Judgment Mohammad Rafiq, J.-Aforesaid two writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners Kishore Singh and Daljeet Singh against the Judgment dated 30.03.1999 passed by the Rajasthan Civil Service Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur whereunder the appeal preferred by respondent Laxmi Kumar Nuval (hereinafter referred as the private respondent) against his supersession by his juniors was allowed with direction to the Government to reconsider his case alongwith the case of the petitioners and other eligible candidates for promotion in merit quota on the post of Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Department of the State for the vacancies of the year 1992-93. 2. The petitioner Kishore Singh upon being selected by Rajasthan Public Service Commission was initially appointed as Assistant Engineer (Civil) in the Irrigation Department sometime in the year 1970. He was thereafter promoted on the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) against the vacancies of the year 1978-79 and then further promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) against the vacancies of the year 1993-94 on the basis of merit. He was then promoted to the post of Additional Chief Engineer vide order dated 02.08.1999 against the vacancies of the year 1999-2000. 3. Similarly, the petitioner Daljeet Singh was also appointed as Assistant Engineer (Civil) on the basis of selection by RPSC sometime in the year 1970. He was thereafter promoted on the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) against the vacancies of the year 1982-83 and then Superintending Engineer (Civil) against the vacancies of the year 1993-94 on the basis of merit. He was also then promoted to the post of Additional Chief Engineer vide order dated 02.08.1999 against the vacancies of the year 1999-2000. 4. Private respondent Laxmi Kumar Nuval, like both the petitioners, was also appointed on the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) on the basis of same selection made by RPSC in the year 1970 in which they were all selected. It is however significant to note that he was placed above petitioners in the merit list prepared by RPSC. He was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) in the year 1978. It is however significant to note that he was placed above petitioners in the merit list prepared by RPSC. He was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) in the year 1978. He was considered for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer against the vacancies of the year 1992-93 and 1993-94 against the vacancies meant for merit quota, but on both the occasions he was not adjudged meritorious enough to be recommended for promotion but thereafter finally he was promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) against the vacancies of the year 1994-95 on the basis of his selection for the vacancies of seniority-cum-merit quota. Aggrieved of his supersession by the petitioners Kishore Singh and Daljeet Singh and their promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer (Civil) vide order dated 06.08.1993, the private respondent filed an appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal (in short the Tribunal). 5. During the course of hearing, the Tribunal called for the original APARs dossiers of the private respondent so as to examine whether or not he has been rightly adjudged not suitable for promotion on the post of Superintending Engineer against the vacancies of the year 1992-93 in the quota of merit. Relevant records of all seven years preceding thereto from the year 1985-86 to 1991-92 was examined. On the basis of examination of original APARs of all those seven years, the Tribunal concluded that service record of private respondent of five years out of these seven years was "very good". The Tribunal in arriving at such satisfaction relied on a Judgment of this Court passed in Prem Prakash Bidyasar vs. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1634 of 1994 decided 08.09.1995 WLR 1996 Page 197 and held that APARs of the private respondent in relation to the year 1989-90 and 1991-92 were recorded in two parts. While in one part of each of these years, his work has been assessed as "very good", in the other part as only "good", but in view of ratio of P.P. Bidyasar, the assessment for both the years shall to be taken as "very good" for the purpose of adjudging the merit of private respondent. While in one part of each of these years, his work has been assessed as "very good", in the other part as only "good", but in view of ratio of P.P. Bidyasar, the assessment for both the years shall to be taken as "very good" for the purpose of adjudging the merit of private respondent. The Tribunal accordingly while allowing appeal directed the Government to hold review DPC for promotion on the post Superintending Engineer against the vacancies of the year 1992-93 in so far as the quota of merit was concerned. It is this Judgment of the Tribunal which is being questioned in the present two writ petitions. 6. I have heard Shri M.S. Singhvi, learned Counsel for the petitioners in both the cases, Shri N.M. Lodha learned Advocate General for the State and Shri R.N. Upadhyay, learned Counsel for the private respondent Shri Laxmi Kumar Nuwal. 