Judgment 1. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. This writ application has had a chequered history and the matter has come back before this Court on remand vide order dated 29.11.2006. This order came to be passed in L.P.A. No. 1463 of 1997. After dealing with the appeal the Court after discussing the various issues raised before it came to hold as under: "2. It is settled law that when a right to appeal has been granted by a Statute, the appeal, as preferred in exercise of such right, becomes an extension of the original adjudication proceeding and accordingly facts of the case and the law applicable thereto can be considered de novo in the appeal. The power of the writ court under Article 226 is limited and that is restricted to judicial review. Having regard to the fact that the appellate authority approved the order imposing penalty before imposition thereof and thereby purported to deny the right to appeal vested in the petitioner by the said regulations and also having regard to the fact that Clause 25 of the said Regulations bars an appeal against an appellate order passed by the Board of Directors, it would be appropriate on our part to make available to the writ petitioner a forum of appeal and in such circumstances while setting aside the order impugned in this appeal we remand back the matter to the writ Court with a request to it to exercise all powers as that of the writ Court as well as of the appellate Court to ascertain whether there has been any miscarriage of justice in imposing the penalty of dismissal in the facts and circumstances of the case." 3. The petitioner was discharged from service by the respondent Ware Housing Corporation on an order issued by the Managing Director, which is dated 10.6.1983. This order is Annexure-5 to the writ application. The appeal of the petitioner against the said order remained pending for consideration and disposal for more than a decade. It was only when the High Court passed an order dated 28.11.1995 directing the respondents to dispose off the appeal that the decision contained in Annexure-14 dated 28.10.1996 came to be passed. The order passed in the appeal states that the appeal of the appellant is totally misconceived as the order of dismissal has been passed by the Board of Directors against which no appeal lies. The order passed in the appeal states that the appeal of the appellant is totally misconceived as the order of dismissal has been passed by the Board of Directors against which no appeal lies. Moreover, the order of dismissal has been affirmed by the Hon ble High Court on merit, therefore, I do not see any substance in the appeal of the appellant and the same is accordingly rejected. This order passed in appeal, according to the petitioner is a cryptic and illegal order showing total non-application of mind on the issue. 4. The petitioner was appointed as Accounts Officer in the Corporation on 27.4.1976. By virtue of his office he was treated to be a Class-I employee and, therefore, he was entitled to travel by first class in railway while on official duty. During course of his official duty he was asked to visit Purnea and Naugacchia. The petitioner undertook this journey but it seems that the journey was undertaken by him through road and after completion of the tour in terms of his entitlement instead of submitting a TA. bill by road, as per his entitlement submitted a bill equivalent to the first class railway fare for the journey in question to redeem the expenses in the journey. This according to the petitioner was done because as per the entitlement the maximum he could have get was a first class fare of railways, therefore, he submitted his claim accordingly. This submission of TA. bill was taken objection to and a departmental enquiry was initiated for raising a wrong TA. bill. 5. The petitioner was charge-sheeted by order dated 8.4.1980, which is Annexure-3 to the writ application. Enquiry was held, petitioner participated and denied the charges on the ground that there was no motive or malafide on his part while submitting this TA. bill because it was in terms of the entitlement and he did accept that since he undertook the journey by car, therefore, instead of submitting a bill for road travel he had submitted a bill equivalent to first class railway fare, which was in any way less than the actual cost involved in the travel. However based on the enquiry report the petitioner was imposed punishment of discharge. This punishment order is dated 10.6.1983 and is Annexure-5 to the writ application. However based on the enquiry report the petitioner was imposed punishment of discharge. This punishment order is dated 10.6.1983 and is Annexure-5 to the writ application. The appeal against the said order before the Chairman was kept pending for years together but only on the intervention of the High Court later that the order came to be passed in appeal. This order is at Annexure-14 and is also one of the impugned orders. 6. Bihar State Ware Housing Corporation is a statutory body and has been established under Sec. 43(2)(a) of the Ware Housing Corporation Act of 1962. The Corporation has formulated its own staff regulation and the service conditions including one for recruitment, appointment, promotion and disciplinary issues. 7. The challenge of the petitioner to the order of punishment imposed as contained in Annexure-5 as well as the order passed in appeal, which is Annexure-14 are many fold. Some of these submissions are that the petitioner was not provided with the enquiry report nor was any show-cause issued to him before imposition of punishment of discharge. He also challenges the order of discharge as being unnecessarily harsh and excessive, therefore, being disproportionate to the charge it deserves to be interfered with by this Court. He further submits that in terms of the Regulation of the Corporation as contained in Clause 21 (2) itself, the power to impose penalty upon him was vested in the Executive Committee as he was a Class I Officer. In case of Class-ll and III employees this power is vested in the Managing Director. But despite the above provision in the regulation the Managing Director passed the order of punishment against the petitioner. The respondents stand is that order in question was passed on a decision supposedly taken by the Board of Directors. The decision of punishment if it was taken by the Board of Directors has created its own anomalous situation. Any decision of the Executive Committee was subject to appeal before the Board of Directors, but since the Board of Directors itself mistakenly took a decision to impose the punishment upon the petitioner, the petitioner was denied his substantive statutory right of appeal. This fact is not in dispute and has been accepted both by the petitioner as well as the respondents. 