JUDGMENT Hon'ble Rajesh Tandon, J. Heard Sri P.C. Maulekhi, counsel for the appellant and Sri Yogesh Pande, counsel for the claimant-respondent nos. 1 and 2 and Sri Dinesh Chauhan, counsel for the respondent no. 3. 2. By the present A.O. filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, appellant has prayed for setting aside the award dated 21.5.2005 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/District Judge, Champawat in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 39 of 2005 Girdhari Lal Vs. Tej Singh and others, whereby a sum of Rs. 1,94,000/- has been awarded to the claimant-respondent no. 1. 3. Briefly stated, a claim petition was filed by the claimant-respondent nos. 1 and 2 being Motor Accident Claim Petition no. 39 of 2005 Girdhari Lal Vs. Tej Singh and another claiming a sum of Rs. 21,10,000/- towards compensation along with interest @ 12% per annum. 4. According to the claimants, on 27.8.2004 at about 4.30 p.m., when Prakash Ram (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) was going to Lohaghat by Jeep No. U.P. 01/3821 (hereinafter referred to as the vehicle in question), which was being driven rashly and negligently by its driver, as soon as it reached near Devalkanda bend, due to rash and negligent driving of the driver, it got disbalanced and fell down into a ditch. In this accident, the deceased received simple and grievous injuries and he died on the spot. At the time of accident, the deceased was 25 years of age and was earning a sum of Rs. 5,000/- per month. 5. Opposite Party No. 1 - Tej Singh has stated in his written statement that he is the registered owner of the Vehicle No. U.P. 01/3821. It has been stated that at the time of accident, Vehicle in question was being driven in a moderate speed and cautiously and all of a sudden the driver of the vehicle in question pushed the brake but due to bad and narrow road, the brake did not work and the vehicle in question caused accident. It has been stated that the accident did not occur due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle in question. It has further been stated that the amount of claim is excessive and the vehicle in question was insured with the New India Assurance Company comprehensively, therefore, the Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation. 6. It has been stated that the accident did not occur due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle in question. It has further been stated that the amount of claim is excessive and the vehicle in question was insured with the New India Assurance Company comprehensively, therefore, the Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation. 6. Insurance Company has filed the written statement stating therein that no information was given to the Company regarding the occurrence by the owner of the vehicle in question, in violation of the terms and conditions of the policy. Further it has been stated that at the time of accident, the vehicle in question was not carrying valid papers and the driver was not holding a valid driving licence. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the claims tribunal has framed the following issues : "(1) As to whether the accident took place on 27.8.2004 at about 4.30 p.m., near Devalkanda, P.S. Lohaghat, District - Champawat due to rash and negligent driving of the Jeep No. U.P. 01/3821 in which 25 years of age Prakash Ram died on the spot? (2) Whether at the date, place and time of accident, the driver of the Vehicle No. U.P. 01/3821 was not having valid driving licence having hill endorsement? (3) Whether at the date, place and time of accident, the vehicle in question was not insured with the opposite party no. 2? (4) Whether at the date, place and time of accident, the vehicle in question was being driven violating the terms and conditions of the policy and permit? (5) Whether the petition is bad due to non-impleadment of necessary parties? (6) Relief?" 8. On behalf of the claimants, Girdhari Ram and Mahesh Ram were examined as P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 respectively. Towards the documentary evidence, copy of the First Information Report, copy of the post mortem report, copy of the Insurance Policy and salary certificate were filed. 9. On behalf of the opposite parties, Opposite Party No. 1 has filed the copy of the Registration Certificate, Photocopy of the Fitness Certificate of the Vehicle, Photocopy of the Insurance Policy, Photocopy of the Tax Payment Certificate, copy of the contract motor cab, copy of the driving licence of the Driver and photocopy of the pollution Control Certificate. 9. On behalf of the opposite parties, Opposite Party No. 1 has filed the copy of the Registration Certificate, Photocopy of the Fitness Certificate of the Vehicle, Photocopy of the Insurance Policy, Photocopy of the Tax Payment Certificate, copy of the contract motor cab, copy of the driving licence of the Driver and photocopy of the pollution Control Certificate. Insurance Company has filed the Investigation Report, Attested Photocopy of the Driving Licence and photocopy of the conditions of the permit. 