JUDGMENT T.N.K. Singh, J. 1. This Writ Petition (PIL) is an unique petition filed by 10 (ten) different political parties, despite sharp difference on various issues. The issues raised in the present writ petition are of far reaching constitutional significance as they have a direct bearing on democracy which constitute a basic feature of our Constitution and also that the delimitation exercise and re-adjustment of the territorial constituencies in the State are required to be carried out on the basis of the census figures. 2. Heard Mr. Raju Ramchandran, learned Senior Advocate, Mr. N.P.C. Singh, Senior Advocate and Mr. S. Biswajit Singh, Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. K. Kumar Singh, learned C.G.S.C. for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 and 6 and learned Advocate General, for the respondent No. 5. 3. By an order of this Court dated 04.12.2006 passed in C. Misc. (PIL) No. 12.2006,5 (five) social organizations have been impleaded as interveners in the present writ petition. Also heard Mr. S. Srivastava learned Counsel for the interveners. 4. The factual panorama of the present writ petition is that the State of Manipur is a very poor and underdeveloped State, lacking behind in all modern facilities and infrastructures. There are 9 (nine) Districts in the State of Manipur and out of which 4 (four) Districts, namely (1) Thoubal (2) Bishnupur, (3) Imphal East and (4) Imphal West are located in valley areas of the State of Manipur and the remaining 5(five) Districts, namely, (1) Senapati, (2) Chandel (3) Ukhrul (4) Tamenglong and (5) Churachandpur are located in the Hill areas of the State of Manipur and the Tribals of Hill Districts can settle in any parts of the valley Districts but the non tribal valley people are not allowed to settle in the hill areas by purchasing immovable properties as per the State Land Law in order to give certain legal protections to hill people (Tribals) of Manipur. In view of fast urbanization in the valley districts, migration of many tribals from the hill Districts to the valley Districts had been taken place for the last many years and as a result thereof, hill people of Manipur come to valley and settle in the valley areas by possessing immovable properties. For example, Tangkhul tribe from Ukhrul District settled at Dewlaland and Nigaram in Imphal District. For example, Tangkhul tribe from Ukhrul District settled at Dewlaland and Nigaram in Imphal District. Similarly many people of Senapati District had been settling at Sangakpham village in the Imphal District, many tribal people from Churachandpur District has been settling at Imphal Airport area, in Imphal West District. The tribal people of Chandel District has been settling at Haokip Veng, Zomi Villa, Chassad Road (New Checkon), Old and New Lambulane etc. in Imphal East District. As a result thereof, the growth rate of population should be more in valley Districts rather than the hill Districts. In other word, the population growth rate of hill Districts should not be higher than that of State as well as valley Districts. 5. In the period between 1992 to 1998 there was ethnic clash between the Kuki tribes and the militants of the Naga tribes from the hill villages in hill areas of Manipur. Because of the ethnic clash a large number of innocent people had been massacred and hundreds of Kuki villages from the three hill districts of Manipur, namely, Senapati, Ukhrul, Chandel were uprooted, as a result thereof, many people of the Kuki tribes migrated to the other districts by shifting their homes, particularly to the valley districts. Eventually the population in the said three hill districts i.e., Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel were drastically decreased. The magnitude of the problem of migrating the members of the Kuki tribes to the valley districts were so huge that the State of Manipur was not able to meet expenditure incurred to rehabilitate the displaced/affected people. The Government of Manipur requested the Central Government under the letter of the General Secretary (Home), Govt. of Manipur dated 05.05.2004 to the Joint Secretary (NE) Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi for an additional fund of Rs.9 (nine) crores to meet cost of the remaining rehabilitation works. 6. There was a hue and cry from the public through the public media on the local newspaper in the year 2003 that there was unnatural, abnormal, impossible and miraculous growth of population in the 9 (nine) Sub-divisions of the 3(three) hill districts, namely, Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel as shown in the provisional Census Report of 2001 as published by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of India. The Census Report of 2001 has failed to give any reasonable explanation to this unnatural phenomenon. The Census Report of 2001 has failed to give any reasonable explanation to this unnatural phenomenon. The following are the growth rate figures: a. All India average 21.34% b. All Manipur average 30.02% c. thickly populated valley districts (Imphal West, Imphal East), Thoubal and Bishnupur 18.00% d. In the 9 thinly populated hill Sub-divisions 168.78% (max) to 40.89% (min) The Census figure as per 1991 -2001 and also the percentage of growth for the said 9(nine) sub-divisions are given in the Chart. Dist. Sub-division Census figure as per Increase in % 1991 2001 Senapaii Mao Marani 49,676 1,20,774 143% do Paomata 19,448 43,299 123% do Purul 22,213 59,705 169% do Saitu Gamphzol 28,327 43,612 54% Chandel Chakpikarong 21,582 46,998 118% do Moreh 20,085 32,513 69% do Machi 10,803 17,076 58% do Chandel HQ 18,544 26,127 41% Ukhrul Kasom