JUDGMENT By the Court.—The petitioners have preferred this petition for quashing the notice dated 7th March, 2000 whereby the Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad (hereinafter called the Development Authority’) had put the premises in dispute to auction described as House No. 26-27, Pannalal Road and mentioned at Serial Nos. 38 to 41 of the said auction notice. The recital of the impugned notice indicates that the said land was made available to the Development Authority after having been declared surplus in the hands of the owners under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the Act 1976). The challenge is on the ground that the property in dispute was never taken of and any proceedings under the Act 1976 stood abated by virtue of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter called the Act 1999). 2. The facts relevant for the purposes of this controversy are that notices under the provisions of the Act 1976 were issued proposing to declare surplus certain area of the premises whereafter the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 22.10.1982 declared an area of 1054.05 sq. meters as surplus in the hands of each of the three petitioners respectively. The petitioners contend that the said order of the Prescribed Authority was not followed up by taking recourse to proceedings for obtaining physical possession of the said land, as a result whereof the petitioners were entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Act 1999. Accordingly, it is urged that the auction proceedings resorted by the Development Authority treating the said land to be surplus under the Act 1976 is patently illegal and unlawful, which cannot be given effect to. The matter has been contested by the respondents and a Counter-affidavit has been filed by Harendra Veer Singh, the then Additional District Magistrate, Allahabad and another Counter-affidavit has been filed by the Tehsildar in the office of the Development Authority Shri Pushkar representing the respondents No. 2 and 3. Rejoinder affidavits to the said Counter-affidavits have also been filed by the petitioners. 3. We have heard Shri S.N. Verma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri P.K. Mukherjee for the petitioners, Shri Ashok Kumar Pandey for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and the learned Standing Counsel for respondents No. 1, 4 and 5. 4. Rejoinder affidavits to the said Counter-affidavits have also been filed by the petitioners. 3. We have heard Shri S.N. Verma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri P.K. Mukherjee for the petitioners, Shri Ashok Kumar Pandey for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and the learned Standing Counsel for respondents No. 1, 4 and 5. 4. Shri Verma submits that in the absence of any consequential action having been taken in accordance with the provisions of Sections 10 (5) and 10 (6) of the Act 1976 and having failed to invite the petitioners to offer their choices of land as required under Section 8(3) of the said Act, the respondents have no authority in law to either claim possession over the land or treat it as surplus and put it to auction. He contends that the petitioners have been throughout in continuous uninterrupted actual physical possession and, therefore, with the commencement of the Act 1999, all proceedings that had been initiated for declaring the land as surplus stood abated and hence the consequential action of putting the property to auction is liable to be set aside. 5. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1, 4 and 5 and Shri Ashok Kumar Pandey appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 have vehemently opposed the writ petition contending that the land had vested in the State under Section 3 of the Act 1976 and taking over of actual physical possession is totally immaterial. It is urged that any subsequent proceedings for taking possession are merely formal and as such even if it is assumed that actual physical possession had not been taken, it would not materially affect the status of the land after the commencement of the Act 1999. A feeble and half-hearted attempt has been made on behalf of the respondents to demonstrate that some steps as required under the provisions of Section 10 (5) of the Act 1976 had been taken to serve notice on one of the petitioners namely petitioner No. 1 Ravindra Prakash Misra and, therefore, there is a compliance of the provision which renders the vesting in the State complete and hence the petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. 6. Having considered the rival submissions made by learned Counsel for the respective parties, we find that the petitioners have come up with a specific cases in the writ petition that no notice was ever served under Section 10 (5) of the Act 1976 and further that no such notice appears to have been issued. It is specifically alleged in paragraphs 11 to 13 of the writ petition that no such steps were taken and in paragraph 16, it is categorically stated that the respondents never undertook any exercise at all in respect of any of the petitioners under Section 10 (6) of the Act 1976. It is alleged that the claim of possession made by the respondents is merely on paper and the petitioners, at no point of time, were ever dispossessed from the land in question. In reply thereto, the Counter-affidavit on behalf of the Development Authority simply states that the same did not require any specific reply but the Counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State recites that a notice under Section 10 (3) followed by a notice under Section 10(5) of the Act 1976 had been issued and copies thereof have been filed along with the said Counter-affidavit. A perusal of the notice under Section 10(5) of the