7. Shri M.S. Singhvi, learned Counsel for the petitioners argued that the performance of the respondent Laxmi Kumar Nuwal (appellant before the Tribunal) in relation to whole of the years 1989-90 and 1991-92 could not have been rated very good because his APARs for each of the years was recorded in two parts; one as "very good" and other as only "good". This being a matter of fact, the learned Tribunal was not justified in rating the APARs of whole of the year as "very good" . Shri Singhvi argued that the explanation to Rule 24(A)(11) has not been correctly appreciated by the learned single Judge of this Court in P.P. Bidyasar (Supra) which matter, according to him, has not been correctly decided. He argued that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the aforesaid explanation had substituted an earlier explanation w.e.f. 30.11.1991. The earlier explanation provided that for the purpose of selection for promotion on the basis of merit, officers with outstanding or consistently very good record shall only be selected and their names arranged in the order of merit. In view of the Judgment of this Court in the case of Shambhu Singh Meena & Ors. The earlier explanation provided that for the purpose of selection for promotion on the basis of merit, officers with outstanding or consistently very good record shall only be selected and their names arranged in the order of merit. In view of the Judgment of this Court in the case of Shambhu Singh Meena & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1992 (2) WLC 571 (Raj), which was later approved by the Honble Supreme Court in Shambhu Singh Meena vs. State of Rajasthan, 1995 (2) Supp SCC 431, the requirement was that a person for being selected on merit possess very good/outstanding ratings for all seven years in question. The rule making authority however intervened and changed the criteria of merit for the advantage of all concerned by reducing the requisite number of such ratings from seven years to five years, but at the same time indicating its intention that such requirements would be liable to be strictly adhered to and cannot be reduced any further. This, according to Shri Singhvi, becomes evident from the language of the newly inserted explanation which interalia provides that for the purpose of selection for promotion on the basis of merit, no person shall be selected if he does not have outstanding or very good record in at least five out of seven years preceding the year for which DPC is held. The use of the word "at least" in the explanation assumes significance which means that it cannot under any circumstances be less than five years. The requirement of very good/outstanding rating for five years out of seven years has been insisted because the promotion in question is on merit criteria alone and if such requirement is further diluted by permitting inclusion of such candidates who do not have very good or outstanding rating for the whole of the year, the very insistence of the rule making authority that such candidate should at least possess outstanding or very good rating five out of seven years would be frustrated. Shri Singhvi, learned Counsel for the petitioner further argued that the learned Single Judge in P.P. Bidyasar (Supra) has reduced the rigor of the merit of outstanding/very good in relation to two years out of required five years even though the petitioner in that case in those years did not have very good rating for the whole of the year. Shri Singhvi, learned Counsel for the petitioner further argued that the learned Single Judge in P.P. Bidyasar (Supra) has reduced the rigor of the merit of outstanding/very good in relation to two years out of required five years even though the petitioner in that case in those years did not have very good rating for the whole of the year. But if this argument is taken to its logical conclusion, it could even mean that if a person is having very good/outstanding service record in one part of five years out of seven years and good in remaining part of those five years, then too his rating in such five years would have to be treated as very good and he would still be entitled to be considered for promotion against merit quota. 8. In order to buttress his argument especially on interpretation of the word "at least" apart form referring to Judgment s of this Court in Anokh Mal Bhura Lal vs. Chief Panchayat Officer, AIR 1957 (Raj) 388 and Judgment of Allahabad High Court in Kunwar Hari Raj Singh vs. District Magistrate Bijnor, AIR 1992 Allahabad 203, Shri Singhvi referred to the dictionary meaning of the word "at least" from the New Lexicon Websters Dictionary and the Random House Dictionary. Shri Singhvi further argued that the explanation which was replaced by the explanation interpreted by the learned Single Judge in P.P. Bidyasar (Supra) was rather more stringent and if the history of the rule is traced, then it will become clear that the rule making authority wanted minimum five years performance as very good/outstanding out of seven years for promotion on merit quota. According to him, while making interpretation of a rule, entire scheme of the rules with due importance to each of the words used therein and what was the position of earlier rule and what mischief the amended rule intended to suppress, would have to be seen. Shri Singhvi in this connection relied on the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 and Union of India vs. Elphin Stone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 2001 (4) SCC 139 . Shri Singhvi in this connection relied on the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 and Union of India vs. Elphin Stone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 2001 (4) SCC 139 . Shri Singhvi, therefore, prayed that the Judgment of the Tribunal be set-aside and in case it is considered necessary, the Judgment of P.P. Bidyasar (Supra) which according to him has not been correctly decided should be re-considered by making a reference in the matter to a larger bench. 