JUDGMENT Hon'ble Rajesh Tandon, J. Heard Shri Sudhanshu Dhulia, Sr. Advocate assisted by Shri Vipul Sharma, counsel for the appellant and Shri Alok Singh, Sr. Advocate assisted by Shri Dharmendra Barthwal counsel for the respondent. 2. By the present second appeal filed under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant has prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 7.10.2004 passed in Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2003 passed by the Additional District Judge/FTC-V, Dehradun. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE 3. Briefly stated, a suit was filed by the plaintiff before the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Dehradun for a decree for declaration and permanent injunction. The suit was decreed. Against the said decree the defendant preferred the appeal. The appeal was dismissed by the appellate court. Hence, the present second appeal has been filed. The second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law :- "1. Whether the relief claimed by the plaintiff was barred by Section 37 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973? If so, have the courts below erred in law in decreeing the suit? 2. Whether the provision relating to deemed sanction of the Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority has wrongly been interpreted by the courts below ? 3. Whether the plaint of the plaintiff was liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure?" PLAINT AVERMENTS 4. According to the plaint averments, the plaintiff had submitted a plan alongwith the documents required to the Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority for raising constructions at plot no. 973/4/113 (Old No. 568/1) at Rajpur Road, Dehradun. A sum of Rs. 45/- towards fee for submission of plan on 11.1.2002 was also deposited. Thereafter, the plaintiff visited the office of Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'the Authority') several times and on enquiring about the plan submitted by him, he was always replied that his matter was being looked into by the Authority. The plaintiff did not get any response from the Authority and he sent a registered notice to the Authority on 23.7.2000 under the bye-law no. 2.17 which is at par with the bye-law no. The plaintiff did not get any response from the Authority and he sent a registered notice to the Authority on 23.7.2000 under the bye-law no. 2.17 which is at par with the bye-law no. 3.20 of the Authority stating therein that in case no decision is communicated to the plaintiff within a period of 20 days from the receipt of the said notice, the plaintiff will commence and carry out the proposed development/construction work in accordance with the plan submitted by him. The said notice was duly served upon the Authority on 3.8.2000 but the Authority has not communicated any decision to the plaintiff and, as such, the plaintiff had the right to commence and carry out the proposed construction work. Further, it has been stated that the plaintiff started digging the foundation but the employees of the Authority came to the spot and stopped further working inspite of any right or jurisdiction to interfere in the construction of building as per the plan submitted by the plaintiff to the defendant Authority. The plaintiff has sustained heavy losses because the plan was submitted on 11.1.2000 and more than one year has elapsed and during this period the prices of building material have gone up and the plaintiff has also deprived of from completing construction work and utilizing the property as well. The plaintiff has prayed for the following reliefs :- "(a) A decree for declaration declaring that the plan submitted to defendant on 11.1.2000 for construction of building at property bearing Old No. 568/1, New No. 973/4/113 Rajpur Road, Dehradun which is Annexure of the plaint is deemed to have been sanctioned in view of Bye-law no. 2.17 of the Bye Laws framed by the defendant under U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. (b) A decree for Permanent Injunction restraining the defendant not to interfere in the Construction of the Building by other plaintiff at Old No. 568/1, New No. 973/4/113, Rajpur Road, Dehradun as per plan submitted to the defendant. (c) Full cost of the suit be awarded. (d) Any other relief to which plaintiff is found entitled may kindly be granted." WRITTEN STATEMENT 5. (c) Full cost of the suit be awarded. (d) Any other relief to which plaintiff is found entitled may kindly be granted." WRITTEN STATEMENT 5. A written statement has been filed on behalf of the Authority submitting inter alia that the plaintiff had not submitted the application form as approved by the Authority under Sub-section 1 of Section 15 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and the plaintiff had deposited a sum of Rs. 45/- only towards fee against a minimum fee of Rs. 50/-. The plaintiff has never visited the office of the Authority. The notice sent by the plaintiff under the Bye-law no. 2.17 of MDDA is wholly wrong as the said notice is used to be given for the development of the land. As such, the plaintiff had no right to make constructions without sanctioning of the map and the Authority had full right to stop the constructions. Further, it has been submitted that the suit is barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act inasmuch as UP Urban Planning and Development Act being a Special Act, the remedies against any grievance is clearly demonstrated in the said Act since it is a self contained Act and hence the suit for injunction does not lie and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine at the threshold itself and the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure. 6. The plaintiff has also filed a rejoinder and has reiterated the averments made in the plaint. It has also been stated that the plaintiff has sent the notice under Bye-law no. 217 instead of 3.20 but merely on wrong mentioning of the number of bye-law, the notice cannot be said illegal. ISSUES 7. On pleadings