Act 1976 demonstrates that the said notice has been issued in the name of the petitioner No. 1 only. The Counter-affidavit nowhere recites that notices were served separately on all the petitioners under Section 10(5) of the Act 1976. There is no averment in the Counter-affidavit as to how the said notice was served on the petitioner No. 1. There is also no averment in the Counter-affidavit which would indicate that notices were issued to the petitioners No. 2 and 3. Apart from this, paragraph 16 of the writ petition has not been denied effectively at all. Paragraph 8 of the Counter-affidavit of the State simply states that there is nothing on the record of the said answering respondent in respect thereof. This leaves no room for doubt that no proceedings for taking actual physical possession were ever initiated under Section 10(6) of the Act 1976. Paragraph 8 of the Counter-affidavit of the State simply states that there is nothing on the record of the said answering respondent in respect thereof. This leaves no room for doubt that no proceedings for taking actual physical possession were ever initiated under Section 10(6) of the Act 1976. On the contrary, the respondent State has relied on respondents No. 2 and 3 to the effect that the possession must have been taken by the Development Authority whereas the Counter-affidavit on behalf of the Development Authority is completely silent as to how the Development Authority took possession. The only effective recital in the Counter-affidavit of the Development Authority is that since the land vested in the State, the auction proceedings were validly initiated. Paragraph 12 of the Counter-affidavit of the Development Authority simply states that the contents of paragraphs 5 to 11 of the writ petition need no comments. Disclosure of the entire material and the averments made in the affidavits of the respondents, as discussed hereinabove and as available on record, clearly indicate that the respondents failed to take actual physical possession of the property in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act 1976. 7. In the absence of any material to the contrary, the inescapable conclusion is that the petitioners continued to retain the actual physical uninterrupted possession which was also protected during the pendency of the writ petition under an interim order dated 14.3.2000. 8. On the aforesaid factual premise, we find force in the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners which is squarely supported by the two Division Bench decisions of this Court in the case of Chhabinath v. State of U.P. and others, 2005 (2) AWC 1405 followed by the decision in the case of State of U.P. and another v. Hari Ram and another, 2005 ALJ 2402. The following observations in the case of State of U.P. v. Hari Ram (supra) are quoted below in support of our conclusions : "30. In Section 10 (3) of the Act, the expression used by the Legislature is that land declared surplus “.......shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government............” Term ‘vested’ refers to de jure ‘title’ and ‘interest’ in the surplus land irrespective of actual possession. 33. In Section 10 (3) of the Act, the expression used by the Legislature is that land declared surplus “.......shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government............” Term ‘vested’ refers to de jure ‘title’ and ‘interest’ in the surplus land irrespective of actual possession. 33. In contradistinction to the above, in the case of ‘surplus land’ ‘being vested’ in the State under Section 10 (3) of the Act, the Act further provided steps for taking possession under Section 10(5) or 10 (6) of the Act. 37. From the above dictionary meanings it is clear that expression ‘vest/vested’ may or may not include ‘transfer of possession’. It means that ‘vested’ includes ‘physical possession or not’ shall depend upon the overall reading of statutory provisions. 38. In the light of the above, the expression ‘vesting’ used in the Act, 1976 and the Repeal Act has to be read with reference to and in the context they are used. A perusal of Section 10 of the Principal Act (particularly Sections 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Repeal Act provide that surplus land when ‘deemed to have vested’ does not refer to ‘physical possession’. This becomes conspicuous on reading Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, which alone talk of ‘actual physical possession’. 43. Section 10(1) of the Act contemplates a ‘notification’ in the official Gazette of the concerned State giving particulars of the vacant land held by a person in excess of ceiling limit. The words “such vacant land is to be acquired” used in the Notification shows the surplus land will be acquired later. Section 10(3) of the Act provides for another notification in the official Gazette to notify the date with effect from which ‘such land shall be deemed to have been acquired and deemed to have absolutely vested’ in the State Government. 44. Expression ‘possession’ is used for the first time in Sections 10(5) and thereafter 10(6) of the Act. Notification under Section 10 (1) and 10 (3) are not relevant so far as the question of applicability of saving clause of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is concerned. 45. 44. Expression ‘possession’ is used for the first time in Sections 10(5) and thereafter 10(6) of the Act. Notification under Section 10 (1) and 10 (3) are not relevant so far as the question of applicability of saving clause of Section 3 of the Repeal Act is concerned. 45. Section 10(5) of the Act provides that Competent Authority may by notice in writing order any person, who may be in possession of the land declared surplus to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorized in this behalf within 30 days of the service of notice. Section 10 (5) makes it clear and shows that vesting’ is something different and distinct from ‘’possession’. 46. Section 10 (6) of the Act takes care of a stage when a person, in possession of surplus land fails to surrender/deliver possession voluntarily or receipt of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act and, in that contingency authorizes/empowers competent authority to take physical/de facto possession of such vacant lands so declared surplus land. 47. Section 3 of the Repeal Act amply reflect the purpose and intention the Legislature, namely where a land owner remains in physical possession, then irrespective of its being ‘declaring surplus, and/or entry being made in favour of State in Revenue Records as a consequence of vesting and even if compensation is paid or received, in law, surplus land gets exempted and ought to remain with original landowner. The relevant criterion is whether physical possession of the land declared surplus was ever taken by the State Government. If answer is in ‘negative’, the landowner must not suffer and have the benefit of Repeal Act because, due to the inaction/failure on the part of State to take physical possession before coming into force the Repeal Act, in negation of ‘Aim and object’ and purpose of the Act. 48. Section 3 (2) (a) and (b) of Repeal Act make clear that even receipt of compensation will not disentitle one to claim benefit of the Repeal Act if compensation is refunded, provided a person continues to be in physical of the land declared surplus. 49. The above interpretation of Section 3 of the Repeal Act; further finds support from Section 11 of the Act, which refers to ‘deemed acquisition’ under Section 10 (3) of the Act. 49. The above interpretation of Section 3 of the Repeal Act; further finds support from Section 11 of the Act, which refers to ‘deemed acquisition’ under Section 10 (3) of the Act. It has no reference to Section 10 (5) or 10 (6) of the Act. It shows that notional compensation (as against market value) becomes payable, as and when land is ‘deemed vested’ in the State Government even without resumption of or taking physical possession of surplus land. For claiming compensation or taking over of ‘physical possession’ is not the condition precedent under the Act. Section 11 (1) of the Act affirms the above position and explains the purpose of incorporation of Section 3 (2), Clauses (a) and (b) of Repeal Act. Section 3 (2) (a) of Repeal Act—qualifies that ‘surplus land’ is deemed vested under Section 10 (3) of Principal Act but possession of which has not been taken. It shows that condition precedent by taking of physical possession is not the ‘deemed vesting’ or mutation in Revenue Records. 50. Mere ‘mutation’ of entry in favour of State/other persons in revenue records, is irrelevant/inconsequential so far as the applicability of Section 3 of Repeal Act is concerned. 51. Similar conclusion is irresistible if we read Section 4 of the Repeal Act that again talks of possession of which has been taken over by the State. Answer to the question ‘when possession is taken over can be found out from the entries made in due course—at relevant time in ULC Forms I, II and III. 54. It is clear that mere vesting of ‘land declared surplus’ under the Act, without resuming ‘de facto possession’, is of no consequence and the landholder shall be entitled to the benefit of Repeal Act. 55. There is no even an iota of material to show that steps were taken by the petitioners to take physical/de facto possession of the surplus land on spot. 58. Firstly, an illegal act is not recognized in law and has to be ignored unless specifically required under statute to be reckoned with. Secondly, possession of surplus land, on notice given under Section 10(5) of the Act is to be surrendered by the landowner voluntarily in pursuance to said notice. 58. Firstly, an illegal act is not recognized in law and has to be ignored unless specifically required under statute to be reckoned with. Secondly, possession of surplus land, on notice given under Section 10(5) of the Act is to be surrendered by the landowner voluntarily in pursuance to said notice. If the landowner does not surrender possession in pursuance to the aforesaid notice, the Act’ contemplates taking possession by force and coercing the landowner under Section 10(6) of the Act. If possession is taken in an extraordinary manner (process not recognized in law) i.e. without resorting to the provisions contemplated under Section 10(5) or Section 10(6) of the Act, then possession will be irrelevant and of no consequence so far as the applicability of the Repeal Act is concerned. The repeal Act shall have no effect on the Principal Act if possession of surplus land was not taken as contemplated in the Principal Act. Repeal Act, clearly talks possession being taken under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act. It is a statutory obligation on the Competent Authority or State to take possession as permitted in law. It is to be appreciated that in case possession is purported to be taken under Section 10(6) of the Act, still Court is required to examine whether taking of such possession’ is valid or invalidated on any of the considerations in law. If Court finds that one or more grounds exist which show that the process of possession, though claimed under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act is unlawful or vitiated in law, then such possession will have no reorganization in law and it will have to be ignored and treated as of no legal consequence. The possession envisaged under Section 3 of the Repeal Act is de facto and not de jure only. 59. we may also point out that neither in the Principal Act nor the rules framed