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2007 DIGILAW 590 (KER)

Hubert Peyoli v. M. Abusali

2007-09-07

M.SASIDHARAN NAMBIAR

body2007
Judgment :- Plaintiff in O.S.435 of 1985 on the file of Munsiff Court, Nedumangad is the appellant. Defendants are respondents. Appellant instituted the suit seeking a decree for realization of Rs.5518.30 with interest on the principal amount of Rs.5110/- as the balance amount due on a loan obtained on executing a bond creating a charge over the plaint schedule property. Appellant instituted the suit as O.S.499 of 1983 before Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram on 8.9.1983. But as per Kerala Civil Court Ordinance 31 of 1983 promulgated on 5.9.1983 and published in Gazette on 6.9.1883, pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsiff Court was enhanced to Rs.15000/-. But without taking note of the pecuniary jurisdiction of Munsiff Court pursuant to the ordinance suit was instituted before Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram as the suit was valued at Rs.10,678.80 inclusive of the interest till that date. In view of the ordinance enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of Munsiff Court, as per order dated 27.9.1983, Sub Court returned the plaint to the appellant for presentation before proper court granting three weeks time for presentation. The suit was represented before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram on 12.10.1983. But as a charge decree was sought in the plaint and the property is within the jurisdiction of Munsiff Court, Nedumangad as provided under Section 16(c) of Code of Civil Procedure the plaint should have been presented before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad instead of Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram. As that defect was found out later by the counsel, plaintiff filed an application for withdrawal of the suit for presentation before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad. As per order dated 20.9.1985, sanction was granted. The plaint was directed to be returned for presentation before the proper court. Plaint was taken back and represented before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad on 1.10.1985. 2. Respondents appeared and filed a written statement disputing the plaint claim. Necessary issues were framed and evidence was recorded. 3. Learned Munsiff on the evidence of PW1, DW1 and Exts.A1 to A3, granted a decree, directing respondents to pay Rs. 10640.80 with interest providing that it could be realized by sale of plaint schedule property. Defendants challenged the decree and judgment before District Court, Thiruvananthapuram in A.S.79 of 1988. Learned Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the decree and judgment of the trial court holding that suit is barred by time. 10640.80 with interest providing that it could be realized by sale of plaint schedule property. Defendants challenged the decree and judgment before District Court, Thiruvananthapuram in A.S.79 of 1988. Learned Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the decree and judgment of the trial court holding that suit is barred by time. Learned District Judge considered the question whether appellant is entitled to exclude the period from 12.10.1983, the date on which the plaint was represented before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram and 1.10.1985, the date on which it was represented before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Relying on the decision of this court in M/s. Mooken Devassy Ouseph and sons V. Rajappan Pillai(AIR 1984 Kerala 91), learned District Judge held that when the plaint was returned from Sub Court, Thiruvananthpauram for presentation before proper court and it was presented before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram, the period from 12.10.1983 to 1.10.1985 cannot be excluded from computing the period of limitation as it cannot be said that appellant was bonafide prosecuting the suit. Learned District Judge took the view that if appellant had taken due care and attention, it would not have been presented before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram. Appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed. It is challenged in the second appeal. 4. The second appeal was admitted formulating the following substantial questions of law. 1) Whether the finding of first appellate court that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the facts of the case is correct in law 2) Whether the court below is correct in holding that the suit is barred by limitation. 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondents reported no instructions and respondents called and found absent. 6. 1) Whether the finding of first appellate court that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the facts of the case is correct in law 2) Whether the court below is correct in holding that the suit is barred by limitation. 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondents reported no instructions and respondents called and found absent. 