S. S. NIJJAR, CJ. ( 1 ) AIRPORTS Authority of India has filed this Letters Patent appeal against the judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge (Justice pratap Kumar Ray) on 23rd February, 2007 in W. P. No 8256 (W) of 2005 (Pradip kumar Banerjee and Ors. vs. Airports Authority of India and Ors, ). By the aforesaid judgment, the learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside the order of suspension passed against respondent No. 1 with the further direction to reinstate him in service with all consequential benefits within a month from the date of the order and to continue his salary allowances and service benefits in accordance with law. ( 2 ) THE substantial question of law which arises in this appeal is whether an employee acquitted by the Criminal Court of criminal charges would be automatically entitled to be reinstated in the service. Further, is the employer debarred from holding a departmental enquiry on the same allegations which formed the subject-matter of the criminal prosecution. ( 3 ) WE may briefly, notice the relevant facts. respondent No. 1 was working as an Assistant Engineer in the Kolkata office of the Airport Authority of India in the year 1991. His duty, inter alia, was to supervise various construction works done by different contractors. All labour payments were made in his presence on the basis of certificates issued by him. On a complaint made by one, Shibnath Paramanik, the representative of M/s. Tara Sankar Construction company, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) laid a trap and he was caught "red handed" while accepting bribe. It seems that respondent had also admitted his guilt before the CBI. A criminal case was started against him. He was detained in police custody from 30th April, 1991 for more than 48 hours. By office order dated 6th May, 1991 he was placed under suspension with effect from 30th April, 1991. ( 4 ) BY judgment and order dated 10. 12. 1999 passed in Special Case No. 8 of 1993, the 1" Special Court at Alipore found respondent No. 1 guilty of offences punishable under sections 7 and 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of corruption Act. The 1st Special Court was of the view that appellant should be sentenced for imprisonment for the minimum period. 12. 1999 passed in Special Case No. 8 of 1993, the 1" Special Court at Alipore found respondent No. 1 guilty of offences punishable under sections 7 and 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of corruption Act. The 1st Special Court was of the view that appellant should be sentenced for imprisonment for the minimum period. Accordingly he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-in default, rigorous imprisonment for three moths more. However, in view of the conviction of respondent No. 1, the competent disciplinary authority by order dated 13th July, 2000 dismissed him from service under Regulation 26 of international Airport Authority of India (IAAI) Employees' (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1987. Respondent No. 1 filed a Departmental appeal against the order of dismissal, which was rejected on 8/20th November, 2000 by the (appellant) appellate authority. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved against the order of dismissal and the order of the appellate authority, the respondent No. 1 filed Writ Application No. 22034 (W)of 2000. This writ petition was disposed of by learned Single Judge of this court directing that in the event of acquittal by the Criminal Appeal Court, it would be open to the petitioner to make appropriate representation before the airport authority for consideration of his case for reinstatement. In coming to the conclusion, learned Single Judge relied upon a judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Director of Collegiate Educntion (Admn.) vs. V. S. Nagoor meera, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1364 . ( 6 ) THE criminal appeal filed by respondent No. 1 against the conviction and I sentence was allowed by this Court on 16th July 2004. The order of conviction and sentence was set aside and the appellant was acquitted. After acquittal, respondent No. 1 filed a representation praying for reinstatement in service. However, since the employer took no action, respondent No. 1 again moved writ Application No. W. P. 21324 (W) of 2004. Judgment dated 22. 12. 2004 the writ petition was disposed of by this Court with the direction to the Chairman of the airport authority, who is the appellate authority, to dispose of the representation filed by respondent No. 1. ( 7 ) CONSIDERING the representation filed by the respondent No. 1 and after giving him personal hearing, the appellate authority by order dated 24. 03. ( 7 ) CONSIDERING the representation filed by the respondent No. 1 and after giving him personal hearing, the appellate authority by order dated 24. 03. 2005 set aside the order dated 13. 07. 2000, imposing penalty of dismissal from service and placed respondent No. 1 under suspension with effect from 13th July, 2000. Respondent No. 1 challenged the aforesaid order of suspension by filing the present writ petition. During the pendency of the writ petition, departmental proceeding was initiated and chargesheet was served on respondent No. 1 through Charged Memo dated 7th September, 2005. Therefore, he had filed can No. 9915 of 2005 in which he had sought for quashing of the Memorandum dated 7th September, 2005. The application was directed to be heard along with main matter. By an interim order this Court directed slay of departmental proceedings till disposal of the writ application. ( 8 ) IT is not disputed that the factual allegations in the criminal proceedings and the allegations in the departmental proceedings are identical, witnesses of both proceedings are identical and documents relied upon also are identical. By judgement and order dated 23rd February, 2007, the learned Single Judge, justice Pratap Kumar Ray, ordered reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 along with allowances and service benefits. The appellants have also been directed to "allow the joining of the writ petitioner forthwith and the release all arrear salary and service benefits within a month from this date and to continue his salary, allowances and service benefits in accordance with law. " Hence, the appeal by the Airport Authority of India. ( 9 ) AT the motion stage we declined to grant the stay of the judgment but fixed the final hearing of the appeal on 13th June, 2007. