Judgment :- Challenge in this Revision Petition is the order of dismissal dated 010. 2005 in I.A.No.14959 of 2005 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, declining to condone the delay of 2370 days in filing the Petition to set aside the exparte decree in O.S.No.137 of 1995. 2. Facts in nutshell are as follows:- Ejectment Suit in O.S.No.137 of 1995 was filed by the Respondent / Plaintiff Devasthanam for evicting the Petitioner / Defendant from the Suit Property. Summons was ordered to be served on the Petitioner for her appearance before the Court on 22.02.1995. The Petitioners Husband was served on 31.01.1995 at the address given in the Plaint. On 22.02.1995, the Petitioners Counsel Mr.K.Balasubramaniam filed Vakalath and the case was adjourned to 22.06.1995 for filing of Written Statement. For filing of the Written Statement, the case was adjourned to several dates. The Petitioner also filed I.A.No.3460 of 1995 under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. Thereafter, the Petitioner / Defendant did not file Written Statement nor pursued the matter. On 29.07.1998, the Defendant was set exparte and exparte decree was passed on 210. 1998. The Respondent / Plaintiff Devasthanam filed E.P.No.768 of 2005 for taking delivery of possession. In the Execution Proceedings, the Petitioner was served with Notice. 3. In brief, case of the Petitioner is as follows:- No suit summons was served on her and without due process by adopting illegal methods and by means of committing fraud on the Court, the Respondent / Plaintiff Devasthanam has obtained decree against the Petitioner for ejectment. According to the Petitioner, she is not residing at No.67, Vivekananda Colony, Madras – 26 and she is not a resident of Chennai and she is permanently residing at Trichy. After purchase of leasehold right, the Petitioner has executed the General Power of Attorney in favour of her elder brother M.Rajendran on 211. 1988. The Power Holder did not make payments regularly and the Power Agent of the Petitioner acted against the interest of the Petitioner and hence, the Petitioner cancelled the Power of Attorney on 09.04.2003. The Petitioner was not served with any suit summons. She came to know about the decree only when she was served with the Notice in the Execution Proceedings E.P.No.787 of 2005. Thereafter, the Petitioner has secured Plaint Copy on 22.07.2005 and immediately taken steps to set aside the decree passed against her. The Petitioner was not served with any suit summons. She came to know about the decree only when she was served with the Notice in the Execution Proceedings E.P.No.787 of 2005. Thereafter, the Petitioner has secured Plaint Copy on 22.07.2005 and immediately taken steps to set aside the decree passed against her. According to the Petitioner, since suit summons was not served on her, limitation as provided under Article 123 would start running from the date of knowledge of the decree i.e., 19.07.2005. However, the Petitioner had also filed Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 2370 days in filing the Petition under O.9 R.13 C.P.C. 4. Pointing out engaging of counsel Mr. K. Balasubramaniam and filing of Application under Sec.9 of the City Tenants Protection Act, the Respondent / Plaintiff Temple filed Counter Statement and strongly resisted the Application. 5. The Trial Court compared the disputed signature of the Petitioner in the Vakalath and Petition and found that the signature thereon is similar as that of the Petitioner. The Trial Court held that summons was duly served upon the Petitioner and she had also engaged the counsel and participated in the suit proceedings. The Trial Court faulted the Petitioner for suppressing material facts and observing that each and every days delay has not been satisfactorily explained, dismissed the Application, which is challenged in this Revision Petition. 6. Contending that the reasonings of the Impugned Order are erroneous, learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that exparte decree was obtained by the Plaintiff Devasthanam by committing fraud on the Court and abusing process of the Court. Taking me through the Typed Set of Papers, learned counsel urged this Court to compare the signature of the Petitioner in Vakalath with her other signatures. It was submitted that in other proceedings between the parties i.e., suit for recovery of arrears of rent and in the legal notices exchanged between the parties, there was no mention about the decree in O.S.No.137 of 1995, which clearly shows the fraudulent manner in which the decree was obtained by the Plaintiff Devasthanam. 7. Learned counsel for the Respondent has submitted that filing of Petition under Section 9 of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act would show that the Petitioner had knowledge of the proceedings and having participated in the proceedings, the Petitioner has come out with false allegations. 7. Learned counsel for the Respondent has submitted that filing of Petition under Section 9 of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act would show that the Petitioner had knowledge of the proceedings and having participated in the proceedings, the Petitioner has come out with false allegations. It was further submitted that summons was duly served upon the Petitioners Husband and presumption is to be raised as to regularity of official acts performed by the Process Server. 8. Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed by the Petitioner making serious allegations of fraud and abuse of process of Court. In the Petition, the Petitioner has mainly raised three grounds viz., (i) She was not served with suit summons; (ii) she did not engage the counsel Mr. K.Balasubramaniam and signature in the Vakalath and the Application under Sec.9 of TN City Tenants Protection Act are not the signatures of the Petitioner; and (iii) the Petitioner came to know of the decree in O.S.No.137 of 1995 only on 19.07.2005, when she was served with Notice in the Execution Proceedings. I have carefully examined the records and anxiously considered the contentions. 9. In the Plaint in O.S.No.137 of 1995, the Petitioners address was given as "No.67, Vivekananda Colony, Vadapalani, Madras – 26". The suit summons sent to the above address was received by the Petitioners husband viz., Sakthivel on 31.01.1995 in the same address. After the Petitioners Husband had received the suit summons, the Petitioner had engaged a counsel by name Mr. K. Balasubramaniam and contested the suit for nearly four years. The Petitioner had also filed Petition in I.A.No.3460 of 1995 under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act and that Petition was dismissed due to the Amendment brought in City Tenants Protection Act. After the Petitioner entered appearance through her counsel on 22.02.1995, the suit has been posted on various dates for filing of the Written Statement till 29.07.1998. Since the Petitioner had not filed the Written Statement, she was set exparte and the decree was passed on 210. 1998. 10. Contention of the Petitioner is that she was not residing at No.67, Vivekananda Colony, Vadapalani, Madras and that she is permanently residing at Trichy and her sons are residing at No.71, 100 Feet Road, Easwaran Koil Rear Side, Vadapalani, Chennai. The Petitioner has not produced any documents showing her permanent address at Trichy. 1998. 10. Contention of the Petitioner is that she was not residing at No.67, Vivekananda Colony, Vadapalani, Madras and that she is permanently residing at Trichy and her sons are residing at No.71, 100 Feet Road, Easwaran Koil Rear Side, Vadapalani, Chennai. The Petitioner has not produced any documents showing her permanent address at Trichy. The I.T. Returns produced by the Petitioner would not establish her Permanent Residence at Trichy. Assuming that the Petitioner had been residing in Trichy, the summons having been received by her Husband and having entered appearance through counsel, the Petitioner ought to have pursued the matter. It is relevant to note that in I.A.No.3460 of 1995 filed under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act also, only the address at Vadapalani is given as the address of the Petitioner. 11. The Petitioner made a desperate attempt in denying even the signature of her husband in the Suit summons. By perusal of the records it is seen that the Court Notice was served on the Petitioners Husband Sakthivel. For serving the Notice upon the Petitioners Husband Sakthivel, the Junior Bailiff has made the following endorsement : "Received Plaint and summons Sd/- G. Sakthivel ehd; 31/01/95 md;W cs;spl;l tpyhrk; brd;W gpujpthjpapd; fzthplk; ifbahg;gk; bgw;nwd;/ Soly Sd/- Junior Bailiff Affd Before me Sd/- D. N". The above endorsement of Junior Bailiff affirmed before the Deputy Nazir would clearly establish proof of service of summons upon the Petitioners Husband. 12. Under Sec.114 illus (e) of the Indian Evidence Act, all judicial and official acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done. This presumption is mainly applied to judicial and official acts. Where any judicial or official act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that formal requisites were complied with. In this case, the official act of service of summons upon the Petitioners Husband is proved. The Court cannot ignore the endorsement of the Junior Bailiff. Under Sec.114 illus (e) of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court is to raise presumption of due service of process. 13. Holding that presumption under Sec.114 illus (e) of the Indian Evidence Act that official acts are performed regularly would apply to the evidence given by Court officials and bailiff endorsements, M.SRINIVASAN, J., (as His Lordship then was) in the decision reported in C.Ramasami ..Vs.. 13. Holding that presumption under Sec.114 illus (e) of the Indian Evidence Act that official acts are performed regularly would apply to the evidence given by Court officials and bailiff endorsements, M.SRINIVASAN, J., (as His Lordship then was) in the decision reported in C.Ramasami ..Vs.. Kuruva Boyan and Others (1991 (1) L.W. 244) has held as follows:- "...It is not possible for a Court to ignore the evidence afforded by the Court Officials to the effect that delivery has been effected, on the mere allegation that there was no actual delivery. In order to reject the official records such as the bailiffs endorsements, there must be a definite and specific plea of fraud. In the absence of a plea of fraud with full particulars as are necessary to support the same, the Court shall not direct an enquiry as to whether there is actual delivery. In every case the judgment debtor is interested in stating that there is no physical delivery in order that he may obtain an order of stay in the appellate court. A bare allegation that the delivery is a paper delivery and that the appellant continues in possession is hardly sufficient to direct an enquiry whether there is physical delivery. The presumption under Sec.114 of the Evidence Act that official Acts are performed regularly will undoubtedly apply...." 