Judgment : Dharma Rao Elipe, J. 1. Aggrieved by the orders dated 111. 1998 passed by the Tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal (in short the Tribunal) dismissing the Original Applications, O.A. Nos.1441 and 3058 of 1993, the original applicant has filed the above Writ Petitions. .2. The petitioners case, in brief, is that while he was working as Deputy Registrar at Tuticorin during 1985-86, one Thangavelu joined as Joint Registrar, that dispute arose between him and the said Thangavelu in the matter of use of the official jeep and maintenance of the records therefor, that to avoid the situation, the petitioner failed to repair the jeep when it developed a trouble and on account of the said Thangavelu, Joint Registrar had framed four charges against him vide Charge Memo in Na.Ka. No.4064/87/A2 dated 27/22-2-1987 under Rule 17(a) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules) involving minor penalty procedure, that later on the Joint Registrar altered the said charges from Rule 17(a) to Rule 17(b) involving major penalty procedure and issued a Charge Memo dated 13. 1987, that he was placed under suspension by order dated 23. 1987, when he was due to retire on 33. 1987, that on the report submitted by the Joint Registrar, Tuticorin, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies framed two charges, alleging (i) misappropriation of Rs.1000/- from the funds of Arumuganeri Agricultural Cooperative Bank and (ii) misappropriation of Rs.1000/- from the funds of Thenthirupathi Agricultural Co-operative Bank, that in the enquiry held in respect of the said charges, he was warned and censured respectively that on the basis of the report submitted by Thangavelu, Joint Registrar, Disciplinary Proceedings were initiated against him on the tile of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings of Madurai Region at Madras and the Tribunal submitted a report to the Government stating that the charges have been held proved, that a second show cause notice was issued to him calling upon his explanation against the proposed penalty of dismissal from service, that he submitted a representation on 6. 1991, that the Government, after obtaining the views of the Public Service Commission, passed the order dated 21. 1993 dismissing him from service. 3. The order dated 21. 1993 passed by the first respondent dismissing the petitioner from service was the subject matter of challenge in O.A. No.1441 of 1993 filed by the petitioner. 1991, that the Government, after obtaining the views of the Public Service Commission, passed the order dated 21. 1993 dismissing him from service. 3. The order dated 21. 1993 passed by the first respondent dismissing the petitioner from service was the subject matter of challenge in O.A. No.1441 of 1993 filed by the petitioner. The petitioner had also filed another Application, O.A. No.3058 of 1993 before the Tribunal. Challenging the charge memos dated 22. 1987 and 13. 1987 issued by the Joint Registrar, Tuticorin and also the Charge Memo dated 5. 1991 issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. 4. In so far as the petitioners challenge to the order of dismissal was concerned, the Tribunal, after considering the dismissal order passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, held that a Government servant can be punished only on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry and that when a witness was declared hostile and cross-examined with the permission of the Court, his evidence remains admissible and that there was no legal bar to have a conviction upon his testimony if the same has been corroborated by other reliable evidence. The Tribunal also held that there was no procedural infirmity in the enquiry proceedings and that it was not open to the Tribunal to re-appreciate the evidence and came to its own conclusion. In the other Application, where the challenge was to the Charge Memo dated 22. 1987, 13. 1987 and 5. 1991, the Tribunal found that no ground was made out for quashing the charge memos and that inasmuch as the order of dismissal was upheld in the connected original Application, this Application was also dismissed by the Tribunal. .5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was due for retirement on 33. 1987 and the third respondent, with whom the petitioner had a friction in the matter of use and maintenance of the official jeep, with a view to wreak vengeance against him started levelling series of charges against the petitioner. The third respondent first issued a charge memo dated 22. 1987 under Rule 17(a) of the Rules (minor penalty procedure) and on receipt of the petitioners explanation, he issued an amended Charge Memo dated 13. 1987 involving major penalty procedure. This itself would show the attempt of the third respondent in not allowing the petitioner to retire peacefully. The third respondent first issued a charge memo dated 22. 1987 under Rule 17(a) of the Rules (minor penalty procedure) and on receipt of the petitioners explanation, he issued an amended Charge Memo dated 13. 