ORDER Yadav, J. -- 1. The decision rendered in this writ petition shall govern by disposal of WP(S) No.180/2006, as the parties submit that issues involved in these writ petitions is common and be disposed of by common order. 2. The Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry of Telecommunication and other functionaries being aggrieved of the order passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur (hereinafter shall be referred as Tribunal) in OA 633/2001 has preferred the present writ petitions invoking supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Tribunal vide impugned order dated 18.10.2005 has directed the reinstatement with all consequential benefits by setting aside order of termination on the ground that the principle of natural justice was not followed. 3. The relevant facts leading to the lis mentioned above are that the, respondent in pursuance to an advertisement issued by the petitioner department was appointed as Extra Departmental Delivery Agent (hereinafter referred to as EDDA) for Gwalior city in the minimum of pay scale of Rs.1740-30-2640 vide order dated 7.2.2000 the order of appointment stipulated : "DEPARTMENT OF POST INDIA THE POSTMASTER, LASHKAR HEAD POST OFFICES, Memo No. H2-Misc/2000 Dated at Lashkar 7.2.2000 In pursuance of the order contained in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Gwalior, Memo No.H2/9/Redeployment/99-2000 dated 28.1.2000 Shri Rajesh Sharma S/o Shri Radha Vallabh Sharma is hereby appointed as Extra Department Delivery Agent in the Speed Post Business Centre, Gwalior RS PO with effect from the date of joining on the post at the minimum the Time Related Continuity Allowance (TRCA) Rs.1740-30-2640 and shall be paid such allowances as are admissible from time to time. 2. Shri Rajesh Sharma should clearly understand that his employment as EDDA shall be in the nature of contractual liable to be terminated by him or by the undersigned by notifying the order in writing and that his conduct and service shall be governed by the Posts & Telegraph Extra Department Agent (Conduct and Service) Rules 1964 as amended from time to time. 3. This appointment is subject to satisfactory verification of character and other testimonials. (A.K. Tomar) Postmaster, Lashkar HO" 4. That on 31.7.2001 a notice purportedly under rule 8 of Department of Post Gramin Dak Sevaks (Conduct and Employment) Rules, 2001 was issued. 3. This appointment is subject to satisfactory verification of character and other testimonials. (A.K. Tomar) Postmaster, Lashkar HO" 4. That on 31.7.2001 a notice purportedly under rule 8 of Department of Post Gramin Dak Sevaks (Conduct and Employment) Rules, 2001 was issued. The said notice was issued in pursuance to the order dated 21.6.2001 passed by the Principal Chief Post Master General, Bhopal whereby it was ordered to cancel the recruitment and terminate the services of all the 5 appointed candidates after observing the usual formalities. The reasons shown for issuing the aforesaid notice was : "DEPARTMENT OF POST Memo No. H2/Misc/2000 Dated at Lashkar 31.7.2001 Notice Under rule No.8 of Department of Posts Gramin Dak Sevak (Conduct and Employment) Rules, 2001. 1. In pursuance of the order contained in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices Gwalior Division Gwalior letter No.H2/9/redeploymenti 99-2000 dated 28.1.2000 Shri Rajesh Sharma was provisionally appointed as EDDA in Speed Post Centre Gwalior RS PO vide this office memo of even No. dated 7/2/21/2/2000 after completing pre-appointment formalities. 2. Later one applicant Shri Ajay Kumar S/o late Shri Thakurdas filed an application before the CAT, Jabalpur against his non-appointment to the post of EDDA. The application of the candidate has been disposed of at admission stage directing Chief Post Master General, Bhopal to dispose of the representation of the applicant by speaking order within a period of 8 weeks. The representation of the candidate was rejected by the Principal Chief Post Master General, Bhopal vide his order No. Inv/cc/STA-2-256/2001 dated 21.6.2001 and in this order it was also ordered to cancel the recruitment and terminate the services of all the 5 appointed candidates after observing the usual formalities. (copy of PCPMG Bhopal letter in enclosed). 3. Therefore the undersigned has provisionally come to the conclusion to terminate the services of Shri Rajesh Sharma EDDA Speed Post Centre, Gwalior RS. 4. Shri Rajesh Sharma is hereby given an opportunity of making representation on the proposed penalty. Such representation, if any should be made in writing and submitted so as to reach in this office within one month from the date of receipt memo. The memo should be acknowledged. Post Master Lashkar HO 474001" 5. The respondent-employee, after receiving the show cause filed his reply. Such representation, if any should be made in writing and submitted so as to reach in this office within one month from the date of receipt memo. The memo should be acknowledged. Post Master Lashkar HO 474001" 5. The respondent-employee, after receiving the show cause filed his reply. The Department, as it appears from the record, instead of taking decision on the aforesaid show cause notice, issued another notice in pursuance to rule 8(1) of Department of Post Gramin Dale Sevaks (Conduct and Employment) Rules, 2001 on 18.8.2001, indicating that his services shall stand terminated with effect from the date of expiry of period of one month. Subsequently, the services of the respondent was terminated on expiry of one month. 