hereunder, any mode of taking possession has been provided. In respect of one mode (referred to mode of taking possession under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894), this Court and the Apex Court have pointed out that taking of possession under the said Act cannot be symbolical or on paper only and it is taking of actual possession on the spot. In respect of one mode (referred to mode of taking possession under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894), this Court and the Apex Court have pointed out that taking of possession under the said Act cannot be symbolical or on paper only and it is taking of actual possession on the spot. In the case of Balwant Narain Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, (1976) 1 SCC 700 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1767 ), Untwalia, J. observed : "......It is neither a possession on paper nor a “symbolical” possession as generally understood in civil law. But the question is what is the mode of taking possession. The Act is silent on the point. Unless possession is taken by the written agreement of the party concerned the mode of taking possession obviously would before the authority to go upon the land and to do some act which would indicate that the authority has taken possession of the land. It may be in the form of a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise or by hanging a written declaration on the spot that the authority has taken possession of the land. The presence of the owner or the occupant of the land to effectuate the taking of possession is not necessary. No further notice beyond that under Section 9(1) of the Act required. When possession has been taken the owner or the occupant of the land is dispossessed. Once possession has been taken the land vests in the Government.........” 62. Thus, in Balwant Narain Bhagde ( AIR 1975 SC 1767 ) (supra), possession was meant as possession on the spot’ and not symbolical’ one. 67. In the case of Pandit Madan Swaroop Shrotia v. State of U.P., (2000 All LJ 1460), the Supreme Court clearly observed that since there is nothing on record to indicate that the State had taken possession over the surplus land, the present proceedings have to be abated and are hereby abated under Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. Present case in hand is in no way stands as a different footing and aforesaid decision is fully applicable.” 9. Present case in hand is in no way stands as a different footing and aforesaid decision is fully applicable.” 9. Apart from this, the petitioners were never put to any notice nor is there anything on record to indicate that the petitioners were called upon to give any choice in respect of that part of the land which they wanted to retain as required under Section 8(3) of the Act 1976. The respondents, therefore, in our considered opinion, could not have proceeded to alter the status of possession or take over the property and put it to auction. It is evident that till the commencement of the Act 1999, the respondents had not taken actual physical possession of the land and, therefore, any consequential action resorted to by the opposite parties is a nullity. The present case is squarely covered by the decisions, referred to hereinabove, on facts as well as in law. 10. Learned Counsel appearing for the Development Authority attempted to justify the auction proceedings on the strength of the judgment dated 31.1.2003 in Writ Petition No. 20105 of 2000, S.A.K. Roy v. District Magistrate, Allahabad and others. We have carefully scanned the said judgment and find that there the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner therein had suppressed the fact that the auction had already consummated and the private parties had already been put in possession of the land in dispute. Thus, in that case, it appears that the actual physical possession had been taken which fact had not been brought to the notice of the Court as a result whereof the petition was dismissed on that ground. It is well settled that a case is an authority on what it actually decides and not what logically followed from it. In the said decision, no issue appears to have been either canvassed nor the facts of the said case were similar to the facts in the present writ petition. In the present case, as has been noted above, possession had neither been taken in the fact nor in law and which fact has been clearly established from the pleadings on record. In view of this, the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Development Authority in the case of S.A.K. Roy (supra) is not at all applicable and is squarely distinguishable. 11. In view of this, the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Development Authority in the case of S.A.K. Roy (supra) is not at all applicable and is squarely distinguishable. 11. The petitioners have been found in possession and entitled to retain the same in view of the provisions of the Repeal Act 1999. As such the respondents have no authority or competence to take possession of the land in dispute after the commencement of the Act 1999. The consequential action of putting the property to auction is also untenable in the eyes of law, hence the petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned notice is liable to be quashed. 12. The petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned auction notice dated 7th March, 2000, insofar as it relates to the petitioners’ land, namely Site Nos. 26 and 27, Pannalal Road, Allahabad as detailed at Item Nos. 38 to 41 of the said notice published in Hindi Daily Amar Ujala’ dated 7th March, 2000 is quashed and it is hereby declared that all proceedings under the Act 1976 in respect of the property in dispute stand abated. No order as to costs. ————