Research › Search › Judgment

Chhattisgarh High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 517 (CHH)

Ram Prasad Agrawal v. Rammanohar Soni.

2007-08-30

D.R.DESHMUKH

body2007
JUDGMENT 1. This is the defendant/tenant's second appeal. 2. The respondent/plaintiff had instituted a suit for eviction of the appellant/defendant on grounds under Section 12(1)(b)(c)(d) and (m) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961(henceforth `the Act, 1961'). 3. Vide judgment and decree dated 06-07-2000 passed by Ist Civil Judge Class-I, Rajnandgaon in Civil Suit No.9-A/1998 the suit was decreed on all the aforesaid grounds. 4. The appellant/defendant preferred first appeal. Ist Additional District Judge, Rajnandgaon, vide judgment and decree dated 11-12-2002 in Civil Appeal No.15-A/2000, affirmed the findings recorded by the trial Court relating to grounds for eviction under Section 12(1)(b) and (c) of the Act, 1961 while reversing the trial Court's judgment and decree for eviction under Section 12(1)(d) and (m) of the Act, 1961. 5. It is not in dispute that the appellant/defendant is a tenant in the suit accommodation situated at Manav Mandir Chowk, Rajnandgaon, which is shown in red colour in Schedule A to the plaint. The appellant/defendant was inducted as a tenant in the suit accommodation by Chaituram, father of the respondent/plaintiff. 6. The respondent/plaintiff had pleaded that in the year 1979, the appellant/defendant had sub-let the chabutara and open land in front of the suit accommodation to one Moti Halwai for doing the business of sweets. It was also pleaded by an amendment incorporated subsequently in the year 1995 that the appellant/defendant had sub-let the suit accommodation for purposes of business and was not in occupation of the suit accommodation. As regards the ground under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, 1961 is concerned, the respondent/plaintiff relied on the pleadings of the appellant/defendant in para 2 of the written statement, which is as under : 7. The appellant/defendant denied the plaint allegations in toto. In his testimony, the appellant/defendant did not deny that the respondent/plaintiff was not the landlord. It was stated that his son Manoj Kumar was running a shop "Agrawal Stationery and Books" in the suit premises jointly with him. 8. The lower appellate Court, while affirming the judgment and decree under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, 1961 passed by the trial Court, stated in para 11 of the judgment as under: 9. It was stated that his son Manoj Kumar was running a shop "Agrawal Stationery and Books" in the suit premises jointly with him. 8. The lower appellate Court, while affirming the judgment and decree under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, 1961 passed by the trial Court, stated in para 11 of the judgment as under: 9. In the above scenario, this appeal raises the following two substantial questions of law: "(A) Whether the First Appellate Court erred in not appreciating the evidence on record relating to the ground of eviction of the tenant under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act and thereby fell into error while affirming the finding recorded by the trial Court under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act without application of mind to the evidence led by the parties? (B) Whether the pleading of the appellant/defendant that besides the plaintiff other members of his family were joint-owners of the suit house and thus necessary parties in the suit would amount to denial of title of the landlord by the tenant so as to provide the ground under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act?" 10. Shri Anoop Majumdar, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant placed reliance on Ramlal and another vs. Phagua and others, 2005 AIR SCW 6348 while arguing that the lower appellate Court being the final Court of fact ought not to have mechanically affirmed the findings of the trial Court on the ground of eviction under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, 1961. It was, therefore, argued that in second appeal, the High Court should re-appreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. Placing reliance on Madhukar and others vs. Sangram and others, 2001 AIR SCW 1804, it was argued that first appeal being a valuable right, it was the duty of the lower appellate Court to deal with all issues and evidence led by the parties before recording any finding. Since the lower appellate Court, without assigning any reasons, simply recorded an agreement with the finding recorded by the trial Court, the impugned judgment was liable to be set aside. Since the lower appellate Court, without assigning any reasons, simply recorded an agreement with the finding recorded by the trial Court, the impugned judgment was liable to be set aside. It was also contended that since the respondent/plaintiff had not given any intimation to the appellant/defendant about having received the suit accommodation on a partition effected by Chaituram, the appellant/defendant had raised a question that other co-owners were necessary parties, which did not in any manner tantamount to dis-owning the character and nature of possession over the suit premises as a tenant. Placing reliance on Sheela and others vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash (supra), it was urged that the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, 1961 was liable to be set aside. 11. On the other hand, Shri P.K.C.Tiwari, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent/plaintiff argued in support of the impugned judgment. Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent/plaintiff, while placing reliance on Girijanandini Devi and others vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124, contended that it is not the duty of the appellate Court when it agrees with the view of the trial Court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court, decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice. 12. It was also submitted that for constituting a ground under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, 1961, it is not necessary that sub-letting should continue on the date of the suit. It was proved that the appellant/defendant had sub-let a part of the premises to Moti Halwai for conducting sweets business at some point of time, which, by itself, constitutes a ground for eviction of the tenant under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, 1961. Reliance was also placed on Gajanan Dattatraya vs. Sherbanu Hosang Patel and others, AIR 1975 SC 2156. Placing reliance on Fida Husain vs. Abdul Gaffor, 1979 (2) All India Rent Control Journal 449, it was submitted that disclaimer of title of a co-owner by the tenant by pleading sole ownership in another co-owner constitutes a ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, 1961. Placing reliance on Fida Husain vs. Abdul Gaffor, 1979 (2) All India Rent Control Journal 449, it was submitted that disclaimer of title of a co-owner by the tenant by pleading sole ownership in another co-owner constitutes a ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, 1961. Placing reliance on Babu Lal S/o Gopilal Jain vs. Bilasi Bai W/o Seetaram Trivedi and another, 1998 MPACJ 151, it was submitted that there is overwhelming evidence, oral as well as documentary, to show that the tenant had parted with possession of the tenanted accommodation in favour of his son, which constituted valid ground for eviction of tenant under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, 1961. Reliance was also placed on Gajra Bevel Gears Ltd. (M/s.) vs. Manohar and others, 1997 (2) JLJ 127. 13. So far as the first substantial question of law is concerned, a perusal of para 11 of the impugned judgment shows that the lower appellate Court has expressed complete agreement with the appreciation of evidence in paragraphs 26 to 31 by the trial Court and the findings recorded on the ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, 1961. Paragraphs 24 to 32 of the judgment of the trial Court are as under: (14) Ex.P-48, which is a publication in daily Sabera The above publication clearly shows that the appellant/defendant had parted with possession of the suit shop in favour of Manoj Agrawal. 15. Testimony of the respondent/plaintiff that the appellant/defendant had sub-let the chabutara and some portion of the land in front of the suit shop to Moti Halwai is wholly unrebutted. Asandas, P.W.-2 has also deposed that Moti Halwai was conducting a sweet shop at the platform during the period when the appellant/defendant had closed the typing shop. The appellant/defendant has also admitted in cross- examination in paragraphs 25 and 26 that his typing shop did not exist in the suit accommodation since 1980 and has further admitted in para 33 of his testimony that Rajesh Kumar, his son-in-law had also conducted business for some time in the suit shop. The appellant/defendant also admitted in para 31 that the licence of the shop "Agrawal Book Sellers and Stationers" was taken in the name of his son Manoj Agrawal. The appellant/defendant also admitted in para 31 that the licence of the shop "Agrawal Book Sellers and Stationers" was taken in the name of his son Manoj Agrawal. This is further substantiated by the testimony of Dharmpal Gajbhiye, P.W.-5, who has proved the entry in the register maintained under the M.P. Shops and Establishments Act, 1958 showing the registration of the Agrawal Book Sellers and Stationers, Manav Mandir Chowk, Rajnandgaon in the name of Manoj Agrawal. 16. Upon a minute scrutiny of the evidence adduced by the parties and the findings recorded by the trial Court in paragraphs 26 to 31, in the light of the circumstances mentioned above, I am of the considered opinion that the lower appellate Court has rightly expressed agreement with the finding recorded by the trial Court on the ground of eviction under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, 1961. The trial Court had, on a proper consideration of the entire evidence and the subsequent conduct of the parties, recorded a finding wholly consistent with law that the ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, 1961 was established. Therefore, the lower appellate Court was not required to enter upon a re-appraisal of the evidence and general approval of the reasons assigned by the trial Court in support of its conclusion was sufficient. In Girijanandini Devi and others vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary (supra), the Apex Court held as under: "(12) ..... It is not the duty of the appellate Court when it agrees with the view of the Trial Court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the Trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." 17. In this view of the matter, the lower appellate Court did not commit any error in agreeing generally with the reasons given and the finding recorded by the trial Court for coming to a conclusion that the ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, 1961 was established. Since the trial Court had, on proper appreciation of the entire evidence, recorded the above finding, the expression of general agreement by the lower appellate Court with the reasons given by the trial Court is not contrary to law. Since the trial Court had, on proper appreciation of the entire evidence, recorded the above finding, the expression of general agreement by the lower appellate Court with the reasons given by the trial Court is not contrary to law. The first substantial question of law is accordingly answered in negative against the appellant/defendant and in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. 