6. The respondents being aggrieved of the order of terminating preferred an application before the Tribunal under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 seeking the quashment of the order of termination. The Tribunal while acceding to the relief sought directed the reinstatement without any back wages. The Tribunal while granting the aforesaid relief recorded its reasons as under : "10. We have given careful consideration to the rival contentions and we find that the appointments of the applicant have been made after following due procedure. There were no complaints against the applicants. Their work was quite satisfactory. It was only the Principal Chief Post Master General who has ordered to cancel the recruitment of the applicants on the ground that their appointments had been made by the Senior Superintendent of Post Officer, which happens to be the higher authority than the Post Master, who is the appointing authority in this case. 11. We also find that though the respondents have stated in their replies that the appointments of the applicants were made on contractual basis, however, on perusal of the impugned orders dated 31.7.2004 we find that the applicants were appointed on provisional basis. As regards holding of enquiry and issue of show cause notices are concerned, we find that the services of the applicants have been terminated not on the ground of misconduct and, therefore, there was no necessity of holding an enquiry as per the procedure prescribed for holding a detailed enquiry. 12. As regards holding of enquiry and issue of show cause notices are concerned, we find that the services of the applicants have been terminated not on the ground of misconduct and, therefore, there was no necessity of holding an enquiry as per the procedure prescribed for holding a detailed enquiry. 12. We further find that rule 4(3) ibid has been inserted by the orders dated 9.5.2003 issued by the Director General Posts, by which powers have been given to the superior authority to review the appointment orders. In the instant cases, we find that the appointment orders of the applicants have been issued in the year 2000. Thus, the superior authority had no powers to review the appointments of the applicants which were made in the year 2000. Moreover, the appointments of the applicants have been made by due selection. The approval given by the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices to the proposal submitted by the Post Master for appointment of the applicants, does not prejudice the appointment of the applicants." 7. While challenging the aforesaid order it is urged by the counsel for the petitioner at the outset that in similar matter, the Indore Bench of this High Court has set aside the similar order in WP(S) 1458/2005 and other connected matters. It was accordingly contended that since the appointment of the respondent was purely contractual and could be terminated by giving one month's notice as stipulated in the letter of appointment, therefore non-affording an opportunity of hearing does not render the termination illegal. 8. Per contra, the counsel for respondent has supported the order of Tribunal on the ground that the appointment of the respondent was in accordance with the Recruitment Rules framed by Department by holding selection through advertisement and though nomenclatured as a contractual appointment has all the elements of regular appointment. It is further urged that the finding of illegal appointment recorded in the order dated 21.6.2001 was without affording any opportunity of hearing and was also without any basis and since there was no basis for holding that the recruitment was de hors Rules, the petitioner Department instead of completing enquiry resorted to the "Notice Clause". It is urged that the action besides being malicious is arbitrary and illegal. It is urged that the action besides being malicious is arbitrary and illegal. The respondents in support relied upon the decision of apex Court rendered in the case of UPSE v. Girish Jayantilal Vaghela and others [ (2006)2 SCC 482 ]. We may at the outset hold that the judgment relied upon by the respondent is not applicable in the instant case because the issue involved in the case of Girish Jayantilal Vaghela (supra), was whether while appointed on contract under the State Government, a person can be said to be a holder of Civil Post. It was held in paragraph 24 as under : "for the reasons discussed above, we are clearly of the opinion that respondent No.1 cannot be said to be a Government servant as he was working on contract basis and, therefore, he was not eligible for any relaxation in upper age limit." 9. In the present case the issue involved is : (a) Whether after having issued notice of termination of service on the ground that there was irregularity in the selection, it was just and proper on the part of employer, without following the procedure prescribed under the Rules to have issued one months notice and terminated the service? (b) Whether being governed by Rules having statutory force the employees were not entitled for the opportunity of hearing? 