S. P. KUKDA Y, J.:- Ramji Jiranga Pawar (accused No.1), Atya Jiranga Pawar (accused No.2), Isrya Jiranga Pawar (accused No.3), Arsh Jibhala Choudhari (accused No.4). Sega Bhamta Naik (accused No.5), Manjya Jiranga Pawar (accused No.6), Parbatsing Jiranga Pawar (accused No.7) and Dwarka Bhusadya Pawar (accused No.8) were prosecuted for the commission of offence punishable under sections 143, 147, 148,302; 326, 324, 504 and 506 r/w. 149 of the Penal Code for having committed murder of Kalsya and causing injuries to his father Raija Niaka Walvi and uncle Vanya Naika Walvi. Accused nos.2, 3,4 and 5 were acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. Accused No.1 is convicted for the offences punishable under section 324 of IPC. He is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/-. Accused No.6 is convicted for the offence punishable under sections 302 and 324 of IPC. He is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- for the first offence and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/- for the second offence. Accused No.7 is convicted for the offence punishable under section 323 of IPC. He is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.l,000/-. All the sentences carry stipulation for non payment of fine. Accused nos. 1,6,7 and 8 have filed the present appeal challenging propriety of the order of conviction and sentence dated 30th March, 2005 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Shahada. 2. Complainant Raija Naika Walvi (P.W.1) is native of Ambapada which is part of Modalgao, Taluka Akrani; District Nandurbar. Accused nos. 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 are brothers. They are also natives of Modalgao. Appellant No.2 had filed a complaint with Mhasawad Police Station against P.W.1 alleging that he had accused his mother to be a witch. Thus, both the parties were called to Police Station. They were to go to Mhasawad via Dhadgao. It was decided that both parties should meet each other at Dhadgao for settlement of the dispute. P.W.1 came to Dhadgao with his brother Vanya (P.W.4), son Kalsya @ Kalla (deceased), daughter-in-law Indirabai, nephew Magtya Motya Padvi (P.W.5) and some residents of Modalgao. Some of his relatives from Bhujgao and Kuktar were to join him at Dhadgao. Appellants also came to Dhadgao in a private jeep with their brothers and relatives. P.W.1 came to Dhadgao with his brother Vanya (P.W.4), son Kalsya @ Kalla (deceased), daughter-in-law Indirabai, nephew Magtya Motya Padvi (P.W.5) and some residents of Modalgao. Some of his relatives from Bhujgao and Kuktar were to join him at Dhadgao. Appellants also came to Dhadgao in a private jeep with their brothers and relatives. Both the parties met each other at open place in front of Sainath Medical Stores at about 11.45 a.m. The parties could not settle disputes between them. During the course of parleys, there was exchange of words between members of the rival groups, which aroused passion and led to a sudden fight. During exchange of words, appellant no.2 inflicted knife blow on the lumber region of the deceased. The deceased fell down on sustaining bleeding injury. When P.W.1 and P.W.4 intervened, appellant no.2 dealt knife blow on the left side of the back of P.W.4 and appellant no.4 dealt stick blow on his back. Appellant no. 1 dealt blow with iron rod on the head of P.W.1 and appellant no.3 hit him on the back. Others threatened members of the complainant's party with dire consequences. After the incident the injured were taken to Rural Hospital by their relatives. 3. On admission of the injured to the hospital, Dr. Padvi (P.W.6) informed the Police and started treatment of the patients. During the examination of P.W.1 at 11.55 a.m. P.W.6 noticed bone deep contused lacerated wound of the size 6 cms. x 2 cms. over right side of the scalp extending from frontal to parietal region and tenderness with swelling at the neck of the femur indicating suspected fracture. Examination of P.W.4 revealed stab wound of the size of 6 x 2 x 1 cms. over left lumber region. P.W.6 issued injury certificates (Exs.70 & 71) in respect of these injuries. 4. On receipt of the intimation, P.I. Bhadane went to the hospital. By that time Kalla had expired at 12.30 p.m. P.I. Bhadane recorded complaint of P.W.1 (Ex.60) and registered offence against the accused under sections 147, 148,302,326,324 and 504 r/w. 149 of IPC at 1.50 p.m. and handed over the investigation to P.S.I. Pawar. In the meanwhile, P.W.6 examined and treated appellant nos.2 and 3 at about 1.15 p.m. Appellant no.2 had sustained lacerated wound over forehead which required seven stitches and appellant no.3 had sustained lacerated wound on his forehead. 5. In the meanwhile, P.W.6 examined and treated appellant nos.2 and 3 at about 1.15 p.m. Appellant no.2 had sustained lacerated wound over forehead which required seven stitches and appellant no.3 had sustained lacerated wound on his forehead. 