8. In fact order dated 29.11.2006 of the L.P.A. Bench confirms the above position. This fact is not in dispute and has been accepted both by the petitioner as well as the respondents. 8. In fact order dated 29.11.2006 of the L.P.A. Bench confirms the above position. It was in this background that the Division Bench in its wisdom set aside the order passed by the Single Judge and remanded the matter for fresh consideration by the Court for adjudication and also to act as if this Court was the forum for appeal for the petitioner. 9. On behalf of the respondents it is stated that the petitioner had initially moved this High Court in the year 1983 but that writ was dismissed and he did not get any relief. Thereafter subsequently another writ application was filed on the ground that the earlier order of the Court was a non-speaking one, High Court entertained the writ application of the petitioner but in its wisdom refused to grant any relief to the petitioner. The learned Single Judge did not find any infirmity in the decision of the Corporation since it held that the Board of Directors itself had taken this decision, therefore, nothing more was needed to be done in this case. The matter should have been allowed to rest after this. 10. The contention of the respondents is misplaced because the second writ application of the petitioner was entertained. The Court after consideration dismissed the case on a limited or to some extent misplaced ground holding that since the decision of dismissal was of the Board of Directors, therefore, nothing more required to be done despite statutory/right of appeal being negated. However, this order has been interfered with and the Division Bench held the decision to be erroneous. This Court surely has to ascertain in terms of the direction of the Division Bench whether there has been any miscarriage of justice while imposing the penalty of dismissal in the facts and circumstances of the case. In other words the order of punishment has to be tested by the Single Judge on its own merits afresh irrespective of the kind of orders which may have come to be passed in this case earlier. 11. Two things on the face of the pleadings of the parties emerge. One that the claim of the petitioner of the T.A. bill of Rs. 486.23 P. was presented to the Corporation but never passed or paid. 11. Two things on the face of the pleadings of the parties emerge. One that the claim of the petitioner of the T.A. bill of Rs. 486.23 P. was presented to the Corporation but never passed or paid. It is not the case of the Corporation that any objection was raised and communicated to the petitioner in this regard too. Nor is it the case of the Corporation that the claim of the petitioner for the above payment was initially accepted and paid and only then did they realise that a wrong claim has been made on his behalf. The Corporation was within its powers to reject the T.A. bill of the petitioner, not pay him a penny, if it felt that the above demand or claim of the petitioner was not in terms of the Rules. However, the way the Managing Director has responded and reacted on the issue seems to be a very harsh and impulsive action on his behalf. One thing which has to be kept in mind while imposing punishment on any employee is the proportionality between the delinquency and the corresponding punishment which has to be imposed upon the said delinquent. If the charges are not grave and the punishment of discharge was imposed for the same then this Court will have to examine whether the conduct of the petitioner was such that no lesser punishment other than discharge would have satisfied the need of the hour. Presentation of a T.A. bill of Rs. 486.23 P. which was not even paid by the Corporation cannot be considered to be such a conduct of the petitioner which required imposition of order of discharge when it is not disputed that the petitioner had undertaken the journey in question. Keeping in mind that the petitioner had joined service of the Corporation in the year 1976 and had rendered just about 7-8 years of service, the petitioner could have been let off with strong warning, censure or similar punishment but to take away his very livelihood on the ground that he had presented an irregular T.A. bill of Rs. 486.23 P., in the opinion of this court is positively excessive and disproportionate to the charge. 12. 486.23 P., in the opinion of this court is positively excessive and disproportionate to the charge. 12. The second aspect of the matter which this Court surely would like to observe is that the authorities in question had not followed its own regulations and rules with regard to imposition of punishment upon the petitioner. In terms of regulation 21, the power to impose punishment on Class-I employee vested in the Executive Committee but this power was exercised by the Board of Directors, which was the appellate authority in case of the petitioner and this decision of the Board of Directors probably at the behest of the Managing Director denied the petitioner a valuable right of appeal which was available to him under the Statute. The respondent Corporation not only took away the right of appeal of the petitioner but also sat over the appeal for more than a decade and by doing so delayed a decision in the matter which required utmost priority. Ultimately the decision in the appeal after all had a direct bearing on the issue of whether the petitioner would be entitled to continue in the service of the Corporation by an early adjudication on the legality or otherwise of the order of discharge. 