9. Shri N.M. Lodha, learned Additional Advocate General also joined Shri M.S. Singhvi in submitting that the learned Single Judge while deciding P.P. Bidyasar has although noticed the explanation, but has not discussed much in detail about the import and content of the said explanation. According to him, in fact no discussion whatsoever has been made about the interpretation of the said explanation except that it has been noticed with reference to Clause 11 of the instructions laying down guidelines for promotion. He argued that when original explanation containing a similar guideline had provided the prescription of seven out of seven years ACR ratings to be outstanding or very good, which was the ratio of Shambhu Singh Meenas case also, the Government on the basis of consultation and deliberations at the high level purposely decided to relax such requirement by providing that no person shall be selected if he does not have outstanding or very good record in at least five out of seven years preceding the year for which DPC is held. There was, therefore, no escape from the interpretation that five out of seven years outstanding/very good rating was the minimum requirement for consideration of the case of a person for promotion against merit quota. He, therefore, also submitted that law laid down by the learned Single Judge in P.P. Bidyasar needs re-consideration. 10. Shri R.N. Upadhaya, learned Counsel for the respondent Laxmi Kumar Nuwal submitted that his client had although filed the appeal but since during the pendency of writ petition he has already expired, therefore, he appears to have lost interest in the matter and he does not have any instructions in the case. He did not, therefore, wish to make any argument on the merits of the case. 11. He did not, therefore, wish to make any argument on the merits of the case. 11. According to Rule 24(A)(6) of the Rajasthan Service of Engineers and Research Officers (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1954 (for short the Rules of 1954), the selection for promotion to all other higher posts or higher category of posts in the State service, which includes the post of Superintending Engineer also shall be made on the basis of merit and on the basis of seniority-cum-merit in the proportion of 50 : 50. Rule 24(A) (11) and especially its Explanation would be relevant for deciding the present controversy and, therefore, is being reproduced hereunder for the facility of reference : "11(a) "The Committee shall consider the cases of all the senior most persons who are eligible and qualified for promotion to the class of posts concerned under these rules and shall prepare a list containing names of the person found suitable on the basis of seniority-cum-merit and/or on the basis of merit, as the case may be, as per the criteria for promotion laid down in these rules, equal to the number of vacancies determined under rule relating to "Determination of vacancies" of these rules. The list so prepared on the basis of merit, as the case may be, shall be arranged in the order of seniority on the category of posts from which selection is made. (b) The Committee shall also prepare a separate list on the basis of seniority-cum-merit and/or on the basis of merit, as the case may be, as per the criteria for promotion laid down in the rules, containing names of persons equal to the number of persons selection in the list prepared under (a) above to fill temporary or permanent vacancies, which may occur subsequently. The list so prepared on the basis of seniority-cum-merit and/or on the basis of merit shall be arranged in the order of the seniority in the category of posts from which selection shall be made. The list so prepared on the basis of seniority-cum-merit and/or on the basis of merit shall be arranged in the order of the seniority in the category of posts from which selection shall be made. Such a list shall be reviewed and revised by the Departmental Promotion Committee that meets in the subsequent year and that such list shall remain in force till the end of the last day of the next year or till the Departmental Promotion Committee meets, whichever is earlier, such list shall be sent to the Appointing Authority together with annual Confidential Reports/annual performance Appraisal Reports and other Service Record of all the candidates included in the lists as also of those not selected, if any". Explanation.-For the purposes of selection for promotion on the basis of merit no person shall be selected if he does not have "Outstanding" or "Very Good" record in at least five out of the 7 years preceding the year for which D.P.C. is held". 