10. While deciding issue No. 1, the claims tribunal has relied upon the statement of the claimant P.W. 2 Mahesh Ram - ocular witness. He has stated the entire story stating that the Driver of the Jeep in question was driving the Jeep rashly and negligently and the road, where the accident took place, was a wide road. He has stated that he was also traveling in the said Jeep. Relying upon the statement of Mahesh Ram, the claims tribunal has recorded the finding that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle in question, in which deceased died on the spot. 11. I find no infirmity or illegality in the aforesaid finding and the same deserves to be confirmed. 12. While deciding the Issue No. 2 with regarding driving licence of the driver of the vehicle in question, the claims tribunal has relied upon the Paper No. 22 Ga/1 photocopy of the driving licence of the driver of the vehicle in question, which shows that the same was valid at the time of accident with endorsement to driver in hill areas. This issue has been decided against the Insurance Company. 13. I do not find any ground to interfere with the aforesaid finding and the same deserves to be confirmed. 14. While deciding the Issue No. 3 as to whether the vehicle in question was not insured with the Insurance Company at the time of accident, the claims tribunal has relied upon the copy of cover note of the Insurance Policy Paper No. 19 GA 1/1 to 19 Ga 1/4, which shows that the vehicle in question was insured with the New India Assurance Company comprehensively for third party rights. This issue has been decided accordingly. 15. Aforesaid finding requires no interference and the same deserves to be confirmed. 16. This issue has been decided accordingly. 15. Aforesaid finding requires no interference and the same deserves to be confirmed. 16. While deciding the Issue No. 4 as to whether the vehicle in question was being driven in violation of the terms and conditions of the Permit and the Insurance Policy, since it has not been proved as to how the violation of the conditions of the policy has been made as there were only seven passengers traveling the Jeep in question, therefore, the claims tribunal has recorded a finding that the vehicle in question was not being driven against the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. This issue was decided accordingly. 17. I find no ground to interfere with the aforesaid finding and the same deserves to be confirmed. 18. While deciding the Issue No. 5 as to whether the claim petition is bad for non-impleadment of necessary parties, the claims tribunal has decided this in negative of the appellant. 19. I find no illegality or infirmity in the aforesaid finding and the same deserves to be confirmed. 20. While deciding the Issue No. 6 with regard to quantum of compensation, the claims tribunal has assessed the age of the deceased as 25 years after relying upon the Post Mortem Report and statement of Girdhari Ram. According to the age of the deceased, multiplier of 17 has been selected. The claims tribunal has taken the income of the deceased as Rs. 15,000/- per annum as notional income and thereafter, deducted 1/3rd of the personal expenses and then the annual dependency comes to Rs. 10,000/- per annum. But, the claims tribunal has taken into consideration the annual dependency as Rs. 11,000/-. Multiplying the annual dependency with 17, the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 1,87,000/-. Apart from that the claims tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 2,000/- for funeral expenses and Rs. 5,000/- for loss of love and affection. Thus, a total sum of Rs. 1,94,000/- has been awarded to the claimants towards compensation. 21. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the vehicle in question was being plied by a person who was having an experience of only 8 months, while there was a specific condition on the permit that the person driving the vehicle should have an experience not less than five years. 22. 21. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the vehicle in question was being plied by a person who was having an experience of only 8 months, while there was a specific condition on the permit that the person driving the vehicle should have an experience not less than five years. 22. I have gone through the photocopy of the driving licence of the driver of the vehicle in question and it appears that the same was valid at the time of accident, so far as the experience of not less than 5 years is concerned, it is the work of the R.T.O. to look the permit and reject it if there is violation of permit, but it is not the work of the Insurance Company to take this plea. 23. Counsel for the appellant has referred National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut [2007 (2) T.A.C. 398 (S.C.)], where the Apex Court has referred the Indian Law on Motor Vehicles with regard to 3rd party rights against the insurance company. The Apex Court has observed as under:- "19. The primary stand of the insurance company is that the person driving the vehicle did not have a valid driving license. 