JUDGMENT (PER F.I. REBELLO, J.): The petitioners are the owners of land bearing Survey No.469/2B situated at Sangli, admeasuring 1088.12 sq. meters within the limits of the Respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 came into existence since 9th February, 1998. Before that the land was within the limits of the erstwhile Sangli Municipal Council. Respondent No.1 and its predecessors are the Planning Authority for the lands situated within their planning area. In the notified development plan the petitioners land has been shown as reserved for the purpose of "Cold Storage". The development plan of Sangli city was notified on 28th March, 1977 and has come into force with effect from 1st June, 1977. As the respondent No.1 and/or its predecessor in title did not take any steps to acquire the reserved land, the petitioners caused a notice to be served on 4th December, 1987 pursuant to the provisions of Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) through their Power of Attorney Holder. The respondent No.1 was called upon the take immediate steps to acquire the land. The notice was received on the same date. The respondent No.1 by their letter dated 12th March, 1998 asked the petitioners to furnish documents in order to commence the process of acquisition of the land. The documents which were sought, were :- (1) Map of Survey No.469 showing the shares of yourself and all others. (2) Copy of Power of Attorney executed in favour of Suresh Vaman Lagu (3) Bill regarding House-tax paid to former Sangli Municipal Council. It was informed that on annexing the documents to the application, within 7 days of receipt thereof, due and proper action would be commenced, otherwise the notice dated 14th December, 1997 would be treated as withdrawn. The petitioners received the said notice on 20th March, 1998 and by communication of 27th March, 1998 forwarded the necessary information. 2. The respondent No.1 thereafter was pleased to pass a resolution on 1st June, 1998 resolving to acquire the land for Cold Storage and sent the land acquisition proposal to the Collector of Sangli vide their letter dated 26th June, 1998. It may be mentioned that in the notice received by the respondent No.1 on 4th December, 1997 the Power of Attorney holder had mentioned that the property is owned by Vijay Baburao Babaar. It may be mentioned that in the notice received by the respondent No.1 on 4th December, 1997 the Power of Attorney holder had mentioned that the property is owned by Vijay Baburao Babaar. The present petition came to be filed on 29th April, 1999. 3. At the hearing of this petition on behalf of the petitioners their learned Counsel has raised the following contention:-Respondent NO.1, it is submitted, has not taken steps to acquire the land in terms of the provisions of Section 127 read with Section 126 of the M.R.T.P. & P.U.L.P. Act within the time prescribed by Section 127 of the Act and consequently the application forwarded by respondent NO.1 to the Appropriate Government on 26th June, 1998 is beyond the prescribed period and as such the property stands de-reserved. 4. A reply was filed by Krishna Madhavrao Shikhare, Assistant Director of Town Planning, Sangli. The facts as averred by the petitioner are not disputed. It is only set out that the Municipal Corporation had resolved to acquire the land within the stipulated time limit from the receipt of the purchase notice. Passing a resolution is part and parcel of the process of land acquisition steps were, therefore, taken on time. 5. A reply has also been filed on behalf of the Respondent No.1 by S.J. Sadamate, Town Planner. It is firstly submitted that the resolution for acquisition was passed on 1st June, 1998 which was within six months as contemplated by Section 127 of the M.R.T.P. Act. Reference is made to the steps taken pursuant to the Commissioner forwarding the application of 26th June, 1998 to the Collector of Sangli pursuant to the resolution of 1st June, 1998. It is not necessary to advert to other facts. No interim relief was granted by this Court. However, the petition was expedited. 5. On behalf of the respondent No.1 their learned Counsel has submitted as under:- (1). It is firstly submitted that the resolution was passed on 1st June, 1998 to acquire the land. Passing of the resolution by respondent No.1 on 1st June, 1998 is a step in the process of acquisition and, therefore, there being compliance of the requirements of Section 127 of the M.R.T.P. Act it cannot be said that there is a deemed de-reservation. Passing of the resolution by respondent No.1 on 1st June, 1998 is a step in the process of acquisition and, therefore, there being compliance of the requirements of Section 127 of the M.R.T.P. Act it cannot be said that there is a deemed de-reservation. (2) It is next submitted that at any rate the petitioners were called upon to furnish information by letter of 12th March, 1998 which is furnished on 27th March, 1998 and consequently the period of six months would commence from 27th March, 1998. The application was made on 26th June, 1998 and as such the same was within the period prescribed under Section 127 and as such there is no de-reservation. 6. The facts are not disputed. The question of law that we are called upon to answer from the submissions of the parties are as under:- (i) Whether passing of a resolution by a Corporation/Council before the expiry of six months from the service of notice under Section 127 of the M.R.T.P. Act is a step in the proceedings and consequently the land does not stand de-reserved. (ii) Whether the notice of 12th March, 1998 served by the Respondent NO.1 on the Power of Attorney Holder of the petitioners calling upon them to produce the information would arrest the time as set out in Section 127 of the M./R.T.P. Act. Will the time or period commence only from the date the petitioners Power of Attorney gave information i.e. from 27th March, 1998. 7. We may, therefore, answer the first issue. For that purpose we may gainfully reproduce Section 127 of the Act which reads as under:- "127. Will the time or period commence only from the date the petitioners Power of Attorney gave information i.e. from 27th March, 1998. 7. We may, therefore, answer the first issue. For that purpose we may gainfully reproduce Section 127 of the Act which reads as under:- "127. Lapsing of reservation.