It is for the parties pleading otherwise, to establish that the power was not exercised with a bona fide intention. The petitioners are not able to satisfy this court that there is lack of bona fides, on the part of the government, in issuing the impugned G.O. It has already been observed that even according to the respondents, the various aspects of the matter, in the course of implementation of the G.O., are under consideration of the government. It hardly needs any emphasis that insistence on fixation of speed governors on a particular category of vehicles not only involves substantial expenditure, but also would reduce the utility of the vehicle, correspondingly. Before resorting to such steps, the government must satisfy itself, in all respects. Though the object sought to be achieved through issuing the G.O. appears to be laudable, the steps indicated therein do not accord with law. Necessary corrective steps need to be undertaken, in the context of the discussion undertaken in the preceding paragraphs. For this purpose, the state is granted time till 15.7.2007, to issue fresh orders, if it is so advised. Till such time, the impugned G.O. can be permitted to hold the field, subject to certain conditions. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitions are allowed to the extent that; a) The G.O.Ms.No.239, Transport, Roads & Buildings (TR.I) Department, dated 24.11.2006, insofar as it insists on installation of speed governors to the categories of transport vehicles, registered or operating in Hyderabad, Ranga Reddy, Nalgonda and Chittoor districts, is illegal and contrary to the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules made there under. b) The impugned GO shall, however, remain in force, till 15.7.2007 with the modification, which the restriction therein shall not apply to the vehicles registered outside the districts mentioned in it, as well as to those registered in those districts, but operating outside the said districts. Within this time, it shall be open to the Government to issue fresh orders, in accordance with law. Within this time, it shall be open to the Government to issue fresh orders, in accordance with law. Either way, the impugned G.O. would become inoperative after 15th July 2007. It shall also be open to the government and its subordinates, to take steps under Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, to regulate the traffic and speed, particularly in the areas, where the occurrence of accidents is more. c) There shall be no order as to costs.