1987 involving major penalty procedure. This itself would show the attempt of the third respondent in not allowing the petitioner to retire peacefully. The petitioner has maintained unblemished service record and earned appreciation from the predecessors of the third respondent and the trouble came to the petitioner in the form of dispute with the third respondent in the matter of use of the official jeep. The third respondent had created evidence against the petitioner and submitted a report which was accepted by the first respondent resulting in dismissal of the petitioner from service at the fag end of his service career. The Supreme Court, by catena of several decisions, has deprecated in strong expressions the practice of placing an employee under suspension at the fag end of his service career and initiating Disciplinary Proceedings for the alleged misconduct committed long back. The Tribunal has failed to appreciate this basic aspect of the case in proper perspective. .6. Learned Counsel further submitted that insofar as the alleged illegal gratification received by the petitioner from one Parthasarathy, who was examined as PW-19 in the enquiry, for revoking his suspension, the Disciplinary Authority had failed to appreciate the contradictory statements given by PW-19 before the Investigating Officer and before the enquiring officer. When before the Enquiry Officer, PW-19 retracted his earlier statement made before the third respondent and deposed that the statement given by him before the third respondent was as per the dictation of the third respondent himself on the promise made by the third respondent that he would reinstate him in service if he could give a statement as per his dictation, he was treated as hostile witness and was cross-examined by the prosecution. The Disciplinary Authority erred in accepting the contradictory evidence of PW-19 and the explanation offer by the prosecution for his retraction and coming to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the charge. The Disciplinary Authority erred in accepting the contradictory evidence of PW-19 and the explanation offer by the prosecution for his retraction and coming to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the charge. The Tribunal failed to note that the Disciplinary Authority has not considered the evidence of PW-19 and erred in accepting the same by observing that there is no legal bar to have a conviction upon the testimony of a hostile witness, if the same is corroborated by other reliable evidence. In this case, the contradictory evidence of PW-19. who was declared hostile, was not case against the petitioner is a case of no evidence. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal, confirming the dismissal of the petitioner from service, is unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside. In support of the above contention, learned counsel relied on the Supreme Courts decision in Central Bank of India v. Shri Prakash Chand Jain, 1969 (1) SCR 735 . 7. In so far as the challenge to the Charge Memos, learned counsel submitted that in respect of the two charges framed by the second respondent on the basis of the report submitted by the third respondent relating to misappropriation of funds, after the conduct of the enquiry, the first respondent by its order dated 7. 1992 disposed of the said charges with a warning and censure respectively to the petitioner. 8. Learned counsel also submitted that in respect of the Charge Memo dated 22. 1987, the oral enquiry was over on 8. 1987, but no orders were passed thereon and the matter is being kept pending and in view of the inordinate delay in passing the order on the said charges, the same is liable to be quashed. The Charge Memo dated 13. 1987 (major penalty procedure) is also liable to be quashed on the ground that the third respondent was not competent to issue a Charge Memo involving major penalty procedure inasmuch as much a charge memo under the Rules could be issued only by the appointing authority, viz., Registrar of Co-operative Societies. 9. Learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents 1 to 3 submitted that there was no element of mala fide or victimisation as alleged by the petitioner in passing the dismissal order against him. The third respondent framed the charge only after verification of the facts and records. 9. Learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents 1 to 3 submitted that there was no element of mala fide or victimisation as alleged by the petitioner in passing the dismissal order against him. The third respondent framed the charge only after verification of the facts and records. Based on the findings of the competent authority through a detailed enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority came to the conclusion that the charge of illegal gratification against the petitioner was held proved through the evidence adduced in the enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority passed the dismissal order only after obtaining the views of the Public Service Commission. The date of birth of the petitioner as per the service record is 13. 1929 and therefore his date of superannuation was 33. 