of the parties, the trial court has framed the following issues :- ß1- D;k oknh ds Hkou dk uD”kk ,e-Mh-Mh-,- ls lSaD”ku ekuk tk;sxk vkSj og bl vk/kkj ij Hkou dk fuekZ.k djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 2- D;k oknh }kjk okn dk ewY;kadu de fd;k x;k gS rFkk U;k;”kqYd de vnk fd;k x;k gS\ 3- vuqrks’k\ 4- D;k oknh dk okn fof”k’V vuqrks’k vf/kñ dh /kkjk 41 ds izko/kkuksa ls ckf/kr gS\ 5- D;k oknh dk okn vkns”k 7 fu;e 11 lhihlh ds izko/kkuksa ls ckf/kr gS\ EVIDENCE LED ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF 8. On behalf of the plaintiff, affidavit of Shri Ravi Prakash Goyal has been filed. Towards the documentary evidence the plaintiff has produced plan of the house 3 ka/11 and 3 ka/12, copy of map i.e. 9 ka, copy of notice sent to the Authority i.e. 10 ka, Receipt i.e. 11 ka and certificate issued by the Postal Department i.e. 12 ka. EVIDENCE LED ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT 9. On behalf of the defendant, affidavit of Shri Satish Kumar Chauhan has been filed. Towards the documentary evidence, copy of application filed under Sub-Section 1 of Section 15 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 i.e. paper no. 23 ka/3, tariff of application for map i.e. paper no. 23 ga/5 and Bye-laws i.e. paper no. 23 ga/6 of 23 ga/8 have been produced. ISSUE-WISE FINDINGS RECORDED BY THE TRIAL COURT 10. Issue no. 1 - While deciding this issue as to whether the map plan submitted by the plaintiff shall be treated to be sanctioned by the M.D.D.A. and the plaintiff is entitled to make constructions, the trial court has recorded the finding that the plaintiff has filed the plan as per the approved format and the defendant has not given any intimation about the application filed by the plaintiff and further, the Authority has not given any reply of the notice sent by the plaintiff under the Bye-law no. 3.20 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. 11. Before the trial court, it has been submitted that there is no provision to send the application for sanctioning of plan by registered post and a sum of Rs. 45/- has been deposited towards fee against Rs. 50/-. While discussing on the said submissions, the trial court has recorded the finding that U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 or the Bye-laws, nowhere excludes the provision of sending the application for sanctioning of plan by registered post. Therefore, it will be deemed that the application has been filed in accordance with the due procedure. Further, taking into consideration paper no. 23 ga/5 which is the tariff plan for sanctioning of map, the trial court has recorded the finding that the plaintiff has sent a sum of Rs. 45/- when in point of fact, the plaintiff was to deposit a sum of Rs. 30/- only as the proposed construction plan was with regard to a school. 23 ga/5 which is the tariff plan for sanctioning of map, the trial court has recorded the finding that the plaintiff has sent a sum of Rs. 45/- when in point of fact, the plaintiff was to deposit a sum of Rs. 30/- only as the proposed construction plan was with regard to a school. The trial court has recorded the finding that it cannot be said that the plaintiff has paid insufficient fee. On the basis of the aforesaid, the trial court has come to the conclusion that the plan submitted by the plaintiff is deemed to be sanctioned and the plaintiff is entitled for making construction in accordance with the proposed plan. 12. Issue no. 2 - While deciding issue no. 2 with regard to valuation of the suit and payment of less court fee accordingly, the trial court has decided this issue against the defendant as not pressed. 13. Issue no. 4 - While deciding issue no. 4 as to whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by the provisions of Section 41(h) of Specific Relief Act, the trial court has recorded the finding that the appeal may be preferred against any order. But since no order has been passed by the authority with regard to the map, there arises no question to prefer an appeal. Therefore, the said issue was decided against the defendant. 14. Issue no. 5 - While deciding as to whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, the trial court has decided this issue against the defendant as not pressed. 15. Issue no. 3 - While deciding issue no. 3 with regard to relief, the trial court has come to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be decreed against the defendant. 16. 15. Issue no. 3 - While deciding issue no. 3 with regard to relief, the trial court has come to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be decreed against the defendant. 16. On the basis of the aforesaid, the trial court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff and passed an order to the following effect :- ßoknh dk okn izfroknh ds fo#) lO;; vkKIr fd;k tkrk gS rFkk ;g ?kks’k.kk dh tkrh gS fd oknh dk uD”kk tks mlus izfroknh ds ;gka fnukad 11-1-2000 dks LohÑr djus gsrq izLrqr fd;k gS og izfroknh }kjk LohÑr fd;k tk pqdk gS rFkk oknh mDr uD”ks ds vuqlkj fuekZ.k djus dk vf/kdkjh gS rFkk izfroknh dks mijksDr uD”ks ds vuqlkj oknh ds fuekZ.k esa gLr{ksi djus ls LFkk;h :i ls fuf’k) fd;k tkrk gSAÞ 17. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the defendant has preferred an appeal. The appellate court has dismissed the appeal and has affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. DISCUSSION ON SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT SECOND APPEAL 18. As already stated above, the present second appeal has been admitted on the substantial questions of law mentioned in paragraph no. 3. The substantial questions of law are being discussed serially. 