JUDGMENT S. R. DONGAONKAR, J. :- Being aggrieved by the Judgment, in Sessions Trial No. 65/2000 decided by the Judgment dated 28-6-2002, passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Amravati, by which appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer, imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.1000/- and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months, he has preferred this appeal to challenge the same. 2. The appellant (accused) was prosecuted for the offence under section 302 of Indian Penal Code on the allegations that he had committed murder of his sister - deceased Indrakala by setting her on fire by pouring kerosene on her person on the date of incident i.e. on 24-12-1999 at about 6.00 a.m. at village Brahmanwada - Govindpur. It is the prosecution case that the deceased Indrakala, her other sister Gahukarna and mother - Banabai were living adjacent to the house of the accused who is her brother. There were disputes between them about the agricultural land. Prior to the date of incident, there was quarrel between the deceased-Indrakala and appellant-Dadarao. It is the case of the prosecution that on the date of the incident in the early morning at about 6.00 a.m., the deceased Indrakala had gone for urine purpose in the courtyard of her house. Appellant Dadarao came there, he poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. Deceased Indrakala removed her saree of her own and after extinguishing fire she along with her sister went to the Police Station, Mahuli Jahagir, where she lodged report. Thereafter, she was taken to Irvin Hospital, Amravati. On the same day of her admission, P.S.I. Karegaonkar recorded her statement. Thereafter, on receiving a requisition from Irvin Hospital S.J.M. Sudhir Deshpande also recorded her dying declaration. Initially offence under section 307 of Indian Penal Code was registered against the appellant - Dadarao. The Investigating Officer then visited the spot of incident. He prepared spot panchnama and seized articles from the spot. Later on he arrested the appellant. The deceased Indrakala, however, while taking the treatment died on 18-1-2000 due to the burn injuries in the Hospital. It may be mentioned that prior to her death one another dying declaration was recorded. As said Indrakala had died, the offence was converted into one under section 302 of Indian Penal Code. 3. Later on he arrested the appellant. The deceased Indrakala, however, while taking the treatment died on 18-1-2000 due to the burn injuries in the Hospital. It may be mentioned that prior to her death one another dying declaration was recorded. As said Indrakala had died, the offence was converted into one under section 302 of Indian Penal Code. 3. After due investigation, the appellant came to be charge-sheeted for the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code in the court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amravati. 4. The said case in turn was committed to the Court of Session, Amravati. 5. The 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Amravati framed the charge against the appellant for the offence punishable under section 302 of Indian Penal Code for the aforesaid offence. Accused/appellant pleaded not guilty to the same. His defence is that of denial. According to him, deceased was not cohabiting with her husband. She was residing with her mother and younger sister. The mother was insisting his deceased sister that she should reside with her family members and because of this, there were disputes between the parties. On the date of incident, deceased was preparing tea, and she caught fire accidentally. Gahukarna tried to extinguish fire. Thus according to him, the deceased had suffered bum injuries due to accident while preparing tea. 6. In order to establish the guilt of the appellant/accused, prosecution examined in all 12 witnesses. The main witnesses are on the point of dying declarations of the deceased. The prosecution has also examined the alleged eye witnesses to the incident namely Gahukarnabai. She has however, turned hostile. 7. It is necessary to note that the victim - Indrakala had lodged report to the police station. Her report is to the effect that accused/appellant had poured kerosene on her person, and she was set ablaze by the appellant. It is necessary to note the gist of the evidence of other prosecution witnesses. P.W. 1-Gautam Ambadas Ghodeswar - Exhibit 18 is witness to the spot panchnama. He has however, turned hostile. P.W.2-Keshav Bhimrao Meshram, is also witness to the spot panchnama so also seizure, he has also turned hostile to the prosecution. P.W.3-Gahukarna Natthuji Gajbhiye as stated above is alleged eye witness to the incident. P.W.4- Awdhut Ramdas Jethe - Exhibit 22 is the witness to the alleged statement by the deceased. He has however, turned hostile. P.W.2-Keshav Bhimrao Meshram, is also witness to the spot panchnama so also seizure, he has also turned hostile to the prosecution. P.W.3-Gahukarna Natthuji Gajbhiye as stated above is alleged eye witness to the incident. P.W.4- Awdhut Ramdas Jethe - Exhibit 22 is the witness to the alleged statement by the deceased. He has also turned hostile to the prosecution. P.W.5 Anil Mahadeorao Mankar is the Special Judicial Magistrate who has recorded dying declaration of the deceased - Indrakala on 10-1-2000 on requisition. P.W.6-Sudhir Eknath Deshpande - is witness who has recorded dying declaration of the