JUDGMENT Abhay M. Naik, J. Short facts leading to the appeal are that the plaintiff/appellant instituted a suit for restoration of possession and mesne profit in respect of suit land situated at village Digris, District Khandwa. Case of the plaintiff is that the defendants No. 1 and 2 are real brothers. They got separated quite a long back. Defendant No. 1 owned the land comprised in Survey No. 133/2 whereas the land comprised in Survey Nos. 222, 223 was recorded jointly in the names of defendants No. 1 and 2. Area of Survey Nos. 222, 223 was 1.89 and 0.18 decimal respectively which came to be in all 2.07 decimal. Out of this, the defendant No. 1 sold the southern portion in area 1.38 decimal to the plaintiff whereas the remaining portion remained with defendant No. 2. Thus, the plaintiff purchased the land comprised in Survey No. 133/2 area 1.50 decimal and southern portion of the remaining 2 survey numbers to the extent of 1.38 decimal in area 222, 223 vide registered sale deed dated 8-5-1974 from defendant No. 1 for a consideration of Rs. 4500/-. Since the name of defendant No. 2 was also recorded in the revenue papers, his signatures were obtained in the aforesaid registered sale deed. During May to July, 1975, the plaintiff was engaged in medical treatment of his cousin Kanhaiyalal at Indore when the defendant No. 1 forcibly occupied the suit land in the first week of July, 1975. In the light of the aforesaid, the plaintiff prayed for a decree for restoration of possession and mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month. Defendant No. 1 alone submitted the written statement inter alia contending that the suit land was not sold to the plaintiff. In fact, a loan of Rs. 3000/- was obtained by defendant No. 1 from the plaintiff and the alleged sale deed was got executed as collateral security. Interest at the rate of 3% per month was worked out at i.e. Rs. 1080/-. Further Rs. 420/- was worked out towards other expenses. Plaintiff is a money lender who got executed the registered sale deed for securing the amount of loan. Possession of the suit land was never handed over to the plaintiff. The alleged sale deed was never acted upon and the name of the plaintiff was not recorded in the revenue papers. Further Rs. 420/- was worked out towards other expenses. Plaintiff is a money lender who got executed the registered sale deed for securing the amount of loan. Possession of the suit land was never handed over to the plaintiff. The alleged sale deed was never acted upon and the name of the plaintiff was not recorded in the revenue papers. Since the defendant No. 1 needed the loan, his brother i.e. defendant No. 2 put his signature on the alleged sale deed to favour the defendant No. 1. It has been further averred that repayment to the tune of Rs. 15000/- has been made in phased manner, however, no receipt was obtained in view of the cordial relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Learned trial judge decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment dated 13th of August, 1986 which was challenged before the lower Appellate Court u/s 96 of Civil Procedure Code. Learned lower Appellate Court by impugned judgment and decree reversed the decision of the trial Court and ultimately dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on 2-4-1990. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, plaintiff/appellant has preferred the present appeal which has been admitted on the following substantial question of law:-- Whether the sale deed dated 8-5-1974 (Ex. P/1) conveyed a valid title to the plaintiff and the decree of the trial Court was not liable to be reversed? Shri Virendra Verma and Shri Z.M. Shah, learned counsel made their respective submissions which have been considered in the light of the records of the Courts below. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the sale deed dated 8-5-1974 contained in Ex. P/1 is an outright sale and it did convey a valid title to the plaintiff. This being so, the oral evidence contrary to EX. P/1 stands excluded from consideration. Learned lower Appellate Court has, thus, committed an illegality in considering the oral evidence while reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial judge. The submission is to be examined on the touchstone of law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lekhraj Diddi vs. Sardar Sawan Singh, 1971 MPLJ 438 : 1971 JLJ 545 where it has been held as under :-- 6. The submission is to be examined on the touchstone of law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lekhraj Diddi vs. Sardar Sawan Singh, 1971 MPLJ 438 : 1971 JLJ 545 where it has been held as under :-- 6. We find that there is, in this suits like those in this case, a widespread misunderstanding about pleading and proof of facts in derogation of the terms contained in registered documents. It is, therefore, necessary to indicate in a few words how these matters should be approached. Once it is admitted, or proved, that a party has executed a sale deed like the one dated December 3, 1963 in this case, then, between the parties to that deed or their representatives in interest, no oral evidence can be led for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms unless a case falling under any proviso to section 92 of the Evidence Act is specifically pleaded. In the absence of such a plea, there can be no question of lifting the veil and examining the nature of the transaction and effect must be given to the conclusiveness of the terms contained in the deed. So Lekhraj Diddi has pleaded in the suit filed by him that, before executing the sale deed, it was clearly contracted that the sale deed would not be given any effect and that, after repayment of the loan, it would be returned with an endorsement that it was a nominal transaction or, if so desired, a deed of reconveyance would be executed. The question, therefore, would be whether, upon approaching the case without any a priori notions about the nature of the transaction and without any pre-possession of judicial