10. The respondent when appointed in the year 2000 was governed by the Rules of 1964, viz. P & T ED Agents (C & S) Rules, 1964. These rules were subsequently replaced in the year 2001, vide, DG Posts, letter No.22-1/20000 ED & Trg. dated 24.4.2001 and are called Gramin Dak Sevaks (Conduct and Employment) Rules 2001. These rules contain elaborate provisions controlling the appointment, leave, penalties and other matters relating to the conduct of these Gramin Dak Sevaks/EDDA. There is a schedule annexed to the rules naming the appointing authorities in respect of each category of employees. Rule 7 states that the Sevaks shall be entitled to such leave, as may be determined by the Government, from time to time. The employment of a Sevak who had not put in more than three years' service shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given by either side. The rules also indicate the nature of penalties which may be imposed and the procedure for imposing them. The employment of a Sevak who had not put in more than three years' service shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given by either side. The rules also indicate the nature of penalties which may be imposed and the procedure for imposing them. A right of appeal is provided against an order imposing any of the penalties on the employee. Various other conditions are provided under these rules and as held by the apex Court in the case of Superintendent Post Office v. P.K. Rajamma [ AIR 1977 SC 1677 (para 4)], that "an extra departmental agent is not a casual worker but he holds a post under the administrative control of the State. It is apparent from the rules that the employment of an extra department agent is in a post which exists "apart from" the person who happens to fill it at any particular time. Though such a post is outside the regular civil services, there is no doubt it is post under the State". Thus, the relationship between the EDDA's/Gramin Dak Sevaks and the Department is that of Master and Servant and not that of principal and agent and are governed by rules framed by the Department. 11. In the case of State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta [ AIR 1967 SC 884 ], in para 9 and 11 it was held : "9. The question is whether a Mauzadar is a person holding a civil post under the State within Article 311 of the Constitution. There is no formal definition of "post" and "civil post". The sense in which they are used in the Services Chapter of Part XIV of the Constitution is indicated by their context and setting. A civil post is distinguished in Article 310 from a post connected with defence; it is a post on the civil as distinguished from the defence side of the administration, an employment in a civil capacity under the Union or a State, see marginal note of Article 311. In Article 311, a member of civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State is mentioned separately, and a civil post means a post not connected with defence outside the regular civil services. A post is a service or employment. In Article 311, a member of civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State is mentioned separately, and a civil post means a post not connected with defence outside the regular civil services. A post is a service or employment. A person holding a post under a State is a person serving or employed under the State, see the marginal notice to Articles 309, 310 and 311. The heading and the sub-heading of Part XIV and Chapter I emphasise the element of service. There is a relationship of master and servant between the State and a person said to be holding a post under it. The existence of this relationship is indicated by the State's right to select and appoint the holder of the post, its right to control the manner and method of his doing the work and the payment by it of his wages or remuneration. A relationship of master and servant may be established by the presence of all or some of these indicia, in conjunction with other circumstances and it is a question of fact in each case whether there is such a relation between the State and the alleged holder of a post. 11. Judged in this light, a Mauzadar in the Assam Valley is the holder of a civil post under the State. The State has the power and the right to select and appoint a Mauzadar and the power to suspend and dismiss him. He is a subordinate public servant working under the supervision and control of the Deputy Commissioner. He receives by way of remuneration a commission on his collections and sometimes a salary. There is a relationship of master and servant between the state and him. He holds an office on the revenue side of the administration to which specific and onerous duties in connection with the affairs of the State and attached, an office which falls vacant on the death or removal of the incumbent and which is filled up by successive appointments. He is a responsible officer exercising delegated powers of Government. Mauzadars in the Assam Valley are appointed Revenue Officers and ex-officio Assistant Settlement Officers. Originally, a Mauzadar may have been a revenue farmer and an independent contractor. He is a responsible officer exercising delegated powers of Government. Mauzadars in the Assam Valley are appointed Revenue Officers and ex-officio Assistant Settlement Officers. Originally, a Mauzadar may have been a revenue farmer and an independent contractor. But having regard to the existing system of his recruitment, employment and functions, he is a servant and a holder of a civil post under the State." 