JUDGMENT 1. The tenant - appellant/plaintiff is aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 26-11-1999 passed in Civil Appeal NO.14-A/I997 by the 1st Additional District Judge, Raigarh, whereby the judgment and decree dated 12-05-1997 passed in Civil Suit NO.66-A/1992 by the 1st Civil Judge Class-II, Raigarhgranting injunction in favour of the appellant/plaintiff was reversed while allowing the counter clam of the landlord - respondent No. 1/defendant No.2 for eviction under clauses (c) and (g) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act, 1961 ') of the tenant, i.e., the appellant/ plaintiff from the suit accommodation. 2. Brief facts are that the appellant/plaintiff Amritlal, who died during the pendency of the second appeal, had instituted a civil suit against the respondents for grant of permanent injunction restraining from dispossessing the appellant/plaintiff from the suit accommodation except in accordance with law. The case of the appellant/plaintiff was that he was a tenant in House No. 110/2 situated in Ward No. 17, Koshtapara, Raigarh (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit accommodation at a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- and was paying rent to respondents No.1/defendant No.2. It was further pleaded that respondent No.1/defendant No.2 was not the owner of the suit accommodation and was merely the Sarvarakar and caretaker of the property owned by Bhagwan Mahavir Temple. It was further pleaded that respondent No.1/defendant No.2 had fraudulently got his name registered as owner in the records of the Corporation. Respondent No. I/defendant No.2 had in collusion with respondent No.2/defendant No.1 sent a notice to the appellant/ plaintiff on 02-05-1992 that the suit accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and should be vacated so that it could be demolished. It was pleaded that the suit accommodation was in good condition and there was no need for its demolition. 3. Respondent No. 1/defendant No.2 denied the allegations in to to and pleaded that the suit accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and repair of the suit accommodation was not possible unless it was got vacated. It was also pleaded that the suit accommodation was not fit for human habitation. 3. Respondent No. 1/defendant No.2 denied the allegations in to to and pleaded that the suit accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and repair of the suit accommodation was not possible unless it was got vacated. It was also pleaded that the suit accommodation was not fit for human habitation. A counter claim was made for eviction of the appellant/plaintiff inter alia on the ground of denial of ownership of respondent No. I/defendant No.2 over the suit accommodation by the appellant/plaintiff and also on the ground that the accommodation had become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and was required bona fide by the landlord for carrying out repairs, which could not be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. 4. The learned trial Judge rejected the counter claim and granted a decree for permanent injunction in favour of the appellant/plaintiff and against the respondents/defendants. Respondent No. 1/defendant No.2 preferred first appeal, i.e., Civil Appeal No. 14-A/1 997 before the 1st Additional Disttict Judge, Raigarh. The lower appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial Court and allowed the counter claim of respondent No. 1/defendant No.2 and granted a decree for eviction of the appellant/plaintiff under clauses (c) and (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. Being aggrieved, the appellant/plaintiff preferred this second appeal. 5. The appeal was heard on the following substantial question of law : "Whether the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court allowing the counterclaim and granting eviction of the tenant under Section12(1)( c) & (g) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, is contrary to law?" 6. Shri Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff contended that the tenant did not deny that he was a tenant at rent of Rs. 40/- per month in the suit accommodation and was paying rent to respondent No. 1/defendant No.2 regularly. It was contended that under these circumstances, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court under clause (c) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 was liable to be set aside. Reliance was placed on Sheela and others Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash'. It was contended that under these circumstances, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court under clause (c) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 was liable to be set aside. Reliance was placed on Sheela and others Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash'. It was further argued that since in para 19, the lower appellate Court did not record a specific finding that respondent No.1/defendant No.2 had proved the ground under clause (g) of sub section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961, the judgment and decree under clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 was liable to be set aside. It was also contended that the appellant/plaintiff had led evidence that he had got the suit accommodation repaired. The landlord was, therefore, not entitled to a decree for eviction under clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. Reliance was placed on Shadi Singh Vs. Rakha. 7. On the other hand, Shri Manindra Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate forrespondent NO.I/dcfendant NO.2 submitted that if this Court would reach a conclusion that no specific finding was recorded by the lower appellate Court that the ground for eviction under clause (g) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 was proved by respondent No.1 /defendant No.2, the matter should be remanded to the lower appellate Court for doing so. As regards the ground for eviction under clause (c) of sub -section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961, it was argued that the averments of the appellant/plaintiff in the plaint as also in para 3 of the reply of the counter claim and his testimony in paragraphs 1 and 3 left no room for any doubt that the appellant/plaintiff had denied the ownership of respondent No. I /defendant No.2 over the suit accommodation. Therefore, interference in the decree for eviction passed under clause (c) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 was not called for. 8. Having considered the rival submissions, I have perused the record. Clause (c) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 