5. After taking over the investigation, P.W.7 came to the hospital and held inquest (Ex.62) over the dead body of Kalla and made a request to the medical officer to conduct postmortem. During the postmortem P.W.6 found that the deceased had sustained stab wound of the size 6 x 2 x 6 cms. over right lumber region beneath the ribs by sharp cutting weapon. The injury had resulted in rupture of right lower lobe of the liver and had cut the kidney and the blood vessels, which resulted in profuse bleeding. The autopsy surgeon noted the external and internal injuries in the postmortem report (Ex.72) and opined that the death is caused on account of the hemorrhagic shock due to injuries to the vital organs. 6. After the inquest the investigating officer visited the scene of occurrence. He attached sample of blood stained soil, control soil and stones from the spot. One jeep bearing registration no.MH-18/H-513 was also there. During the search of the vehicle, iron rod (Article 5), Stick (Article 6) and knife (Article 7) were found under the seat. The vehicle, along with these articles, was attached under Spot Panchanama (Ex.64). On the same day the investigating officer recorded statements of the witnesses. Clothes of the injured were attached under seizure memo (Ex.83 and 84). Articles attached along with blood samples of the injured, were sent to Forensic Laboratory. Report of the Chemical Analyser (Ex.86) disclosed that there was human blood on the knife and blood of A group on all the clothes. Other reports (Ex.87 to 89) disclosed that blood of complainant, his son and brother belongs to A group. On completion of the investigation the accused were charge-sheeted. 7. The appellants adopted defence of total denial. According to them, appellant no.2 and 3 had been to Dhadgao for settlement of the dispute in respect of complaint filed by appellant no.2 with Mhasawad Police. At that time Sunya Reshma Valvi dealt blow on the head of appellant no.2 and Magtya (P.W.5) assaulted appellant no.3. Both of them had lost consciousness on account of this assault. Appellants did not examine witnesses in their defence. 8. At that time Sunya Reshma Valvi dealt blow on the head of appellant no.2 and Magtya (P.W.5) assaulted appellant no.3. Both of them had lost consciousness on account of this assault. Appellants did not examine witnesses in their defence. 8. The prosecution examined in all seven witnesses. Evidence of P.W.1, 4 and 5 is recorded with the help of an interpreter. 9. P.W.1 stated that appellant no.2 was making an effort to usurp his agricultural land, therefore, the meeting was arranged for a compromise. However, the dispute could not be settled. During the discussion there was difference of opinion between him and appellant no.2. Later on there was exchange of words between appellant no.2 and the deceased. During this exchange of words, appellant no.2 took out knife from his pocket and dealt a blow on the back side of the deceased. He himself and his brother Vanya (P.WA) went to the rescue of the deceased. Appellant no.2 dealt a blow on the back of P.WA and appellant no.4 dealt a blow on his back with stick. Appellant No.1 dealt a blow with an iron rod on his forehead. Appellant no.3 hit him with a stone on the back. Others threatened them with dire consequences. After the incident, they were brought to the hospital, where his son succumbed to the injuries, at about 12.30 p.m. Police Officer recorded his complaint (Ex.60) at the hospital. The witness identified knife (Article 7); an iron rod (Article 5); Stone (Article 6); and stick (Article 3) shown to him. During cross-examination, it has been brought on record that the witness is a rustic witness, who could not read the clock, nor could he give gut number of his field. The witness admitted that the complaint was lodged against himself and the deceased by the appellant no.2 with Mhasawad police, accusing them of spreading a rumor that mother of appellant no.2 practices black-magic. The witness further admitted that after exchange of words there was a sudden fight between both the parties, but denied to have seen injuries suffered by appellant nos.2 and 3 on their head. 10. P.WA has given background in which the meeting for compromise was held at 11.45 in the open place opposite medical shop at Dhadgao and has recounted the incident. P.W.4 stated that there was exchange of words between his brother Raija and nephew Kalya with appellant no.2. 10. P.WA has given background in which the meeting for compromise was held at 11.45 in the open place opposite medical shop at Dhadgao and has recounted the incident. P.W.4 stated that there was exchange of words between his brother Raija and nephew Kalya with appellant no.2. During the exchange of words, appellant no.2 took out knife from his pocket and dealt a blow on the back of the deceased. Appellant no.l dealt blow with iron rod on the head of P.W.1 and appellant no.3 hit him on the back with stone. Appellant no.4 dealt a stick blow to him. On account of the assault, he had sustained injury to his back. Others who were present threatened them with dire consequences. After the incident, they were taken to the hospital where his nephew succumbed to the injuries at about 12.30 p.m. The witness identified weapons and clothes which were worn by himself; his brother and nephew at the time of occurrence. During the cross-examination, the witness stated that the incident did not last for long. There was exchange of words for one or two minutes and the fight was over within one minute. He conceded that during the exchange of words, suddenly the fight started, but has denied knowledge about the injuries suffered by appellant no.2 and 3 during the course of the incident. 