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has submitted that acquittal of respondent No. 1 cannot put an embargo on the right of the employer to conduct a departmental enquiry. According to learned Counsel, even when an employee is acquitted, the judgment passed by the Criminal Court has to be scrutinized by the employer to determine as to whether the employee is entitled to be reinstated in service or any further departmental proceedings have to be initiated against the delinquent employee. According to learned Counsel, even when an employee is acquitted, the judgment passed by the Criminal Court has to be scrutinized by the employer to determine as to whether the employee is entitled to be reinstated in service or any further departmental proceedings have to be initiated against the delinquent employee. In the present case, undoubtedly, the service conditions of the employees of the Airport Authority of India are governed by the Airports Authority of India Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 2003. These regulations have been made in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) read with clause (b) of sub-section (2)of section 42 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 by the Central government. Therefore, these regulations being statutory in nature are binding on all the employees of the appellate authority. Respondent No. 1 has been suspended under Regulation 23. This regulation provides that where a penalty of dismissal imposed upon an employee is declared void by a Court of Law, and where the disciplinary authority decides to hold a further inquiry against the employee on the basis of which penalty of dismissal was imposed, the employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the competent authority from the date of original order of dismissal. The chargesheet has been issued to respondent No. 1 after due scrutiny of the entire material including the judgments of the Criminal Courts by the appellate authority. After due scrutiny it has been found by the appellate authority that even though respondent No. 1 has been acquitted of the criminal charges, he was involved in serious misconduct. He had been caught red handed while accepting bribe from a contractor. The respondent No. 1 has not been acquitted on the ground that there was no evidence against him. He has been acquitted only on benefit of doubt. The ground of his acquittal was that there was not sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of respondent No. 1 beyond reasonable doubt. This acquittal cannot be equated to a finding of innocence. It is not a case of complete exoneration. In the departmental proceedings an employee can be given a major punishment including punishment of dismissal in case serious charges of misconduct are established against him. In establishing the charge against the delinquent employee it would not be necessary for the employer to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. It is not a case of complete exoneration. In the departmental proceedings an employee can be given a major punishment including punishment of dismissal in case serious charges of misconduct are established against him. In establishing the charge against the delinquent employee it would not be necessary for the employer to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. It would be sufficient to lead such evidence which would establish the charge on balance of probabilities. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has erred in law in foreclosing the option of the employer to conduct a departmental enquiry into the serious charges which have been levelled against the respondent No. 1. In such circumstances, the airport authority would be entitled to hold a regular departmental enquiry against respondent No. 1. ( 11 ) IN support of his submission, the learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon a number of judgments of the Supreme Court, namely, Ajit Kumar nag vs. General Manager, reported in 2005 (7) SCC 764 south Bengal State Transport Corporation vs. Swapan Kumar Mitra, reported in 2006 AIR SCW 768; Banshi Dhar vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. , reported in 2007 (1) SCC 324 ; deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) vs. V. S. Nagoor Meera, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1364 ; Commissioner of Police, New Delhi vs. Narender Singh, reported in 2006 (4) SCC 265 . ( 12 ) ON the other hand, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that the learned Single Judge has correctly come to the conclusion that on acquittal respondent No. 1 is entitled to reinstatement, he has been acquitted by the Appeal Court as the case put forward by the prosecution had been disbelieved. The learned Single Judge has come to this conclusion on consideration of the language of the Appeal Court while assessing the evidence led by the prosecution. The learned Single Judge has made particular reference to the observations of the Appellate Court that "there was no such event of said shady transaction as alleged. The learned Single Judge has come to this conclusion on consideration of the language of the Appeal Court while assessing the evidence led by the prosecution. The learned Single Judge has made particular reference to the observations of the Appellate Court that "there was no such event of said shady transaction as alleged. " Thereafter, the learned Single Judge has observed as follows : "the finding and observation in the criminal appeal clearly lead this Court to conclude that the acquittal was on merit on assessing the evidence and materials due to the findings, namely, "that there was no materials to believe about the shady transaction as alleged and further on holding that there was a heavy shadow on the