Khullen 6,341 10,426 64% 7. Because of the hue and cry from the general public about the abnormal growth of population in the said 9(nine) sub-divisions of the 3(three) hill districts as per provisional report of Census 2001, some non government organizations, specially one Lawyers, Guild, as an act of social service, for the cause and welfare of the people of Manipur made hectic enquires and investigation and ultimately came across certain abnormal, miraculous and improbable, impossible rate of population growth in the said 9 (nine) Sub-divisions of the 3 (three) hill districts, namely, Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel. The Government of Manipur took a decision for verification of the population recorded for the State of Manipur in the Census Report 2001 and constituted a Committee of officers under Office Memorandum No. 5/1 (57)/99-H (Census) dated 09.07.03 in pursuance of the Cabinet decision taken on 04.07.2003 to enquire into the abnormal increase in population figures in some of Hill Sub-Divisions of the State of Manipur as per Census of India Report 2001, and Committee consists of the following 5(five) members: 1. Shri R.C. Mishra, Principal Secretary Chairman 2. Shri Santosh Macheria Special Secretary (Home) Member 3. Director (Economics & Statistic) Member 4. DCs concerned Member 5. National Informatics Centre (NIC) Imphal Bench Member 8. Shri R.C. Mishra, Principal Secretary Chairman 2. Shri Santosh Macheria Special Secretary (Home) Member 3. Director (Economics & Statistic) Member 4. DCs concerned Member 5. National Informatics Centre (NIC) Imphal Bench Member 8. The said Committee made a detailed enquiry and found that there were abnormal growth in respect of 4(four) Sub-Divisions i.e., Mao-Maram, Paomata, Purul and Chakpikarong recorded in the Census of India report 2001 and also in respect of other hill sub-divisions and thereafter submitted report dated 14.09.2003 to the Home Department, Govt. of Manipur. The Committee also made a finding that the population growth in respect of 4 Sub-Divisions i.e., Mao-Maram, Paomata, Purul and Chakpikarong as reflected in the provisional figures of Census 2001 are highly abnormal and without any rational explanation. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the population of these Sub-Divisions as well as others where the decadal growth rates deviate substantially from the average growth rate of the State require verification on the ground so as to ascertain the factual position. Accordingly, the State Government may take up the matter with the Census Commissioner/Registrar General of India to carry out the necessary checks/verifications. 9. On 18.09.2003, the Cabinet of the State of Manipur after detail deliberations, decided to furnish the details of electoral rolls and population as per hill house tax returns for the year 1991-2001 in respect of Sub-Divisions where the decadal growth rate is found to be abnormally high (more than 40% when compared to Census 1991) and abnormally low (less than 15% when compared to Census 1991) to the Registrar General of India. 10. Many organisations including the said Lawyers Guild filed representations to the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India with copy forwarded to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, the Secretary, the Delimitation Commission of India as well as Director of Census operation, Manipur for re-census and correction of the population figures stating all the details concerning the bogus population figures. As the Respondent No. 2, the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, failed to rectify the mistakes by correcting the bogus population figures, the said Lawyers Guild filed a writ petition in the form of public interest litigation in the year 2003 in the Gauhati High Court which has been registered as WP(PIL) bearing No. 53/2003. of India, failed to rectify the mistakes by correcting the bogus population figures, the said Lawyers Guild filed a writ petition in the form of public interest litigation in the year 2003 in the Gauhati High Court which has been registered as WP(PIL) bearing No. 53/2003. The Division Bench of this Court had finally disposed of the said Writ Petition (PIL) 53/2003 by passing the order dated 24.02.2004 directing the Registrar General & Census Commissioner of India to consider the representations made by the State of Manipur as well as petitioners' representation dated 09.10.2003 before final publication of the Census report in view of the Census Act of 1948 and the rules framed thereunder. In the said order dated 24.02.04 passed in WP(PIL) No. 53/03 it had been ordered that the Delimitation Commission of India shall not issue the order under the Delimitation Act, 2002 delimiting the Constituency and re-adjusting seats of parliament and Assembly Constituencies till the final Census Report is published and also it is incumbent on the part of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner of India to take into consideration of the objections which had been presented before it. 11. Instead of rectifying the abnormal growth in the said 9 Sub-Divisions had selectively chosen and picked up only the said 3 Sub-Divisions i.e., Mao-Maram, Paomata and Purul of Senapati District of Manipur and lowered the growth rate to a ridiculous symmetrical high rate of 39% in all the said 3 Sub-Divisions as an eye-wash vide letter of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India dated 17.05.04 to the Lawyers Guild, Gauhati High Court i.e., petitioners of the WP(PIL) No. 53/2003. Being aggrieved by the failure of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner of India to rectify the abnormal growth of population for the remaining 6 (six) Sub-Divisions of the said 9 hill Sub-Divisions the petitioners filed the present Writ Petition (PIL) for issuance of a writ of mandamus to the respondents thereby directing for recounting of heads of the population in general for the whole state and more particularly 9 Sub-Divisions of the hill districts of Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel of the State of Manipur and also for a direction to the concerned authorities to publish another Census Report 2001 by rectifying the abnormal, exaggerated, manipulated and unnatural population figure in respect of the hill districts in the State of Manipur. 