11. P.W.5 who is another eyewitness, has given similar version of the incident, admitting that on failure of the talks, there was exchange of words and during the sudden fight, appellant no.2 dealt knife blows on the back of the deceased and on the back of P.W.4. Appellant no.l inflicted an injury on the head of P.W.1 with iron rod and appellant no.3 hit him with stone on the back. Appellant no.8 also dealt a stick blow on the back of the P.WA. After the occurrence, he himself, Indirabai and others, took the injured to the rural hospital, where Kalya expired at 12.30 p.m. During the cross-examination, it was again confirmed by the witness that there was exchange of words, which gave rise to sudden fight, during which, appellant nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 assaulted complainant, his son and his brother. 12. Dr. Apsing Padvi (P.W.6) has given intimation regarding the admission of the injured to the hospital to Dhadgao police. Thereafter, he treated the injured. 1, 2, 3 and 4 assaulted complainant, his son and his brother. 12. Dr. Apsing Padvi (P.W.6) has given intimation regarding the admission of the injured to the hospital to Dhadgao police. Thereafter, he treated the injured. P.W.1 was examined at 11.55 a.m. who was found to have sustained following injuries mentioned in the injury certificate (Ex.70): (i) CL W over scalp right side oblique in direction from frontal region to parietal region - 6 cm x 2 cm x bone deep; (ii) suspected fracture neck of femur, tenderness present swelling present. 13. Immediately after the examination of P.W.1, P.W.4 was also examined. He had sustained a single injury, that is noted in injury certificate (Ex.71). The injury was a stab wound over back at left lumber region of the size 6 x 2 x 1 cms. P.W.6 had also performed autopsy. The injury described in column no.17 of postmortem notes (Ex.72) is - stab wound over right side of back, below ribs i.e. right lumber region, sharp cutting edge and profuse active bleeding was present. Size of injury was 6 cm x 2 cm x 6 cm. On internal examination, the injuries to liver, kidney and blood vessels disclosed during internal examination are mentioned in column no.21. It was found that right lower lobe of liver was ruptured, showing signs of active bleeding. Right kidney and the blood vessels were also cut and were showing signs of active bleeding. The cause of death, is given as hemorrhagic shock due to injury to vital organs. 14. P.W.7 stated that on receipt of the intimation from the rural hospital, Police Inspector Bhadane went there and recorded complaint of P.W.1. On the basis of this complaint, offence came to be registered. Thereafter investigation was given to him. He, therefore, visited rural hospital and held inquest (Ex.62) on the dead body. He then visited the spot with the witnesses. From the spot, he collected soil stained with blood; control soil and stones. At the scene of occurrence, Commander Jeep bearing registration No.MH18/H-513 was parked. When the jeep was searched, he found iron rod; blood-stained knife and stick under the seat. These articles jeep, sample of soil and stones were attached under spot panchanama (Ex.64). On the same day, he recorded statement of witnesses and arrested all the accused except appellant nos.2 and 3, who were taking treatment in the hospital. When the jeep was searched, he found iron rod; blood-stained knife and stick under the seat. These articles jeep, sample of soil and stones were attached under spot panchanama (Ex.64). On the same day, he recorded statement of witnesses and arrested all the accused except appellant nos.2 and 3, who were taking treatment in the hospital. Both of them were arrested on 1-4-2004. Bloodstained shirt of P.W.1 was attached under seizure memo (Ex.83); shirt of P.W.4 was attached under seizure memo (Ex.84); clothes of deceased were attached by his colleague. The articles seized during the course of investigation were sent to the Forensic Laboratory and the Chemical Analyser's reports (Exs.86 to 89) were later on received. 15. On consideration of all the circumstances, learned Trial Judge found that the key witnesses P.W.1, P.W.4 and P.W.S are rustic witnesses. Enumerating the inconsistencies pointed out by learned defence counsel in para 33 of the judgment and discussing their effect on the credibility of these prosecution witnesses, Trial Judge observed in para 33 of the judgment, that the omissions appearing in the evidence of these rustic witnesses are minor omissions which are found even in the evidence of truthful witnesses. These discrepancies do not affect basic fabric of the testimony of the witness. Dealing with the contention that the prosecution has suppressed genesis of the occurrence by not explaining injuries suffered by appellant nos.2 and 3, the Trial Judge placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Laxmansingh's case ( AIR 1976 SC 2263 ) to come to the conclusion that in view