deceased, when she was admitted in Irvin Hospital on 24-12-1999 as per requisition. Dying declaration recorded by him is at Exhibit 30. P.W.7-Dr. Anil Mahadeorao Kavimandan, has performed autopsy on the dead body of Indrakala and he has given opinion regarding cause of death of the deceased. According to him, the deceased had died due to septicemia with septicemic shock due to 74% bums. P.W.8-Ramdas Atmaramji Kanherkar is Head Constable who was attached to the Police Station, Mahuli Jahagir on 24-12-1999. He has been examined to show that the deceased Indrakala had lodged report about the incident, and a station diary Entry No. 7 to that effect was recorded. He had done the spot panchnama and had seized some of the articles from the spot as per Exhibit 34 and 35. P.W.9-Dr. Prakash Gopalrao Sune- is the witness who had send Exhibit 39 to the P.S.O. which is an alleged application of the deceased to state that she· had sustained bum injuries while preparing tea. P.W.10-Madhav Jadbaji Karegaonkar is P.S.I. who has registered the offence on the strength of the dying declaration of Indrakala dated 24-12-1999 bearing Crime No. 119/1999 under section 307 of Indian Penal Code. He has conducted further part of the investigation. He had recorded statements of the witnesses and after completion of the investigation submitted charge-sheet against appellant/accused for the offence under section 302 of Indian Penal Code, as deceased Indrakala had died. P.W.11-Dr. Mrs. Seema Prakash Sune - is the witness who is Medical Officer, who has certified regarding fitness of the deceased to make dying declaration as per Exhibit 50 when the dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the SJ.M. Mankar on 10-1-2000. P.W.11-Dr. Mrs. Seema Prakash Sune - is the witness who is Medical Officer, who has certified regarding fitness of the deceased to make dying declaration as per Exhibit 50 when the dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the SJ.M. Mankar on 10-1-2000. P.W.12-Sahadeorao Shankarrao Netanrao - is police official who was working as A.S.I. and who has got recorded the report of the deceased Indrakala on 24-12-1999 at Mahuli Jahagir Police Station when he was station diary in-charge as per Exhibit 53 wherein she has stated that the appellant had poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire and whereupon the sana Entry No.7 was registered. P.W.13- Dr. Kishor Krushnarao Bele who was attached to Irvin Hospital and he examined deceased and found that she was fit and well oriented to give statement when her dying declaration was recorded on 24-12-1999. 8. The defence has examined the mother of the appellant - and deceased, Banabai in defence to show that at the relevant time, Indrakala had woke up at about 6.00 a.m. She went to prepare the tea. When she was taking the box of tea, end of saree had fallen down upon the fire place and she caught fire. Gahukarna tried to extinguish the fire. Thereafter she was taken to the hospital. 9. Thus, it will be seen that it is the case of the prosecution that appellant accused had poured kerosene on the person of the deceased and set her on fire, whereas it is the contention of the defence that she while preparing tea had caught fire. There is no dispute that she had suffered burn injuries and because of that she had died in the hospital. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Daga has submitted that there is one dying declaration in the form of letter written by the deceased to the Police Inspector, City Kotwali, Amravati through Medical Officer to the effect that she had suffered accidental burn injuries while preparing tea and therefore, the other dying declarations recorded by the Special Executive Magistrate and Police are not correct and they are not reliable. It is the contention of the learned counsel further that there were good relations between the appellant and the deceased and there was no question of appellant setting her on fire. It is the contention of the learned counsel further that there were good relations between the appellant and the deceased and there was no question of appellant setting her on fire. Further according to him, the report, if any, which appears to be lodged at the Police Station before she was taken to the hospital is false and concocted. Further he has submitted that the deceased had died in the hospital after about 18 days. The deceased had died due to complications during the period of treatment and therefore, the appellant, if at all he is found to be responsible for the incident, at the most can be held guilty for the offence under section 304 of Indian Penal Code. He has further submitted that there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of P.W. Gahukarna i.e. sister of the deceased and D.W. Banabai i.e. mother of the deceased who are the alleged eye witnesses to the incident. Therefore, according to him, the fact that the deceased had suffered homicidal death is not established and also if at all the appellant is found to be responsible for the incident, he can be held guilty only for the offence under section 304, Indian Penal Code. And as the appellant has undergone considerable sentence i.e. since he is in jail for about 7 years, appellant should be sentenced to the period already undergone. He has relied on 2005 All MR (Cri) 185, Ramakant Sidramappa Waghmare vs. State of Maharashtra and 2006(2) Mh.L.J. (Cri.) 544 = 2006 All MR (Cri) 3372, Kisan Rama Waghmare @ Katkari vs. State of Maharashtra, to contend that as there is evidence of eye witnesses available, to the effect that the deceased had suffered accidental burns, the dying declarations made by her should not be relied upon as they do not inspire confidence. He has also relied on the observations of this Court in 2001(2) Mh.L.J. 288 = 2001 All MR (Cri) 529, Madhavrao Sakharam Sardesai vs. State of Maharashtra and 2005 All MR (Cri) 1651, Subhash slo Nagorao Junghare vs. State of Maharashtra, to contend that if the offence is made out, it is only one under section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. 