12. Similarly, in the case of Mathuradas Mohanlal Kedia and others v. S.D. Munshaw and others [AIR 1991 SC 53], the apex Court while considering provision of Gujarat Panchayat Act (6 of 1962) and while examining the Panchayat service whether it could be construed to be a civil service of the State in para 15 has held as under : "15. ...the true test for determination of the question whether a person is holding a civil post or is a member of the civil service is the existence of a relationship of master and servant between the State and the person holding a post under it and that the existence of such relationship is dependent upon the right of the State to select and appoint the holder of the post, its right to suspend and dismiss him, its right to control the manner and method of his doing the work and the payment by it of his wage and remuneration. It further held that the relationship of master and servant may be established by the presence of all or some of the factors referred to above in conjunction with other circumstances. Applying these tests, this Court held that a Mauzadar in the Assam Valley who was engaged in the work of collection of land revenue and other Government dues and in the performance of certain other special duties was a person holding a civil post under the State. Following the above decision in Superintendent of Post Officers etc. etc. v. P.K. Rajamma [ (1977)3 SCR 678 = AIR 1977 SC 1677 ], this Court held that persons who were working as extra departmental agents of the Posts and Telegraphs Department were persons holding civil posts." 13. Following the above decision in Superintendent of Post Officers etc. etc. v. P.K. Rajamma [ (1977)3 SCR 678 = AIR 1977 SC 1677 ], this Court held that persons who were working as extra departmental agents of the Posts and Telegraphs Department were persons holding civil posts." 13. In the case of Brij Mohan Singh v. Union of India and others [ (2002)9 SCC 453 ], the apex Court has upheld the judgment of Central Administrative Tribunal wherein the Tribunal has rejected the claim of Extra Departmental Agent whose services were terminated after completion of three years of continuous service on the ground that there were some gross irregularities and manipulations in the procedure adopted by the appropriate authority for making appointment. However, in the instant case there is no such enquiry conducted nor any opportunity of hearing has been granted to the respondents. 14. The Rule of 2001 no doubt provides for two modes of exercise of power to remove the Sevak, one under rule 8 and the other under rule 10. It is true that rule 8, read with condition No.2 of the appointment letter empowers an employer to terminate the employment by giving notice and when such prerogative is exercised it is beyond the scope of Judicial Review. It is equally a settled law that the Court can lift the veil of the innocuous order to find out whether it is the foundation or motive to pass the offending order. 15. In the instant case, the show cause notice dated 31.7.2001 refers to a decision taken on 21.6.2001 by the Post Master General to terminate the services of 5 Sevaks including the respondent herein and the reason assigned is that the "recruitments were not made in accordance with the recruitment Rules". Since there were allegations, rule 10 of the Rules contemplate an enquiry. The rule does not distinguish a Sevak who has completed one year or three years of service. The said rule stipulates the procedure for imposing a penalty : "10. Since there were allegations, rule 10 of the Rules contemplate an enquiry. The rule does not distinguish a Sevak who has completed one year or three years of service. The said rule stipulates the procedure for imposing a penalty : "10. Procedure for imposing a penalty : (1) No order imposing a penalty shall be passed except after -- (a) the Sevak is informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the allegation on which it is proposed to be taken and given an opportunity to make any representation he may wish to make; and (b) such representation, if any, is taken into consideration by the appointing authority : Provided that the penalty of dismissal or removal from employment shall not be imposed except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges : Provided further that where it is proposed after such enquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such enquiry. (2) The record of proceedings shall include -- (i) a copy of the intimation to the Sevak of the proposal to take action against him; (ii) a copy of the statement of allegations, along with a list of evidence in support thereof, communicated to him; (iii) his representation, if any; (iv) the records of the enquiry proceedings along with the enquiry report of the appointing authority or Enquiry Officer, if any, appointed in a case where a formal enquiry is necessary; (v) the representation, if any, of the Sevak on the Inquiry Officer's Report; (vi) findings of the appointing authority in respect of the allegations, with reasons therefore; and (vii) the order imposing the penalty." 16. The authorities after issuing a notice under the rule 10(1)(a) and receiving the reply under rule 10(1)(b), instead of proceeding further and holding enquiry short circuit the same by resorting to the provision under rule 8 of issuing one month's notice. The Sevak is thus deprived of the valuable right of hearing guaranteed under the Statutory Rules. The authorities after issuing a notice under the rule 10(1)(a) and receiving the reply under rule 10(1)(b), instead of proceeding further and holding enquiry short circuit the same by resorting to the provision under rule 8 of issuing one month's notice. The Sevak is thus deprived of the valuable right of hearing guaranteed under the Statutory Rules. Thus, the contention raised by the petitioner department that no prejudice was caused to the Sevak when an action is taken in accordance with rule cannot be accepted for the reasons that the authorities having resorted