of the clear, cogent and reliable evidence of the eyewitnesses, non explanation of the injuries suffered by appellant nos.2 and 3 are not fatal to the prosecution case. On careful analysis of all the pros and cons, learned Trial Judge arrived at the conclusion that evidence of P.W.1, P.W.4 and P.W.5 is cogent, consistent and reliable. Considering the admission given by the eye-witnesses that the exchange of words had taken place as the bid to settle the disputes amicably failed and this led to the mutual fight (maramari) between the warring groups, the Trial Judge came to the obvious conclusion that the accused had not formed an unlawful assembly with common object of committing murder of Kaliya or with an object of assaulting complainant and his brother. Pursuing this line of reasoning the Trial Judge came to the conclusion that the accused are responsible for their individual acts. He, therefore, acquitted accused nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 of all the offences with which they were charged and convicted the appellants for their individual acts. On the point of the nature of the offence committed by appellant no.2, learned Trial Judge rejected the plea of the defence counsel that the offence would fall under Section 304, Part (II) on the basis of the reasoning that, appellant no.2 had come prepared for the eventuality of failure of the attempt to compromise the dispute and had armed himself with a knife. The fact that appellant no.2 was armed with knife led the learned Judge to hold that the attack was preplanned and that appellant no.2 had taken undue advantage of the situation that his adversaries were unarmed. In this view of the matter, learned Judge found that the assault on the deceased was with the intention to cause death, therefore, offence punishable under section 302 of the Penal Code is made out. In conformity of these findings, learned Trial Judge convicted the appellants for their individual acts and sentenced them to imprisonment as stated earlier. 16. In support of the appeal, learned counsel Shri. Kapadia has commented on the reliability of the evidence of the eye-witnesses by referring to the non explanation of the injuries suffered by appellant nos.2 and 3. However the main thrust of the arguments is regarding the nature of the offence committed by appellant no.2. Learned counsel would argue that in the face of the admissions given by the prosecution witnesses that as a sequel to the exchange of words between the parties, there was a mutual fight and the assault on the deceased was in the heat of passion, exception 4 to section 300 would be attracted. Referring to these admitted facts learned counsel would submit that case of appellant no.2 is squarely covered by Section 304, Part II and does not fall under section 302 of the Penal Code. 17. Learned A.P.P. Shri. P. M. Shinde fully supports findings recorded by the Trial Judge. Learned AP.P. argues that evidence of the eye-witnesses leaves no scope for the contention that the act of causing fatal injury to the deceased was unintentional. 17. Learned A.P.P. Shri. P. M. Shinde fully supports findings recorded by the Trial Judge. Learned AP.P. argues that evidence of the eye-witnesses leaves no scope for the contention that the act of causing fatal injury to the deceased was unintentional. Pragmatic analysis of the circumstances brought on record by the prosecution clearly establish commission of offence under section 302 of the Penal Code by appellant no.2. It is further contended that no fault can be found with the appreciation of the evidence of the eye-witnesses by the Trial Judge. The evidence of these witnesses is truthful and establishes complicity of the appellants in the commission of offences made out by their individual acts. It is submitted that interference with the order of conviction and sentence is not warranted. 18. Undisputed facts of the present case show that members of both the sides came together at Modalgao for settlement of the dispute between P.W.1 and appellant no.2. Failure to settle the dispute resulted in exchange of words which culminated in mutual fight between the parties. Presence of the appellants and the eye-witnesses at the time of the occurrence is not in dispute. The eye-witnesses are illiterate cultivators from the undeveloped region of the State. They do not, know any language except their own dialect. Their evidence was required to be recorded with the help of an interpreter. The incident took place at about 11.45 a.m. Immediately thereafter, they were taken to the hospital. Condition of the deceased was precarious on account of the profuse bleeding from the stab injury and damage to the liver, kidney and blood vessels. Statement of the father of the deceased came to be recorded in these circumstances. It is thus, apparent that there is no possibility of embellishment or concoction of a false story by the complainant as he himself and others with him were anxious about the deteriorating condition of the deceased. They were not in a mood to concoct a story nor was there time to do so. Statements of the witnesses were also recorded on the same day. The offence was registered at 1.50 p.m. Soon thereafter, the