11. The learned A.P.P. Mr. 11. The learned A.P.P. Mr. Patel has supported the Judgment and order of the trial court contending that the prosecution has established that the accused had set fire to the deceased as contended by the prosecution, and it is established through the reliable dying declarations of the deceased. Further according to him, the case is such that the appellant cannot be held guilty for the offence punishable under section 304 of Indian Penal Code. He is guilty only for the offence Under section 302 of Indian Penal Code only. 12. Here is peculiar case where all the dying declarations are to the effect that the appellant had poured kerosene on the person of the deceased and set her on fire. There is only one letter which is allegedly written by the deceased to the police to the effect that she had suffered burn injuries while preparing tea. Eye witness Gahukarna did not support the prosecution case, whereas the evidence of D.W. i.e. mother of the deceased has supported the defence. Therefore, the crucial question would be, whether the deceased had suffered burn injuries due to setting fire by the appellant as alleged by the prosecution. 13. As stated above the prosecution has examined the alleged eye witness to the incident namely - Gahukarnabai. She has however, turned hostile. In cross examination by the learned P.P., she has stated it is true to say that she had extinguished fire by pouring water on the person of Indu and then she was taken in S.T. Bus to the Hospital. She denied the statement made by deceased to the police wherein she stated that appellant had poured kerosene on the person of Indu and set her on fire. 14. As stated above the mother of the deceased i.e. D.W. Banabai has supported defence. In this behalf, however, it needs to be noted that she was confronted by her statement before the police, wherein it is recorded that she had heard noise of Indrakala that the appellant had poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. 15. In this case, undisputedly Gahukarna had taken the deceased to the hospital. The question is whether the dying declaration in the shape of report made in the police station while proceeding towards hospital which is first in time, is trustworthy. 16. 15. In this case, undisputedly Gahukarna had taken the deceased to the hospital. The question is whether the dying declaration in the shape of report made in the police station while proceeding towards hospital which is first in time, is trustworthy. 16. In this behalf, it is necessary to note the evidence of P.W. 8 - P.H.C. Ramdas Kanherkar who has deposed on 24-12-1999 at about 7.30 a.m. one Indubai Ramrao Jethe had come to Mahuli Jahangir P.S., A.S.I. Sahadeo (P.W.12) has recorded her statement (Exhibit 53), and entry to that effect was made at the station diary No. 7 and thereafter he went to Brahmanwada Govindpur for investigation, where after he prepared panchnama etc. In crossexamination it was suggested that said Indubai did not come to Police Station, nor she lodged any report, so recorded. It is pertinent to note that in her report Exhibit-53 before the police she has stated that the appellant had poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. Thus evidence of P.W. 8 Ramdas and P.W. 12 Sahadeo (police officials) corroborate each other. At this juncture, it can be noted that had the deceased suffered accidental burn injuries, at that very moment, she would not have implicated the appellant "falsely". It is difficult to comprehend that she would take advantage of her accidental injuries at that time to falsely implicate the appellant who is her brother. 17 .As stated above, the other two dying declarations, also support the prosecution case. It is necessary to note the evidence of P. W.5 Anil Mankar who is working as Special Judicial Magistrate and who had recorded dying declaration of the deceased on 10-1-2000, this dying declaration was recorded at about 6.00 p.m. Said dying declaration is recorded in the question and answer form and she has clearly stated that Dadarao Nagorao Meshram had poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire at about 6.00 0' clock in the morning when she was urinating in the courtyard. It is pertinent to note that this statement in the dying declaration was recorded and it is inconsonance with the statement to the police also - dying declaration recorded by P.W. 6 - Sudhir Deshpande which was recorded on 24-12-1999, wherein, she had stated that - This day at 6.00 0' clock in the morning when she came outside for urination , Dadarao Meshram poured kerosene on her person, ignited a matchstick and threw the same on her person, as a result of which she had caught fire. She had also stated that she had put off the saree and the fire automatically got quenched and thereafter, she had gone to police station wherein Police Constable recorded her statement. All these dying declarations - one before police and two before the Special Judicial Magistrate support the case of the prosecution. True that the defence has pointed out some discrepancies here and there, but the consequence is to the effect that the appellant had poured kerosene on the person of the deceased and set her on fire at the relevant time. 18. This takes us to consider the impact of Exhibit 39 which is the letter allegedly written from the hospital by the deceased to the Police Station Officer in which there is statement contending that she had suffered accidental fire while preparing tea. 19. This letter needs to be closely examined. It shows that it bears one thumb print, alleged to be of deceased Indrakala. It mentions: "I the aforesaid patient, humbly submit an application as under: I sustained bums while preparing tea on the hearth on 24-12-1999 at 5.00 O'clock in the morning my statement was recorded after I was admitted to Irvin Hospital. But due to pain I could not understand as to what statement I gave. Hence I wish to give my statement again. Hence I request you to record my statement again. Date: 10-1-2000 Thumb Impression of Indrakala Ramdas Jethe." [English version] It is to the effect that she had suffered accidental burn on 24-12-1999 at about 5.00 0' clock in the morning and her statement was recorded after she was admitted in Irvin Hospital, but due to pain she could not understand as to what statement she gave and she wanted to make fresh statement. This will show that she wanted to rescile from the earlier statement and dying declaration implicating the accused/appellant. This will show that she wanted to rescile from the earlier statement and dying declaration implicating the accused/appellant. This letter is dated 10-1-2000, i.e. after considerable time of her admission in the hospital. Even thereafter, she had repeated her statement in the earlier dying declarations, before the Special Judicial Magistrate - P.W.5 Anil Mankar. She has stated, before him that accused/appellant poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. Vide evidence of P.W. 5 Anil Mankar it clearly seems that she might have written the aforesaid letter, at the insistence of her relatives present in the hospital, but still, after writing letter even it is assumed to have been bearing her thumb print, deceased has confirmed her allegations against the appellant. It must be because of her anguish arising out of act done by the appellant. 20. As already stated above, there is no doubt in our mind that she had made report to the police station Mahuli Jahagir implicating the accused for pouring kerosene on her person and setting her ablaze immediately after the incident and therefore, when there is nothing on record to suggest that despite accidental burns to her she could implicate the appellant falsely, the dying declaration made by her in her report at the first instance, thus case of prosecution of an attempt to kill her has to be accepted. 21. The authorities, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant 2005 All MR (Cri.) 185, Ramakant Sidramappa Waghmare vs. State of Maharashtra and 2006(2) Mh.L.J. (Cri.) 544 = 2006 All MR (Cri) 3372, Kisan Rama Waghmare @ Katkari vs. State of Maharashtra are not attracted in the present case, as here the gist of the dying declaration made by the deceased are supporting the prosecution case and there is no question of doubting the same; particularly when the dying declaration in the shape of her report before the police implicating the appellant for the offence under section 307, Indian Penal Code is clearly acceptable. Reasons as to why P.W. Gahukarna and D.W. Banabai are deposing in favour of appellant/defence are not far to seek. Their evidence is not acceptable. As such we are of the opinion that the prosecution has established its case about the manner in which incident had Occurred. Reasons as to why P.W. Gahukarna and D.W. Banabai are deposing in favour of appellant/defence are not far to seek. Their evidence is not acceptable. As such we are of the opinion that the prosecution has established its case about the manner in which incident had Occurred. 22 This takes us to consider as to what offence is made against the appellant i.e. whether the offence under section 302 or 304 of the Indian Penal Code. 23. The Medical Officer who had conducted autopsy has opined as regards the cause of death of deceased as "septicemia with septicemic shock due to 74% burns." It is not disputed that deceased was taking medical treatment for more than 20 days in the hospital. It is also matter of record that the hospitalisation papers are not produced by the prosecution. The question is whether, in these circumstances the appellant can be held guilty for the offence under section 302 of Indian Penal Code in view of the reported decision of this court in 2001(2) Mh.L.J. 288 = 2001 All MR (Cri.) 529, Madhavrao Sakharam Sardesai vs. The State of Maharashtra, and 2005 All MR (Cri) 1651, Subhash s/o Nagorao Junghare vs. State of Maharashtra. 