13. The petitioner was dismissed in the year 1983 and if he had continued in service he would have superannuated on 6.3.2001. In other words, even if the Court interferes with the order of punishment the petitioner cannot be put back in service. The question now arise is as to what ought to be the punishment or the relief which the petitioner can be granted in this case since the Court prima facie finds the order of discharge to be illegal. 14. In this regard the petitioner has brought to my notice a decision rendered by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi V/s. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 484. The petitioner contends that in terms of this decision it is not only open to the High Court to interfere in the order of punishment on the ground that the same is disproportionate but to shorten the litigation the High Court has requisite authority to impose proper punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. The petitioner contends that in terms of this decision it is not only open to the High Court to interfere in the order of punishment on the ground that the same is disproportionate but to shorten the litigation the High Court has requisite authority to impose proper punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. The Hon ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could also pass orders to render complete justice to the parties and it is misconceived that because of Article 142 this power was available only to the Supreme Court. Paragraph 23 of the decision in this regard is being relied and quoted hereinafter: "23. It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the High Courts, can be no ground to think that they have not to do complete justice, and if moulding of relief would do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot be ordered. Absence of provisions like Article 142 is not material, according to me. This may be illustrated by pointing out that despite there being no provision in the Constitution parallel to Article 137 conferring power of review on the High Court, this Court held as early as 1961 in Shivdeo Singhs case, AIR 1963 SC 1909 , that the High Courts too can exercise power of review, which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction. I would say that power to do complete justice also inheres in every court, not to speak of a court of plenary jurisdiction like of High Court. Of course, this power is not as wide which this Court has under Article 142. That, however, is a different matter." 15. With regard to punishments and disproportionality of it, the finding of the Supreme Court in paragraph 24 is equally important and is, therefore, reproduced below: "24. What has been stated above may be buttressed by putting the matter a little differently. The same is that in a case of dismissal, Article 21 gets attracted. With regard to punishments and disproportionality of it, the finding of the Supreme Court in paragraph 24 is equally important and is, therefore, reproduced below: "24. What has been stated above may be buttressed by putting the matter a little differently. The same is that in a case of dismissal, Article 21 gets attracted. And, in view of the interdependence of fundamental rights, which concept was first accepted in the case commonly known as Bank Nationalisation case, (1970)3 SCR 530 : ( AIR 1970 SC 564 ) which thinking was extended to cases attracting Article 21 in Maneka Gandhi V/s. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 , the punishment/penalty awarded has to be reasonable; and if it be unreasonable, Article 14 would be violated. That Article 14 gets attracted in a case of disproportionate punishment was the view of the Court in Bhagat Ram V/s. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 442 : ( AIR 1983 SC 454 ) also. Now if Article 14 were to be violated, It cannot be doubted that a High Court can take care of the same by substituting, in appropriate cases, a punishment deemed reasonable by it." 16. That being the settled legal position this Court is of the opinion that the order of punishment passed against the petitioner contained in Annexure-5 as well as the order passed in appeal which is Annexure-14 deserves to be interfered with and the same are quashed. Since the petitioner has already superannuated in the year 2001 in terms of his age at the time of joining service he cannot be ordered to be reinstated in service. But looking at the fact that the action of the respondent corporation has been held to be not only illegal but in violation of the settled principles of law, this Court is of the opinion that since the petitioner has reached 58 years on 6.3.2001 he cannot be reinstated in service. Further since he has not worked since 1983 direction for payment of salary too cannot be granted to him but by virtue of the order of dismissal being set aside the petitioner would be deemed to have continued in service and would be deemed to have retired. The respondent Corporation is directed to consider this period of dismissal from 1983 till his date of retirement to be in service and would be entitled to retiral benefits. The respondent Corporation is directed to consider this period of dismissal from 1983 till his date of retirement to be in service and would be entitled to retiral benefits. They shall work out his retiral dues by virtue of this order as if he was never discharged from service. This Court further directs that a cost of Rs. 10,000.00 be awarded as compensation against the respondents to be paid to the petitioner. It is a token sum keeping in consideration that the petitioner has lost his entire life and livelihood because of an arbitrary and illegal decision taken against him by the Corporation. The above exercise should be carried out within three months and petitioner shall be paid his dues within the same time. 17. This writ application accordingly stands allowed with the above directions.