ORDER S. Shanmugavelayutham, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has come forward with this petition seeking the relief of quashing the proceedings initiated against him by the respondent/complainant for the alleged offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 2. The learned Senior Counsel contended that the main ground raised for quashing the proceedings in this petition is that the respondent/complainant initiated the proceedings on the basis of the second notice dated 27.1.2005 and no complaint was filed by the respondent/complainant after issuing the first notice dated 13.9.2004 and it is contended that the cause of action arose in this case only from the date of issue of first notice dated 13.9.2004. It is pointed out by the learned senior counsel that the respondent/complainant represented the cheque again and after dishonour of the cheque, issued the second notice dated 27.1.2005 and thereafter, filed the complaint after complying the mandatory requirements contemplated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 3. The learned senior counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in a case in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar AIR 1998 SC 3043 reported in : (1998) 6 SCC 514 (1999) MLJ (Crl) 39 : to the proposition that the cause of action arose only once as the payee can present the cheque any number of times during the period of its validity and on such presentation and its dishonour a fresh right, and not cause of action accrues in his favour. Once the payee gives a notice under Clause (b) of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time, he would be liable for the offence and the cause of action for filing the compliant will arise. 4. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that earlier notice dated 13.9.2004 was issued to the wife of the petitioner herein and therefore, it is to be construed that the earlier notice was served on the petitioner, the accused in this case, as he is none else than the husband of Annakili, roprietrix of Dhaksha Enterprises, Madurai. 4. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that earlier notice dated 13.9.2004 was issued to the wife of the petitioner herein and therefore, it is to be construed that the earlier notice was served on the petitioner, the accused in this case, as he is none else than the husband of Annakili, roprietrix of Dhaksha Enterprises, Madurai. It is also submitted by the learned senior counsel that even in the complaint in his case, the cause title is mentioned as the complainant v. the accused, the petitioner herein Murugan, H/o. Annakili, Dhaksha Enterprises, Madurai. Therefore, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel that the present complaint filed on the basis of the second notice dated 27.1.2005 is barred by limitation and the cause of action arose through the serving of the first notice dated 13.9.2004 served on the wife of the accused/the petitioner herein, viz., Annakili. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel and also perused the other materials, viz., the notice dated 13.9.2004 addressed to the wife of the accused, the petitioner herein and the notice dated 27.1.2005. 6. At the outset, I am unable to accept the contention raised by the learned senior counsel to the effect that the present complaint is barred by limitation as the complainant initiated the present proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the basis of the second notice dated 27.1.2005 for the simple reason that the earlier notice was served on the wife of the accused and as far as the petitioner, the accused is concerned, it is the admitted version that the complainant sent the statutory notice dated 27.1.2005 for the simple reason that the earlier notice was served on the wife of the accused and as far as the petitioner, the accused is concerned, it is the admitted version that the complainant sent the statutory notice dated 27.1.2005 for the first time. Therefore, the question of complainant initiating proceedings under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act against the accused on the basis of the second notice is not at all arise. The one and only notice received by the accused, as stated, is the notice dated 27.1.2005. 7. For the better understanding of the facts of the case, it is necessary to highlight the averments and allegations contained in the complaint preferred by the respondent herein. The one and only notice received by the accused, as stated, is the notice dated 27.1.2005. 7. For the better understanding of the facts of the case, it is necessary to highlight the averments and allegations contained in the complaint preferred by the respondent herein. A perusal of the complaint discloses that the accused is managing the proprietary concern Dhaka Enterprises” and also the authorised signatory of the concern. The wife of the accused Annakili is the proprietrix of the concern. There was an agreement dated 26.8.2002 between the complainant and the accused and his wife for supply of their products. The accused has received an advance amount of Rs.2, 00, 000/- from the complainant for the supply of the products and the accused also issued a receipt for the same. It is also specifically mentioned in the complaint that though the wife of the accused is the proprietrix, the entire transaction took place between the accused and the complainant as the above said amount was received only by the accused. It is further stated in the complaint that the accused not supplied the goods, as agreed and also accepted and agreed to return the advance amount with interest and issued a cheque for a sum of Rs.2, 40, 000/- towards the advance and interest. 8. It is stated that on the presentation of the above said cheque, the cheque was returned as the same was dishonoured for “Funds Insufficient” and on intimation, the accused has paid a sum of Rs.15, 000/- through a bank draft and promised to pay the balance amount. Thereafter, the accused issued, in favour of the complainant, a cheque bearing No.388954 dated 27.8.2004 for Rs. 2, 23, 300/- drawn on ICICI Bank Limited, Jeyanager Branch, Bangalore, covering the advance amount and interest due. The complainant presented the cheque for collection through Global Trust Bank Limited, now absorbed by Oriental Bank of Commerce, Coimbatore, and the said cheque was also dishonoured on the ground “Funds Insufficient”. It is also stated in the complaint that the previous counsel of the complainant, instead of sending the notice to the accused, by mistake, sent a notice to the wife of the accused and she is not the drawer of the dishonoured cheque and the wife of the accused also replied that she has not issued any cheque as mentioned in the notice. It is further stated in the complaint that thereafter the complainant represented the cheque into their bank, viz., Oriental Bank of Commerce, Coimbatore, and the same was dishonoured on the ground of “Funds Insufficient”‘ as per the Bank memo dated 7.1.2005. The complainant sent a statutory notice dated 27.1.2005 and the statutory notice was served on the accused on 2.2.2005 and thereafter he has not paid the amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice and the present complaint filed by the complainant within the stipulated time, as contemplated under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. 9. Therefore, a perusal of the complaint makes it crystal clear that the complainant has not suppressed about the fact of sending earlier notice to the wife of the accused as same was sent by mistake by his previous counsel and the wife of the accused is not drawer of the dishonoured cheque. 