6. Learned counsel appearing for appellant relying on the decision of this court in Kunjukrishnan V. Viswanathan and others(1964 KLJ 712) and High Court of Andra Pradesh in Dhronavajjula Vidyamba V. Vallabhajosyula(AIR 1958 AP 218) and Madras High Court in Mohamed Sali V. M.G. Fernando(AIR 1974 Madras 286)argued that though under Section 15 of the Code, a suit has to be instituted in the lowest grade that does not mean that higher courts have no jurisdiction to try the suit and hence Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram, where the suit was originally instituted, was having jurisdiction to try the suit and the only defect was that the suit was not instituted before the lowest grade as provided under Section 15 and to cure that defect, Sub Court returned the plaint for presentation before the proper court granting three weeks time and as Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram had jurisdiction to grant time, and the suit was presented within that period, the suit is within time, as originally the suit was instituted within time. It was also argued that the presentation of the suit before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram could only be a bonafide mistake committed by the counsel and in any case, it cannot be a mistake committed by the party and a mistake committed by the counsel cannot be termed tainted and therefore the period during which appellant was prosecuting the suit before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram till it was represented before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad, on the same day on which it was returned from Thiruvananthapuram, is to be excluded as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the finding of first appellate court is not sustainable. The learned counsel relying on the decision of Supreme Court in Mata Din V. A.Narayanan(AIR 1970 SC 1953), Concord of India Insurance Co. The learned counsel relying on the decision of Supreme Court in Mata Din V. A.Narayanan(AIR 1970 SC 1953), Concord of India Insurance Co. V. Nirmala Devi(AIR 1979 SC 1666), Ghasi Ram and others V. Chait Ram Saini and others(1998(6) SCC 200), and the High Courts in Surajbhan V. M/s. Sadul Textiles(AIR 1988 Rajasthan 164), Baladev Jew Thakur V. Dhaneswar(AIR 1961 Orissa 54), Param Kirti Saran V. Dewan Singh(AIR 1961 Allahabad 564), and Dasarath Behera V. Katai Devi(AIR 1991 Orissa 160) argued that the finding of the first appellate court is erroneous and the finding of the trial court that suit was filed within time and is not barred by time is perfectly correct and appellant is entitled to the decree granted by the trial court. 7. If Sub court had no jurisdiction to grant time for representation of the plaint, when it was returned for presentation before proper court, whether suit is bared by time? If the representation is within the time, as the suit should have been filed only at Munsiff Court, Nedumangad, whether the period during which the suit was prosecuted at Munsiff Court could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act? These are the relevant points to be settled. 8. Under Section 15 of Code of Civil procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Here the suit was not instituted before the court of lowest grade but before sub court. The question is whether Section 15 of the Code takes away the jurisdiction of Sub Court to try the suit, as the valuation of the suit is within the pecuniary jurisdiction of Munsiff Court? When the suit was instituted on 8.9.1983, as per the provisions of Ordinance 31 of 1983, pecuniary jurisdiction of Munsiff Court was Rs.10,000/-. Therefore as provided under Section 15 of the Code, suit should have been instituted before Munsiff Court. As appellant in the plaint sought a charge decree, the suit should have been instituted before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad where the property is situate, as provided under 16(c) of the Code. Whether Section 15 of the Code takes away the jurisdiction of the court of higher grade. 9. Velu Pilla, J in Kunjukrishnan's case (supra) considered a similar situation. As appellant in the plaint sought a charge decree, the suit should have been instituted before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad where the property is situate, as provided under 16(c) of the Code. Whether Section 15 of the Code takes away the jurisdiction of the court of higher grade. 9. Velu Pilla, J in Kunjukrishnan's case (supra) considered a similar situation. That suit was filed before the District Court though valuation of the suit was below 2000/- and it should have been presented before Munsiff Court. District Court returned the plaint. It was then presented before Munsiff Court. Trial court and first appellate court excluded the period of pendency of those proceedings by applying Section 14 of Limitation Act. This court considered the question whether District Court, before which the plaint was originally presented was a court which had jurisdiction to try the suit, as the suit should have been presented before the Munsiff Court. Finding that under sub section 4 of Section 2, a District Court is defined as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the District and under Section 10 of Travancore Civil Courts Act, which was then in force, District Court shall be deemed to be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction, it was held that jurisdiction of the District court extends to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature and there is nothing in the code which takes away that jurisdiction of the District Court to try original suits within its local limits, it was held :- "Section 15 of the Code has enacted that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it, but this is a provision which relates to the place of suing, and does not deprive the District Court of its jurisdiction to try original suits. Similarly it was not and could not be contended, that a decree of the District Court is void for the reason that the suit in which it was passed was within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsiff Court. It is a policy of the law of procedure, that suits must be filed in the lowest court competent to try them". 10. It is a policy of the law of procedure, that suits must be filed in the lowest court competent to try them". 10. A Full Bench of the High Court of Madras in Ramamirtham v. Rama Film Service (AIR 1951 Madras 93) considering this question held that while Section 15 enjoins the institution of a suit in the court of lowest grade competent to try it, it does not oust the jurisdiction of the court of higher grade and even if the court of a higher grade tries and dispose of a suit, which could have been instituted in a court of lowest grade, the decision is not without jurisdiction and it is not a nullity. It was held that a court of higher grade does not act without jurisdiction in trying a suit, which under Section 15, might and ought by reason of its valuation, have been tried by an inferior court. 