-- If any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified in any plan under this Act is not acquired by agreement within ten years from the date on which a final Regional plan, or final Development plan comes into force or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land under this Act or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (I of 1894), are not commenced within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice on the Planning Authority, Development Authority or as the case may be, Appropriate Authority to that effect; and if within six months from the date of the service of such notice, the land is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed, and thereupon the land shall be deemed to be released from such reservation, allotment or designation and shall become available to the owner for the purpose of development as otherwise, permissible in the case of adjacent land under the relevant plan." Section 126 is also relevant. We may, therefore, reproduce the relevant portion of Section 126, which reads as follows:- "126(1) Acquisition of land required for public purposes specified in plans.-- (1) When after the publication of a draft Regional plan, a Development or any other plan or town planning scheme, any land is required or reserved for any of the public purposes specified in any plan or scheme under this Act at any time the Planning Authority, Development Authority, or as the case may be, any appropriate Authority may, except as otherwise provided in Section 113-A, acquire the land – (a) by an agreement by paying an amount agreed to or, (b) in lieu of any such amount, by granting the land-owner or the lessee, subject, however, to the lessee paying the lessor or depositing with the Planning Authority, Development Authority or Appropriate Authority, as the case may be, for payment to the lessor, an amount equivalent to the value of the lessor’s interest to be determined by any of the said Authorities concerned on the basis of the principles laid down in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Floor Space Index (FSI) or Transferable Development Rights (TDR) against the area of land surrendered free of cost and free from all encumbrances, and also further additional Floor Space Index or Transferable Development Rights against the development or construction of the amenity on the surrendered land at his cost, as the Final Development Control Regulations prepared in this behalf provide, or (c) by making an application to the State Government for acquiring such land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the land (together with the amenity, if any, so developed or constructed so acquired by agreement or by grant of Floor Space Index or additional Floor Space Index or Transferable Development Rights under this section or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as the case may be, shall vest in the Planning Authority, Development Authority, or as the case may be, any Appellate Authority." 8. A reading of Section 127 would indicate that if the land reserved allotted or designated is not acquired by Agreement within 10 years of a final development plan coming into force or if proceedings for acquisition of such land under the M.R.T.P. Act or under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land can serve notice on the Appropriate Authority or as the case may be on the Development Authority and if within six months from the date of service of such notice, the land is not acquired or "no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition", the reservation, allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed. In the instant case the land was not acquired by agreement nor were proceedings for acquisition taken under the M.R.T.P. Act or under the Land Acquisition Act within the period prescribed. We are concerned with the third situation after service of notice. The question is whether the expression "as aforesaid" would include a resolution passed by the respondent No.1. If we hold that passing of a resolution, is such a step, then can it be held that there is no deemed de-reservation. To answer the issue, gainful reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association & Ors. 1988 Mh.L.J.1. To understand the issue there, we may advert to some of the facts there. A learned Judge held that the period of six months prescribed under Section 127 of the Act, begins to run on the date of service of the purchase notice on the Corporation. The notice dated 1st July, 1977 was received on 4th July, 1977. On August 28, 1977 the Executive Engineer wrote to the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 asking for information regarding the ownership of the land and the number of the tenants thereof. Like in the present case, the letter intimated that the period under Section 127 of the Act would commence from the date on which the information was received. A reply was addressed, pointing out that the information required was with the Corporation and the information required was presumably furnished on August 16,1977. The Corporation passed a Resolution on January 10, 1978 and made the application to the State Government on January 31, 1978. A reply was addressed, pointing out that the information required was with the Corporation and the information required was presumably furnished on August 16,1977. The Corporation passed a Resolution on January 10, 1978 and made the application to the State Government on January 31, 1978. The State Government issued the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 on April 7, 1978. The learned Single Judge, did not accept the contention of the Corporation of running of time and held that the time would commence on the date of service of purchase notice on the Corporation. An Appeal was preferred. The learned Division Bench held that the most crucial step was the application to be made by the Corporation to the State Government under Section 126(1) of the Act for acquisition of the land. The Appeal was dismissed. The Corporation preferred an S.L.P. before the Supreme Court. The issue framed by the Supreme Court for consideration was "whether the period of six months specified in Section 127 of the Act is to be reckoned from the date of service of the purchase notice dated July 1, 1977 by the owner on the Planning Authority