1987 and before that date, pending enquiry into grave charges against him, he was placed under suspension. The suspension order issued by the Government and his continuance of services after the date of his superannuation and the subsequent dismissal order issued by the Government were well within the Rules applicable to the Government servants. .10. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Government Pleader. Perused the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal. First we will deal with the dismissal order passed against the petitioner on the basis of the charge framed against him that he received illegal gratification from one Parthasarathy for passing an order revoking his suspension and reinstatement. The crux of the alleged charge was that the petitioner, by handing over the jewel loan card related to the loan availed by him to Parthasarathy (under suspension), had asked him to clear off the jewel loan with a promise to reinstate him and accordingly Parthasarathy remitted the amount of Rs.2789.70 towards the jewel loan and on the next day the petitioner passed an order directing the Special Officer to reinstate Parthasarathy in service and thereby the petitioner abused his official position and authority, had derived the pecuniary advantage to the tune of Rs.2789.70 other than legal remuneration and failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and violated Rule 20 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules. 11. 11. In so far as the evidence of Parthasarathy is concerned, it is seen that when he was examined as PW-19, he has categorically stated that it was only at the instance of the third respondent that he gave a statement against the petitioner. Further, in the enquiry proceedings he turned hostile and therefore, whatever evidence he has tendered in the enquiry proceeding is inadmissible, but can only be considered. The Tribunal, however, has wholly relied on the evidence of PW-19 while confirming the impugned order passed by the third respondent, which is contrary to law. Therefore, we are of the view that the finding of the Tribunal to that extent is illegal and perverse and the same is liable to be set aside. 12. As seen from the facts and circumstances of the case, though initially the charges were framed under Rule 17(a) of the Rules, but later on the charges were altered to the one under Rule 17 (b) and this was done without following the procedure as contemplated in the Rules, without conducting any further enquiry and without giving any opportunity to the petitioner. Further, the third respondent is not the competent authority to issue the charge memo under Rule 17(b) of the Rules as he was not the appointing authority of the petitioner and even on this ground also the order of punishment is liable to be set aside. .13. Further, there was inordinate delay in passing the order of punishment. Though the enquiry was initiated as early as on 8. 1987, the passing of the order of punishment was kept pending for about five years and finally the punishment was imposed on 21. 1993. There is no explanation for such an inordinate delay in passing the final order. Time and again, the Supreme Court and this Court has deprecated the initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings against an employee or the fag end of his retirement and keeping the matter pending for a long time by keeping the matter pending for a long time by keeping the employee under suspension. Further when the petitioner had pleaded that there was official prejudice and enmity between him and the third respondent in the matter of use and maintenance of the official vehicle, the Tribunal has failed to consider this aspect of the case in proper perspective while dismissing the Original Applications. Further when the petitioner had pleaded that there was official prejudice and enmity between him and the third respondent in the matter of use and maintenance of the official vehicle, the Tribunal has failed to consider this aspect of the case in proper perspective while dismissing the Original Applications. The Disciplinary Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner when there was hardly fifteen days left for his retirement. More over, when his date of retirement is on 13. 1987 and the order of suspension was passed on 23. 1987 by invoking G.O. No.173. Therefore, when once the petitioner has reached the age of superannuation on 13. 1987, the placing the petitioner under suspension after his date of superannuation is without authority and that when the relationship of master-servant ceased to exist, no Disciplinary Proceedings could be initiated against the petitioner. On this ground also, the impugned order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the Tribunal has committed an error in upholding the order dated 21. 1993 passed by the first respondent. The Tribunal has committed an illegality in dismissing the Original Applications filed by the petitioners. The impugned orders passed by the Tribunal are, therefore, liable to be set aside. 15. The impugned orders passed by the Tribunal are set aside and consequently, the Writ Petitions are allowed. No costs.