10. In view of the facts of thing case, I am of the considered view that the decision of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (1999) MLJ (Crl) 39 (SC) is not helpful to the petitioner. 11. In the decision the Hon‘ble Apex Court categorically held that the payee can present cheque any number of time during the period of its validity. It is also specifically held by the Apex Court in that decision that once the payee gives a notice under Clause (b) of Section 138 he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time he would be liable for the offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. 12. But in the instant case, the undisputed fact remains that the earlier first notice was not sent and served on the drawer, viz., the accused and only the second notice dated 27.1.2005 addressed to the drawer of the cheque, viz., the accused and the petitioner herein and therefore, the cause of action arise only from the date of serving the statutory notice dated 27.1.2005. 13. It is also relevant to note and consider the later decision of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. AIR 2001 SC 676 : (2001) 6 SCC 463 : (2001) MLJ (Crl.) 388. : 14. 13. It is also relevant to note and consider the later decision of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. AIR 2001 SC 676 : (2001) 6 SCC 463 : (2001) MLJ (Crl.) 388. : 14. In that decision, the complainant sent the first notice to the accused and the accused claimed to have received only empty envelope and further requested the complainant to send the contents, if any. The complainant, in turn represented the cheque again thereafter, on the dishonour of the cheque, sent a second notice of the dishonour of the cheque and demanded payment. The second notice was received by the accused and he did not make any payment and as a result, the complainant filed the complaint. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court has held that such complaint is maintainable. It is has held by the Apex Court that: “The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was enacted and Section 138 thereof incorporated with a specified object of making a special provision by incorporating a strict liability so far as the cheque, a negotiable instrument, is concerned. The law relating to negotiable instruments is the law of commercial would legislated to facilitate the activities in trade and commerce making provision of giving sanctity to the instruments of credit which could be deemed to be convertible into money and easily passable from one person to another. The laws relating to the Act are, therefore, required to be interpreted in the light of the object intended to be achieved by it despite there being deviations from the litigants. Efforts to defeat the objects of law by resorting to innovation measures and methods are to be discouraged. Section 138 of the Act makes a civil transaction to be an offence by fiction of law. To constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act, the complainant is obliged to prove its ingredients which include the receipt which makes the accused under clause (b). It is not the “giving” of the notice which makes the offence but it is the “receipt” of the notice by the drawer which gives the cause of action to the complainant to file the complaint within the statutory period.” The Hon‘ble Supreme Court has further held in that decision as follows: Section 27 of the General Clauses Act deals with the presumption of service of a letter sent by post. The dispatcher of a notice has, therefore, a right to insist upon and claim the benefit of such a presumption. But as the presumption is a rebuttable one, he has two options before him. One is to concede to stand of the sendee that as a matter of fact he did not receive the notice, and the other is to contest the sendee's stand and take the risk for proving that he, in fact, received the notice. If he opts for the former, he can afford to take appropriate steps for the effective service of notice upon the addressee. Such a course was adopted by the appellant company in the present case and the complainant filed, admittedly, within limitation from the date of the notice of service conceded to have been served upon the respondents. Concededly in response to the notice sent by the appellant on 13.6.1998, the respondents sent their letter dt. 20.6.1998 which the appellant received on 30.6.1998, the day on which the period of limitation on the basis of earlier notice was to expire. The appellants exercised the option to accept the averments made by the respondents in their letter dated 20.6.1998 and issued a fresh notice after again presenting the cheque. The respondents have not denied the issuance of their letter dated 20.6.1998. Despite admitting its contents, they opted to approach the High Court for quashing the proceedings merely upon assumption, presumption and conjectures. They tried to blow hot and cold in the same breath stating on the one hand that the notice of dishonour had not received by them and the other praying for dismissal of the complaint on the plea that the complaint was barred by time in view of the notice served by the appellant, which they had not received. The plea of the respondents was not only contradictory, and an afterthought, but apparently carved out to resist the claim of the complainant and thereby frustrate the provisions of law. The High Court fell in error by not referring to the letter of the respondents dated 20.6.1998 and quashing the proceedings merely by reading a line from the complaint. The receipt of the second notice has concededly not been denied by the respondents. Therefore, the order of the High Court quashing the complaint filed by the appellant is set aside.” 15. The receipt of the second notice has concededly not been denied by the respondents. Therefore, the order of the High Court quashing the complaint filed by the appellant is set aside.” 15. The Hon‘ble Apex Court has also considered in the decision cited supra, the earlier decision in a case in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (supra) 16. This Court is of the considered view that the principle laid down in the decision of the Apex Courtcited supra, is squarrely applicable to the facts of the instant case. 17. In this case also, the undisputed fact remains that the accused, viz., the petitioner herein received only second statutory notice dated 27.1.1005. It is pertinent to note even in that notice dated 27.1.2005, the complainant has mentioned about sending the earlier notice be mistake to the wife of the accused as she is not a drawer of the dishonoured cheque and as such the notice was sent by mistake by their counsel. Subsequently, the complainant represented the cheque and on dishonour of the cheque issued the present statutory notice dated 27.1.2005 and the notice, was also admittedly received by the accused the petitioner herein and thereafter he gave the notice within the stipulated time and also filed the complaint in time by following the mandatory requirements as contemplated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 18. Therefore, there is absolutely no ground made out by the petitioner for quashing the proceedings initiated against the petitioner in C.C. No. 494 of 2005 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.V. Coimbatore for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 19. For the aforesaid reasons, the quash petition is dismissed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. Petitions closed.