investigating officer visited the spot. The vehicle used by the appellants was still parked at the scene of the occurrence as appellant no.2 and 3 had also suffered injuries and were also at the Rural Hospital for treatment. Statements of the witnesses were also recorded on the same day. The offence was registered at 1.50 p.m. Soon thereafter, the investigating officer visited the spot. The vehicle used by the appellants was still parked at the scene of the occurrence as appellant no.2 and 3 had also suffered injuries and were also at the Rural Hospital for treatment. Weapons used for the commission of the offence were found in the vehicle and were attached under the panchanama of the scene of occurrence. All the accused except the appellant nos.2 and 3 who were injured, were arrested. Major part of the investigation was completed within few hours of the occurrence. Evidence of the eyewitnesses receives full corroboration from the medical evidence of P.W.6. In the light of these facts, approach adopted by the Trial Judge in appreciating effect of the omission by P.W.4 to refer to an assault on him by appellant no.2 with knife and the minor discrepancies in the evidence of eye-witnesses pointed out by the defence counsel, can not be faulted. Learned Trial Judge has discussed the principles of the law governing the appreciation of evidence of the related witness and non explanation of the injuries suffered by two of the assailants and found that the principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not apply to the facts of the present case. In the light of this, no fault can be found with the conclusion of the Trial Judge that the evidence of the eye-witnesses is truthful and reliable. Considering the totality of the circumstance, in our considered opinion, interference with the findings of the Trial Judge regarding the complicity of the appellants in the commission of the offence is not warranted. Learned counsel for the appellants has rightly refrained from spending much of the time in defending the appellants in respect of their complicity in the commission of the offence; though he did comment on the reliability of the related witnesses and non explanation of the injuries suffered by appellant nos.2 and 3. 19. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants that in view of the admission given by the eye-witnesses that there was exchange of words resulting in sudden fight between the rival parties, case of appellant no.2 would be covered by section 304, Part (II) deserves consideration. 20. Principles governing applicability of exception 4 to section 300 are well settled. 19. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants that in view of the admission given by the eye-witnesses that there was exchange of words resulting in sudden fight between the rival parties, case of appellant no.2 would be covered by section 304, Part (II) deserves consideration. 20. Principles governing applicability of exception 4 to section 300 are well settled. In terms of this exception culpable homicide is not murder if the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, during the course of a sudden quarrel and the perpetrator has not acted in a cruel or unusual manner or has not taken undue advantage of the situation. The distinction between exception 1 and 4 is that though in both there is an absence of premeditation, in exception 1 there is total deprivation of self control whereas in exception 4 the judgment of the offender is clouded by the heat of passion. There is a provocation in both but in exception 4 causing of injury is not the direct consequence of the provocation. Irrespective of the genesis of the occurrence, subsequent conduct of the parties which results in the mutual fight puts them on equal footing. Though the expression sudden fight is not defined, it implies provocation and trading of blows by both sides. In such a case the commission of homicide is not attributable to unilateral provocation, thus, only one side can not be blamed for the resultant act. The law on this point is expounded by the Apex Court in Prakash Chand Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2004)11 SCC 381 : [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 2807 (S.C.)]. In para 7, Their Lordships observed : "7. The fourth exception of Section 300, IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men' sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men' sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A "sudden fight" implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused; (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed." 21. These principles are reiterated by the Supreme Court in Pappu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2006)7 SCC 391 : [2006 ALL MR (Cri) 2360 (S.C.)]. The Sessions Judge has also adverted to these principles. The fallacy lies in the application of the principles to the facts of the present case. These principles are reiterated by the Supreme Court in Pappu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2006)7 SCC 391 : [2006 ALL MR (Cri) 2360 (S.C.)]