24. In the case of Madhavrao Sakharam Sardesai, this court in paragraph 15 and 16 has observed thus: "15. Clause thirdly of section 300, 1ndian Penal Code would also not be applicable. - A perusal of the said clause would show that before it can be invoked, two prerequisites have to be satisfied, namely :_ (A) there should be intention to inflict the bodily injury which has inflicted in contra distinction to its being accidental; (B) the bodily injury inflicted should be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. We make no bones in observing that neither pre-requisite (a) nor Prerequisite (b) are satisfied. Pre-requisite (a) is not satisfied because, although the appellant had the intention to cause bums which he caused to the deceased but, it cannot be said that he had the intention to cause septic bums. The post-mortem shows that these septic bums led to the death of the deceased, in the post-mortem report, the cause of death is mentioned as septic shock due to bum. In this connection it is pertinent to refer to the evidence of Dr. The post-mortem shows that these septic bums led to the death of the deceased, in the post-mortem report, the cause of death is mentioned as septic shock due to bum. In this connection it is pertinent to refer to the evidence of Dr. Sane P.W. 8 that contrary to her advise, the deceased was discharged on the same day, it is not clear from the evidence whether she was directly taken to Jahangir Hospital or first taken home and thereafter to the said hospital. In such a situation, the possibility of bums becoming septic either in transit to Jehangir Hospital or in the hospital itself cannot be ruled out. Pre-requisite (b) is also not satisfied. In the instant case, since the genuineness of the post-mortem report has been admitted by the defence under section 294, Criminal Procedure Code the Autopsy surgeon has not been examined. Dr. Sane P.W.8 who is the solitary doctor who has been examined in the instant case did not state that the injuries suffered by the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. At this juncture, we would like to emphasis that since the genuineness of the post-mortem report has been admitted by the defence, it cannot be ipso facto concluded that the injuries suffered by the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The burden of so proving would always rest on the prosecution and would have to be discharged by it unless of course a naked perusal of the injuries shows that they are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Our view is fortified by the observations contained in para 5 of the decision of the Supreme Court which are to the same effect, made by it in the case of Brij Bhukan vs. State of U. P. recorded in AIR 1957 Supreme Court 474. In the instant case, a perusal of the ante mortem bums suffered by the deceased does not per se lead to the inference that they were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It should be borne in mind that the deceased succumbed to her bums 10 days after the incident. For the said reasons, clause thirdly would be inapplicable. In our view, clause fourthly would also not be applicable. It should be borne in mind that the deceased succumbed to her bums 10 days after the incident. For the said reasons, clause thirdly would be inapplicable. In our view, clause fourthly would also not be applicable. A perusal of clause fourthly would show that it would be attracted if a person who commits a act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must: (a) in all probability cause of death or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Layman invariable and man of law often proceed on a erroneous premise that if a person has the knowledge that the act committed by him is imminently dangerous, then he would be liable under the said clause. Nothing can be further from truth. Knowledge simpliciter on the part of a person of an act being imminently dangerous would not invoke the application of clause fourthly. Its application would only be invoked if coupled with the said knowledge, there is the knowledge that the said act either in all probability would cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In the instant case, the evidence is that the deceased died 10 days after the incident not on account of burns simpliciter, but due to septic shock resulting from burns. It is true that there was direct nexus between the appellant's act and the burns suffered by the deceased, but in our view there was no direct nexus between the act of the appellant and the burns turning septic. As we have mentioned earlier, the evidence of Dr. Sane shows that the deceased took her discharge on the date of the incident itself from Sasoon Hospital contrary to medical advice. We have also mentioned earlier that there is no clear evidence whether from Sasoon Hospital she was first taken to home or taken directly to Jehangir hospital. It may be that burns of the deceased may have turned septic either prior to her being admitted in Jehangir Hospital or in Jehangir hospital itself, septic may have set in her burns. In such a factual matrix even though the appellant can be attributed the knowledge that his act was imminently dangerous but, no knowledge can be fastened to him that it would in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. Hence, clause fourthly would not be applicable." 25. In such a factual matrix even though the appellant can be attributed the knowledge that his act was imminently dangerous but, no knowledge can be fastened to him that it would in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. Hence, clause fourthly would not be applicable." 25. It is apparent from the observations in the decision that in that case there was no nexus between the act of the appellant and the burns turning septic. 