Honble ASOPA, J.–Heard counsel for the parties on the application filed under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India filed by the respondent for vacation of interim order dated 27-2-2007. (2). The reply to the said application has been filed by counsel for the petitioner. (3). This Court on 27-2-2007 passed the following order:- ``Issue notice to the respondents of the writ petition as also of stay petition. Rule is made returnable within two weeks. Meanwhile, operation of the order dated 22-2-2007 (Anx. 2) shall remain stayed and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioner to continue as Director, Information and Public Relation, Government of Rajasthan. (4). The preliminary objection of Mr. R.D. Rastogi, counsel for the respondent is that on 27-2-2007, the application of the petitioner for withdrawal of the order of voluntary retirement dated 22-2-2007 was rejected but despite that the writ petition has not been amended, therefore, same has become infructuous and in infructuous writ petition, interim order cannot be allowed to continue. Mr. Rastogi, has placed reliance on a judgment rendered in the case of State of Mysore & Anr. vs. M.M. Thammaiah & Anr. reported in (1974) 2 SCC 281 (Para 19). (5). Mr. Ashok Gaur, counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the issue involved in the writ petition is ``whether a Government employee can withdraw application for voluntary retirement before the effective date or not? In the present case, till 26-2-2007 the aforesaid application dated 23-2-2007 was neither decided nor the petitioner was allowed to withdraw the application seeking voluntary retirement, which was to be made effective from 28-2-2007, although he has prayed that the same be made effective from 1-3-2007. He further submits that this Court passed the interim order on 27-2-2007 and rejection of his application for withdrawal of voluntary retirement is also of the same date i.e. 27-2-2007, which is not of much consequence to decide the right of the petitioner to withdraw application for voluntary retirement before the effective date, therefore, the writ petition has not become infructuous. (6). I am prima-facie of the view that the judgment relied by counsel for the respondent rendered in case of State of Mysore & Anr. (6). I am prima-facie of the view that the judgment relied by counsel for the respondent rendered in case of State of Mysore & Anr. vs. M.M. Thammaiah (supra) relates to the deletion of the rule and during the pendency of the case, permission to amend the petition was not sought, therefore, the Supreme Court was of the view that only relief challenging the legality of the Rule 137 of mysore Forest Rules had become infructuous for the aforesaid reason, is not applicable and the present writ petition has not become infructuous. (7). A bare perusal of interim order dated 27-2-2007 would reveal that the same consists two parts, first is ``stay of operation of impugned order dated 22-2-2007 and second is mandatory direction to ``allow the petitioner to continue as Director, Information and Public Relation. (8). As regards, first part of the interim order, submission of Mr. R.D. Rastogi is that there is no prima facie case and balance of Convenience is also not in favour of the petitioner. Further, discontinuance of an employee, whose voluntary retirement application has been accepted, will not cause any kind of injury to him. The petitioner will get all the monetary reliefs in case writ petition is allowed. The order dated 22-2-2007 has been stayed and in case the writ petition is not allowed then the respondent will suffer the injury of continuing a person who already stood voluntary retired. (9). Mr. Gaur on first part of stay has submitted that the law on the subject of voluntary retirement is fairly well settled by the Supreme Court that an employee can withdraw the application for voluntary retirement before the effective date which has been followed by the Division Benches of this Court in cases of (1) State of Raj. & Ors. vs. Achala Ram - 2005(4) SLR 86, (2) Board of Secondary Education, Ajmer & Ors. vs. Smt. Sharda Pareek - 2005 (10) RRD 4093 and inaction on the part of the respondents of not allowing the petitioner to withdraw the said voluntary retirement application and further not setting aside the voluntary retirement order is contrary to said well established principle of law, thus there exists a strong prima facie case in his favour. vs. Smt. Sharda Pareek - 2005 (10) RRD 4093 and inaction on the part of the respondents of not allowing the petitioner to withdraw the said voluntary retirement application and further not setting aside the voluntary retirement order is contrary to said well established principle of law, thus there exists a strong prima facie case in his favour. The reason for voluntary retirement for personal reasons resolved when application for withdrawal was submitted on 23-2-2007 and the same were ceased to exists, therefore, the balance of convenience is also in his favour and in case the interim order is not continued then the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss of status as he has to lead premature retired life. Mr. Gaur further submits that a perusal of Rule 50 of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1996 would reveal that process of voluntary retirement involve three stages i.e. offer, acceptance and withdrawal of offer before