Judgment M. Y. Eqbal, J.-This second appeal by the plaintiff-appellant is against the judgment of reversal. 2. Plaintiff-appellant's suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession being Title Suit No. 26 of 1986 was decreed by Munsif, Hazaribagh in terms of judgment dated 12th May, 1988. However, in appeal filed by the defendant-respondents being Title Appeal No. 68 of 1988, the 2nd Additional District Judge, Hazaribagh being the appellate Court, in terms of the judgment and decree dated 1.9.1990 reversed the finding recorded by the trial Court and allowed the appeal, thereby set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 3. The plaintiff's case, inter alia, is that he purchased 4 decimals of land under Plot No. 239 of Khata No. 661 of village Noora, PS-Sadar, District Hazaribagh from the defendants-respondents through a registered sale-deed dated 25.8.1980 for a consideration of RS.1000/-. After purchase, the plaintiff was put in possession of the land. The plaintiff thereafter applied for mutation of the land in his name in Khas Mahal Office which was allowed and rent-receipts were issued in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit land. The plaintiff also got the land entered into register of Municipality in his name and started paying rent and taxes. Plaintiff's further case is that on 1.11.1985 when he went to Patna after locking the hut, the defendants at the instigation of the enemies of the plaintiff, occupied the hut forcibly. On return from Patna, the plaintiff alleged to have protested which finally resulted that on 21.,3.1986 the Circle Officer and B.D.O., Hazaribagh came to the tea-stall of the plaintiff and demanded to see the sale-deed, rent receipt, etc., which were produced by the plaintiff and taken away by those Officers. The plaintiff's further case is that on 1 .2.1986 when he went to the aforesaid officials to take back the papers, the Circle Officer with the help of five musclemen compelled him to sign a Sada paper of relinquishment of his claim from the land and the hut, which necessitated him for filing the instant suit. 4. The case of the defendant-respondents, on the other hand, is that the suit was bad for non-rejoinder of other cosharers of the defendants as the entire suit land is possessed by the defendants and other co-sharers jointly. 4. The case of the defendant-respondents, on the other hand, is that the suit was bad for non-rejoinder of other cosharers of the defendants as the entire suit land is possessed by the defendants and other co-sharers jointly. The defendants denied and disputed the execution of sale-deed dated 25.8.1980 and also denied the receipt of any amount by way of consideration and putting the plaintiff in possession of the same. According to the defendants, the alleged sale deed was forged and fabricated document and was never acted upon. It was categorically stated by the defendants that they never put L.T.I. on the alleged sale deed. 5. The trial Court framed following 11 issues for consideration: I. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? II. Has the plaintiff got any valid cause of action for the suit? III. Is the suit barred by law of Limitation, estoppel waiver and acquiescence? IV. Is the suit bad for non joinder of necessary party? V. Is the sale deed dated 25.8.80 executed by defendants? VI. Is the sale deed dated 25.8.80 a valid, legal and binding document? VII. Had plaintiff got possession upon the suit land by virtue of sale deed dated 25.8.80 and reconstructed hut thereon? VIII. Has plaintiff been dispossessed on 1.1.85 from the suit land in the manner as claimed by the plff? IX. Is the deed of relinquishment dated 1.2.86 has been voluntarily executed or it was obtained, on show of force and under threat? X. Is the plaintiff entitled for a decree for declaration of title and recovery of possession as prayed for? XI. To what relief or reliefs, if any plaintiff is entitled to? 6. Both the parties adduced evidence, both oral and documentary, in support of their respective cases. The plaintiff-appellant proved the sale deed, rent receipts, tax receipt, etc. The trial Court proceeded on the basis that initial onus lay on the plaintiff to prove that the suit land was purchased by virtue of registered deed of sale and he was put in possession of the same. The moment the defendants alleged that they did not put their L.T.I. on the sale deed, the onus shifted on the shoulder of the defendants to prove that fact. Since the disputed L.T.I. on the sale deed was not sent for examination by experts at the instance of defendants-respondents, they failed to discharge their onus. The moment the defendants alleged that they did not put their L.T.I. on the sale deed, the onus shifted on the shoulder of the defendants to prove that fact. Since the disputed L.T.I. on the sale deed was not sent for examination by experts at the instance of defendants-respondents, they failed to discharge their onus. Consequently, on the basis of registered sale deed coupled with rent receipts, tax receipts, etc., the plaintiff is entitled to get a declaration of title in his favour. On these findings, the trial Court decreed the suit. 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the defendants preferred appeal. The appellate Court, however, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The appellate Court is of the opinion that the view taken by the trial Court was wrong. According to the appellate Court, when there is denial of execution of sale deed and denial of L.T.I. by the defendants, the entire onus was on the plaintiff to prove that the sale deed was executed by the defendants. The appellate Court held that since no step was taken by the plaintiff to get the L.T.I. on the sale-deed compared with the L.T.I. of the defendants by experts, the title of the plaintiff could not have been declared. 8. I have heard Mr. Vijoy Gopal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. No one appears on behalf of the respondents. 9. This appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- "Whether the learned appellate Court of appeal below could have reversed the finding of fact arrived at by the learned trial Court only on the ground that L.T.I. of the defendant nos.1 & 2 were sent for expert's opinion; although admittedly the plaintiff proved L.T.I. of the said defendants?" 10. From perusal of the judgment of the appellate Court, it appears that the appellate Court has not correctly appreciated the law with regard to onus of proof in cases where the execution of sale-deed is denied by the party. 11. It is well settled that when both parties adduced evidence, the question of burden of proof loses its importance and the Court has to come to a decision on consideration of all materials. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of "Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos. VS. 11. It is well settled that when both parties adduced evidence, the question of burden of proof loses its importance and the Court has to come to a decision on consideration of all materials. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of "Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos. VS. Thukalan Paulo Avira & Ors." ( AIR 1959 S.C. 31 ). The aforesaid principle was followed by the patna High Court in the case of "Haquik Mian vs. Rajendra Prasad & Ors." [ 1996(1) PLJR 132 ] where it was held that when both parties have led evidence having fully aware with the pleadings of the other side, in that event, the burden of proof loses its significance. In the case of "La khan Sao vs. Dharmu Choudhary [ (1991)3 SCC 331 ], the Supreme Court observed that it is always open to the defendant not 10 lead any evidence where the: onus is, upon the plaintiff but after having gone into evidence, he cannot ask the Court not to look at and act on it. The question of burden of proof at the end of case when both parties have tendered evidence is not of any great importance and the Court has to come to a decision on a consideration of all materials. In the light of the aforesaid principle, I shall discuss the facts of the instant case. 12. As noticed above, the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession alleging that the suit land was purchased by him from the defendants by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 25.8.1980 after paying the consideration amount. The plaintiff's case was that after the aforesaid purchase, he applied for mutation before the Khas Mahal Officer and the Authority after making inquiry, mutated his name with respect to the suit property and granted rent receipts. The plaintiff further alleged to have prepared a hut situated in the land and remained in possession of the same. However, in 1986 when the plaintiff went out of station, the defendants forcefully entered into the suit property. The defendants, on the other hand, pleaded that they did not execute the alleged sale-deed dated 25.8.1980 in favour of the plaintiff and no consideration amount was received by them. They also pleaded that• the document does not bear their L.T.I. and that the sale-deed is forged one. The defendants, on the other hand, pleaded that they did not execute the alleged sale-deed dated 25.8.1980 in favour of the plaintiff and no consideration amount was received by them. They also pleaded that• the document does not bear their L.T.I. and that the sale-deed is forged one. Both parties adduced evidence. The plaintiff proved the sale-deed by examining witnesses including the Scribe of the document. The plaintiff's witnesses have supported the case of the plaintiff who also proved the saledeed, rent-receipts and other documents in support of his title and possession. The defendants, on the other hand-asserted that the alleged sale-deed is a forged and fabricated document and it does not bear their L.T.I. Only defendant No.1 came on the dock. Defendant No.2 did not examine himself to support the aforesaid allegation. No other witnesses were examined. The trial Court, in the aforesaid premises, held that the plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence to prove his title and possession, but the defendants did not discharge their onus, although asserted that the sale-deed was forged and fabricated document. The trial Court held that the initial onus was on the plaintiff to prove that he purchased the land from the defendants and came in possession of the same. In this way, the plaintiff has discharged his initial onus to prove the case: In the said circumstances, the onus shifts on the shoulder of the defendants to prove those circumstances. The appellate Court, on the other hand, held that when the defendants have denied the execution of the sale-deed, the onus lies solely on the plaintiff to prove that the sale-deed in question was executed and it was a genuine and valid document. The appellate Court further held that in view of the denial of the execution of sale-deed and also denial of the L.T. I., the entire onus was on the plaintiff to prove that the sale-deed was executed and it was a genuine and valid document. 13. In my view, the appellate Court has not correctly appreciated the law with regard to burden of proof. In the instant case, as noticed above, the plaintiff proved the execution and registration of the saledeed, brought genuine witnesses including the Scribe of the document and also proved possession over the suit property after the aforesaid purchase. 13. In my view, the appellate Court has not correctly appreciated the law with regard to burden of proof. In the instant case, as noticed above, the plaintiff proved the execution and registration of the saledeed, brought genuine witnesses including the Scribe of the document and also proved possession over the suit property after the aforesaid purchase. The plaintiff also proved the document regarding mutation of the land in his favour and continuous grant of rent receipts. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellate Court has committed serious error of law in holding that the plaintiff has failed to discharge his onus by proving that the sale-deed is a genuine document. The finding recorded by the appellate Court suffers from serious infirmity and error of law. The judgment and decree of the appellate Court, therefore, is liable to set aside. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored.