Judgment Surya Kant, J. 1. - In this petition under sec. 438 Cr. P. C. , the petitioner initially sought pre-arrest bail in the case FIR No.11 dated 12.1.2007, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC, registered at Police Station ellanabad, District Sirsa. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case which glaringly disclose the exercise of powers under Sec.156 (3) Cr. P. C. in a mechanical manner, the inherent jurisdiction under Sec.482 Cr. P. C. , has been suo motu invoked so as to quash the FIR as also the consequential proceedings arising therefrom. 2. The facts may be briefly noticed. 3. A complaint dated 3.1.2007 was instituted under Sec.156 (3) Cr. P. C. , inter alia, alleging that the petitioner had approached the complainant and his brothers to purchase the petitioners agricultural land measuring 19 kanal 8 marlas situated within the revenue estate of Village kunthla; the complainant and his brothers agreed to purchase the said land @ Rs.36,000 per acre, therefore, an agreement to sell was executed between the parties on 10.10.1990; the petitioner, firstly, received rs.22,000 as earnest money and thereafter balance sale consideration of Rs.65,300 was also received by him on 12.12.1990; the sale-deed was to be executed on 17.12.1990; the petitioner, however, did not execute the sale-deed in favour of the complainant and his brothers and put off the matter on one pretext or the other; the petitioner, however, became greedy and has now sold the said land to Smt. Shanti Devi, w/o Inder Singh, and has executed a sale-deed in her favour and that since the subject land has been sold by the petitioner and purchased by Smt. Shanti Devi knowing fully well that the complainant and his brothers had already purchased the same, both of them were guilty of committing offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 506 IPC. 4. The learned Judicial Magistrate invoked his powers under sub-section (3) of sec. 156 and ordered investigation into the above quoted complaint. 5. 4. The learned Judicial Magistrate invoked his powers under sub-section (3) of sec. 156 and ordered investigation into the above quoted complaint. 5. The police, accordingly swung into action and registered the FIR in question on 12.1.2007 and made a move to arrest the petitioner, forcing him to rush to the learned additional Sessions Judge at Sirsa for grant of anticipatory bail which was, however, declined to him vide order dated 8.2.2007 after observing that since, as per the allegations, the petitioner had executed the sale-deed in favour of Smt. Shanti Devi despite receiving full sale consideration from the complainant and his brother, "it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail. " 6. At the time of preliminary hearing, this court took notice of the fact that even as per the allegations contained in the FIR, the alleged agreement to sell was executed on 10.10.1990 and in terms thereof the saledeed was to be executed on 17.12.1990. However, no civil suit for specific performance was ever filed by the complainant nor did he take any other legal action for return of the alleged earnest/advance money paid by him to the petitioner in the year 1990. Even a legal notice was never ever served by him upon the petitioner. He, however, suddenly approached the learned Judicial Magistrate under Sec.156 (3) Cr. P. C. after a period of more than 16 years and got the FIR registered. Show cause notice was accordingly issued to the complainant to explain as to how criminal proceedings could be initiated against the petitioner at this belated stage. The complainant was also called upon to explain as to why the FIR in question which prima facie, was an abuse of process of court, be not struck down at the threshold. 7. On a specific query by the Court, learned counsel for the complainant could not refute the fact that after the expiry of the date of execution of the sale-deed dated 17.12.1990, no legal action was ever taken by the complainant against the petitioner till the complaint dated 3.1.2007 was filed under Sec.156 (3) Cr. 7. On a specific query by the Court, learned counsel for the complainant could not refute the fact that after the expiry of the date of execution of the sale-deed dated 17.12.1990, no legal action was ever taken by the complainant against the petitioner till the complaint dated 3.1.2007 was filed under Sec.156 (3) Cr. P. C. On the asking of the Court, learned State counsel, on the basis of the instructions from the Investigating officer who is present in Court, fairly states that except for the allegations contained in the complaint, no other incriminating material has so far been found collected against the petitioner during the course of investigation. 8. The undisputed facts, thus, unravel that even when the complainants civil suit for specific performance or for recovery of the alleged earnest money paid by him or to claim damages etc. is hopelessly time barred, more so when he never came into possession of the subject land, he has succeeded in entangling the petitioner in a criminal case. What are the parameters to be kept in view before exercising powers under Sec.156 (3) Cr. P. C. by a Judicial magistrate-is one of the core issue of which requires consideration in these proceedings. 9. Section 156 (1) Cr. P. C. provides that a cognizable case can be investigated by the officer-in-charge of a police station even without the order of a Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the limits of such police station falls and who has power to enquire or try such case. 10. Sub-section (3) of Sec.156 Cr. P. C. further provides that "any Magistrate empowered under Sec.190 may order such an investigation" "as above mentioned". In other words, a Magistrate is empowered to order investigation in any cogniscible case in relation to which he has jurisdiction to try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Further, the allegations must disclose commission of a "cognizable offence" which is a pre-requisite to enable the Magistrate to order an investigation in relation thereto. It necessarily means that the investigation of an alleged cognisable offence cannot be ordered mechanically. While the learned magistrate is not expected to deliver a "judgment" at this stage, at the same time he cannot demean the judicial process by acting as a postal authority to deliver every complaint at the door of the Police Station concerned. 11. It necessarily means that the investigation of an alleged cognisable offence cannot be ordered mechanically. While the learned magistrate is not expected to deliver a "judgment" at this stage, at the same time he cannot demean the judicial process by acting as a postal authority to deliver every complaint at the door of the Police Station concerned. 11. Now-a-days, when frivolous litigation is a bane to judiciary, there is a need to be over-cautious of the fact that disgruntled elements carrying oblique motives and who fail to persuade the police to entertain their false or frivolous complaints, approach the learned Judicial Magistrates to secure directions under Sec.156 (3) Cr. P. C. in order to make the police to register the case and arrest their opponents. These powers are invariably misused to settle civil disputes as well. Unfortunately, if the directions are also issued without going into the contents of the complaint or formation of a tentative opinion as to whether or not such complaint discloses the "cause of action" or commission of a cognizable offence, it would lead to harassment of innocent persons and increase in court dockets, thereby defeating the very cause of administration of criminal justice system. 12. The facts of the case in hand speak in volumes. If the learned Judicial Magistrate had taken a little care to note that even according to the complainant the alleged "agreement to sell" was entered into between the parties more than 16 years back and the last date to execute the sale-deed had also expired in December, 1990; that the complainant had suddenly come out of his shell to launch a punitive action against the petitioner and his co-accused; that taking cognizance of such a complaint was expressly barred under Sec.468 Cr. P. C. and that the doors of civil as well as criminal courts already stood closed for the complainant as both the actions were hopelessly time-barred and no cause of action, had accrued or revived, no direction in purported exercise of powers under sub-section (3) of sec. 156 Cr. P. C. could be issued. 13. The learned Judicial Magistrate was, thus, obligated to apply his mind in order to form an opinion as to whether or not on the plain reading of the allegations, a cognizable offence was made out and if so, whether it required investigation by the police or not. 14. 156 Cr. P. C. could be issued. 13. The learned Judicial Magistrate was, thus, obligated to apply his mind in order to form an opinion as to whether or not on the plain reading of the allegations, a cognizable offence was made out and if so, whether it required investigation by the police or not. 14. As regards to the suo motu exercise of powers under Sec.482 Cr. P. C. suffice to say that these powers are exceptional in nature and can be sparingly invoked: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii)to prevent abuse of the process of court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice etc. No inflexible rules can be laid down to govern the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction as the same would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. 15. In R. P. Kapur V/s. State of Punjab the apex Court held that where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuation of criminal proceedings or where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to invoke powers under Sec.482 Cr. P. C. and to quash the criminal proceedings. 16. In State of Haryana V/s. Bhajan Lal and others the Hon ble Supreme Court explained the scope of exercise of power under sec. 482 Cr. P. C. in order to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It was reiterated that where the allegations m the FIR and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence justifying investigation by police officers under Sec.156 (1) Cr. P. C. and when the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or the complaint as well as the evidence, if any, collected by the investigation agency in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence, such criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed in exercise of powers under Sec.482 Cr. P. C. The above noticed principles were reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka V/s. M. Devendrappa. 17. In somewhat similar circumstances, in the case of Zandu Pharmaceutical Works ltd. and others V/s. Mohd. P. C. The above noticed principles were reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka V/s. M. Devendrappa. 17. In somewhat similar circumstances, in the case of Zandu Pharmaceutical Works ltd. and others V/s. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and another4 where cognizance of a criminal complaint was taken by the learned Judicial magistrate overlooking the fact that the same was expressly barred under sec. 468 Cr. P. C. , the Apex Court quashed the said complaint as well as the order of summoning passed therein. 18. In the light of the above noticed undisputed facts and the principles of law, I am satisfied that continuation of the impugned criminal proceedings shall amount to the abuse of process of the court and would encourage frivolity in litigation. The manner in which the respondent-complainant has taken the petitioner to an un-holy task, making him to run here-and-there to save his liberty, also requires to be seriously viewed. 19. Consequently, this petition is allowed; the impugned FIR No.11 dated 12.1.2007, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC, registered at Police Station Ellenabad, district Sirsa and the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed. The prayer made by the petitioner to grant him pre-arrest bail, obviously, is rendered instructions. 20. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has been forced to incur totally avoidable expenses as a result of false accusation, the respondent-complainant is also burdened with costs of Rs.25,000 which he is directed to pay to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order failing which the SHO, P. S. Ellenabad is directed to take appropriate legal action against the respondent-complainant. The compliance report be placed on record. Petition allowed.