14. The question might arise whether service of Notice upon the Petitioners Husband is due service. Under O.5 R.15 C.P.C where the Defendant is absent from his residence at the time when the service of summons is sought to be effected and there is no likelihood of his being found within a reasonable time, the service may be effected on any adult member of the family whether male or female residing with him. Hence, service of summons upon the defendants husband is due service upon the Defendant. 15. The decision reported in Womens Indian Association represented by its Secretary Parvathy Srinivasan Vs Mangudi and two others ( 1993 (2) L.W. 483 ), was the suit for injunction instituted by a Tenant, the Defendant (landlord) filed a Counter Claim seeking recovery of possession of the property. The Plaintiff / Tenant filed a Reply Statement. Thereafter, the Plaintiff / Tenant filed a Petition claiming the benefits of Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. In the said case, the Application was dismissed as barred by limitation. The Plaintiff / Tenant filed a Reply Statement. Thereafter, the Plaintiff / Tenant filed a Petition claiming the benefits of Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. In the said case, the Application was dismissed as barred by limitation. The Court has held that the process of counter claim served on Pleader is sufficient to impute knowledge to the party, this Court has held as under:- "...In the Law Lexicon, reprint edition 1987 by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, at Page 1236, the word "summons" has been stated to be a process issued from the office of a Court of Justice requiring the person to whom it is addressed to attend the Court for the purpose therein stated. Essentially, a summon is a communication emanating from a Court under the signature of the Presiding Officer and addressed to a person to appear before the Court and answer the claim made against him in the suit or other proceeding. Primarily, therefore, the object of the issue of summons is to put the opposite party in a suit or proceeding on notice of the claim made in the suit or proceedings as well as the basis therefore and also to call upon him to meet the claim made. It is in this context, the observations relied on by learned counsel for the Petitioner in Srinivasan Iyengars case (77 L.W. 59 = 1964 (I) M.L.J. 323 ), become relevant. Referring to the argument that the word "Summons" has got to be understood in the context as any process of Court by which the possession of the tenant is actually threatened to be taken away..." On the facts of the case, it was held that the earliest point of time when the respondent had knowledge of the threat held out in respect of his possession, was on 01.09.1986, when the Written Statement containing the counter claim was made or atleast on 112. 1986, when the respondent filed a reply Statement. In the present case, the petitioner must have deemed to have knowledge of ejectment suit when the suit summons was served upon her husband. 16. After due service of summons, the Petitioner has entered appearance by engaging counsel Mr. K. Balasubramaniam and filed Petition in I.A.No.3460 of 1995 under Sec.9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. In the present case, the petitioner must have deemed to have knowledge of ejectment suit when the suit summons was served upon her husband. 16. After due service of summons, the Petitioner has entered appearance by engaging counsel Mr. K. Balasubramaniam and filed Petition in I.A.No.3460 of 1995 under Sec.9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. The petitioner denied her signatures in the Vakalath and in the Application under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act contending that they are forged. The Trial Court compared the signature in the Vakalath and signature in the Application under Sec. 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act and formed an opinion that both signatures are identical and are that of the Petitioner. The finding of the lower court is assailed contending that the Court has erred in comparing the signatures in the Vakalath in O.S.No.137 of 1995 filed in the year 1995 and the Affidavit in the Application under Sec. 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act and such a wrong approach by the Trial Court has resulted in erroneous finding. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has contended that the Trial Court ought to have compared the disputed signatures in the Vakalath and in the Application under Sec. 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act with the admitted signatures of the Petitioner. Taking me through the various signatures of the Petitioner, learned counsel for the Petitioner urged this Court to conclude that the signatures in the Vakalath and in Sec.9 Application are not the signatures of the Petitioner. In the facts and circumstances of the case, comparison of the signatures and forming an opinion is not warranted. Service of summons upon the Petitioners Husband, appearance in the suit by engaging a counsel and filing Section 9 Application would clearly falsify the plea of forgery. Why should any other person should forge the signature of the Plaintiff and filed Section 9 Application? The plea of forgery does not address to reason. 17. The petitioner has alleged that the Power of Attorney, who is none other than her elder Brother has committed certain acts and omission and committed forgery in forging the Petitioners Signatures. In the Reply Notice sent to the Plaintiff Devasthanam on 110. The plea of forgery does not address to reason. 17. The petitioner has alleged that the Power of Attorney, who is none other than her elder Brother has committed certain acts and omission and committed forgery in forging the Petitioners Signatures. In the Reply Notice sent to the Plaintiff Devasthanam on 110. 2003, the Petitioner has alleged that her Power Agent has forged the signature of the Petitioner in the Vakalath and other pleadings and after coming to know of his misdoings and misappropriation of the amount collected from the Tenants, the Power of Attorney was cancelled on 09.04.2003. Serious allegations were made against the Power of Attorney in 2003. Even at that stage the Petitioner had not chosen to file any application in O.S.No.137 of 1995 to set aside the decree. Reasons for inaction of the Petitioner between October 2003 and August 2005 is not at all explained. Much arguments was advanced contending that either in the legal notice or in the suits filed for recovery of arrears of rent, the Plaintiff Devasthanam has not chosen to mention about the decree in ejectment suit. It was further contended that non mention of decree in ejectment suit in various proceedings would only show intention of the Plaintiff Devasthanam in suppressing the decree in ejectment suit. This contention has no merits, since the Petitioner herself has contested the ejectment suit for a period of about four years and had knowledge of the ejectment suit. 18. As rightly observed by the lower Court, the Petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands. She has not only alleged forgery of her signatures, but has also made serious allegations about the proceedings of the Court. It is pertinent to note that so far the Petitioner had not taken any steps either against the said Advocate Mr.K.Balasubramaniam or against the Power of Attorney, who is her own elder brother. 19. She has not only alleged forgery of her signatures, but has also made serious allegations about the proceedings of the Court. It is pertinent to note that so far the Petitioner had not taken any steps either against the said Advocate Mr.K.Balasubramaniam or against the Power of Attorney, who is her own elder brother. 19. Contending that the words "Sufficient Cause" should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and delay is to be condoned when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bonafides is imputable to the party, learned counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance upon the decisions reported in Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs Kuntal Kumari and others (A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 575), The State of West Bengal Vs The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others (A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 749), N.Balakrishnan Vs M.Krishnamurthy (1998 (II) C.T.C. 533), Chhabi Kulavi and Another Vs Ganesh Chandra Mondal (JT 2001 (1) S.C. 267), V.K.Industries and others Vs M.P.Electricity Board (2002 (1) C.T.C. 703), Sankaralingam and Another Vs V.Rahuraman ( 2002 (3) C.T.C. 13 ), Apangshu Mohan Lodh and Others Vs State of Tripura and others ( 2004 (1) S.C.C. 119 ), Shyam Sundar Sarma Vs Pannalal Jaiswal and Others ( 2005 (1) S.C.C. 436 ), Bhanu Kumar Jain Vs Archana Kumar and Another ( 2005 (1) S.C.C. 787 ), State of Nagaland Vs Lipok Ao and Others ( 2005 (3) S.C.C. 752 ), Tarachand (Deceased) and Others Vs Kathija ( 2005 (4) C.T.C. 255 ), Joint Commissioner, H.R. & C.E Vs Ambasamudram Taluk Vetta Thirukoil ( 2006 (1) C.T.C. 45 ) and S. Mohan Vs Cruz Mary ( 2006 (1) C.T.C. 191 ). In the factual scenario of the present case, the above decisions have no relevance. The explanation of the Petitioner smacks of malafides and this is not a fit case where the Court should show indulgence to the Petitioner in condoning the delay. 20. When the lower Court has exercised the discretion declining to condone the delay, the Revisional Court would not lightly interfere. The delay cannot be excused as a matter of judicial generosity. More so, when serious allegations are made against the official proceedings. That apart, the valuable right accrued to the Plaintiff Devasthanam cannot be lost sight of. The Impugned Order does not suffer from any arbitrariness or unreasonableness warranting interference. 21. For the foregoing reasons, the Impugned Order dated 010. The delay cannot be excused as a matter of judicial generosity. More so, when serious allegations are made against the official proceedings. That apart, the valuable right accrued to the Plaintiff Devasthanam cannot be lost sight of. The Impugned Order does not suffer from any arbitrariness or unreasonableness warranting interference. 21. For the foregoing reasons, the Impugned Order dated 010. 2005 of the V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in I.A.No.14959 of 2005 in O.S.No.137 of 1995 is confirmed and this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P.No.10578 of 2006 is closed.