26. In the case of Subhash it was observed by this court in paragraph 17 thus: "17. The next question, which falls for our consideration in the present case, is as to whether the offence committed by the Appellant is a murder under section 300, Indian Penal Code, or a culpable homicide not amounting to murder as defined under section 304, Part I or Part II of Indian Penal Code. In the instant case, the deceased was admitted in the hospital on 18th May, 1993 with 45% of burns and she died after thirty nine days i.e. on 26th June, 1993. The opinion of the doctor reflected in Exh.18 (admitted document) shows that the cause of death was burns due to Septecames. In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution is completely silent with regard to the treatment given to the deceased during the course of her stay in the hospital and in absence thereof, it is not known as to whether the proper medical treatment was administered to the deceased when she was alive for thirty-nine days after the incident. Similarly, in the instant case, recitals in the Dying Declaration show that the Appellant on the day of incident was consuming liquor right from the morning and at the relevant time, he rushed towards deceased, poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. It is, no doubt, true that in the normal set of circumstances, in such a situation, it can safely be inferred that the act is committed with an intention of causing death of the deceased. It is, no doubt, true that in the normal set of circumstances, in such a situation, it can safely be inferred that the act is committed with an intention of causing death of the deceased. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, as referred to hereinabove, it is possible to hold that the deceased did not succumb only due to burn injuries sustained by her and the possibility of death due to Septecames, in absence of any evidence about medical treatment given to the deceased, cannot be ruled out, particularly when the deceased died after thirty-nine days and, therefore, the evidence of the prosecution demonstrates that the Appellant has caused burn injuries to the deceased with an intention of causing such bodily injuries as are surely to cause death and the offence committed by the Appellant, therefore, would fall within the ambit of provisions of section 304, Part -I of the Indian Penal Code." However, offence in that case was converted into one under section 304 Part -I of Indian Penal Code considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. In that case it was possible to hold that deceased did not succumb only due to burn injuries sustained by her and the possibility of death due to Septecames, in absence of any evidence about medical treatment given to the deceased, was ruled out. Here there are no suggestions, substantiating such case given to the Medical Officer - Dr. Kavimandan. In cross-examination he has admitted that the patient had expired after 24 days. He also stated that there were more bum injuries on the lower limb. He has stated that after the lapse of first week, there can be possibility of pus formation in the burn injuries. But there is nothing to suggest that deceased could have died because of some other reason than the burn injuries suffered in the incident. This witness has clearly deposed that principally, the cause of death is bum, unless there are bum injuries septicemia could not be developed and 74% bum injuries are sufficient to cause death. Appellant has to be presumed to intend for; which is the natural consequence of his act. 27. This witness has clearly deposed that principally, the cause of death is bum, unless there are bum injuries septicemia could not be developed and 74% bum injuries are sufficient to cause death. Appellant has to be presumed to intend for; which is the natural consequence of his act. 27. No doubt, the prosecution has failed to produce the treatment papers of the deceased, but that fact by itself would not attract the observations of this Court in the authorities relied by the learned counsel for the defence. It is pertinent to note that in the case of Madhavrao, the deceased was discharged from the Government Hospital and later on she was admitted in the private hospital. Here is the case where deceased was being treated in the same hospital. It is not the case that she had left the hospital and thereafter, there was aggravation in the injuries and the death of the deceased was because of those complications. It is not possible to hold that the hospital authorities or the deceased was responsible for the aggravation of the injuries resulting in her death. She has died despite continuous treatment. The only inference that can be drawn on the strength of the evidence available on record that the deceased had died only due to bum injuries which were caused to her in the incident, proved as above. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the defence referred to above are not attracted and the appellant cannot be held guilty of the offence under section 304 of Indian Penal Code as contended by defence. He has to be held guilty of the offence charged. 28. In these circumstances the judgment rendered by the Trial Court convicting the accused for the offence punishable under section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentencing him accordingly, cannot be found fault with. Therefore, appeal has to be dismissed. It is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.