to exercise powers under a particular rule cannot without any justification embark upon another set of rules which is detrimental to the interest of a Sevak who happens to be at a receiving end. No doubt it is true that principle of natural justice is not unruly horse {Vivek Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J & K Bank Ltd. [ (2005)5 SCC 337 ]. However the principle of natural justice is attracted when services of some persons are terminated by way of a punitive measure {State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [ (2006)1 SCC 667 (paragraph 47]}. For the aforesaid we are fortified by recent judgment of the apex Court delivered in case of State of Manipur and others v. Y. Token Singh and others [2007 AIR SCW 1995], wherein in paragraph 22 it has been held that "where appointments have been made by a competent authority or at least some steps have been taken in that behalf, the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with". 17. In the case of Karnataka Public Service Commissioner v. B.M. Vijaya Shankar [ (1992)2 SCC 206 ], the apex Court in paragraph 4 held as under : "4. Was natural justice violated? Natural justice is a concept which has succeeded in keeping the arbitrary action within limits and preserving the rule of law. But with all the religious rigidity with which it should be observed, since it is ultimately weighed in balance of fairness, the Courts have been circumspect in extending it to situations where it would cause more injustice than justice. Natural justice is a concept which has succeeded in keeping the arbitrary action within limits and preserving the rule of law. But with all the religious rigidity with which it should be observed, since it is ultimately weighed in balance of fairness, the Courts have been circumspect in extending it to situations where it would cause more injustice than justice. Even though the procedure of affording hearing is an important as decision on merits yet urgency of the matter, or public interest at times require flexibility in application of the rule as the circumstances of the case and the nature of the matter required to be dealt may serve interest of justice better by denying opportunity of hearing and permitting the person concerned to challenge the order itself on merits not for lack of hearing to establish bona fide or innocence but for being otherwise arbitrary or against rules. Present is a case which, in our opinion, can safely be placed in a category where natural justice before taking any action stood excluded as it did not involve any misconduct or punishment." 18. The case at hand does not fall in the exceptional category as would exclude the principle of nature justice. The inevitable conclusion is that the order of termination being without following the statutory provision is bad. It was urged by the counsel for the petitioner that even the procedure prescribed would have resulted in the same conclusion does not sound to logic. It is not disputed that the statutory rules govern the conditions of service of the Sevaks and the Rules prescribe the procedure to be followed when a punitive action is contemplated and under these rules substantive right of reasonable opportunity of hearing is guaranteed and the non-following the same has definitely caused prejudice to the Sevak whose employment has been terminated. 19. We are aware that a Division Bench of this Court at Indore has upheld the termination of Sevak by setting aside the orders passed by the Tribunal in somewhat similar cases. 19. We are aware that a Division Bench of this Court at Indore has upheld the termination of Sevak by setting aside the orders passed by the Tribunal in somewhat similar cases. However, a closer look to the facts of the cases decided by the Indore Bench reveals that though the nature of, appointment was same as in the instant case and termination was in exercise of powers under rule 8, however, there was no preceding order by Post Master General, as in the instant case, holding that there was irregularity in recruitment, nor there was any show cause notice, as in the instant case, in contemplation of a penal action. In the given set of facts as were there before the Division Bench Indore, we respectfully agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Bench. However, in the present case the set of facts are totally different from those before Indore Bench of this High Court. Even the counsel for the petitioner, Union of India, has not been able to draw the similarity. It is not disclosed that in the set of cases before Indore Bench, the order of termination purportedly issued under rule 8 were preceded by an order of the nature as it exists in the case in hand. We therefore, were left with no option but to proceed on the basis of facts of present case. 20. It is well settled that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be reduced therefrom. It is also well settled that ratio of case must be understood having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein {See Inderpreet Singh Kohlon and others v. State of Punjab and others [ (2006) 11 SCC 356 para 53], P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. [ (2004)11 SCC 672 ], M.P. Gopalkrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala [ (2005) 11 SCC 45 ] and Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank v. Neelam [ (2005)5 SCC 91 ]}. 21. For the reasons stated above we have no hesitation in upholding the orders passed by the Tribunal. The petitions are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.