JUDGMENT T.P.S. Mann, J.:- The petitioners are seeking quashing of complaint dated 8.10.2004 filed by respondent and for setting aside the order dated 19.12.2005 passed by judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Hisar, whereby they were summoned to face trial for offences punishable under Sections 323, 498-A, 406, 506, 120-8 IPC. 2. The petitioners are three brothers of Shankar Lal and three sisters-in-law of said Shankar Lal, being his brothers respective wives. Apart from the petitioners, the complaint was filed by the respondent against her husband Shankar Lal, mother­ in-law Smt. Tulsi Devi, besides a daughter each of brothers-in-law Surender and Jagdish. At the stage of summoning, the respondent gave up her allegations against the two nieces of her husband Shankar Lal. After perusal of the statements of witnesses examined by the respondent in her preliminary evidence and the documents relied upon by her, learned Judicial Magistrate summoned the petitioners, besides. Shankar Lal and Smt. Tulsi Devi for the aforementioned offences. 3. The case of the respondent was that she was married to Shankar Lal on 27.6.1993. Her father had spent a sum of Rs. Three lacs in the marriage, besides giving cash, jewellery and valuable articles in dowry. From this marriage, two sons were born. The father of the complainant spent a sum of Rs. 25,000/- on each of the occasion of birth of the two ,children, besides giving valuable clothes and jewellery to the accused on their specific demands. In spite of this, the accused had been demanding more and more money from her and giving severe beatings. She was turned out of the matrimonial home. Her father had paid cash amount to the tune of Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 30,000/- on 4/5 different occasions with a fond hope that the accused will not harass and humiliate her. About a year before the filing of the complaint, father of the respondent died. She had only one brother, who had very limited sources of income and therefore, unable to meet the increasing demands of dowry raised by the accused. A Panchayat was also convened but to no effect. The accused would give beatings to her and demand from her to bring cash from her brother. She had been informing her brother by writing letters to him. In May 2004, all the accused persons asked her to bring a sum of Rs. A Panchayat was also convened but to no effect. The accused would give beatings to her and demand from her to bring cash from her brother. She had been informing her brother by writing letters to him. In May 2004, all the accused persons asked her to bring a sum of Rs. Two lacs for investing in their show-room/ shop of jewellery at Sirsa. When she failed to fulfil the said demand, she was beaten and made to leave the matrimonial home, along with her minor children. She made a complaint to the Inspector General of Police in the month of June, 2004 against the accused persons. Accordingly, they were called by the police, but they assured that they would not harass and humiliate the respondent. Ultimately, she was taken back to the matrimonial home at Sirsa on 27.6.2004. Even, thereafter, the accused did not improve their behaviour towards her. They again started harassing and humiliating her, besides demanding more and more dowry. Her gold ornaments were snatched. On 5.8.2004, the accused gave beatings to - her. Her husband Shankar Lal and his brother Surender tried to strangulate her, but did not succeed as she was able to raise an alarm. She came back to Hisar on the following day and apprised her brother about the entire matter. All her dowry articles, including gold ornaments, were retained by the accused. She had raised specific demand for the return of those articles but the accused refused to accede to the same. On 7.10.2004, when the accused appeared in the office of Superintendent of Police, Hisar, they again declined to return the dowry articles. Instead, they demanded a sum of Rs. Two lacs from her and her brother in the presence of the witnesses. She had also filed an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar. With these allegations, the respondent filed the criminal complaint. 4. At the time of recording of the preliminary evidence, the respondent examined Surender Kaur as CW1, HC Mahender Singh as CW2, Dr. Jaibir Sharma as CW3, herself as CW4, Ram Parkash as CW5 and Ram Kumar as CW6.. Learned Judicial Magistrate found sufficient grounds to proceed against the petitioners and two others, namely, Shankar Lal and Smt. Tulsi Devi and accordingly, summoned them as accused to face the trial. 5. Jaibir Sharma as CW3, herself as CW4, Ram Parkash as CW5 and Ram Kumar as CW6.. Learned Judicial Magistrate found sufficient grounds to proceed against the petitioners and two others, namely, Shankar Lal and Smt. Tulsi Devi and accordingly, summoned them as accused to face the trial. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the complaint and the summoning order, in so far as they relate to the present petitioners, are liable to be quashed. Surender, Jagdish and Roshan Lal petitioners are brothers of Shankar Lal, whereas Santosh, Usha and Geeta petitioners are wives of the brothers of said Shankar La!. None of the petitioners was concerned with the day to day affairs of the respondent and her husband. They had no interest in demanding any dowry article from her nor they were to gain anything from the same. In fact, they are residing separately from Shankar Lal. Attention in this context has been drawn to the ration-cards (Annexures P3 to P8) of the petitioners. A perusal of those would show that the petitioners were separate in residence and mess from Shankar Lal. Even otherwise, there was no specific allegation levelled against the petitioners in the complaint. Only general and vague allegations were stated therein. Accordingly, it was prayed that the petition be accepted by quashing the complaint and the summoning order, in so far as they relate to the petitioners. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was not maintainable as the petitioners had statutory remedy of filing a revision against the summoning order. On merits, was contended that the petitioner were living jointly with Shankar Lal, husband of the respondent and, therefore, had been interfering in her daily affairs. Allegations were levelled by her in the complaint against the petitioners which were also supported by the material produced on record by way of her preliminary evidence, consisting of her statement and that of five others. Thus, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material placed before me. 8. Thus, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material placed before me. 8. Though, the order of summoning is not an interlocutory order and thus, revisable, yet this Court - has vast powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to exercise inherent powers, the moment it finds that the petitioners have been falsely implicated by the respondent by abusing the process of the Court. Apart from this, it may also be noticed that the petitioners have laid a challenge to the criminal complaint itself which, if the material so warrants, can be quashed only after exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 9. The case of the petitioners is that they are residing separately from Shankar Lal and had their own ration-cards. Copies of these ration-cards have been placed on record as Annexures P.3 to P.8. In reply to the said averment of the petitioner that they were living separately from Shankar Lal and had their own separate ration-cards in their names, the respondent has simply stated in para 6 of her reply that the petitioners are living jointly with her husband. She has not denied the existence of the ration-cards of the petitioners. 