effective date. In the instant case, offer dated 10-2-2007 was accepted on 22-2-2007 w.e.f. 28-2-2007 and before the effective date, the petitioner has submitted the application on 23-3-2007 for withdrawal of voluntary retirement. Thus, the same is bilateral act coupled with right of withdrawal before effective date whereas the cases of compulsory retirement, termination, removal, dismissal are unilateral act of the Government as per rules, therefore, not allowing the withdrawal of application for voluntary retirement stands on different footing than the aforesaid cases where services are brought to an end and normally a positive direction for continuance is not passed. while concluding the aforesaid submissions Mr. Gaur submitted that the interim order dated 27-2-2007 was rightly passed. (10). Considering the above aspect of the matter, I am of the view that there exists a strong prima facie case in favour of the petitioner and the reason for voluntary retirement ceases to exist, therefore, the balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner and in case stay of operation of the impugned order is not continued then petitioner would be compelled to live premature retired life, which would cause loss of status to him resulting in irreparable injury. The usual prayers of interim relief prayed in the writ petitions are for staying the operation of the impugned order, but before granting the said interim relief, the Court has to consider the aforesaid three well known ingredients for grant of interim relief, i.e. strong prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury as well as the fact that the order may not cause any injury to the public at large or to the persons who are not before the Court. The application for withdrawal of voluntary retirement was neither decided nor the petitioner was allowed to withdraw the voluntary retirement till 26-2-2007 which is contrary to well established principle that voluntary retirement can be withdrawn before effective date and the petitioner approached this Court on 26-2-2007 before effective date of voluntary retirement i.e. 28-2-2007. As indicated above the balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner and in case no interim relief of staying impugned order is continued, then the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss, therefore, in the cases cited by respondent of Supreme Court and High Court (referred and discussed in subsequent paras) not to pass the interim order which tantamounts to allowing the writ petition, have been given in cases of issuing the interim relief of appointment, absorption, regularisation, confirmation, admission in superspeciality of medical etc. are not applicable so far as ``stay of the operation of impugned order is concerned. Thus, first part so far as it relates to staying of the operation of the impugned order dated 22-2-2007 (Annx. 2) is concerned, the same deserves to be continued. (11). The submission of counsel for the respondent for second part of order is that the main relief cannot be granted at the interim stage. This Court while granting the interim relief in the mandatory form by directing the respondent to allow the petitioner to continue as Director, Information and Public Relations, Government of Rajasthan, has granted the main relief which tantamounts to allowing the writ petition at the interim stage. He further submits that the relief is beyond the scope of the writ petition also. In support of his aforesaid contention, counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the following judgments:- 1. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal vs. Dunlop India Ltd. & Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 260 ] 2. Commissioner/Secretary to Government Health & Medical Edu. Deptt. Civil Sectt. In support of his aforesaid contention, counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the following judgments:- 1. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal vs. Dunlop India Ltd. & Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 260 ] 2. Commissioner/Secretary to Government Health & Medical Edu. Deptt. Civil Sectt. Jammu vs. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli (1995 Supp (4) SCC 214] 3. Shiv Shankar & Ors. vs. Board of Directors, U.P.S.R.C.T.C. & Anr. (1995 Supp (2) SCC 726] 4. State of U.P. & Anr. vs. Visheshwar (1995 Supp (3) SCC 590] 5. Bank of Maharashtra vs. Race Shipping & Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (1995) 3 SCC 257 ] 6. State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Raj Karan Singh (1998) 8 SCC 529 . (12). The relevant para 2, 3 & 4 of the judgment of Supreme Court in case of State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Visheshwar - 1995 Supp (3) SCC 590 are as under:- ``2. This appeal is against an interim order by which the writ petitioner Visheshwar (respondent herein) has been directed to be confirmed on the post of Forest Guard and there is also direction to pay him salary of a regular employee holding that post. 3. The main question for decision in the writ petition before the High Court is the status of the writ petitioner on the basis of his claim to the post of Forest Guard, which is yet to be adjudicated. By the interim order the High Court has actually granted the final relief itself without an adjudication on the point in controversy on which the grant of that relief depends. In these circumstances, granting of the final relief in the form of interim relief was wholly unwarranted. The impugned order dated 1-11-1993 has therefore to be set aside. The question of grant of relief claimed in the writ petition would be considered on its merits by the High Court and that relief to which the writ petitioner is found to be entitled may be granted at the time of decision of the writ petition. No such interim order of the kind which has been made is called for. 4. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. No costs. (13). The Supreme Court in case of Bank of Maharshtra vs. Race Shipping & Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. No such interim order of the kind which has been made is called for. 4. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. No costs. (13). The Supreme Court in case of Bank of Maharshtra vs. Race Shipping & Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (1995) 3 SCC 257 has also considered two other judgments of the Supreme Court in Asstt. CCE vs. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 1 SCC 260 and State of Rajasthan vs. Swaika Properties - (1985) 3 SCC 217 . The relevant para 11 of the Bank of Maharashtra (supra) is as follows:- ``11. Time and again this Court has deprecated the practice of granting interim orders which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for no better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out, without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the public interest and a host of other considerations. (See : Asstt. CCE vs. Dunlop India Ltd.; State of Rajasthan vs. Swaika Properties). In the remaining judgments of the Supreme Court, the aforesaid observations/directions have been reiterated. (14). In reply to the aforesaid submission of counsel for the respondent Mr. Gaur, on second part of interim order, submits that some time withholding of interim relief would amount to dismissal of the writ petition itself, as by the time the main matter comes up for hearing nothing would remain to be granted as relief. He further submits that the Court may having regard to strong prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, may grant interim relief even though it amounts to granting the final relief, in rare cases under compelling circumstances. Further submission of Mr. Gaur is that the Court is not precluded from granting interim relief after considering the compelling circumstances whether the injury complained is immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. He placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Deoraj vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2004) 4 SCC 697. The relevant para 11 & 12 of the said judgment are as follows:- ``11. The Courts and tribunals seized of the proceedings within their jurisdiction take a reasonable time in disposing of the same. This is on account of fair-procedure requirement which involves delay intervening between the previous and the next procedural steps leading towards preparation of case for hearing. The relevant para 11 & 12 of the said judgment are as follows:- ``11. The Courts and tribunals seized of the proceedings within their jurisdiction take a reasonable time in disposing of the same. This is on account of fair-procedure requirement which involves delay intervening between the previous and the next procedural steps leading towards preparation of case for hearing. Then, the courts are also overburdened and their hands are full. As the conclusion of hearing on merits is likely to take some time, the parties press for interim relief being granted in the interregnum. As order of interim relief may or may not be a reasoned one but the factors of prima facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience do work at the back of the mind of the one who passes an order of interim nature. Ordinarily, the court is inclined to maintain status quo as obtained on the date of the commencement of the proceedings. However, there are a few cases which call for the courts leaning not in favour of maintaining the status quo and still lesser in percentage are the cases when an order tantamounting to a mandamus is required to be issued even at an interim stage. There are matters of significance and of moment posing themselves as moment of truth. Such cases do cause dilemma and put the wits of any judgment to test. 12. Situations emerge where the granting of an interim relief would tantamount to granting the final relief itsel. And then there may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of the main petition itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. In such cases the availability of a very strong prima facie case- of a standard much higher than just prima facie case, the considerations of balance of convenience and irreparable injury forcefully tilting the balance of the case totally in favour of the applicant may persuade the court to grant an interim relief though it amounts to granting the final relief itself. Of course, such would be rare and exceptional cases. Of course, such would be rare and exceptional cases. The court would grant such an interim relief only if satisfied that withholding of it would prick the conscience of the court and do violated to the sent of justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end the court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. Obviously such would be rare cases accompanied by compelling circumstances, where the injury complained of is immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the Court may put the parties on such terms as may be prudent. (15). The ratio decidendi in all the judgments of Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, West Bengal vs. Dunlop India Ltd. & Ors. (supra), Commissioner/Secretary to Government Health & Medical Edu. Deptt. Civil Sectt. Jammu vs. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli (supra), Shiv Shankar & Ors. vs. Board of Directors, UPSRCTC & Anr. (supra, Bank of Maharashtra vs. Race Shipping & Transport Col. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (supra) & State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Raj Karan Singh (supra) cited by Mr. Rastogi is not to pass the mandatory interim order by issuing interim mandamous which results in allowing the writ petition and main issue of appointment, absorption, confirmation, regularisation is in dispute and require final adjudication. Whereas ratio decidendi by the Supreme Court in case of Deoraj vs. State of Maharshtra & Ors. (supra) cited by Mr. Gaur is that in rare exceptional and under compelling circumstances where the impugned order is contrary to settled position of law and non-grant of interim order would result in causing extreme hardship and irreparable loss on account of not following the settled position of law, then the Court may in appropriate cases, depending on the fact of each case and conduct of parties, can pass mandatory interim order. Considering the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Court cited by both the parties, I am of the view that in usual course, no final relief at interim stage by way of interim order can be granted, but mandatory interim relief would depend upon rare, exceptional and compelling circumstances, which are to be dealt with separately for which the conduct of the parties is also relevant. (16). (16). As far as second part of the interim order of continuing the petitioner as Director, Information and Public Relations is concerned, the exparte interim order in mandatory form was issued on the submission of the petitioner that he is holding the charge of the post, which is the highest post with highest responsibilities and in case the order in mandatory form is not passed then the charge of the post of Director, Information and Public Relation will not be allowed to continue with him, which would cause him extreme hardship and humiliation even after the interim order of staying the impugned order dated 22-2-2007 is passed. (17). Some of the facts of not holding the charge after 14-2-2007 which have now been brought to the notice of this Court by application filed under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India and record produced by respondent, require consideration. After submission of application by the petitioner for voluntary retirement on 10-2-2007, the charge of the post was given to Shri M.M. Joshi vide order dated 10-2-2007, who had joined on the said post on 14-2-2007 but on account of mandatory direction of this Court, the charge was handed over back to the petitioner on submitting copy of stay order passed by this Court. The fact of assuming charge by Shri M.M. Joshi on 14-2-2007 has not been disclosed in the writ petition. This Court passed the interim order in mandatory form under the impression that the petitioner was holding the charge of the post on the date of passing of the interim order i.e. 27-2-2007 whereas the petitioner on that date was under awaiting posting order. The aforesaid fact is evident from the acceptance of voluntary retirement application of the petitioner vide order dated 22-2-2007, wherein the fact of keeping him under awaiting posting order is mentioned and this fact has also not been disclosed in the writ petition. (18). As indicated above, in the present case, mandatory direction was issued on expressing serious apprehension by the petitioner of not allowing him to continue on the post of Director despite holding the charge of the said post, but after considering the complete and correct facts regarding not holding charge of the post since 14-2-2007 as narrated hereinabove, I am of the view that mandatory part of the interim order requires reconsideration. Otherwise also, when the interim order was passed by this Court, the petitioner after submitting the copy of the interim order to the respondents, applied for one months leave knowingly well that the Assembly Session is going on. The said application was rejected by the respondent. The aforesaid conduct of the petitioner of applying one month leave during Assembly Session in against public interest and the same will also disentitle him to continuance of second part of mandatory interim order. (19). I am of the view that the interim order dated 27-2-2007 deserves to be modified and the same is modified as under:- ``In the meanwhile, operation of the order dated 22-2-2007 shall remain stayed till further orders and the petitioner be given status and facilities equivalent to the post of Director. The respondent is free to give the charge of the post of Director, Information and Public Relation, Government of Rajasthan to any other competent person but the said post shall not be filled by any regular mode of promotion. (20). The application under Article 226(3) is disposed of as indicated above. (21). Put up for admission on 22-3-2007.