19. So far as the substantial question no. 1 as to whether the relief Claimed by the plaintiff was barred by Section 37 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973? If so, have the courts below erred in law in decreeing the suit, is concerned, on bare perusal of Section 37, it appears that Section 37 deals with the finality of decision passed by the Vice-Chairman or other authorized officer under Section 15 or Section 27 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. Section 37 is reproduced below :- "37. Finality of decision. - [Except as provided in Section 41, every decision] of the Chairman on appeal, and subject only to any decision on appeal (if it lies and is preferred), the order of the Vice-Chairman or other officer under-Section 15, or Section 27, shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court." 20. Application for permission is contained under Section 15 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. It reads as under :- "15. Application for permission. Application for permission is contained under Section 15 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. It reads as under :- "15. Application for permission. - (1) Every person or body (other than any department of Government or any local authority) desiring to obtain the permission referred to in Section 14 shall make an application in writing to the [Vice-Chairman] in such form and containing such particulars in respect of the development to which the application relates as may be prescribed by [bye-laws]. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by particulars as may be prescribed by rules. (2-A) The Authority shall be entitled to levy development fees, mutation charges, stacking fees and water fees in such manner and at such rates as may be prescribed : Provided that the amount of stacking fees levied in respect of any area which is not being developed or has not been developed, by the Authority, shall be transferred to the local authority within whose local limits such area is situated]. (3) On the receipt of an application for permission under sub-section (1), the [Vice-Chairman] after making such inquiry as it considers necessary in relation to any matter specified in clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 9 or in relation to any other matter, shall by order in writing either grant the permission, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order or refuse to grant such permission : Provided that before making an order refusing such permission, the applicant shall be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the permission should not be refused: Provided further that the [Vice-Chairman] may before passing any order on such application give an opportunity to the applicant to make any correction therein or to supply any further particulars of documents or to make good any deficiency in requisite fee with a view to bringing it in conformity with the relevant rules or regulations. [Provided also that before granting permission, referred to in Section 14 the Vice-Chairman may get the fees and the charges levied under sub-section (2-A) deposited]. (4) Where permission is refused, the grounds of such refusal shall be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant. [Provided also that before granting permission, referred to in Section 14 the Vice-Chairman may get the fees and the charges levied under sub-section (2-A) deposited]. (4) Where permission is refused, the grounds of such refusal shall be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant. (5) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may appeal to the (Chairman) against that order within thirty days from the communication thereof and may after giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and, if necessary, also to the representative of the [Vice-Chairman] either dismiss the appeal or direct the [Vice-Chairman] to grant the permission applied for with such modifications, or subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified. (6) The [Vice-Chairman] shall keep in such form as may be prescribed by regulations a register of applications for permission under this section. (7) The said register shall contain such particulars, including information as to the manner in which applications for permission have been dealt with as may be prescribed by regulations, and shall be available for inspection by any member of the public at all reasonable hours on payment of such fee not exceeding rupees five as may be prescribed by regulations. (8) Where permission is refused under this section, the applicant or any person claiming through him shall not be entitled to get refund of the fee paid on the application for permission but the [Vice-Chairman] may, on an application for refund being made within three months of the communication of the grounds of the refusal under sub-section (4) direct refund of such portion of the fee as it may deem proper in the circumstances of the case. [(9)] If at any time after the permission has been granted under sub-section (3), the Vice-Chairman is satisfied that such permission was granted in consequence of any material mis-representation made or any fraudulent statement or information furnished, he may cancel such permission, for reasons to be recorded in writing and any work done thereunder shall be deemed to have been done without such permission: Provided that a permission shall not be canceled without affording to the person or body concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard.] 21. On perusal of the record, it is evident that no order has been passed by the Authority concerned either granting permission or refusing permission in writing. On perusal of the record, it is evident that no order has been passed by the Authority concerned either granting permission or refusing permission in writing. Further no order was communicated to the plaintiff under sub-section (4) of Section 15 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. This plea has not been taken by the defendant in the written statement filed on behalf of the Authority that the plaintiff was informed about the refusal of the sanction plan application and, thus, no order has been passed by the Authority with regard to the sanction plan application for permission filed by the plaintiff. Suit, therefore, cannot be said to be barred by Section 41(h) of Specific Relief Act. 22. Further, Section 37 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 provides that the order of the Vice-Chairman can be challenged in appeal before the Chairman and the decision on appeal shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court. 23. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that since no order has been passed by the Vice-Chairman and, therefore, there was no occasion of preferring an appeal before the Chairman. The plaintiff-respondent having attained the right for construction under the provisions of deemed sanction and, therefore, no appeal was preferred by the plaintiff. A suit, therefore, was filed by the plaintiff for declaration and injunction for restraining the defendant from interfering with the construction work of the plaintiff under the deemed sanction. 24. It is well settled that if statute requires that a particular act should be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner as held in I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards v. Mandal Revenue Officer (1996) 6 SCC 634. The relevant observations are quoted below :- "If the statute requires that a particular act should be done in a particular manner if it is found, as we have found hereinbefore, that the act done by the Government is invalid and ineffective for non compliance with the mandatory requirements of law, it would be rather curious if it is held that notwithstanding such non-compliance, it yet constitutes a 'promise' or a 'representation' for the purpose of invoking the rule of promissory/equitable estoppel. Such a course would render the mandatory provisions of the enactment meaningless and superfluous." 25. Such a course would render the mandatory provisions of the enactment meaningless and superfluous." 25. In Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad (1999) 8 SCC 266, it has been held as under :- "It is well settled salutary principle that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. (See with advantage : Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (1935-36) 63 IA 372: AIR 1936 PC 253 (II), Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 322: 1954 SCR 1098, State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 SCWR 57)". 26. As will appear from Section 15 of the Act that the application has to be presented in accordance with the Bye-laws, the plaintiff having sent the application in accordance with the Bye-laws the then applicable for the sanction of map in order to avail the benefit of 'deeming clause' the suit, therefore, filed by the plaintiff cannot be said to be barred either by the provisions of Section 37 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act or Section 41 (h) of Specific Relief Act or by Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Act. 27. As will appear from the record that the authority concerned had not passed any order with regard to refusal of application and, as such, the application filed by the plaintiff shall come under 'deemed sanctioned'. Further, the Mussoorie Development Authority had not passed any order with regard to refusal of the application, therefore, no appeal was preferred. In view of the aforesaid, I do not find that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by Section 37 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and consequently the substantial question no. 1 is decided against the appellant. 28. Substantial question no. 2 is as to whether the provision relating to deemed sanction of the Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority has wrongly been interpreted by the courts below. 29. Bye-law no. 214 reads as under :- "2.14. The Vice-Chairman shall refuse the permission if : (a) the proposed development work contravenes the provisions of the Act or these bye-laws or any other law for the time being in force. (b) The site proposed for development. 30. Bye-law no. 215 reads as under : "2.15. 29. Bye-law no. 214 reads as under :- "2.14. The Vice-Chairman shall refuse the permission if : (a) the proposed development work contravenes the provisions of the Act or these bye-laws or any other law for the time being in force. (b) The site proposed for development. 30. Bye-law no. 215 reads as under : "2.15. In the case of refusal, the Vice-Chairman shall state the reasons and relevant provisions of the Act or bye-laws which the proposed development contravenes. The Vice-Chairman shall (as far as possible) point out all the objections to the plans and statements in the first instance itself. 31. Bye-law no. 2.16 provides as under : "2.16. The applicant may then resubmit the plans and statements modified in the light of the objections raised. The Vice-Chairman shall again scrutinize the resubmitted plans and if there be further objections, the plan shall be rejected." 32. So far as provisions relating to deemed sanction is concerned, Bye-law no. 2.17 and Bye-law no. 3.20 (though both the Bye-laws contain the same provisions) fully relate with the provisions regarding to deemed sanction. Both the Bye-laws suggest that in case of failure to intimate the decision in writing within 40 days of the receipt of the application, the application shall have a right to give a notice in writing and if further no decision is communicated to the application within 20 days of the receipt of the notice, the applicant shall have a right to commence and carry out the proposed development work. Bye-laws nos. 2.17 and 3.20 are reproduced below :- "2.17. If within 40 days of the receipt of the application, the Vice-Chairman fails to intimate the decision in writing taken by him on the application, the applicant has a right to give a notice in writing to the Vice-Chairman and if for further 20 days, no decision is communicated to the applicant, the application with its annexures shall be deemed to have been sanctioned and thereafter the applicant shall have a right to commence and carry out the proposed development work but he will not be authorised to do anything in contravention of the provisions of the Act or bye-laws." "3.20. If within 40 days of