substratum of the prosecution case that money was paid as a gratification to the accused. " ( 13 ) THESE observations according to the learned Counsel make it abundantly clear that the respondent No. 1 had been acquitted, as there was no material against him. This conclusion of the learned Single Judge, according to the learned Counsel, is further buttressed by the following observations mode by the Appeal Court while allowing the criminal appeal: "hardly I find any material to place my reliance on such evidence so as to hold that really some sort of shady transaction as has been alleged from the side of the prosecution was going on in between the appellant on one side and P. W. 1 on the other". Even further the Hon'ble Appeal Court has held that : "due to non-mentioning of the important fact in the pre-trap memo that some arrangement was made for keeping the flash door partly open giving the witnesses a scope to see and hear out the conversation as was going on inside the aforesaid chamber, it is very hard to believe that the person concerned involved in such shady transaction would dare to carry out such transaction in presence of some unknown persons. " ( 14 ) TAKING into consideration all these observations made by the learned appellate Court the learned Single Judge has further come to the conclusion that: 'hence, on a bare reading of the findings of the Hon'ble Appeal Court it appears that the alleged charge that the writ petitioner was caught red handed by the CBI trap on 13th April, 1991 while taking the bribe was wholly disbelieved by the Criminal Court. Though the language used "benefit of doubt" for passing a judgment of acquittal, this Court is of the view due to aforesaid clear findings that the judgment of acquittal was on merit and it was a case of "hon'ble Acquittal. " ( 15 ) LEARNED Counsel submits that the aforesaid observations clearly indicate that respondent No. 1 had been acquitted as there was no evidence against him. He is therefore clearly entitled to reinstatement. In support of his submission, learned Counsel for the appellant has placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of G. M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. , reported in 2006 (5) SCC 446 . He has also referred to the judgments in the case of R. P. Kapur vs. Union of India and Anr. , reported in AIR 1964 SC 787 ; capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr. , reported in AIR 1999 SC 1416 ; State of Orissa and Ors. vs. Md. Illiyas, reported in 2006 (1) SCC 275 ; Banshi Dhar vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. , reported in 2007 (1) SCC 324 ; deputy Director of Collegiate Education (Adnn.) vs. V. S. Nagoor Meera, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1364 . ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsel further argued that the enquiry which is to be conducted on the basis of the chargesheet, now served on respondent No. 1, is a mere eye wash as the disciplinary authority has already decided to punish him. This is evident from the noting made in the official record. The employer is merely acting on the advice given by the CBI. Therefore, the entire proceedings are vitiated. ( 17 ) WE have anxiously considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. Before we consider the fact situation in this case, it may be more appropriate to consider the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel. In the case of S. Nagoor Meera (supra) the two Judges' Bench of the Supreme court was dealing with an appeal filed by the management. The respondent therein had been issued a show-cause notice calling upon him as to why he should not be dismissed from service in view of the conviction by the Criminal court. The show-cause notice expressly recited that inasmuch as the High Court has only suspended the sentence, his conviction is still in force. The respondent therein had been issued a show-cause notice calling upon him as to why he should not be dismissed from service in view of the conviction by the Criminal court. The show-cause notice expressly recited that inasmuch as the High Court has only suspended the sentence, his conviction is still in force. The respondent challenged the show-cause notice by filing an Original Application in the Tamil nadu Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal' ). His submission, which was upheld by the Tribunal was that inasmuch as the sentence imposed upon him by the Criminal Court has been suspended by the appellate Court (High Court), no proceedings can be taken for terminating his service under and with reference to clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The Tribunal allowed the Original application and quashed the show-cause notice. The correctness of the aforesaid order was questioned by the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education in appeal. ( 18 ) THE Supreme Court held as under: 8. We need not, however, concerns ourselves any more with the power of the Appellate Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the reason that what is relevant for clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) is the "conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge" and there can be no question of suspending the conduct. We are, therefore, of the opinion that taking proceedings for and passing orders of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a Government servant who has been convicted by a criminal Court is not barred merely because the sentence or order is suspended by the Appellate Court or on the ground that the said Government servant-accused has been released on bail pending the appeal. 