. The Sessions Judge has also adverted to these principles. The fallacy lies in the application of the principles to the facts of the present case. In support of his conclusion that the case of appellant no.1 is not covered by 4th exception to section 300, the Trial Judge observed in para 31 of the judgment that "Evidently, the accused no.6 Magtya has not adducted any evidence to prove his contention that his case allegedly falls in the category of exception 4 to section 300 of I.P.C. so as to bringing his case punishable under Section 304, Part II of I.P.C.". 22. In para 32 of the judgment it is further observed that "There is also nothing on record to show that P.Ws.l, 4 and 5 or the deceased Kalla, took an aggressive lead in assaulting the accused nos.6 and 7. On the contrary, when it is quite discernible from the . evidence of P.Ws.l, 4 and 5 that the parties had assembled for carrying out a talk of compromise and in such parleys if the accused is found to have been armed with knife in his pocket, which he took out from the pocket and assaulted deceased Kalla, the above circumstance speak volume that the accused no.6 Manjya had joined the talks of compromise with premeditated intention to take undue advantage of the quarrel if any which may occur, if the talks fail". 23. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accede to this line of reasoning. Once it is held that the accused did not share common object or common intention and are held to be liable for their individual acts merely on the basis of the fact that appellant no.2 was armed with knife, it is not permissible to hold that he had planned murderous attack on the deceased. As the dispute was primarily with P.W.1, appellant no.2 could not have had premonition that he would be engaging in exchange of words with the deceased, has been entirely overlooked by the learned Sessions Judge. As the dispute was primarily with P.W.1, appellant no.2 could not have had premonition that he would be engaging in exchange of words with the deceased, has been entirely overlooked by the learned Sessions Judge. Mere fact that the appellant was carrying knife or that the rival group was not armed does not ipso facto give rise to the presumption that the perpetrator had planned attack on the adversary in the event of failure of the negotiations for settlement, in the absence of other circumstances to substantiate such an inference. It is not permissible to venture into S the realm of conjectures and surmises in I, determining the nature of the liability of the e perpetrator. In the present case, undisputedly both the sides were willing to come together for a compromise. The bone of contention was the allegation made by P.W.1 that mother of the deceased is practising witch craft. The topic was sensitive and the disagreement was not because failure of the talks but because during the discussion the parties lost their cool which led to the exchange of words. Nobody knew that the exchange of words be between the deceased and appellant no.2. This was entirely unexpected. The assault on the deceased, thus, could not have been premeditated. Similarly, in the background that both the parties had previous quarrels and had lodged complaints with Mhasawad Police, in the absence of the material to show that appellant had previous knowledge that the members of the rival parties were unarmed, it can not be held that appellant no.2 had taken disadvantage of the fact that the rival group was not carrying weapons. It may be relevant to point out that, besides the deceased, appellant no.2 had also inflicted knife injury on the back of P.W.4 but it is found to be a simple injury. This fact further substantiates the conclusion that the intention was not to inflict a fatal injury. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we can not sustain finding of the Trial Judge that appellant no.2 had planned an attack with knife or that he did take undue advantage of the situation. In the light of this, we partly allow the appeal. The conviction and sentence of original accused no.6 - Manjya Jiranga Pawar, for offence punishable under section 302 of I.P.C. and RI. In the light of this, we partly allow the appeal. The conviction and sentence of original accused no.6 - Manjya Jiranga Pawar, for offence punishable under section 302 of I.P.C. and RI. for life and fine of Rs.5,000/- is hereby quashed and set aside and is altered to conviction for offence punishable under section 304-11 of the I.P.C. He is sentenced to suffer RI. for six years and fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, further RI. for one year. The conviction of original accused no.6 - Manjya Jiranga for offence punishable under section 324 and the sentence passed thereon is confirmed. The substantive sentences shal1 run concurrently. The conviction of original accused no.1 - Ramji Jiranga Pawar, original accused no.7 Parbatsing Jiranga Pawar and original accused no.8 Dwarka Bhusalya Pawar for offence punishable under section 324 and 323 respectively and the sentence passed thereon are confirmed. Since the original accused nos. 1, 7 and 8 are on bail, their bail bonds stand cancelled. Original Accused nos.1, 7 and 8 to surrender within four weeks. Appeal partly allowed to the extent indicated above. Appeal partly allowed.