the receipt of the application, the Vice-Chairman fails to intimate in writing the decision taken by him on the application, the applicant shall have a right to give a notice in writing to the Vice-Chairman and if for further 20 days, no decision is communicated to the applicant, the applications with its annexures shall be deemed to have been sanctioned. Thereafter the applicant shall have a right to commence and carry out the proposed construction work but he will not be authorised to do anything in contravention of the provisions of the Act or bye-laws." 33. As will appear from the aforesaid provision that if the development work contravenes the provisions of the Act or the Bye-laws, the Vice-Chairman shall state the reason otherwise it shall be treated as deemed sanction in accordance with the Bye-law no. 2.17. INTERPRETATION OF WORD 'DEEMING' 34. Bye-laws 2.17 and 3.20 as applicable at the relevant time provides the word 'deeming'. The word 'deeming' has been interpreted by the Apex Court from time to time. In Harish Tandon v. Addl. District Magistrate, Allahabad, U.P. and others reported in A.W.C. 1995 (1) 106, the Apex Court has held as under :- "10. On behalf of the respondents, it was urged that the expression 'deemed occurring in sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 12 as well as in the Explanation (i) of Section 25 should not be read as conclusive. It should be read as 'deemed until the contrary is proved'. Reference was made to the cases Gray v. Kerslake, Batcheller, (1945) 1 CD 169 and Spencer v. Kennedy, (1926) 1 CD 125, where it was observed that if the work 'deemed' is held to be conclusive, then it shall amount to imputing to the Legislature the intention of requiring the Court to hold as a fact something directly contrary to the true fact. It was also said that such deemed clauses should be read to mean as required by the statute, untill the contrary is proved. 11. The role of a provision in a statute creating legal fiction is by now well settled. It was also said that such deemed clauses should be read to mean as required by the statute, untill the contrary is proved. 11. The role of a provision in a statute creating legal fiction is by now well settled. When a statute creates a legal fiction saying that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth has not been done, the Court has to examine and ascertain as to for what purpose and between what persons such a statutory fiction is to be restored to. Thereafter full effect has to be given to such statutory fiction and it has to be carried to its logical conclusion. In the well known case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finbsbury Borough Council, (1952) Act 109 (B). Lord Asquith while dealing with the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, observed : "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative, state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it... The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." 12. That statement of law in respect of a statutory fiction is being consistently followed by this Court. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak and others, AIR 1953 SC 244:1953 SCR 773. From the facts of that case it shall appear that Bombay Building (Control on Eviction) Ordinance, 1948 which was applicable to certain areas mentioned in the Schedule to it, was extended by a notification to all the areas in the province in respect of buildings intended to be used for the purposes of extended to areas mentioned in the Schedule with the power under sub-section (3) of Section 1 to extent its operation to other areas. This Court held that the deeming Clause in Section 15 of the Act read with Section 25 of the Bombay General Clauses Act has to be given full effect and the expression 'enactment' in the Act will cover the word 'Ordinance' occurring in the notification which had been issued. In that connection it was said : "The corollary thus of declaring the provisions of Section 25, Bombay General Clauses Act, applicable to the repeal of the ordinance and of deeming that ordinance an enactment is that wherever the word 'ordinance' occurs in the notification, that word has to be read as an enactment." 13. In the case of Chief Inspector of Mines and another etc. v. Karam Chand Thapar etc. AIR 1961 SC 838:1962 (1) SCR 9, it was said : "Were these regulations in force on the alleged date of contravention? Certainly, they were, in consequence of the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. The fact that these regulations were deemed to be that they were laws in force on the alleged date of contravention. The argument that as they were "regulations" under the 1952 Act in consequence of a deeming provision, they were not laws in force on the alleged date of contravention is entirely misconceived." 14. In the case of M/s J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 SC 191 : 1988 (1) SCR 700, it was said : "It is well settled that a deeming provision is an admission of the non-existence of the fact deemed. Therefore, in view of the deeming provisions under Explanations to Rules 9 and 49, although the goods which are produced or manufactured at an intermediate stage and, thereafter, consumed or utilized in the integrated process for the manufacture of another commodity is not actually removed shall be construed and regarded as removed. The Legislature is quite competent to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not really exist. 15. Recently in the case of M. Venugopal v. The Divisional Managaer L.I.C. of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and another, JT 1994 (1) SC 281 : 1994 (2) SCC 323 after referring to the case of East End Dwellings Co. 15. Recently in the case of M. Venugopal v. The Divisional Managaer L.I.C. of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and another, JT 1994 (1) SC 281 : 1994 (2) SCC 323 after referring to the case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council (supra), it was said that when one is bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, he must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, must inevitably have flowed." 