11. A Full Bench of High Court of Andra Pradesh in Venketeswarulu V. Satyanarayana (AIR 1957 AP 49) considering the scope of Section 15 of the Code held : "Though Section 15 Civil Procedure Code directs that a suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest jurisdiction competent to try it and though Order 7 Rule 10, empowers a Court to return a plaint, at any stage of the suit to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted, still it has been held that if a suit triable by a Court of a lower grade is tried and decreed by a Court of a higher grade, the decree is perfectly valid. The reason is that Section 15; Civil Procedure Code lays down a rule of procedure and not of jurisdiction on the superior court in such cases. Ratan Sen V. Suraj Bhan ILR 1944 all 20: (AIR 1944 All(1) (K), ILR 17 Cal 155(D): Mohini Mohan V. Kunja Behari 47 Cal WN 720: (AIR 1943 Cal 450) (L), ILR 7 All 230 (FB) (G): Dakor Temple Committee V. Shankerlal, AIR 1944 Bom 300(M)". 12. The same view was followed by the Division Bench of High Court of Andra Pradesh in Dhronavajjula Vidyamba's case (supra). Section 15 of the Code only provides that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. 12. The same view was followed by the Division Bench of High Court of Andra Pradesh in Dhronavajjula Vidyamba's case (supra). Section 15 of the Code only provides that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. There is nothing in the Code taking away the jurisdiction of the higher court, from trying the suit. Hence though the suit ought to have been instituted before the Munsiff Court, it cannot be said that Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram had no jurisdiction to try the suit on 6.9.1983 when the plaint was presented. If that be the case, Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram which had jurisdiction to try the suit, is competent to return the plaint granting time for representation so hat plaintiff could comply with the mandate of Section 15 of the Code. The plaint was returned on 27.9.1983 granting three weeks time to the appellant. The plaint was presented before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram on 12.10.1983. Hence the presentation of the plaint was within the period fixed by Sub Court. Hence the presentation of the plaint on 12.10.1983 is to be taken as continuation of the suit and therefore the suit is to be taken as instituted within time and not barred by time. 13. Learned District Judge also did not find that as the plaint was represented before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram it was not a continuation of the earlier suit and hence barred. First appellate court only held that as suit should have been represented at Munsiff Court, Nedumangad, presentation of the suit at Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram on 12.10.1983 was not bonafide and so the period till 1.10.1985, when it was represented before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad, cannot be excluded under Section 14 of Limitation Act as appellant was not prosecuting the suit before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram bonafide. 14. As rightly argued by learned counsel appearing for appellant, when the plaint was returned from Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram for presentation before proper Court, the plaint was represented by that counsel at Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram instead of Nedumangad. That mistake cannot be taken as the mistake of the appellant and could only be that of his counsel. 14. As rightly argued by learned counsel appearing for appellant, when the plaint was returned from Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram for presentation before proper Court, the plaint was represented by that counsel at Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram instead of Nedumangad. That mistake cannot be taken as the mistake of the appellant and could only be that of his counsel. Learned counsel submitted that counsel who appeared for the appellant might be under the impression that as a personal decree is sought for against defendants and the defendants were residing within the jurisdiction of Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram the suit could be presented before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram though as a charge decree is sought for, as provided under Section 16(c) of the Code, it should have been presented before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad. The question then is whether the presentation of the plaint before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram on 12.10.1983 and its prosecution till it was represented before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad on 1.10.1985 was bonafide and hence could be excluded as provided under Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act. 15. Sub section 1 of Section 14 reads: "In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it". Explanation - For the purposes of this section- (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;". 16. Apex Court in Ghasi Ram's case (supra) analyzing the section laid down the following conditions to be established by the party seeking the benefit of sub-section 1 of Section 14 of Limitation Act. 16. Apex Court in Ghasi Ram's case (supra) analyzing the section laid down the following conditions to be established by the party seeking the benefit of sub-section 1 of Section 14 of Limitation Act. "A perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in order to get the benefit of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, the party seeking its benefit must fulfill the following four conditions:- (1) The plaintiff who filed the suit had been prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence. (2) The earlier proceeding resorted to by the plaintiff was based on the same cause of action. (3) The former proceeding was prosecuted by the plaintiff in good faith in a court. (4) The court, due to the defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, was unable to entertain such proceeding". 17. Therefore what the appellant has to establish to claim the benefit was that he had been prosecuting the suit before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram with due diligence and that proceedings was resorted in good faith and due to the defect of jurisdiction Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram was unable to entertain that proceedings. It cannot be said that appellant was not prosecuting the suit at Munsiff Court without due diligence. He could act only as advised by his counsel. When the counsel instituted the suit at Sub Court in spite of the ordinance enhancing the jurisdiction of the Munsiff Court and when it was returned from Sub Court for presentation before proper court, represented it wrongly at Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram it cannot be said that appellant was not acting without due diligence. Appellant is not to gain anything by presenting the suit before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram, which had no jurisdiction to try the suit. Appellant could only act as advised by his counsel. If the advice given by the counsel was not correct or in accordance with law, it cannot be said that prosecution of the proceeding at Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram was without bona fides. 18. The question whether the delay in filing an appeal due to earlier filing of an appeal in a wrong forum and is a sufficient cause to condone the delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by the Apex Court in Mata Din's case (supra). 18. The question whether the delay in filing an appeal due to earlier filing of an appeal in a wrong forum and is a sufficient cause to condone the delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by the Apex Court in Mata Din's case (supra). Their Lordships, in that case, found that High Court seemed to be of the opinion that an advocate of 34 years standing could not possibly make the mistake of filing an appeal before the District Court and then a revision, as Section 39(1) of Pub jab Courts Act was clear and the period during which the revision was prosecuted cannot be excluded as it was prosecuted without bona fides. Apex Court held that as the counsel was one with experience ought to have known that an appeal above Rs.5000/-must be filed in the High Court and not District Court, whether the counsel was genuinely under a mistake or not. Holding that it was an error committed by the counsel, it was found that the error was not tainted by any mala fide motive on the part of the counsel and High Court would have been justified in extending time but unfortunately High court started from a wrong angle. Considering the principle to be applied while deciding the sufficiency of the cause to condone the delay caused by the SA 588/1993 18 wrong advice of the counsel, it was held: "The law is settled that mistake of counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay although there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground. It is always a question whether the mistake was bonafide or was merely advice (devise-Ed) to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. The High Court unfortunately never considered the matter from this angle. If it had, it would have seen quite clearly that there was no attempt to avoid the Limitation Act but rather to follow it albeit on a wrong reading of the situation". 19. The High Court unfortunately never considered the matter from this angle. If it had, it would have seen quite clearly that there was no attempt to avoid the Limitation Act but rather to follow it albeit on a wrong reading of the situation". 19. Relying on this decision, a learned Single Judge of this court (as Lordship then was) in State of Kerala V. Madhava Kurup (AIR 1971 Kerala 211) held that legal advice given by members of the legal profession may sometimes be wrong and an amount of sometimes be wrong and an amount of latitude is expected in such cases and as litigant legitimately lean on expert counsel, as in other departments without probing the professional competence of the advice, court must see whether in such cases, there is any taint of mala fides or element of recklessness or ruse. If neither is present, legal advice honestly sought and actually given must be treated as sufficient cause when an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is being considered. 20. Apex Court in Concord of India Insurance Co.'s case (supra) relying on the decision of this court in Madhava Kurup's case (supra) held that if legal advisers opinions are to be subjected to further legal scrutiny of their own, an impossible situation may arise and if there is no taint of mala fides or no element of recklessness, it must be treated as bonafide. 21. A single Judge of High Court of Patna had occasion to consider whether the advice given by the counsel which caused the party to litigate before a court having no jurisdiction could be excluded under Section 14(1) of Limitation Act, in Kanta Prasad Singh V. Ram Narayan(AIR 1957 Patna 139). The learned Single Judge held: "The principle underlying S. 14 of the Limitation Act is that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits but falling through the Court being unable to give him such a trial. The principle is clearly applicable not only to cases in which a man brings his suit in the Court, that is, a Court having no jurisdiction to entertain it, but also where he brings the suit in the wrong Court in consequence of a bonafide mistake of law, or defect of procedure. The principle is clearly applicable not only to cases in which a man brings his suit in the Court, that is, a Court having no jurisdiction to entertain it, but also where he brings the suit in the wrong Court in consequence of a bonafide mistake of law, or defect of procedure. A litigant should not be deprived of his rights by reason of the applicability of the law of limitation, when he is diligently and bonafide proceeding to obtain the redress in the higher court also". 