18. A word of caution needs to be made here. The lower appellate Court, in a situation like this, should first deal with the grounds raised by the appellant/defendant in appeal as also during arguments while challenging the finding of the trial Court on an issue. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant should be dealt with one by one. Upon negativing the grounds urged by the appellant for arriving at a different conclusion, the lower appellate Court would have been justified in making an expression of general agreement with the findings recorded by the trial Court. Judgment of the lower appellate Court should reveal application of mind to the grounds of challenge to the finding recorded by the trial Court. 19. So far as the second substantial question of law is concerned, it is pertinent to note that the respondent/plaintiff had admitted in para 27 of his testimony that he had not sent any information to the appellant/defendant about having received the suit accommodation in a partition. Since the appellant/defendant was admittedly inducted as a tenant in the suit accommodation by Chaituram, pleadings in para 2 of the written statement, quoted above, are to be viewed in that context. In Sheela and others vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 1264, the Apex Court has laid down the principle, under which denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of the tenancy by the tenant may constitute an act adversely and substantially effecting the interest of the landlord and thereby providing a ground for eviction of the tenant under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, 1961. In para 17, the Apex Court held as under: "17. In our opinion, denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of Cl. (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. In our opinion, denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of Cl. (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial or disclaimer, as would entail forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a third party. A tenant bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove his ownership or putting the landlord to proof of his title so as to protect himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection made available to him by Rent Control Law but without disowning his character of possession over the tenancy premises as tenant cannot be said to have denied the title of landlord or disclaimed the tenancy. Such an act of the tenant does not attract applicability of S. 12 (1)(c) abovesaid. It is the intention of the tenant, as culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability." 20. In the light of the judgment of the Apex Court and the admission made by the respondent/plaintiff, the pleadings of the appellant/defendant in para 2 have to be construed in the above perspective to determine whether the tenant had disowned the character and nature of possession over the suit premises as tenant or not. The appellant/defendant was inducted as a tenant in the suit accommodation by Chaituram, father of the respondent/plaintiff and no intimation was given to the tenant about the suit accommodation having fallen to the share of the respondent/plaintiff in a partition. The intention of the tenant in raising the pleadings in para 2 of the written statement have to be culled out as raising purely a question of necessary parties and not as an act, which is likely to effect adversely or substantially the interest of the landlord or as a disclaimer of tenancy. The intention of the tenant in raising the pleadings in para 2 of the written statement have to be culled out as raising purely a question of necessary parties and not as an act, which is likely to effect adversely or substantially the interest of the landlord or as a disclaimer of tenancy. The second substantial question of law is accordingly answered that the pleadings of the appellant/defendant in para 2 of the written statement did not constitute denial of title of the landlord so as to provide a ground under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, 1961 to the respondent/plaintiff for eviction of the appellant/defendant. The judgment and decree under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, 1961 passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the lower appellate Court are liable to be set aside. 21. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The respondent/plaintiff, having failed to establish ground for eviction of the appellant/defendant under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, 1961, is not entitled to evict the tenant on that count. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court as also the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, so far as they relate to granting eviction of the tenant under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, 1961, are set aside. However, the impugned judgment and decree insofar as it relates to granting eviction of the appellant/defendant under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, 1961, is affirmed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. A decree shall be drawn accordingly.