20. In Swarn Singh's case (supra) the following situations were noted: (i) the driver had a license but it was fake; (ii) the driver had no license at all; (iii) the driver originally had a valid license but it had expired as on the date of the accident and had not been renewed; (iv) the license was for a class of vehicles other than that which was the insured vehicle; (v) the license was a learner's license. Category (i) may cover two types of situations. First, the license itself was fake and the second is where originally that license is fake but there has been a renewal subsequently in accordance with law. 21. Chapter II contains Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act relating to licensing of drivers driving the motor vehicles. 22. Where the claim relates to own damage claims, it cannot be adjudicated by-the insurance company. But it has to be decided by another forum, i.e. forum created under the Consumer Protection Act 1985 (in short the 'CP Act'). Before the Tribunal, there were essentially three parties i.e. the insurer, insured and the claimants. 22. Where the claim relates to own damage claims, it cannot be adjudicated by-the insurance company. But it has to be decided by another forum, i.e. forum created under the Consumer Protection Act 1985 (in short the 'CP Act'). Before the Tribunal, there were essentially three parties i.e. the insurer, insured and the claimants. On the contrary, before the consumer forums there were two parties i.e. owner of the vehicle and the insurer. The claimant does not come in to the picture. Therefore, these are cases where there is no third party involved." 24. Counsel for the appellant has referred Nainital Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Kusum Rai [2006 (5) SCJD 460 (SC)], where it has been observed as under: "11. We have noticed hereinbefore that the Tribunal has not gone into the said question. It proceeded on the basis that the case was covered by Kamla (supra). The correctness of the said National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Swaran Singh and Others, (2004) 3 S.C.C. 297 : 2004 (1) T.A.C. 321, wherein this Court clearly held: "The owner of the a motor vehicle in terms of Section 5 of the Act has a responsibility to see that no vehicle is driven except by a person who does not satisfy the provisions of Section 3 or 4 of the Act. In a case, therefore, where the driver of the vehicle, admittedly, did not hold any license and the same was allowed consciously to be driven by the owner of the vehicle by such person, the insurer is entitled to succeed in its defence and avoid liability. The matter, however, may be different where a disputed question of fact arises as to whether the driver had a valid license or where the owner of the vehicle committed a breach of the terms of the contract of insurance as also the provisions of the Act by consciously allowing any person to drive a vehicle who did not have a valid driving license. In a given case, the driver of the vehicle may not have any hand in it at all e.g. a case where an accident takes place owing to a mechanical fault or vis major. (see Jitnendra Kumar)" 12. In a given case, the driver of the vehicle may not have any hand in it at all e.g. a case where an accident takes place owing to a mechanical fault or vis major. (see Jitnendra Kumar)" 12. In Swaran Singh (supra), to which one of us wa a party, this Court noticed an earlier decision of this Court, namely, Malla Prakasarao v. Malla Janaki and Others, (2004) 3 S.C.C. 343, wherein one of the members of the Bench, V.N. Khare J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was a member. In that case, it was held: "1. It is not disputed that the driving license of the driver of the vehicle had expired on 20th November, 1982 and the driver did not apply for renewal within 30 days of the expiry of the said license, as required under Section 11 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is also not disputed that the driver of the vehicle did not have driving license when the accident took place. According to the terms of the contract, the insurance company has no liability to pay any compensation where an accident takes place by a vehicle, driven by a driver without a driving license. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the appeal." 25. In Oriental Insurance Company Vs. Amit and others 2007 (1) U.D., 385, the Division Bench has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Swarna Singh's Case (supra) and has come to the conclusion that Section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act is attracted only when there is fundamental breach. The observations are quoted below: "9..........Thus, it is not the case of the respondents that the excess passengers were sitting on the front seat by which the driver of the offending taxi was not able to drive it properly and he could not negotiate the bend due to overloading on the front seat. As such, the accident did not occur due to the overloading. It is to be kept in mind that the minor breaches of conditions of the insurance policy and the breaches which are not found to have been the direct cause of the accident would be treated as minor breaches of inconsequential deviation in the matter of use of vehicles. As such, the accident did not occur due to the overloading. It is to be kept in mind that the minor breaches of conditions of the insurance policy and the