35. In M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, A.P. and another reported in (1994) 2 SCC 323, the Apex Court has held as under :- "11. The effect of a deeming clause is well-known. Legislature can introduce a statutory fiction and courts have to proceed on the assumption that such state of affairs exists on the relevant date. In this connection, one is often reminded of what was said by Lord Asquith in the case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council that when one is bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, he must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which inevitably have flowed from it - one must not permit his "imagination to boggle" when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." 36. As already stated above, the application for plan has been sent to the Authority by registered post by the plaintiff and the same has been served upon the defendant. Therefore, no contravention of provisions of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act or its Bye-laws has been made by the plaintiff. This is admitted fact on behalf of the defendant. Further it has also been admitted by the defendant that a notice has been served upon him under Bye-laws no. 2.17 however, it has been contended that the said notice should have been sent under Bye-law no. 3.20 instead of Bye-law no. 2.17. I do not find any much difference as Section 15 itself contains the provision of development as given in 2.17 of the Bye-laws for which notice has been given. 37. After going through both the bye-laws, I find that there is a single word which changes the meaning of both the bye-laws i.e. word "development" in bye-law no. 2.17 and word "construction" in bye-law no. 3.20. 37. After going through both the bye-laws, I find that there is a single word which changes the meaning of both the bye-laws i.e. word "development" in bye-law no. 2.17 and word "construction" in bye-law no. 3.20. When these two words are taken collectively, I do not find much difference into them. The plaintiff, therefore, has attained the right to commence and carry out the proposed construction work as he submitted the plan on 11.1.2002 and after a lapse of 40 days period, he sent a registered notice on 23.7.2000 and inspite of the said notice under Bye-law no. 2.17, no decision was communicated to the plaintiff. Therefore, no contravention of the provisions of the Act or bye-laws has been made. Section 15 has also used the word 'development' as prescribed by the Bye-law no. 2.17. 38. Further, the trial court has categorically recorded the finding that the appeal may be preferred against any order but since no order has been passed by the Mussoorie Dehradun Development Authority with regard to the application for the sanction of map, therefore, there is no occasion to prefer an appeal and, as such, the suit is not barred by Section 41(h) of Specific Relief Act. 39. In view of the aforesaid, it cannot be said that courts below have wrongly interpreted the provision relating to deemed sanction and, as such, this substantial question of law is decided against the defendant-respondent and in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 40. Substantial question no. 3 is as to whether the plaint of the plaintiff was liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. As will appear from Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, the provision (d) relates to the rejection of plaint on the ground of undervaluation of claim. The same is quoted below :- "11. Rejection of plaint - The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases :- (a) ... (b) ... (c) ... (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; 41. The trial court has recorded the finding that the suit is not barred by Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure. (b) ... (c) ... (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; 41. The trial court has recorded the finding that the suit is not barred by Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure. The finding recorded by the trial court is quoted below :- ßnkSjku lk{; o nkSjku cgl izfroknh ds fo}ku vf/koDrk }kjk ,sls fdlh izko/kku dk mYys[k ugha fd;k x;k ftlds vk/kkj ij oknh dk okn vkns”k 7 fu;e 11 ds izko/kkuksa ls ckfèkr izrhr gksAÞ 42. Further, the said issue has not been pressed before the appellate court. 43. As already stated above, since no order has been passed by the Authority either granting permission or refusing permission in writing. Further no order was communicated to the plaintiff under sub-section (4) of Section 15 of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. This plea has not been taken by the defendant in the written statement filed on behalf of the Authority that the plaintiff was informed about the refusal of the sanction plan application and, thus, no order has been passed by the Authority with regard to the sanction plan application for permission filed by the plaintiff. Therefore, suit is not barred by the provision of any law. 44. In view of the aforesaid, I do not find that the suit was bared by the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the substantial question no. 3 is decided in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. INTERFERENCE WITH THE FINDINGS OF FACT 45. In Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganial (D) through LRs v. Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai (D) through LRs reported in [2007 (66) ALR 310], the Apex Court has held as under :- "Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh 2000 (3) SCC 708-2000 (39) ALR 484 (SC), this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads : "7. It is to be reiterated that under section 100, CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under section 100, CPC. It is to be reiterated that under section 100, CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under section 100, CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter, the High Court did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference to it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact finding Courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into the possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was permissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two Courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings." 46. In Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi and another [2007 (03) RD 610], the Apex Court has observed as under :- "6. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last Court of fact, being the First Appellate Court. It is true that the Lower Appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the Trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the Appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two interferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the Lower Appellate Court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the Lower Appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 7. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the Lower Appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 7. The question of law raised will not be considered as a substantial question of law, if it stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court. Where the facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. Mere appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the First Appellate Court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the First Appellate Court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey, held that whether the Trial Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference. See : Kondiba Dogadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others 2000 (Suppl. RD 265 = 1999 (36) ALR 218 (SC). 8. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended section 100 of the C.P.C. is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradiction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as section 109 of the C.P.C. or Article 133 (1)(a) of the Constitution. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as section 109 of the C.P.C. or Article 133 (1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta AIR 1928 PC 172, the phrase 'substantial question of law' as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing section 100 C.P.C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordship held that it did not mean a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sri Chunilal's case (supra), the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rirnmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju AIR 1951 Mad. 969 : "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to be particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." 9. This Court laid down the following tests as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial : "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 10. In Dy. Commnr. Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain AIR 1953 SC 521, also it was held that a question of law of importance to the parties was a substantial question of law entitling the appellant to a certificate under (the then) section 100 of the C.P.C. 11. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of ant lis. See : Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased by LRs. 2001 (92) RD 336 (SC) = 2001 (52) ALR 794 (SC). 12. The principles relating to section 100, C.P.C., relevant for this case, may be summarized thus : (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or biding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. 13. The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where : (1) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the Court have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding." 47. In Govindraju v. Martamman reported in AIR 2005 SC 1008, the Apex Court has held as under :- "16. As per settled law, the scope of exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in Second Appeal under Section 100 is limited to the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal or additional substantial questions of law framed as a later date after recording reasons for the same. As per settled law, the scope of exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in Second Appeal under Section 100 is limited to the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal or additional substantial questions of law framed as a later date after recording reasons for the same. It was observed in Santosh Hazari's case (supra) that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be a 'substantial' question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing as to the rights of the parties before the Court. As to what would be the question of law "involving in the case". It was observed that to be a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by the Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision between the parties. 48. In Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments v. P. Shanmugama and others (2005) 9 SCC 232, it has been held under :- "14. In our view, High Court has no jurisdiction in the second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts recorded by the first appellate court after careful consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, on record. It was not open to the High Court to reverse the findings of facts as it has done." 49. For the foregoing reasons, substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal are decided against the defendant-appellant and as such, I find no merit in second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the courts below. I see no jurisdiction for the interference with the said concurrent findings of the two courts below. Second appeal, therefore, fails and deserves to be dismissed. 50. Consequently, second appeal is dismissed with costs. Interim orders passed by this High Court are discharged.