10. A perusal of the complaint would show that only general and vague allegations were levelled therein against the petitioners. No specific averment was made or the allegation levelled against any of the petitioners in the same. On almost each and every occasion when the respondent alleges that she was harassed or tortured or beaten, it is stated that the accused, to be precise accused Nos. 1 to 8, participated in these acts. When the petitioners were living separately from the respondent and her husband Shankar Lal, there could not be any question of them harassing, beating or torturing the respondent. In para 9 of the complaint, the respondent went on to level specific allegations against Surender petitioner that he along with Shankar Lal tried to strangulate her on the night of 5.8.2004, but they could not succeed in their evil designs as she had raised an alarm in the meantime. When Surender petitioner is shown to be living separately from his brother Shankar Lal, his presence in the house of his brother Shankar Lal and his wife, during the night could not be believed. When Surender petitioner is shown to be living separately from his brother Shankar Lal, his presence in the house of his brother Shankar Lal and his wife, during the night could not be believed. Even otherwise, the allegations of strangulation go on to the extent of only an attempt. According to the respondent, she raised an alarm and, thus, Surender petitioner and Shankar Lal could not succeed in their evil designs. It appears that these allegations were levelled so as to falsely implicate Surender petitioner. There is a growing tendency in matrimonial disputes to implicate all the family members of the husband on the vague allegations. This ultimately weakens the case of the prosecution, including the one against the real accused. In Ramesh and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2005 (2) RCR (Crl.) 67, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while quashing proceedings against sister-in-law, who was staying at a different place observed that there were bald allegations to rope in many relations of the husband. It was held as under:­ “She is the married sister of the informant’s husband who is undisputedly living in Delhi with her family. Assuming that during the relevant time, i.e., between March and October, 1997, when the 6th respondent (informant) lived in Mumbai in her marital home, the said lady stayed with them for some days, there is nothing in the complaint which connects her with an offence under Section 498-A or any other offence of which cognizance was taken. Certain acts of taunting and ill-treatment of informant by her sister-in-law (appellant) were alleged but they do not pertain to dowry demand or entrustment and misappropriation of property belonging to the informant. What was said against her in the FIR is that on some occasions, she directed the complainant to wash W.C. and she used to abuse her and used to pass remarks such an “ even if you have got much jewellery, you are our slave.” It is further stated in the report that ‘Gowri would make wrong imputations to provoke her husband and would warn her that nobody could do anything to her family. These allegations, even if true, do not amount to harassment with a view to coercing the informant or her relation to meet an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. These allegations, even if true, do not amount to harassment with a view to coercing the informant or her relation to meet an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. At the most, the allegations reveal that her sister­ in-law Gowri was insulting and making derogatory remarks against her and behaving rudely against her. Even acts of abetment in connection with unlawful demand for property/dowry are not alleged against her. The bald allegations made against her sister-in-law seem to suggest the anxiety of the informant to rope in as many of the husband’s relations as possible. Neither the FIR nor the charge-sheet furnished the legal basis to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellant Gowri Ramaswamy. The High Court ought not to have relegated her to the ordeal of trial. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellant Gowri Ramaswamy are hereby quashed and her appeal stands allowed.” In Savitri Devi Vs. Ramesh Chand and others 2003 (3) RCR (Crl.) 823, Delhi High Court observed that there was growing tendency to come out with inflated and exaggerated allegations roping in each and every relation of the husband and if one of them happens to be of higher status or of vulnerable standing, he or she .became an easy prey for better bargaining and blackmailing. In Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs. Union of Indian and others 2005 (3) RCR (Crl.) 745, where the constitutionality of Section 498-A IPC was considered and upheld, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in such type of cases the “action” and not the “section” may be vulnerable and the Court by upholding the provisions of law may still set aside the action, order or decision and grant appropriate relief to the persons aggrieved. In para 17, their lordships, while dealing with dowry menace observed as follows: “The object of the provision is prevent of the dowry menace. But as he (sic) has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bonafide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignomy (ignominy?) suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignomy (ignominy?) suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to unscrupul persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the existing framework. As noted above the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used a shield and not an assassin’s weapon. If cry of “wolf” is made too often as a prank, assistance and protection may not be available when the actual “wolf” appears. There is no question of investigation agency and Courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any pre-conceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide available and generalized statement. Certain statutory presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the Courts is that of watch dog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that an innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally undisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the Courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. It should be their effort to see that an innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally undisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the Courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.” In view of what has been stated above, I find that a case is made out for exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing the complaint and the summoning order in so far as they relate to the petitioners. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The complaint dated 8.10.2004 filed by the respondent and the order passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class on 19.12.2005, in so far as they relate to the summoning of the present petitioners under Sections 323, 49B-A, 406,506 and 120-8 IPC, are quashed. Nothing stated above shall be construed as an expression or opinion on the merits of the case in so far as it relates to the remaining two accused, namely, Shankar Lal and Smt. Tulsi Devi. ——————————