breaches which are not found to have been the direct cause of the accident would be treated as minor breaches of inconsequential deviation in the matter of use of vehicles. Such minor and in consequential deviation at with regard to the conditions of the insurance policy would not constitute sufficient grounds to deny the benefit of coverage of insurance to the claimant. Such a breach on the part of the insured must be established by the insurer to show that not only that the insured used or caused over permitted to be used the vehilce in breach of the Act but also that the damage the victim suffered flowed from the breach. In the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh reported in 2004 (3) SCC 297 & 2004 (1) U.D. p/195, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Tribunal in interpreting the policy conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the consent of "fundamental breach" to allow defences available to the insurer under section 149 (2) of the Act. It has further been held that the damage suffered by the victim must flow from the breach and it must be shown by the insurer. In the instant case, as we have already pointed out that the accident did not occur due to the breach of the conditions of the policy, as such we do not find any substance in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant." 26. In M/s National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Baljit Kaur and others 2004 Air SCW 212, it has been observed as under: "15. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 44 (1), fourth reissue, para 1474, pp. 906-07, it is stated: "Parliament intends that an enactment shall remedy a particular mischief and it is, therefore, presumed that Parliament intends that the Court, when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment corresponds to its legal meaning, should find a construction which applies the remedy provided by it in such a way as to suppress that mischief. The doctrine originates in Heydon's case where the Barons of the Exchequer resolved that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered: (1) what was the common law before the making of the Act; (2) what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide: (3) what remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth; and (4) the true reason of the remedy. And then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall: (a) suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; and (b) suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief pro privato commodo (for private benefit); and (c) add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the act pro publico (for the public good)." 16. Heydon's Rule has been applied by this Court in a large number of cases in order to suppress the mischief which was intended to be remedied as against the literal rule which could have otherwise covered the field. (See for example, Smt. PEK Kalliani Amma and others v. K. Devi and others, AIR 1966 SC 1963; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. V. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1955 SC 661; and Goodyear India Ltd. V. State of Haryana and another, AIR 1990 SC 781). 17. By reason of the 1994 Amendment what was added is "including the owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle." The liability of the owner of the vehicle to insure it compulsorily, thus, by reasons of the aforementioned amendment included only the owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle besides the third parties. The intention of the parliament, therefore, could not have been that the words 'any person' occurring in S. 147 would cover all persons who were traveling in a goods carriage in any capacity whatsoever. If such was the intention there was no necessity of the Parliament to carry out an amendment inasmuch as expression 'any reason' contained in sub-clause (i) of Cl. If such was the intention there was no necessity of the Parliament to carry out an amendment inasmuch as expression 'any reason' contained in sub-clause (i) of Cl. (b) of sub-section (1) of S. 147 would have included the owner of the goods or his authorized representative besides the passengers who are gratituitous or otherwise. 18. The observations made in this connection by the Court in Asha Rani case (supra) to which one of us, Sinha, J. was a party however, bear repetition: "26. In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words "any person" must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used i.e. "a third party." Keeping in view the provisions of the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger traveling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefor." 19. In Asha Rani (supra), it has been noticed that sub-clause (i) of Cl. B) of sub-section (1) of S. 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risks of the passengers traveling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 Amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized representative and not only passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise." 27. As will appear from the aforesaid, the Insurance Company cannot avoid its liability to indemnify the amount of compensation if there is no fundamental breach. 