i.e. the Municipal Corporation here, or the date on which the requisite information or particulars furnished by the owner." The Honourable Supreme Court was pleased to note that whether the reservation had lapsed due to the failure by the Planning Authority to take steps stipulated by Section 127 of the M.R.T.P. Act is a mixed question of fact and law and as such,therefore, it would be difficult, if not well nigh impossible, to lay down a rule of universal application. The Court then observed that the Corporation must prima facie be satisfied that the notice served was by the owner of the affected land or any person interested in the land. At the same time the Court observed that Section 127 of the Act does not contemplate the investigation of title by the officers of the Planning Authority, nor can the officers prevent the running of time if there is a valid notice. The issue of time was answered as under:- "It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition that the period of six months would always begin to run from the date of service of notice. The issue of time was answered as under:- "It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition that the period of six months would always begin to run from the date of service of notice. The Corporation is entitled to be satisfied that the purchase notice under Section 127 of the Act has been served by the owner or any person interested in the land. If there is no such notice by the owner or any person, there is no question of the reservation, allotment or designation of the land under a development plan of being lapsed. It a fortiori follows that in the absence of a valid notice under Section 127 there is no question of the land becoming available to the owner for the purpose of development or otherwise." Considering Section 127 the Supreme Court also observed as under:- "The word ’aforesaid’ in the collocation of the words ’no steps contemplated by Section 126(1)." The Supreme Court upheld the finding of the High Court that the Appellant had failed to take any steps, that is, of making an application to the State Government for acquisition of land within six months from the date of service of the purchase notice. The judgment in Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association (supra) was considered by a learned Division Bench of this Court in Baburao Dhondiba Salokhe vs. Kolhapur Municipal Corporation, Kolhapur & Anr. 2003 (3) Mah. L.J.820. One of the issues which the learned Bench considered was whether passing of resolution within six months is a step in the acquisition of the land. The learned Bench relying on the judgment in Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association (supra) was pleased to hold that the Supreme Court upheld the finding of this Court that "making an application to the State Government for acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act is a most crucial step under Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act. The Bench held that in their considered view it is not the passing of a resolution by the Planning Authority to acquire the land but making an application by the planning authority to the State Government for acquisition of the land required for the purpose specified in development plan which is the relevant date for considering the period under Section 127 of the M.R.T.P. Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner sought to point out that the judgment proceeds in relying on the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association (supra). The only issue which the Supreme Court was considering in Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association (supra) was whether the period of six months specified in Section 127 of the Act has to be reckoned from the date of service of purchase notice by the owner on the Planning Authority or the date on which the requisite information of particulars are furnished by the owner. At this stage we may also refer to a judgment of a learned Single Judge in Sheth & Bharmal (Firm) vs. Municipal Administrator, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors., 1988 Mh. L.J. 613. Considering the plain language of Section 127 the learned Judge was pleased to hold that the proceedings for acquisition of such lands under this Act cannot be said to exclude the application which the Planning Authority has to make to the State Government vide Section 126 and, therefore, all steps mentioned in this chapter in particular Section 126 will be taken to compromise the proceedings for acquisition of land under this Act. 9-10. On consideration of the judgments and the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents it would be clear that the passing of resolution is a step in the process of acquisition, as only then, can a statutory body like the respondent No.1 could proceed further in the process of acquisition. The steps however, contemplated under Section 127 do not include this step. When the Legislature used the language steps as aforesaid, ’the steps as aforesaid’ on a cojoint reading of Section 127 with Section 126(1) (c) amongst others is the making of an application. It is true that the Honourable Supreme Court in Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association has not directly answered that issue. However, it upheld the finding of fact by this Court that the Appellant before it had failed to take steps within six months after the service of the notice. The learned Division Bench of this Court, had taken the view that the crucial step is the making of the application to the State Government. This view was not disapproved by the Honourable Supreme Court. Another learned Bench of this Court has also in Baburao Dhondiba Salokhe (supra) has similarly so held. The learned Division Bench of this Court, had taken the view that the crucial step is the making of the application to the State Government. This view was not disapproved by the Honourable Supreme Court. Another learned Bench of this Court has also in Baburao Dhondiba Salokhe (supra) has similarly so held. In our opinion we have no reason to differ from the view taken in Baburao D. Salokhe (supra) and the earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court from which the Appeal has been filed in the Supreme Court in Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association. The