12. The learned Single Judge of this Honble Court in P.P. Bidyasar (Supra) had the occasion to consider a similar Clause 11 of the instructions issued by the Government which prior to its insertion was included in such instructions issued by the Government as guidelines for the purpose of promotion and the same was exactly similarly worded to the explanation which now finds place as Explanation to Sub-rule (11) of Rule 24(A) of the Rules of 1954. It may be significant to note that such similar explanation in the said rule and at the same place exist in almost all State Service Rules. The dispute in P.P. Bidyasar (Supra) was relating to promotion of a number of Rajasthan Administrative Service to selection scale in the quota of merit for the year 1986-87 and relevant period of seven years was from 1979-80 to 1985-86. In that case too, the petitioner had his APAR written in two parts for each of the year 1980-81 and 1981-82 and in one part of which his work had been rated "very good" or "outstanding" but for the remaining he was rated merely "above average". In those facts, the aforesaid explanation came to be considered and interpreted by this Court where the learned Single Judge in Para 7 of the Judgment finally held as under : ". . In those facts, the aforesaid explanation came to be considered and interpreted by this Court where the learned Single Judge in Para 7 of the Judgment finally held as under : ". . .The original record of the Departmental Promotion Committee and the material which was placed before it was called and perused by the Court. In 1979-80 he has been rated as a Good Officer. In the year 1980-81 the reporting officer has certified him to be a very good field officer and reviewing officer has certified his performance to be satisfactory and found him fit for promotion in his turn. In the year 1980-81 he was rated outstanding by the reporting officer, but the reviewing officer rated him above average. In the year 1981-82 again reporting officer rated him as outstanding officer and the reviewing officer endorsed this on outstanding officer and the reviewing officer endorsed this on 28.08.1982. However, in a subsequent report dated 27.09.1982 the reporting officer rated him above average and on 210.1982 the review officer endorsed this. In the year 1982-83 he was again rated as "Very Good" officer and reviewing officer agreed with him. In the year 1983-84 he was again rated as very good officer by the reporting officer and this was endorsed by the reviewing officer. In the year 1984-85 he was rated as average officer. In the year 1985-86 reporting officer rated him above average, but the reviewing officer rated him a very good officer. Four years 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1989-90 he was under suspension and, therefore, no APARs were written. This, out of the period of seven years from 1979-80 to 1985-86 the petitioner had outstanding or very good remarks for the year 1980-81, 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1985-86. It is true that in the year 1980-81 and 1981-82 remarks were written for two periods and in one of which, in each year, the petitioner has been rated as very good or outstanding, but for the period covered by another report for the same year, he has been rated to be above average. The remark, beneficial to the officer will have to be taken in such circumstances to be remark for the year and thus, the petitioner has got five year good or outstanding remarks during the period of seven years which was to be considered for promotion. The remark, beneficial to the officer will have to be taken in such circumstances to be remark for the year and thus, the petitioner has got five year good or outstanding remarks during the period of seven years which was to be considered for promotion. Under the Government instructions, he was eligible for being considered in the merit quota. However, the minutes of the meeting of the review D.P.C. held on 26.02.1993 reviewing the case of the petitioner for promotion to selection scale of R.A.S. show that petitioner was not found fit for promotion on the basis that he was not meritorious enough for promotion to the selection scale of R.A.S. The review D.P.C. has not elaborated on this subject. But it is clear that the petitioner was not found eligible to be considered in merit quota. The words Meritorious enough for promotion to selection scale of R.A.S. on the basis of merit alone would show that the review D.P.C. thought that he was not eligible under the explanation to Clause 11(c) of the Government instructions, as he was not found to have possess outstanding or very good remarks for atleast five out of seven years under consideration. On the basis of the record made available to this Court regarding the APARs of the petitioner, it can be verified that the petitioner possessed five outstanding or very good APARs out of seven years period under consideration. He was, therefore, fully eligible for being considered as meritorious enough to get promotion. The decision of the review D.P.C., therefore, is clearly vitiated and deserves to be quashed". 13. On enquiry from the learned Additional Advocate General it has transpired that the Judgment passed by the learned single Judge in P.P. Bidyasar was subjected to challenge in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 748 of 1995 which was however dismissed. The Judgment of the division bench however does not make any discussion about the argument which are being raised now before this Court with regard to interpretation of Explanation to Rule 24(11)(B), although, it is a fact that the learned division bench upheld the Judgment by holding that on a close scrutiny of material on record, the Court did not find any infirmity in the impugned Judgment . Neither any discussion was made nor any specific finding was recorded by the learned division bench as to the correctness of the interpretation of the said Explanation. 