10. What is really relevant thus is the conduct of the Government servant which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. Now, in this case, the respondent has been found guilty of corruption by a Criminal Court. Until the said conviction is set aside by the Appellate or other High Court, it may not be advisable to retain such person in service. As stated above, if he succeeds in appeal or other proceeding, the matter can always be reviewed in such a manner that he suffers no prejudice. Until the said conviction is set aside by the Appellate or other High Court, it may not be advisable to retain such person in service. As stated above, if he succeeds in appeal or other proceeding, the matter can always be reviewed in such a manner that he suffers no prejudice. ' ( 19 ) IN the case of Ajit Kumnr Nag (supra) the three-Judges' Bench of the supreme Court has held as hereunder : "11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a Criminal Court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well-settled. Acquittal by a Criminal Court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the rules and regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be convicted by a Court of Law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a Criminal Court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a Criminal Court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside. " ( 20 ) IN the case of South Bengal State Transport Corporation (supra) (the two-Judges' Bench of Supreme Court) it has been held that : "10. Similarly in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathamthitta and Ors. vs. A. Gopalan, 1977 (11) SCC 239, the view expressed in Nelson Motis vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) was fully endorsed by this Court and similarly it was held that the nature and scope of proof in a criminal case is very different from that of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and order of acquittal in the former, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings. This court has further held that in a criminal case change has to be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceeding the standard of proof for proving the charge is mere preponderance of probabilities. Such being the position of law now settled by various decisions of this Court, two of which have already been referred to earlier, we need not deal in detail with the question whether acquittal in a criminal case will lead to holding that the departmental proceedings should also be discontinued. That being the position, an order of removal from service emanating from a departmental proceeding can very well be passed, even after acquittal of the delinquent employee in a criminal case. In any case, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench did not base their decisions relying on the proposition that after acquittal in the criminal case departmental proceedings could not be continued and order of removal could not be passed. " ( 21 ) IN the case of Banshi Dhar (supra) (the two-Judges' Bench of the Supreme court) the Supreme Court considered the question with regard to grant of back wages, if an employee is reinstated on being acquitted in the criminal case. In this case, the appellant had been convicted under section 5 (1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act read with section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. In this case, the appellant had been convicted under section 5 (1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act read with section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. He was placed under suspension during the pendency of the trial and on conviction he was dismissed from service. He was, however, acquitted by the High Court in appeal. In the meantime, the appellant had reached the age of superannuation. He, thereafter, filed a writ petition which was disposed of by the learned Single judge of the High Court with the direction that in the event he files the representation before the competent officer with regard to pension, the same may be considered within a period of three months therefrom. The appeal filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge was dismissed by the learned division Bench. The employee approached the Supreme Court by challenging the orders of the learned Single Bench and Division Bench of the High Court as both the Courts had denied the back wages to him. Considering the facts and situation in that case, it has been held as follows : "9. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to grant of back wages. Each case has to be determined on its own facts. A grave charge of criminal misconduct was alleged against him. He was also found guilty of the charges levelled against him by the Special Judge. The High Court while delivering its judgment dated 16. 1. 2001 in SB Criminal Appeal No. 68 of 1985 inter alia held that the prosecution has not been able to prove that any demand had been made by him. 10. It is now a trite law that judgment of acquittal itself would not have exonerated him of the charges levelled against him. He could have been proceeded against in a departmental proceeding, (See Manager, Reserve Bank of India vs. S. Mani and Commr. of Police vs. Narender Singh ). 11. Departmental proceedings, however, could not be held as on the date of passing of the judgment of acquittal, he had already reached his age of superannuation. He could have been proceeded against in a departmental proceeding, (See Manager, Reserve Bank of India vs. S. Mani and Commr. of Police vs. Narender Singh ). 11. Departmental proceedings, however, could not be held as on the date of passing of the judgment of acquittal, he had already reached his age of superannuation. The learned Counsel may be right that the decisions of this Court referred to hereinbefore involved the respective appellants therein on charge of murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, but, as noticed, it has also been laid down that each case has to be considered on its own facts. The High Court refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction having regard to the aforementioned decision of this Court in Ranchhodji chaturji Thakore. We do not see any reason to take a different view. Grant of back wages, it is well-settled, is not automatic. Even in cases where principles of natural justice have been held to have not been complied with, while issuing a direction of reinstatement, this Court had directed placing of the delinquent employee under suspension. " ( 22 ) IN Narender Singh's case (supra) (the two-Judges' Bench of Supreme court) it has been held that: "13. It