first contention must, therefore, be rejected. The law as it stands, is that the time to be computed for calculating the period of six months is the making of the application to the State Government under Section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act, from the date of receipt of the purchase notice under Section 127 of the M.R.T.P. Act. 11. We may now proceed to answer the second question. Again in our opinion the issue is no longer res integra,considering the judgment in Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association. The following paragraph of the judgment may be reproduced:- "It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition that the period of six months would always begin to run from the date of service of notice. The Corporation is entitled to be satisfied that the purchase notice under Section 127 of the Act has been served by the owner or any person interested in the land. If there is no such notice by the owner or any person, there is no question of the reservation, allotment or designation of the land under a development plan of being lapsed. It a fortiori follows that in the absence of a valid notice under Section 127 there is no question of the land becoming available to the owner for the purpose of development or otherwise." The Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the issue and receipt of notice is a mixed question of fact and law. The land owner or the person interested however has to serve the notice from which the planning authority must be satisfied that it is served by the owner or the person interested. On the facts of this case, the notice was served by the Power of Attorney. On 12th March, 1998 Corporation sent a notice to the Power of Attorney. The land owner or the person interested however has to serve the notice from which the planning authority must be satisfied that it is served by the owner or the person interested. On the facts of this case, the notice was served by the Power of Attorney. On 12th March, 1998 Corporation sent a notice to the Power of Attorney. Would the notice from the Corporation extend the period for acquiring the land. In the first instance in so far as the document No.1 is concerned, the issue of the shares is immaterial as the notice can be served by the owner or a person interested. In other words even a co-sharer. In so far as Item No.3 is concerned, that document is irrelevant for the purpose of acquisition and even otherwise that information would be available with the respondent No.1. Such information was found to be irrelevant in Hakimwadi’s case (supra). The only issue is in respect of document No.2, calling for the production of the copy of the Power of Attorney executed in favour of the Power of Attorney. We have noted earlier that the Supreme Court has taken the view that the period of six months would begin to run from the date of service of the notice and if there is no valid notice by the owner or any person there is no question of land becoming available to the owner for the purpose of development. The question, therefore, would be whether the service of a notice calling for information, 98 days after receipt of the notice under Section 127, can result in extending the time till such time the information is conveyed, in the present case by communication of 29th March, 1998. If that is the date to be considered then the application made on 29th June, 1998 would be within time. In our opinion the answer would lie as to whether the notice was complete in material particulars or incomplete. In the instant case all material particulars for taking steps to acquire had been furnished. What was not furnished was the copy of the Power of Attorney. In our opinion the answer would lie as to whether the notice was complete in material particulars or incomplete. In the instant case all material particulars for taking steps to acquire had been furnished. What was not furnished was the copy of the Power of Attorney. The question is whether this period from the service of notice till calling for the copy of the Power of Attorney and receipt of the copy would result in extending time or whether the period between the service of the notice and the receipt of the information would only stand excluded. In our opinion the reservation of land in the D.P. plan prohibits the owner of the land from making use of the land. Correspondingly a duty is cast on the Corporation to acquire the land. If the Corporation does not acquire the land on the service of notice by the land owner or any person interested it must take steps. As observed by the Supreme Court it will not be possible to lay down a hard and fast rule as to extension or exclusion of time. It would depend on the facts of each case. In the instant case the notice was complete, except as to information as to the Power of Attorney. The name of the owner was disclosed. On the facts of this case, therefore, we must hold that the period between service of the notice calling for the copy of the Power of Attorney and the furnishing of the copy alone would stand excluded. Taking any other view of the matter on the facts of the case would mean, that the respondent No.1 under Section 127, can postpone the entire process of acquisition by calling for information some days previous to the expiry of the period contemplated under Section 127 of the Act. That would defeat a right created in favour of the land owner by the statute. Considering the above in our opinion on the facts of the present case, as the respondent No.1 failed to take steps by making an application to the State Government within six months of the notice being served on it, it must be held that the land stands dereserved. 12. Considering the above in our opinion on the facts of the present case, as the respondent No.1 failed to take steps by making an application to the State Government within six months of the notice being served on it, it must be held that the land stands dereserved. 12. Though there was no interim relief nothing has been brought to our attention that in the meantime the respondent State took steps to acquire the land and had issued declaration under Section 6 as also subsequent steps. Since then a period of nine years has elapsed. 13. In the light of that Rule made absolute in terms of prayer clause (b). There shall be no order as to costs.