14. A holistic view of the matter with reference to antecedents of the position of rule would reveal that the criteria of promotion on the basis of merit came up for consideration of the division bench of this Court in Shambhu Singh Meenas case (Supra) when the petitioners in that case were promoted to Selection Scale of Rajasthan Administrative Service. The contesting respondents challenged their promotion by filing appeals before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal on the ground that they were not promoted in accordance with the rules in as much a those promotees did not have outstanding or very good record for all the seven years preceding the year of their selection. The Tribunal upheld the challenge and set-aside the orders of their promotion. The writ petitions filed by the petitioners were dismissed by division bench of this Court and thereafter the Honble Supreme Court also dismissed the Special Leave to Petition by upholding the view taken by the division bench. The explanation to Sub-rule 11 of the Rule 24-A of the Rajasthan Administrative Service Rules, 1954 which came up for consideration of the division bench as also of the Honble Supreme Court was as under : "Explanation.-For the purpose of selection for promotion on the basis of merit, officers with "outstanding" or consistently "very good" record shall only be selected and their names arranged in the order of seniority". 15. An argument was sought to be raised before the Honble Supreme Court that as a matter of practice for the purpose of selection for promotion on merit basis a person having five out of seven outstanding or very good rating was considered fit. The Supreme Court on analysis of the entire matter and the rule especially the explanation extracted above held the rule requires that the record of the officer should be outstanding or consistently very good and that would imply that it should be for the entire period under consideration". The Supreme Court on analysis of the entire matter and the rule especially the explanation extracted above held the rule requires that the record of the officer should be outstanding or consistently very good and that would imply that it should be for the entire period under consideration". In that view of the matter, the requirement of rule prior to the omnibus amendment in all the State Service Rules vide notification No. F.7(10)/DOP/A-II/77 dated 30.11.1991 was that a candidate for the purpose of selection on merit should possess outstanding or consistently very good record for last seven years. The aforesaid explanation was however substituted by the omnibus amendment made in all the State Service Rules by the explanation which was considered and interpreted by the learned Single Judge in P.P. Bidyasar (Supra). It should, therefore, be clear that the background in which the new explanation was inserted in the Rules to replace the old one clearly indicate that it was intended to dilute the requirement of seven out of seven years APAR ratings being outstanding/very good and to provide "that no person shall be selected if he does not have "outstanding" or "very good" record in at least five out of the seven years preceding the year for which DPC is held". (underlining mine). 16. It is trite law that history of an enactment and the events that preceded the framing of a particular law can always be looked into for the purpose of guidance in arriving at the true intention of the Legislature and interpretation of the given statute. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (Supra) reiterated this proposition of law while holding that when the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context and the context means the statute as a whole, the previous state of law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it intended to remedy. What I find from the explanation to Rule 24(11)(B) is that the rule making authority has laid much emphasis on the requirement of having minimum five years APAR ratings as "outstanding" or "very good" by emphatically providing that "no person" shall be selected if he does not have "outstanding" or "very good" record in at least five out of the seven preceding years for which DPC is held". The rule making authority has thus used selective words such as "no person", "does not" and "at least" in order of repeatedly emphasis on the requirement of having at least five out of seven APAR ratings as "outstanding" or "very good". The explanation with pointed reference to these three phrases if construed in the historical background in which it has been brought into the rule book by substituting the earlier explanation, makes the intention of the rule making authority clearly evident that it is the bottom line below which no one can be considered as meritorious for promotion in merit quota. 17. The New Lexicon Websters Dictionary, published by Lexicon Publications, Inc. New York in its 1987 Publication has defined the word "least" to mean as under : "least (lest) 1. adj. (superl. Of Little) smallest in size, amount, quality, importance etc. the least (usually after a negative smallest, slightest, nor the least suspicion; 2. n. the smallest amount, it was the least he could do at least as the bare minimum to satisfy legitimate expectations, even if any wider statement could be disputed, at least you should say thing you at the least at a minimum estimate, it will cost twice as much at the least not in the least not in the slightest degree least of all with the smallest, justification, none of us can afford to criticize, you least of all; 3. adv. In the smallest degree". 18. Similarly, the Random House dictionary of the English Language in its 1983 Publication has given the following meaning of word least : "least (lest) adj.. a supri. Of little with less or lesser as compar. 1. smallest in size, amount, degree, etc; slightest : He walked the least distance of all. 2. lowest in consideration or importance. nm. 3. something that is least; the least amount, quantity, degree etc. 4. at least, a. at the lowest estimate or figure : The repairs will cost at least $ 100. 