12. 12. It is the further case of the petitioners that re-adjustment of the number of seats and Delimitation of Constituencies are to be made on the basis of the Census held in the year 2001, under Section 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Act, 2002. For easy reference Sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Act 2002 are quoted herein below: Section 8, Readjustment of number of seats.-The Commission shall, having regard to the provisions of Articles 81,170,330 and 332 and also, in relation to the Union territories, except National Capital Territory of Delhi, Sections 3and 39 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963) and in relation to the National Capital Territory of Delhi Sub-clause (b) of Clause (2) of Article 239AA, by order, determine-- (a) on the basis of the census figures as ascertained at the census held in the year 1971 and subject to the provisions of Section 4, the number of seats in the House of the People to be allocated to each State and determine on the basis of the census figures as ascertained at the census held in the year (2001) the number of seats, if any, to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and for the Scheduled Tribes of the State; and (b) on the basis of the census figures as ascertained at the census held in the year 1971 and subject to the provisions of Section 4, the total number of seats to be assigned to the Legislative Assembly of each State and determine on the basis of the census figures as ascertained at the census held in the year (2001) the number seats, if any, to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and for the Scheduled Tribes of the State: Provided that the total number of seats assigned to the Legislative Assembly of any State under Clause (b) shall be an integral multiple of the number of seats in the House of the People allocated to that State under Clause (a). Section 9, Delimitation of constituencies,- (1) The Commission shall, in the manner herein provided, then distribute the seats in the House of the People allocated to each State and the seats assigned to the Legislative Assembly of each State as readjusted on the basis of 1971 census to single member territorial constituencies and delimit them on the basis of the census figures as ascertained, at the census held in the year (2001), having regard to the provisions of the Constitution, the provisions of the Acts specified in Section 8 and also to the following provisions, namely: (a) all constituencies shall, as far as practicable, be geographically compact areas, and in delimiting them regard shall be had to physical features, existing boundaries of administrative units, facilities of communication and public convenience; (b) every assembly constituency shall be so delimited as to fall wholly within one parliamentary constituency; (c) constituencies in which seats are reserved for the Scheduled Castes shall be distributed in different parts of the State and located, as far as practicable, in those areas where the proportion of their population to the total is comparatively large; and (d) constituencies in which seats are reserved for the Scheduled Tribes shall, as far as practicable, be located in areas where the proportion of their population to the total is the largest (2) The Commission shall-- publish its proposals for the delimitation of constituencies, together with the dissenting proposals, if any, of any associate member who desires publication thereof, in the Gazette of India and in the Official Gazettes of all the States concerned and also in such other manner as it thinks fit; specify a date on or after which the proposals shall be further considered by it; consider all objections and suggestions which may have been received by it before the date so specified, and for the purpose of such consideration, hold one or more sittings at such place or places in each State as it thinks fit; and thereafter by one or more orders determine-- (i) the delimitation of parliamentary constituencies, and (ii) the delimitation of assembly constituencies. 13. 13. It is provided in Article 170 of the Constitution of India that each State shall be divided into territorial constituencies in such manner that the ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats allotted to it shall, so far as practicable, be the same through out the State. Further the explanation under Article 170 of the Constitution clarifies that the expression "population" means the population as ascertained at the last proceeding census of which the relevant figures have been published. As such the last proceeding census in the present case as per the proviso to Article 170(2) of the Constitution of India would be the 2001 Census. It is the case of the petitioners that such being the situation under the Census Act, 2002 and the Article 170 of the Constitution of India if the bogus and incorrect final Census of India Report 2001 in the 5 hill districts where the 9 hill Sub-Divisions are located are taken as population, 4 valley districts shall lose 3 Assembly Constituencies and also the 3 Assembly Constituencies from the 4 valley districts which are to be added to the hills districts would become unreserved seats in contravention to the Section 20(2) of the North Eastern Areas (Re-organisation) Act, 1971. 