Judgment :- This revision is directed against the dismissal of the Petition in I.A.No.20598/2004 in O.S.No.175/1991 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, declining to condone the delay of 939 days in filing the application to set aside the exparte Decree. .2. Respondents 1 and 2/Plaintiffs filed the suit O.S.No. 175/1991 for setting aside the Sale Deeds dated 02.04.1984 and 31.07.1985 and for partition and separate possession. Respondents 3 and 4 are the mother and brother of Respondents 1 and 2. The suit was originally filed before the High Court on 02.05.1986 and later the suit was transferred to the City Civil Court, Chennai. Originally, Petitioners who are Defendants 7 and 8 in the suit were not parties in the suit. I.A.No.1865/1993 was filed for impleading the Petitioners as well as 9th Respondent as Defendants 7 to 9. Notice was served by Substituted Service and Petitioners were impleaded as Defendants 7 and 8. In the suit also, Petitioners were served only by substituted Service and the Petitioners were set exparte on 26.03.2002 and exparte Preliminary Decree for partition was passed on 26.03.2002. Final Decree application was filed, in which notice was served upon the Petitioners. Stating that they had knowledge of the proceedings only from 011. 2004, the date on which notices were served in the Final Decree proceedings, Petitioners filed application to set aside the Preliminary Decree passed on 26.03.2002 along with application under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 939 days. The Respondents 1 and 2 strongly resisted the application. 3. Finding that the reason for delay of 939 days is not satisfactorily explained, and no sufficient cause has been shown for the delay, the lower Court dismissed the application. The trial Court further observed that the first Petitioner having admitted that private notice was served upon her, there is no reason for condoning the delay. 4. Assailing the impugned Order and placing reliance upon a number of decisions, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that if the delay is not condoned, the Petitioners would be deprived of the valuable rights. Placing reliance upon a number of decisions, it was submitted that the consistent view taken by the various Courts is to adopt a liberal approach, liberally construing the expression sufficient cause. 5. Placing reliance upon a number of decisions, it was submitted that the consistent view taken by the various Courts is to adopt a liberal approach, liberally construing the expression sufficient cause. 5. Submitting that the application was filed only in the Final Decree stage, the learned Counsel for the Respondents urged that the Petitioners had knowledge of the suit. Since the first Petitioner was served with notice, it was submitted that when Preliminary Decree has been passed, in the Final Decree stage, the same cannot be challenged. 6. It is settled law that Sec. 5 application is to be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice to the parties, Sec.5 gives the Court discretion which is to be exercised in the way in which the judicial power and discretion are to be exercised upon principles which are well understood. The words, sufficient cause should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to the Petitioners. 7. Holding that the expression "sufficient cause" should receive liberal construction, in 2005 (2) CTC 706 [Mohammed Aslam and others Vs. Gowdhaman], Division Bench of this Court has held that length of delay is no matter and acceptability of explanation is the only criterion and some times delay of short range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation, whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range may be condoned as the explanation therefor is satisfactory. In every case of delay, there maybe some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned and delay will be condoned if explanation does not smack malafide and it is not put forth as part of dilatory strategy. The phrase "sufficient cause" should receive liberal construction. .8. Elaborately discussing the scope and discretion under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, in 2005 (3) SCC 752 [State of Nagaland Vs.Lipok Ao and others], the Supreme Court has held as follows: - ."8.The proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction (sic discretion) vested in the Court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy [ AIR 1998 SC 3222 ] it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels. 9. In 2002 (2) CTC 349 [Municipal Corporation, Gwalior Vs. Ramchandran (D) by Lrs. and others], the Supreme Court has held that when valuable rights of parties in immovable properties are involved, the High Court should have condoned the delay and concentrated on examining whether the appeal raised any substantial question of law. The Supreme Court has condoned the delay of 39 days in filing the second appeal by the Municipal Corporation of Gwalior. 10. For the proposition that sufficient cause must receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when no negligence or inaction is imputable to the Petitioner, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners placed reliance upon the following decisions - 2005(5)CTC 433 – Shankar Vs. The Oriental Insurance Company ltd. By its representatives and others; 2005(4)CTC 255 – Tarachand (deceased) and others Vs. Kathija; 2005 (3) MLJ 431 – Selvi Vs. Selvammal; 2005 (3) CTC 638 – Yanaimal Thottam Trust rep. By its Trustee Vs. Lakshmanan and another]; 2006 (2) CTC 388 – Syed Nusarathulla Vs.Natarajan and others]. 11.The true test is whether the Petitioners have acted with due diligence and whether no negligence or inaction is imputable to the Petitioner. 12.As noted earlier, Petitioners/Defendants 7 to 9 were originally not parties to the suit. Plaintiffs filed I.A.No. 1865/1993 for impleading the Petitioners as well as the 9th Respondent as parties - Defendants 7 to 9 in the suit. 12.As noted earlier, Petitioners/Defendants 7 to 9 were originally not parties to the suit. Plaintiffs filed I.A.No. 1865/1993 for impleading the Petitioners as well as the 9th Respondent as parties - Defendants 7 to 9 in the suit. In the impleading Petition, no notice was served to the Petitioners. It appears private notice to the first Petitioner was served upon her. For the second Petitioner, publication was effected in a Tamil News Daily and impleading application was allowed. Again in the suit stage, no suit summons was served on the Petitioners and again summons was served by substituted service. It is thus clear that both in the impleading Petition stage and in the suit, summons was effected only through substituted service. 