1. smallest in size, amount, degree, etc; slightest : He walked the least distance of all. 2. lowest in consideration or importance. nm. 3. something that is least; the least amount, quantity, degree etc. 4. at least, a. at the lowest estimate or figure : The repairs will cost at least $ 100. b. at any rate :in any case : At least he has an alternative. Also, at the least. 5. not in the least, not in the smallest degree : not at all : I am not in the least concerned about the outcome of the World Series. -adv. 6. superi. Of little with less as compar. To the smallest extent, amount, or degree : Thats the least important of all. He talks least". 19. Although, I have studied the division bench Judgment of this Court in Anokh Mal (Supra) and another division bench Judgment of Allahabad High Court in Kunwar Hari Raj Singh (Supra) cited by Shri M.S. Singhvi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, but in my considered opinion, those Judgment s do not throw any light on the controversy involved in the present case. 20. Constitutional bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co., (Supra) while relying on Heydons case 1984 (3) Co Rep 7a (V) in Para 22 of the Judgment held that in order to properly interpret the provisions of Article 286, it is necessary to consider how the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what was the mischief for which the old law did not provide and the remedy which has been provided by the Constitution to cure that mischief . It would be profitable to extract Para 22 of the said Judgment in extenso : "(22) It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when-"Heydons case, 1584(3) Co Rep 7a(V) was decided that- ". . .for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered : 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act, 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd. .for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered : 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act, 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and 4th.The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief , and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief , and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico." 21. In-In re, Mayfair Property Co., 1898 (2) Ch 28 at Page 35 (W) Lindley M.R. in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydons case (V). In-Eastman Photographic Material Co. vs. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, 1898 AC 571 at Page 576 (X) Earl of Halsbury re-affirmed the rule as follows : "My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the Statute in question, it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and to the ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the later Act which provided the remedy. These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion". It appears to us that this rule is equally applicable to the construction of Article 286 of our Constitution. In order to properly interpret the provisions of that Article it is, therefore, necessary to consider how the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide and the remedy which has been provided by the Constitution to cure that mischief ". 22. In order to properly interpret the provisions of that Article it is, therefore, necessary to consider how the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide and the remedy which has been provided by the Constitution to cure that mischief ". 22. What is, therefore, evident on close scrutiny of the Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in P.P. Bidyasar is that all these aspects which are being deliberated upon in the present matter have not received the consideration of the learned Single Judge in the context of the rule position obtaining prior to introduction of the aforesaid explanation, what mischief it sought to suppress and the intention of the rule making authority insisting upon at least five out of the seven APAR ratings to be "outstanding/very good" for the purpose of promotion on merit. The words such as "no person", "does not" and "at least" as have been used in the explanation are pointer to the intention of the rule making authority that there cannot any further relaxation in regard to this much of merit out of the total period of seven years records, which period forms the basis for evaluation of merit of a given candidate. 23. It is trite law that while interpreting the statute, the Courts have to always presume that the Legislature inserted every word therein with a purpose and, therefore, every part of the statute should be given full effect to while interpreting a particular provision. The observations in Para 8 of the Judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Mithlesh Singh vs. Union of India, 2003 (3) SCC Page 309, in this respect are of relevance which are quoted for the facility of reference : "8. . . . . .xxxx. . . . .xxxx. . . . .xxxxx. . . . . . . . . .xxxxx. . . . .xxxxx. . . . .xxxxx. . . . . . . . . . .xxxxx. . . . .xxxxx. . . . .xxxxx. . . . . . . . . . .xxxxx. . . . .xxxxx. . . . .xxxxx. . . . . . The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, and as a consequence a construction which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. .xxxxx. . . . .xxxxx. . . . . . . . . . .xxxxx. . . . .xxxxx. . . . .xxxxx. . . . . . The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, and as a consequence a construction which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. It is not a sound principle of constru