reads as under: "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. Therefore, interference in the decree for eviction passed under clause (c) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 was not called for. 8. Having considered the rival submissions, I have perused the record. Clause (c) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 reads as under: "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (c) that the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein: Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation as his office shall not be deemed to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy;" 9. A plain reading of the above provision shows that the ground for eviction under clause (c) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 has three limbs as under: "(i) that the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance, or (ii) has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or (iii) which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein." 10. This appeal is concerned only with the third limb mentioned above. In Sheela and others Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash' (supra), the Apex Court had considered the requirement of law before a decree for eviction of the tenant under clause (c) of sub-section (l) of Section 12 oft he Act, 1961 could be passed and held as under: "17. In our opinion, denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of Cl. (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. In our opinion, denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of Cl. (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial or disclaimer, as would entail for feature of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a third party. A tenant bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove his ownership or putting the landlord to proof of his title so as to protect himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection made available to him by Rent Control Law but without disowning his character of possession over the tenancy premises as tenant cannot be said to have denied the title of landlord or disclaimed the tenancy. Such an act of the tenant does not attract applicability of S. 12(1)( c) above said. It is the intention of the tenant, as culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability." 11. A perusal of the pleadings of the appellant/plaintiff in the plaint shows that it was admitted that the appellant/plaintiff was a tenant of respondent No.11 defendant No.2 in the suit accommodation at the rent of Rs 40/- per month. As regards the pleadings in para 4 that the property originally belonged to late Ramdas. Eaba, who had executed a Will dated 05-11-1966 in favour of respondent No. II defendant No.2 is concerned, a perusal of para 4 of the written statement filed by respondent No.1/defendant No.2 clearly goes to show that the above mentioned facts pleaded by the appellant/plaintiffwere admitted. It is also pertinent to note that in paragraphs 1 and 5 of his statement on oath, the appellant/plaintiff had categorically admitted that respondent No. 1 /defendant NO.2 was the landlord in the suit accommodation and he was regularly paying rent to him. The appellant/plaintiff had also admitted that respondent NO.1/defendant NO.2 was recorded as an owner of the suit accommodation in the Corporation records. In this manner, placing reliance on Sheela and others Vs. The appellant/plaintiff had also admitted that respondent NO.1/defendant NO.2 was recorded as an owner of the suit accommodation in the Corporation records. In this manner, placing reliance on Sheela and others Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakasht (supra), it cannot be said that the tenant had renounced his character as a tenant and had in clear and unequivocal terms setup a title of the landlord either in himself or a third party. The relationship of the landlord and tenant between the appellant/plaintiff and respondent NO.1/defendant NO.2 is an admitted fact in this case. Merely calling upon the landlord to prove his ownership over the suit accommodation without disowning his character of tenant over the tenanted accommodation as a tenant does not tantamount to accrual of the right of the landlord to evict the tenant under clause (c) of subsection (l) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. It is the intention of the tenant as culled out from the nature of the pleadings, which are determinative of its vulnerability. Therefore, the learned lower appellate Court erred in granting a decree for eviction of the tenant under clause (c) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. The judgment and decree for eviction passed by the lower appellate Court under clause (c) of sub-section (l)of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 is, therefore, liable to be set aside. The substantial question of law relating to the ground for eviction under clause (c) of sub-section (l) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 is answered accordingly. 12, I shall now deal with the ground for eviction under clause (g) of subsection (l) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. Clause (g) of subsection (l) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 reads as under: "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. 12, I shall now deal with the ground for eviction under clause (g) of subsection (l) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. Clause (g) of subsection (l) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 reads as under: "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (g) that the accommodation has become unsafe, or unfit for human habitation and is required bonafide by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated;" As regards the ground for eviction under clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961, respondent NO.1/defendant No.2 was required to prove that the accommodation had become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and was ried out without the accommodation being vacated. The question whether the suit accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and was required bona fide by the landlord for repairs which could not be carried out unless the accommodation is got vacated has 10 be determined with objectivity. The burden to prove the ground under clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 was on respondent No. 11 defendant No.2. This could be discharged not only by adducing evidence but also on the basis of the admissions made by the appellant/plaintiff and his witnesses. There is a clear admission in paragraph 5 of the