22. Another Single Judge of High Court of Allahabad in Param Kirti Saran V. Dewan Singh (AIR 1961 Allahabad 564) considering the period the party was prosecuting before a court which had no jurisdiction to try that suit held that it cannot be said that plaintiff had acted without due care and caution and there was nothing to show that plaintiff did not act with due diligence and so the period is to be extended as provided under Section 14(1) of Limitation Act. 23. The learned District Judge has relied on the decision of this court in M/s. Mooken Devassy Ouseph's case (supra) to hold that Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act is not applicable. In that case the learned Single Judge on the facts found that suit was filed before Munsiff Court, Kochi which had no jurisdiction to try the suit and was returned for presentation before proper court and then presented before Munsiff Court, Paravur. On the facts of that case it was found that cause of action did not arise within the jurisdiction of Munsiff Court, Kochi and defendant was not residing within the jurisdiction of that court and in such circumstances it cannot be said that plaintiff took due care and caution, before filing the suit before the wrong court and so the time taken before that court cannot be excluded. The learned Single Judge relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Madhavarao V. Ramkrishnan (AIR 1958 SC 767) to hold that question is not whether plaintiff did it dishonestly or his actions were malafide but whether given due care and attention the plaintiff could have discovered the omission. The learned Single Judge relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Madhavarao V. Ramkrishnan (AIR 1958 SC 767) to hold that question is not whether plaintiff did it dishonestly or his actions were malafide but whether given due care and attention the plaintiff could have discovered the omission. The learned Single Judge did not consider the question whether the prosecution of the suit in the wrong court was due to the wrong advice given by his counsel and if he was acting bonafide on the advice of the counsel, whether it could be said that prosecution of the suit before the wrong court was without due care and diligence. 24. Almost an identical case was considered by the High Court of Rajasthan in Surajbhan's case (supra). The question considered was whether the time during which the appellant continued to pursue his remedy in the court of senior Sub Judge, Delhi could be excluded, as provided under Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act. Holding that there is no reason to disbelieve the statement of plaintiff that he instituted the suit at Delhi on the basis of legal advise honestly sought by him and plaintiff had acted honestly and bonafide, it was held that there was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff in accepting the advice and in acting upon it and so plaintiff is entitled to the exclusion of the entire time in prosecuting the remedy at Delhi. 25. The facts of this case establish that appellant instituted the suit before Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram within the period of limitation. Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram had jurisdiction to try the suit, though under Section 15 of the Code it should have been instituted before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad, in view of the ordinance 31 of 1983 enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of Munsiff Court. Plaint was therefore returned for presentation before proper court by Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram. As Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram had jurisdiction to try the suit and returned the plaint for presentation before proper court, granting three weeks time and the suit was presented before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram within that period, the suit is to be treated as continuation of the suit. It was presented at Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram by the counsel. Appellant could have acted only on the advice of his counsel. It was presented at Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram by the counsel. Appellant could have acted only on the advice of his counsel. When the appellant was prosecuting the suit at Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram though it had no jurisdiction to try the suit, it cannot be said that the suit was not being prosecuted without due diligence or bonafide, so long as the advice of his counsel was not tainted by mala fides or element of recklessness or ruse. Therefore the presentation of the plaint at Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram on 12.10.1983 and its prosecution before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram till it was returned and represented before Munsiff Court, Nedumangad on 1.10.1985, in the absence of evidence to prove that the advice and action of the counsel was tainted by mala fides or recklessness the prosecution of the case by the appellant could only be bonafide. If so the period appellant was prosecuting the suit before Munsiff Court, Thiruvananthapuram from 12.10.1983 to 1.10.1985 is to be excluded under Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act. The finding of first appellate court that the suit is barred by time is unsustainable. Appellant is entitled to the decree granted by the trial court. The appeal is allowed. The decree and judgment passed by District Court, Thiruvananthapuram in A.S.79 of 1988 is set aside. The decree passed by Munsiff Court, Nedumangad in O.S.435 of 1985 is restored.