JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Shri A.K. Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioner. 2. The writ petition is directed against the order dated 21st February, 2007 passed by the Dy. Collector, Atrauli, District-Aligarh restoring the fair price licence of respondent No. 3 and directing that the agreement executed in favour of the petitioner shall remain inoperative. 3. The facts in brief as stated in the writ petition are that the respondent No. 3 was authorised dealer of essential commodities in Village Tewtu Block Bijauli, District-Aligarh. On certain complaints, Dy. Collector, Atrauli, District-Aligarh i.e. respondent No. 2 suspended his licence on 28th December, 2002 and ultimately cancelled the same by his order dated 28th January, 2003. The respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal No. 14 of 2002-03 against the cancellation order dated 28th January, 2003 before the Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra which was pending and in the meantime, the Gram Sabha passed a resolution on 2nd March, 2003 pursuant whereto the fair price dealership was allotted to the petitioner by an order dated 10th April, 2003. The Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra allowed the appeal of the respondent No. 3 vide order dated 27.11.2006, set aside the cancellation order dated 28th January, 2003 and remanded the matter to the Dy. Collector, Atrauli for passing a fresh order in the light of the directions contained in the appellate order and till the matter is decided by the Dy. Collector, to maintain status quo, since during the pendency of the appeal, the dealership was granted to the petitioner who was supplying essential commodities to the consumers. The Dy. Collector after remand, passed impugned order dated 21st February, 2007 restoring the dealership of the respondent No. 3, as a consequence whereof, the dealership of the petitioner has been made inoperative. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that neither he was impleaded as a party in the appeal nor before the Dy. Collector though having been granted dealership during the pendency of the appeal, she was a necessary party and without giving an opportunity to the petitioner her dealership could not have been cancelled. 5. However, I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission. The petitioner admittedly was granted fair price shop dealership as a result of cancellation of licence of the respondent No. 3. 5. However, I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission. The petitioner admittedly was granted fair price shop dealership as a result of cancellation of licence of the respondent No. 3. The respondent No. 3 has right to challenge his cancellation order, and in those proceedings, the petitioner can neither be said to be a proper or necessary party at any stage. On the contrary, the petitioner’s rights having been created during the pendency of the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 3 were evidently subject to the result of those proceedings and shall abide by the result thereof. 6. A similar controversy came up before this Court in Nand Lal Maurya v. State of U.P., 2002 (1) JCLR 738 , where rejecting a similar argument this Court held : “but he has not been impleaded as party in the plaint filed by the erstwhile licensee. This argument is fallacious. The petitioner has no right because he has been allotted the shop as a consequence of the cancellation of licence of the then existing licensee. The above existing licence has every right to challenge the cancellation of his shop and once his cancellation order is set aside, the dealership automatically goes to him. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the petitioner is either a necessary or proper party and therefore, non-impleadment of the petitioner as a party will not vitiate.” 7. Again in Shiv Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P. and others, 2005(2) JCLR 190, a similar issue, almost identical to the facts of this case, came up for consideration and this Court held as under : “The issue between the parties is as to what is the consequence of the order dated 27th January, 2004, whether in consequence of the order dated 27th January, 2004 the supply of the petitioner was also to be restored or not. The answer of the question is to be found out from the order dated 27th January, 2004 itself. The appeal was filed against the cancellation order and the appellate Court has every jurisdiction to pass any order in the appeal. The appellate Court while deciding the appeal against the cancellation order can set aside the cancellation and restore the shop, can set-aside the cancellation and remand the matter and can pass any other order. The appeal was filed against the cancellation order and the appellate Court has every jurisdiction to pass any order in the appeal. The appellate Court while deciding the appeal against the cancellation order can set aside the cancellation and restore the shop, can set-aside the cancellation and remand the matter and can pass any other order. In the present case, the order dated 27th January, 2004 against the cancellation order dated 24th October, 2001 was not an order finally deciding the controversy. The appellate Court remanded the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer to decide the cancellation afresh due to the reason that reply of the petitioner given to the show-cause notice has not been considered by the Sub-Divisional Officer and further no reasons were given by the Sub-Divisional Officer for not accepting the report of the Supply Officer dated 23rd October, 2001. The appellate Court, thus, intended that fresh order be passed as to whether the shop of the petitioner is liable to be cancelled or not. The appellate Court’s order did not direct for restoration of the supply of the petitioner. However, one of the consequences of the order dated 27th January, 2004 is that allotment of the shop made consequent to the cancellation will come to an end. The shop of respondent No. 3, admittedly, was given after cancellation of petitioner’s shop and after setting aside the cancellation order dated 27th January, 2004, the consequential act of allotment in favour of respondent No. 3 automatically came to an end. This Court has already taken this view in writ petition filed by respondent No. 3 being Writ Petition No. 7525 of 2004 which was dismissed by this Court on 23rd February, 2004. The consequence of the order dated 27th January, 2004 is that position prior to cancellation of the agreement i.e. prior to 24th October, 2001 was to be restored. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be held that in consequence of the order dated 27th January, 2004 the supply of the petitioner ought to have been restored. The Sub-Divisional Officer committed error in passing the order dated 26th February, 2004 restoring the supply of the petitioner. The order of the appellate authority dated 9th July, 2004 up to that extent impugned in the writ petition cannot be faulted. The Sub-Divisional Officer committed error in passing the order dated 26th February, 2004 restoring the supply of the petitioner. The order of the appellate authority dated 9th July, 2004 up to that extent impugned in the writ petition cannot be faulted. However, the order of Sub-Divisional Officer dated 26th February, 2004 by which he stopped the supply of respondent No. 3 was a correct order. After setting aside of the order dated 24th October, 2001, the allotment in favour of respondent No. 3 automatically falls on the ground and the appellate Court ought not to have set-aside the entire order dated 25/26th February, 2004." 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner could not place any provision or authority before the Court to show that the petitioner was a necessary and proper party and even if the dealership of the respondent No. 3 could have been restored, yet the petitioner would have been entitled to continue her dealership which was granted as a result of cancellation of fair price shop dealership of the respondent No. 3. 9. In view of aforesaid, I do not find any reason to interfere with the order impugned in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed in limine. ————