mind in favour of any of the rival versions and upon fairly considering the evidence as a whole, this contract set up in derogation of the sale deed has been clearly established. Speaking generally, this should be the approach to such questions raised in suits like the one filed by Lekhraj Diddi. No doubt the plaintiff/appellant has prayed for restoration of possession on the basis of registered purchase deed dated 8-5-1974 (Ex. P/1). Case of the defendant/respondent No. 1 in specific is that he needed a loan from the plaintiff who was a moneylender. No doubt the plaintiff/appellant has prayed for restoration of possession on the basis of registered purchase deed dated 8-5-1974 (Ex. P/1). Case of the defendant/respondent No. 1 in specific is that he needed a loan from the plaintiff who was a moneylender. A loan was obtained by him from the plaintiff and the alleged registered sale deed dated 8-5-1974 was executed in security of the same. Defendant/respondent No. 1 had no other source of income except the suit land and therefore, he did not intend to sell it. There was no intention of the parties that the disputed land would be transferred to the plaintiff. It was only a collateral security and the same was executed for securing the loan amount plus interest and expenses for documentation. It is further pleaded that the alleged sale deed dated 8-5-1974 was not meant to be a sale and the name of the plaintiff was therefore, not got mutated in the revenue papers. In view of the aforesaid express and specific plea of the defendant, the lower Appellate Court was clearly justified in taking into consideration the oral evidence for examining the true nature of the transaction between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. Learned lower Appellate Court after appreciating the evidence on record has clearly observed in paragraph 3 of the impugned judgment that the plea of defendant that he obtained a loan of Rs. 3000/- is substantiated from the endorsement contained in Ex. P/1 that payment of Rs. 3000/- alone was paid before the Sub Registrar at the time of execution of Ex. P/1. Secondly, it has been found that the plaintiff did not seek mutation in his favour in pursuance of the alleged sale deed contained in Ex. P/1. Thirdly, the disputed land is also recorded in the name of Nathai Bai and Rama Bai in addition to the defendants. Thus, the defendant No. 1 was not the sole Bhumiswami of the disputed land and was not competent to execute the alleged deed of sale. Admittedly, signatures of Nathai Bai and Ram Bai were not obtained on Ex. P/1. Lastly, the decision of the suit land was not handed over to the plaintiff pursuant to the alleged sale deed. Thus, the defendant No. 1 was not the sole Bhumiswami of the disputed land and was not competent to execute the alleged deed of sale. Admittedly, signatures of Nathai Bai and Ram Bai were not obtained on Ex. P/1. Lastly, the decision of the suit land was not handed over to the plaintiff pursuant to the alleged sale deed. Thus, it has been rightly concluded on the basis of the record that the transaction dated 8-5-1974 was in fact in the nature of loan and the alleged sale deed dated 8-5-1974 was got executed from the defendant No. 1 as a collateral security of loan. This apart, possession of the disputed land was also not handed over since the alleged transaction dated 8-5-1974 was a loan transaction and no transfer had actually taken place. Shri Virendra Verma, learned counsel for appellant relying on the decision of Apex Court in the case of Tulsi and Others Vs. Chandrika Prasad and Others, contended that the registered sale deed contained in Ex.P/1 cannot be construed except as registered sale deed and the contrary oral evidence is liable to be excluded. It has been clearly observed by the Apex Court in Tulsi's case (supra):-- 20. Section 91 of the Evidence Act mainly forbids proving of the contents of a writing otherwise than by writing itself and merely lays down the "best evidence rule". It, however, does not prohibit the parties to adduce evidence in a case of deed is capable of being construed differently to show how they understood the same. Further reliance on the decision of Apex Court in the case of Umabai and Another Vs. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) by Lrs. and Another, is also of no help because the Apex Court in that case was of opinion that the real intention of the parties behind the transaction may be well proved. Again in the case of Mushir Mohammed Khan (Dead) By LRS. Vs. Smt. Sajeda Bano and Others, it was held that the Court of law can enter into the true intention of the parties in executing the particular document. Supreme Court in the case of Tamboli Ramanlal Motilal (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Ghanchi Chimanlal Keshavlal (dead) by L.Rs. and another, has clearly held that the real intention of the parties in exhibition of the particular document may be legally gathered. Supreme Court in the case of Tamboli Ramanlal Motilal (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Ghanchi Chimanlal Keshavlal (dead) by L.Rs. and another, has clearly held that the real intention of the parties in exhibition of the particular document may be legally gathered. Thus, the learned lower Appellate Court has rightly found the transaction to be that of loan and that the registered sale deed dated 8-5-1974 did not convey title to the plaintiff. These and other findings of the lower Appellate Court while dismissing the suit are found to be based on correct appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record. Learned counsel for the appellant has failed to point out any admissible evidence which escaped from the notice of the Court. Similarly, no other material admissible evidence was shown to have been ignored by the lower Appellate Court. In this view of the matter, I answer the substantial question of law against the plaintiff/appellant. In the result, the appeal is hereby dismissed, however, no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed