JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prafulla C. Pant, J. By means of this writ petition, moved under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the petitioners have sought writ in the nature of certiorari, quashing the order dated 11.11.1983 (copy annexure-1 to the writ petition), passed by Prescribed Authority, and order dated 19.04.1988 (copy annexure-2 to the writ petition), passed by respondent No. 1, affirming the order passed by Prescribed Authority. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the affidavits, counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit. 3. Brief facts of the case are that petitioner, a landlord of house No. 173, Bara Bazar, Malli Tal, Nainital, moved an application under Section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred as U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972). Respondent No. 3 is a tenant in the first floor of said house. The landlord lives in a tenanted accommodation with his family in house No. 175 Bara Bazar, Malli Tal, Nainital. Pleading that the petitioiner’s family is large and it is difficult to accommodate a large family in a tenanted accommodation, an application for release of accommodation in occupation of respondent No. 3 was sought to be released by the petitioner, claiming his need to be bonafide. It is also alleged by the petitioner that comparative hardship of the petitioner is more than that of the tenant, who can shift to some other accommodation. 4. Respondent No. 3, the tenant contested the application before the Prescribed Authority and alleged that the need of the petitioner is not bonafide. It is further pleaded by respondent No. 3 that the landlord’s son Rajendra Lal Shah, is a businessman and he can easily get alternative accommodation for his family. It is further pleaded in the written statement that in fact the family of Rajendra Lal Shah is already settled in Kotabagh (District Nainital). Respondent No. 3 has further alleged that the house was purchased by the petitioner in the year 1978 and the application has been moved only to pressurise the answering respondent either to vacate or agree to enhance the rate of rent. Lastly, it is stated that the answering respondent has no alternative accommodation where he can shift his family. 5. Contesting parties filed affidavits in support of their cases as evidence before the Prescribed Authority. Lastly, it is stated that the answering respondent has no alternative accommodation where he can shift his family. 5. Contesting parties filed affidavits in support of their cases as evidence before the Prescribed Authority. Prescribed Authority after hearing the parties found that the petitioner’s bonafide need is not proved. It further observed that tenant’s hardship is more than that of landlord and rejected the application under Section 21 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. Aggrieved by said judgment and order dated 11.11.1983, passed by Prescribed Authority in rent control case No. 07 of 1982, the landlord Parsi Lal Shah, preferred an appeal (rent control appeal No. 19 of 1983) before the District Judge, Nainital and the same was transferred to IVth Additional District Judge, who after hearing the parties affirmed the order, passed by Prescribed Authority vide his order dated 19.04.1988. Hence this writ petition was filed before Allahabad High Court in the year 1988. The writ petition is received by this Court by transfer under Section 35 of U.P. Reorganisation Act, 2000, for its disposal. 6. Admittedly, petitioner Shri Parsi Lal Shah (since deceased), purchased the house No. 173 in the year 1978 in Bara Bazar, Malli Tal, Nainital, in which the respondent No. 3 is a tenant. The rate of rent Rs. 125/- per annum is also not disputed. It is also admitted between the parties that the landlord with his family, was living in the tenanted accommodation and now after his death his children are living in the tenanted accommodation in house No. 175 Bara Bazar, Malli Tal, Nainital. The main ground on which Prescribed Authority rejected the application of the petitioner appears to be that the landlord was having three rooms in the tenanted accommodation while the accommodation in question consists of one and a half room. The Prescribed Authority took the opinion that if the petitioner’s large family is not able to live in three rooms set, it cannot be believed that such family can live in one and a half room. The entire approach of the Prescribed Authority is erroneous in law. It is nowhere petitioner’s case that he is vacating the house occupied by him. The entire approach of the Prescribed Authority is erroneous in law. It is nowhere petitioner’s case that he is vacating the house occupied by him. What he has pleaded is this that number of members of family are ten and since grand children are also living in the family, as such, not only there was paucity of accommodation but also there was problem of privacy for the members of family. This Court is of the view that if a landlord is living in a tenanted accommodation and unable to live in his own house what more can be his bonafide need. A landlord cannot be compelled to live in tenanted accommodation when he has got his own house. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that the petitioner had offered exchange of the accommodation and as such, the Prescribed Authority committed no error of law in rejecting the application on the ground that the petitioner’s family could not have genuinely needed one and a half room to accommodate the ten members of his family. I see no force in the contention for the reason that a tenant of another house at his own will cannot exchange accommodation unless the landlord of that house or competent authority is ready to allot the house. 8. Strangely, the appellate authority (respondent No. 1) has not given any reasons why it is affirming the order of the Prescribed Authority. After narrating the facts and mentioning the contentions in short, the appellate authority has simply observed as under :- “Considering the bonafide need of both the parties and their comparative hardship, the learned Prescribed Authority arrived at the conclusion that the application of the landlord is liable to be rejected. I do not find any force in the appeal as the appellant is already having an allotted house having enough space to accommodate his family”. After the above para, the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal. 9. On behalf of the petitioner, attention of this Court is drawn to case of Kamla Ahuja Vs. VIth Addl. District Judge 1981 (U.P.) 1 RCC pg. 199 in which it has been observed that what is to be seen by the authorities is whether the need of the landlord is bonafide or not, not the fact whether the accommodation released would be sufficient or not. VIth Addl. District Judge 1981 (U.P.) 1 RCC pg. 199 in which it has been observed that what is to be seen by the authorities is whether the need of the landlord is bonafide or not, not the fact whether the accommodation released would be sufficient or not. Also, reliance is placed on behalf of the petitioner to the principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in Raghunath G. Panhale Vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. (1999) 8 Supreme Court Cases 1 in which it has been held that “bonafide need or requirement” cannot be equated with “dire or absolute or compelling necessity”. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 Supreme Court Cases 222, the Apex Court has further clarified that expression “bonafide or genuine need” refers to “need” and “requirement” of a certain degree with a thrust within demanding fulfilment. It should be more than simply a ‘desire’. 10. In the present case, the petitioner was living in a tenanted accommodation, had a large family and in such circumstances if he was seeking release of the accommodation, owned by him, which was in occupation of tenant, from no stretch of imagination can it be said to be not a bonafide need. 11. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 argued that petitioner has not filed copy of application for release of the house and as such, the facts cannot be appreciated by this Court. Had the facts not been on recorded in the impugned orders, passed by Prescribed Authority or the appellate authority, this Court could have accepted the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent but the facts on the record, as mentioned in both the impugned orders and which are pleaded in the writ petition and which also find place in the affidavits and counter affdavit, filed before this Court, it is not just and proper on the part of this Court to throw away this writ petiton on the ground that copy of release application is not filed as annexure to the petition. 12. Next argument advanced on behalf of the respondent is that during pendency of writ petition, the petitioner Parsi lal Shah has died. his another son Kailash Lal Shah, has also died. Daughters of Kailash Lal Sah, are also married. 12. Next argument advanced on behalf of the respondent is that during pendency of writ petition, the petitioner Parsi lal Shah has died. his another son Kailash Lal Shah, has also died. Daughters of Kailash Lal Sah, are also married. As such, the need of the original landlord cannot be said to be that of his son Rajendra Lal Sah and daughter-in-law Jiwanti Sah. Ordinarily, the court has to see the need as existed on the day when the petition is filed. In exceptional cases, the development during the pendency of the proceedings are also required to be seen. Since the litigation started in the year 1982, it is now 2007. In a span of 25 years, the change of circumstances is bound to take place, as the landlord was a retired man when he filed application for release of his house. Lastly, it is contended that original landlord’s (Pasri Lal Sah’s) son Rajendra Lal Sah and his wife Jiwanti Sah are living now in Almora. It is further contended that Jiwanti Sah, wife of Rajendra Lal Sah is serving with Khadi Gram Udyog. In reply to this, the petitioner’s counsel, submitted that Rajendra Lal Sah’s wife belong to Kotabagh and in view of the fact that the petitioner’s family was large, Rajendra Lal Sah, had to live in his in-laws place in Kotabagh. In such circumstances, where the accommodation available for the petitioner’s family, which is large, even if the petitioner in compelling circumstances living with his wife, it cannot be said that the need of the landlord has got diluted. 13. As far as the comparative hardship is concerned in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the hardship of respondent No. 3 is more than that of the petitioner. The Prescribed Authority has committed grave error of law by rejecting the claim of hardship of landlord merely on the ground that he is not likely to be evicted from the house where he is living as a tenant. The lower appellate court has committed graver error by not even discussing the issue. As such the findings of both the courts below being perverse are liable to be set aside. 14. For the reasons, as discussed above, the impugned orders dated 11.11.1983, passed by Prescribed Authority, in rent control case no. The lower appellate court has committed graver error by not even discussing the issue. As such the findings of both the courts below being perverse are liable to be set aside. 14. For the reasons, as discussed above, the impugned orders dated 11.11.1983, passed by Prescribed Authority, in rent control case no. 07 of 1982 and order dated 19.04.1988, passed by IVth Additional District Judge, Nainital in rent control appeal No. 19 of 1983, are hereby quashed. The release application moved by the petitioner is allowed. however, in the interest of justice, the respondent No. 3 is allowed three months time from today to vacate the premises and to hand over the possession to the petitioners, failing which the petitioner would be at liberty to get the execution done through Prescribed Authority. Accordingly writ petition stands allowed.