B. M. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) FEELING aggrieved by the impugned order dated 28th July, 2005, passed by the Principal Judge of the Family court, Gwalior in case No. 76/05, this petition has been filed for setting aside the order. Vide impugned order, the learned Judge has disposed of two applications :- 1. An application on behalf of the respondent under Section 125 (3) of Cr. P. C. for granting stay against the recovery of the maintenance allowance. This application has been allowed. ( 2 ) REJECTED another application filed on behalf of the petitioner under the same provision of Cr. P. C. requesting therein to send the respondent in jail in default of non-payment of the same maintenance allowance. 2. Shri D. N. Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that there is no provision in Cr. P. C. or even in Section 125 (3) of Cr. P. C. under which recovery of an amount of maintenance can be stayed. It is also submitted by him that for every breach, the defaulter-husband can be sent to jail as provided with Section 125 (3) of cr. P. C. However, during course of arguments, he has admitted that his application was that the respondent is to be sent to jail for non-payment of the same amount for which he has already served the jail sentence. ( 3 ) SHRI P. K. Chaturvedi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent, while drawing attention on the judgment of this Court in Gulamnabi v. Raisabi has submitted that these proceedings are of quasicivil nature and every Court has inherent powers to do just and to undo unjust. It is also submitted by him that prior to the impugned order vide order dated 17. 03. 05 similar nature of the order was passed staying the maintenance but the petitioner did not challenge that order. Hence, according to the principles of res Judicata, that order has become final against the petitioner and now, petitioner is estopped from challenging this subsequent order through this petition. ( 4 ) SHRI Gupta has submitted in reply that the order dated 17. 03. 05 automatically had become ineffective, hence he did not challenge the same in this Court. ( 5 ) ON perusal of the order dt. 17. 3. 2005, it appears that one application under section 127 (3) of Cr. ( 4 ) SHRI Gupta has submitted in reply that the order dated 17. 03. 05 automatically had become ineffective, hence he did not challenge the same in this Court. ( 5 ) ON perusal of the order dt. 17. 3. 2005, it appears that one application under section 127 (3) of Cr. P. C. was filed on behalf of the respondent, alleging therein that the petitioner has remarried on 5th June 2001. The learned counsel appeared on behalf of the petitioner had refused to receive the notice about that application. In view of that it was ordered that till disposal of that application under section 125 (3) of Cr. P. C. , no order about further recovery could be passed against the respondent particularly, in view of the fact that he has already served jail sentence with regard to the arrears. By non-impugning that order by the petitioner, the argument of the respondent that the petitioner is estopped or prohibited by the principles of res judicata from impugning the second order staying the recovery cannot be sustained. The earlier order was not a final decision of the case, it was passed through the proceedings and as argued by Shri Gupta on behalf of the petitioner, that order passed on 17th March, 2005 had automatically became ineffective, hence there was no necessity for the petitioner to challenge that order in the higher Court. Awarding maintenance is always considered for the sake of livelihood for the wife or children. Mere filing an application under section 127 (3) of Cr. P. C. impugning that order of maintenance on the ground of second marriage, ought not to be stayed. In such cases, the learned Magistrate ought to have decided the application at an early stage. In view of this, granting stay against the recovery of the maintenance allowance by the learned Magistrate appears to be an abuse of the process of the Court, which requires to be set aside. ( 6 ) ABOUT the next contention of Shri gupta that the respondent is liable to serve further sentence for the same default, if amount due is not paid/recovered. ( 6 ) ABOUT the next contention of Shri gupta that the respondent is liable to serve further sentence for the same default, if amount due is not paid/recovered. The perusal of the relevant provisions will be required which are as under :- "125 (3) if any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines any may sentence such person, for the whole, or any part of each month's (allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceedings, as the case may be) remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made: provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amounts within a period of one year from the date on which it became due: provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. ( 7 ) FOR the present, Sub Section (3) of section 125 and first proviso appended therein are relevant. On perusal of the aforementioned provisions the following status appears- "1. That the person against whom an order of maintenance is passed fails to comply the same, and 2. That the person in whose favour the order of maintenance is passed applies within a period of one year from the date it has become due and; 3. That even after issuance of warrant of levy, the amount remains unpaid. Then the person against whom the order was passed becomes liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made. Meaning thereby that during undergoing imprisonment if amount is paid, then before the period of one month, he can be released. 4. That such imprisonment cannot exceed one month for one default whether that default exceeds one month. Meaning thereby that during undergoing imprisonment if amount is paid, then before the period of one month, he can be released. 4. That such imprisonment cannot exceed one month for one default whether that default exceeds one month. Meaning thereby, if an application is filed for recovery of an amount of last 12 months and that amount or any part thereof remains unpaid as despite demand, a warrant of levying the same, shall be issued and if even thereafter full amount of 12 months or any part thereof remains unpaid, then for that default the person against whom the order was passed, becomes liable for imprisonment only for one month as mentioned hereinabove because that default of 12 months will be counted as single default as demanded for one time. It is pertinent to mention here, that it is not necessary for a person in whose favour the order was passed to wait for a period of 12 months or any other period exceeding one month. He can apply for recovery of the maintenance amount even for a period of one month and if that amount remains unpaid and as mentioned above for that period of one month the person against whom the order was passed, becomes liable to imprisonment for a period of one month and for every successive month such applications can be repeated. 5. That the person who has served such imprisonment for a particular default then in that case he will not be liable to any further imprisonment for the default of that period even that remains unpaid after serving the imprisonment. Thereafter, the person entitled for maintenance can take recourse to recover the amount only through a warrant of recovery. " ( 8 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the approach of the learned Magistrate, while disagreeing the aforementioned contention dismissing her application for the purpose does not appear erroneous. ( 9 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the petition is partly allowed. The first part of the order by which the learned Magistrate has stayed the recovery of the maintenance, is set-aside. Petition partly allowed. .