plaint that the roof of the suit accommodation was in a completely dilapidated condition for want of repairs and despite requests made by the appellant/plaintiff, respondent No. 1/ defendant NO.2 did not carry out the repairs. Amritlal, the appellant/plaintiff stated in paragraph 8 that one Kedar used to live in the room behind the suit accommodation, which was vacant since 1992. He also admitted that the accommodation, which was in possession of the tenant Kedar, had become completely dilapidated. He further admitted that another tenanted accommodation adjacent to the suit accommodation, let out to one Arjun, was, on vacation by Arjun, in his possession and that accommodation was also in a completely dilapidated condition. He also admitted that the accommodation, which was in possession of the tenant Kedar, had become completely dilapidated. He further admitted that another tenanted accommodation adjacent to the suit accommodation, let out to one Arjun, was, on vacation by Arjun, in his possession and that accommodation was also in a completely dilapidated condition. He categorically admitted that both the accommodations, vacated by Kedar and Arjun, were unfit for human habitation since they were in a highly dilapidated condition. 13. The appellant/plaintiff admitted further in paragraph 2 that the walls of the suit accommodation do not have a cement plaster. Sher Singh, witness No.2 for the appellant/plaintiff also admitted in paragraph 6 that the walls of the suit accommodation do not have a plaster and have not been white-washed with lime. He also admitted in paragraph 7 that the wooden planks supporting the roof in the suit accommodation were in an extremely dilapidated condition and unless the entire roof was dismantled, it was not possible to repair the same. It is not in dispute that the suit accommodation did not have any toilet. Neelamber Prasad, witness NO.3 for the appellant/plaintiff also admirted that the roof of the suit accommodation needed replacement. Sher Singh, aged about 65 years, the witness No.2 for the appellant/plaintiff further admitted in paragraph 4 that the walls and roof of the suit accommodation have not been repaired since his birth. Neelamber Prasad, witness NO.3 for the appellant/plaintiff also admitted that the suit accommodation is about 70 years old. 14. The abovementioned admissions made by the appellant/plaintiff and his witnesses fully support the testimony of respondent No. 1/defendant No.2 in paragraph 4 that the suit accommodation is in a highly dilapidated condition, the wooden planks supporting the roof are no longer able to bear the weight of the roof and may collapse any moment and thus the suit accommodation was unsafe for human habitation. It is thus proved that respondent No. 1/defendant NO.2 required the suit accommodation bona fide for carrying out repairs, which could not be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. 15. It is thus proved that respondent No. 1/defendant NO.2 required the suit accommodation bona fide for carrying out repairs, which could not be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. 15. Considering the evidence led by the parties and the facts and circumstances mentioned above in its entirety, I am of the considered opinion that the lower appellate Court was right in holding that respondent No. 11 defendant NO.2 had established that the suit accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and could not be repaired unless vacated. The case law of Shadi Singh Vs. Rakha2 (supra) cited by learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff is clearly distinguishable in view of the admissions made by the appellant/plaintiff and his witnesses about the condition of the roof of the suit accommodation. No interference is, therefore, called for in the judgment and decree for eviction passed by the lower appellate Court under clause (g) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. The substantial question of law relating to the ground for eviction under clause (g) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 is answered accordingly. 16. It is true that before granting a decree for eviction under clause (g) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 the lower appellate Court did not record a specific finding in paragraph 19 of the impugned judgment in that regard yet in the facts and circumstances of the case a remit is not justified because the 'lower appellate Court has considered the evidence on record and recorded a conclusion that the evidence led by defendant NO.2 was acceptable that the suit accommodation was in a dilapidated condition and a repair could be carried out only after its vacation, Based on such conclusion, the lower appellate Court eventually granted a decree for eviction tinder clause (g) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961. 1 7. In the result, while setting aside the judgment and decree for eviction of the appellant/plaintiff from the suit accommodation under clause (c) of sub-section , (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 passed by the lower appellate Court, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court insofar as it relates to the ground for eviction of the appellant/plaintiff under clause (g) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 1961 is affirmed. In that view of the matter, the second appeal stands dismissed. 18. The judgment and decree for eviction now rests solely on the ground under clause (g) of sub-section (I) of Section 12 of the Act, 196 I. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff was asked to inform the Court whether the appellant/plaintiff would elect to be placed in the occupation of the accommodation or part thereof from which he is to be evicted. Learned counsel for the appellant/ plaintiff submits that the legal representatives of the decease appellant/plaintiff elect to be placed in occupation of the suit accommodation from which they are to be evicted. The option so exercised is recorded. The legal representatives of the appellant/plaintiff shall hand over vacant possession of the suit accommodation on or before 30th of October, 2007 to respondent No. 1/defendant No.2 so as to enable respondent No. 1/defendant No.2 to commence the work of repairs. Upon delivery of possession on or before the date specified above, the landlord shall complete the work of repairs within a reasonable time and within one month of completion of such work, place the legal representatives of the deceased appellant/ plaintiff in occupation of the suit accommodation. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. A decree be drawn accordingly. Appeal allowed with direction.