is now well-settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed. " ( 23 ) IN the case of G. M. Tank (supra) (the two-Judges' Bench) the Supreme court has observed as follows : 20. It is thus seen that this is a case of no evidence. There is no iota of evidence against the appellant to hold that the appellant is guilty of having illegally accumulated excess income by way of gratification. The respondent failed to prove the charges levelled against the appellant. It is not in dispute that the appellant being a public servant used to submit his yearly property return relating to his movable and immoveable property and the appellant has also submitted his return in the year 1975 showing his entire movable and immovable assets. No query whatsoever was ever raised about the movable and immovable assets of the appellant. It is not in dispute that the appellant being a public servant used to submit his yearly property return relating to his movable and immoveable property and the appellant has also submitted his return in the year 1975 showing his entire movable and immovable assets. No query whatsoever was ever raised about the movable and immovable assets of the appellant. In fact, the respondent did not produce any evidence in support of and/or about the alleged charges levelled against the appellant. Likewise, the criminal proceedings were initiated against the appellant for the alleged charges punishable under the provisions of the PC Act on the same set of facts and evidence. It was submitted that the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar (verbatim) set of facts and evidence. The appellant has been honourably acquitted by the competent Court on the same set of facts, evidence and witness and, therefore, the dismissal order based on the same set of facts and evidence on the departmental side is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice. 30. The judgments relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the chargesheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr. V. B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnessed examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon the statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The Investigating Officer Mr. V. B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnessed examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon the statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the Criminal Court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. " ( 24 ) IN coining to this conclusion the Supreme Court took into consideration the observations made in two earlier cases, namely, R. P. Kapur vs. Union of india and Anr. , reported in AIR 1964 SC 787 , and Corporation of the City of nagpur and Anr. vs. Ramchandra and Anr. , reported in 1981 (2) SCC 714 . In R. I. Kapur's case (supra) (the five-Judges' Bench), the Supreme Court laid down the law as follows (page 792, para 9) : "9. If the trial of the criminal charge results in conviction. disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant so convicted, even in case of acquittal proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. " ( 25 ) IN Ramchandra's case (supra) (the three-Judges' Bench) the Supreme court observed as follows : "6. The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is in matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the Criminal Court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction in any way fettered. However, as quite some time has elapsed since the departmental inquiry had started the authority concerned will take into consideration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worthwhile to continue the departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal of the respondents, If, however, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the inquiry, it can certainly do so. In case the respondents are acquitted, we direct that the order of suspension shall be revoked and the respondents will be reinstated and allowed full salary thereafter even though the authority chooses to proceed with the inquiry. Mr. Sanghi states that if it is decided to continue the inquiry, as only arguments have to be heard and orders to be passed, he will see that the inquiry is concluded within two months from the date of the decision of the Criminal Court. If the respondents are convicted, then the legal consequences under the rules will automatically follow. " ( 26 ) AS noticed earlier, the Supreme Court distinguished the ratio in the following judgments in the cases of Ajit Kumar Nag (Supra), Depot Manager, a. P. SRTC vs. Mohd. Yousufmiya and Ors. , reported in 1997 (2) SCC 699 , State of A. P. vs. Sree Rama Rao, reported in 1964 (3) SCR 25 , and Krishnakali Tea estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh, reported in 2004 (8) SCC 200 . ( 27 ) WE may also notice here the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Md. Illiyas (supra) (the two-Judges' Bench ). In this case, the Supreme court laid down the law after interpreting the earlier judgments of the Supreme court in the following words: "12. When the allegation is of cheating or deceiving, whether the alleged act is wilful or not depends upon the circumstances of the case concerned and there cannot be any strait-jacket formula. The High Court unfortunately did not discuss the factual aspects and by merely placing reliance on an earlier decision of the Court held that prerequisite conditions were absent. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it, is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it, is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulales: (i) findings or material facts, direct and inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Union of India vs. Dhanwanti Devi ). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament, In Quinn vs. Leathern the Earl of Halsbury, L. C. observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be the exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. " ( 28 ) IN the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) (the two-Judges' Bench)the Supreme Court has held as follows :