28. As will appear from the aforesaid, the Insurance Company cannot avoid its liability to indemnify the amount of compensation if there is no fundamental breach. 28. So far as the plea of hill endorsement is concerned, the claims tribunal has recorded a finding to the following effect: ßfoi{kh la[;k & 1 }kjk i=koyh ij nq?kZVukxzLr frfFk o le; ij thi pkyd ifjjke dh oS/k pkyu vuqKfIr izLrqr dh xbZ gS tks i=koyh ij dkxt lañ 22x@1 miyCèk gSA ftlds fojks/k esa foi{kh lañ 2 ds vf/koDrk us dksbZ rdZ Hkh izLrqr ugha fd;k gSA bl izdkj ;g rF; fl) gS fd pkyd ds ikl nq?kZVuk dh frfFk dks oS/k ykbZlsal FkkA rn~uqlkj ckn fcUnq lañ 2 ;kphx.k ds i{k ls ldkjkRed :i ls fu.khZr fd;k tkrk gSAÞ 29. This Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Heera Devi and others (A.O. No. 302 of 2003) decided on 27th February, 2007 has observed as under: "9) Sri D.S. Patni has further submitted that the driver of the vehicle has no valid driving license as there is no endorsement in the driving license regarding authority to drive the vehicle in hill areas. Sri D.S. Patni has referred Rule 193 of the M.V. Rules 1998, which reads as under: 193. Endorsement of certain licenses for hill roads- No person shall drive a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle on a hill road unless his license to drive such public service vehicle or goods vehicle has been endorsed by a registering authority with a permission to drive upon hill roads situated within the jurisdiction of such registering authority or in the case of a public service vehicle hired by tourists, by the registering authority of the State with which reciprocal arrangements on the point have been agreed upon. 11) On the other hand the counsel for the respondents Sri Kishor Kumar, Sri L.K. Tiwari and Sri P.S. Bisht have submitted that aforesaid endorsement is only applicable for public service vehicles and further their being no such provision under the M.V. Act, therefore, Rule 193 cannot be held to be applicable. 12) I have considered the submissions in the light of the above rules and I find that if there was no endorsement of authorization to drive the vehicles in hills, the license cannot be held invalid." 30. 12) I have considered the submissions in the light of the above rules and I find that if there was no endorsement of authorization to drive the vehicles in hills, the license cannot be held invalid." 30. In view of the above, I do not find any reason to interfere under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act with the award passed by the claims tribunal concerned and the A.O. deserves to be dismissed. However, counsel for the appellant has submitted that the interest is on higher side. 31. In Managing Director, T.N.S.T.C. Vs. Sripriya and others [2007 (67) ALR 813] Supreme Court, the Apex Court has observed as under: "10. In regard to choice of the multiplicand the Halsbury's Laws of England in Vol. 34, para 98 states the principle thus: "98. Assessment of damages under the fatal Accidents Act, 1976. - The Courts have evolved a method for calculating the amount of pecuniary benefit that dependants could reasonably expect to have received from the deceased in the future. First the annual value to the dependants of those benefits (the multiplicand) is assessed. In the ordinary case of the death of a wage-earner that figure is arrived at by deducting from the wages the estimated amount of his own personal and living expenses. The assessment is split into two parts. The first part comprises damages for the period between death and trial. The multiplicand is multiplied by the number of years which have elapsed between those two dates. Interest at one-hald the short-term investment rate is also awarded on that multiplicand. The second part is damages for the period from the trial onwards. For that period, the number of years which have based on the number of years that the expectancy would probably have lasted; central to that calculation is the probable length of the deceased's working life at the date of death." 15. Considering the age of the deceased appropriate multiplier would be 12. The income fixed by the Tribunal and the deduction for personal expenses do not warrant any interference. Worked out on that basis, the entitlement of the loss of income is Rs. 5,76,000. The other expenses awarded unaltered. In other words, total entitlement of the claimant is fixed at Rs. 6,00,000. The income fixed by the Tribunal and the deduction for personal expenses do not warrant any interference. Worked out on that basis, the entitlement of the loss of income is Rs. 5,76,000. The other expenses awarded unaltered. In other words, total entitlement of the claimant is fixed at Rs. 6,00,000. It would be appropriate to fix the rate of interest at 7.5% instead of 9% as done by the Tribunal and maintained by the High Court." 32. In view of the aforesaid, the appellant will be liable to pay simple interest @ 7.5% per annum in place of 8% per annum, in case the same has not yet been paid. Amount, if any, deposited in the court shall be transmitted to the claims tribunal concerned. 33. With the aforesaid modification in the rate of interest, A.O. is dismissed. No order as to costs.