13. Substituted service should be ordered only when the Court is satisfied that the Defendant is keeping out of way or that for other reasons, the Defendants could not be served in the ordinary way. Before ordering publication, service through Court notice as well as by registered post with acknowledgment due is to be simultaneously ordered. Failure to do so may lead to serious consequences and the unscrupulous parties might obtain a Decree without actual service of notice upon the Defendants. .14. Substituted service cannot be resorted to without taking efforts to effect service in the ordinary course i.e. through the Court as well as by registered post. Satisfaction of Court is essential for ordering substituted service. Although substituted service is effectual for the purpose of Or.V R.20(2) CPC, as if it had been made on the Defendant personally, the Defendants are entitled to show that it was not due service. 15. In the affidavit filed along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Petitioners have averred that they have not been served with any notice and paper publication is not due service. This Court finds that petitioners have shown sufficient cause for their non-appearance in the suit stage. 16. Earlier, suit was dismissed for default on 30.11.1999. Plaintiffs have filed I.A.No.17218/2000 under Or.1 R.9 CPC to restore the suit. Along with that application, Plaintiffs filed I.A.No.17219/2000 "to dispense with notice to the Defendants 1, 2 and 7 to 9". On 08.02.2001, the lower Court has passed Order dated 08.02.2001 stating that Defendants 1, 2, 7 to 9 are already set exparte in the suit and dispensed with the Notice. Along with that application, Plaintiffs filed I.A.No.17219/2000 "to dispense with notice to the Defendants 1, 2 and 7 to 9". On 08.02.2001, the lower Court has passed Order dated 08.02.2001 stating that Defendants 1, 2, 7 to 9 are already set exparte in the suit and dispensed with the Notice. In the restoration application, paper publication was ordered for Defendants 3 to 6 and publication was effected and Defendants 3 to 6 were set exparte. Restoration application was allowed and the suit was restored. It is seen that at all stages of the suit, no notice was served upon the Petitioners/Defendants 7 to 9. 17. Non appearance of the Petitioners in the suit stage appears to be bonafide. Private notice is said to have been served upon the first Petitioner. No sanctity could be attached to such service of private notice upon the first Petitioner. Private notice though permissible is not effectual as Court notice or RAPD. Where summons was not duly served on the Petitioners, they cannot possibly appear in the Court when the suit was taken up for hearing or at the subsequent dates. The fact that the first Petitioner had received private notice, cannot be the reason for declining to condone the delay. As such, no negligence nor inaction could be attributed to the Petitioners. .18. Plaintiffs have filed the suit for declaring the two Sale Deeds dated 02.04.1984 and 31.07.1985 executed by the Respondents 1 and 4 as null and void and for partition and separate possession of their 5/8th share. Respondents 1 to 4 are the sons and wife of late Nagabooshana Naidu. Plaintiffs have challenged the Sale Deeds in favour of Gnanaprakasam Alexis executed by the Respondents 1 to 4. The Petitioners claim to have purchased the property from the legal heirs of the said Gnanaprakasam Alexis. According to the Petitioners, they are in possession of the property for nearly 20 years and that they are paying revenue taxes and the revenue records also stand in their name. Serious issues are involved in the suit and the Defendants have substantial defence to putforth in the suit. When the Sale Deeds are challenged and when the subject matter of the property relates to immovable property, by remaining exparte, the Petitioners do not stand to gain anything. On the other hand, exparte Decree if sustained would cause serious prejudice to the Petitioners. When the Sale Deeds are challenged and when the subject matter of the property relates to immovable property, by remaining exparte, the Petitioners do not stand to gain anything. On the other hand, exparte Decree if sustained would cause serious prejudice to the Petitioners. While considering the application for condonation of delay, the lower Court ought to have kept in view the stake of respective parties and the hardship that might be caused to the Petitioners if exparte Decree is set aside. Between the same parties, there is also a preemption suit in O.S.No.7536/1996. In the said suit also, delay in filing the application to set aside the exparte Decree was allowed on terms. Revision Petition preferred against that Order in C.R.P.No.930/2004 was also dismissed by this Court. 19. Even though there is considerable delay in filing the application, it cannot be held that the Petitioners had deliberately delayed the matter. Ordinarily, litigant is not expected to derive any benefit by simply delaying in moving the Court in suits of immovable properties. In this connection, it is worthwhile to refer to the observations made in the decision AIR 1987 SC 1353 [Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs.Mst.Katiji and others], wherein it is held as follows::- "..... It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that - .(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. .(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. .(3) "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. .(4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. .(4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. .(5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. .(6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so". 20.Having regard to the nature of the suit, I am of the considered view that the delay in filing the application to set aside the exparte Decree is to be condoned. When there is no proper exercise of discretion by the lower Court, it is always open to the revisional Court to consider the cause shown. No negligence, inaction or lack of bonafide could be attributed to the Petitioners. Notwithstanding the serious objection raised by the counsel for the Respondents, this Court is inclined to condone the delay, however on terms. The trial Court is directed to number the application under Or.9 R.13 CPC and allow the same after setting aside the exparte Decree. 21.In the result, the order passed in I.A.No.20598/2004 in O.S.No.175/1991 dated 03.03.2006 on the file of VI Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai is set aside and this Revision Petition is allowed. No costs. CMP No.6140/2006 is closed. Section 5 application would be allowed on payment of cost of Rs.5,000/-[Rupees Five Thousand only] to the Respondents 1 and 2/Plaintiffs, within a period of six weeks from the date of this Order. 22.The trial Court is directed to afford sufficient opportunity to the Petitioners to file Written Statement and proceed with the matter in accordance with law. 23.The trial Court is directed to proceed with the suit in accordance with law.