14. The Chief Electoral Officer, Election Commission of Manipur vide order dated 24.06.2005 ordered to conduct thorough re-verification of electors of 34 polling Stations 5 in 41 Chandel (ST) A.C. and 29 Nos. in 42 Tengnoupal (ST) A.C. through the Manipur Civil Service Officers and in that re-verification it was found that many villages were found non-existent apart from the fact that some villages were found to be shifted and deserted in Chandel district. As such many of the villages in the said 9 hill Divisions of the 3 hill districts were found to be non existent. On 21.09.05 the State Cabinet held a meeting and decided to recommend to Home Minister, Govt. of India including Prime Minister and Delimitation Commission of India to re-verify the Census Report 2001 in the State of Manipur with a request to maintain the status quo of the existing number of seats of Assembly Constituencies. On 21.09.05 the State Cabinet held a meeting and decided to recommend to Home Minister, Govt. of India including Prime Minister and Delimitation Commission of India to re-verify the Census Report 2001 in the State of Manipur with a request to maintain the status quo of the existing number of seats of Assembly Constituencies. The political parties in the State are of the view that if the Delimitation Commission goes ahead with the exercise based on faulty, defective, inflated and manipulated figure of Census Report of India 2001, it may sharpen the division and clash of interest between the hill and valley and this may ultimately lead to a social turmoil/disorder. 15. On 25.11.2005, the petitioners submitted another representation to the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India to rectify or review or re-count the final Census Report of India 2001 regarding the State of Manipur as a whole, specially in respect of 9 Sub-Divisions in 3 hill districts. 16. This Court passed an interim order dated 14.12.05 in the present writ petition to the effect that Registrar General and Census Commissioner as well as the Delimitation Commissioner of India shall not proceed with the delimitation exercise in respect of Manipur State for the purpose of Sections 8 and 9 of The Delimitation Act, 2002 and also that Registrar General and Census Commissioner shall be at liberty to rectify the alleged faulty defective census figures of final Census Report of India 2001 in the meantime. This Court while passing the said interim order dated 14.12.05 liberty was granted to the party to approach this Court for modification, verification and clarification of the interim order. But none of the respondents file any application for modification or clarification of the interim order dated 14.12.05. 17. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 i.e., the Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India and Director of Census Operations and Chief Principal Census Officer, Manipur, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India filed joint affidavit-in-opposition. 17. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 i.e., the Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India and Director of Census Operations and Chief Principal Census Officer, Manipur, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India filed joint affidavit-in-opposition. In the said affidavit-in-opposition, it has been mentioned that Shri R Sinha, Secretary, Border Management in the Ministry of Home Affairs and Shri J.K. Banthia, Census Commissioner had visited Manipur from 15 to 17 September 2003 for an on-the-spot assessment of the situation and held discussions with the State Government. Thereafter, the Chief Minister of Manipur again wrote to the Deputy Prime Minister on 15th September 2003 conveying the decision of the State Cabinet for a fresh census throughout the State or at least in those Sub-Divisions where the growth is abnormally high or low more than 40% or less than 15% compared to 1991 census. The Census Office which had begun the investigations had found in physical examination of the census records that there were prima facie irregularities/manipulation in respect of 3 Sub-Divisions viz. Mao-Maram, Paomata and Purul of Senapati district and also that there was evidence of deliberate attempt to overstate the population of households. The schedules appeared to have been tempered with and signatures of households looked forged. Several enumeration blocks had been formed with population far in excess of the prescribed number of about 750 persons or 150 households for formation of the enumeration block. 18. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in their joint affidavit-in-opposition had stated that there was deliberate attempt to overstate the population of households and also some irregularities and signatures of households looked forged and also several enumeration blocks had been formed with population far in excess of the prescribed number in the hill area and also that there was full involvement of the State machinery down to the village level in census taking and making available the results to the census office. It may not be correct to hold that large scale errors and manipulation had escaped all these levels. It is also stated that in case of 9 Sub-Divisions that recorded high growth rates a detailed analysis was carried out using all available information including comparison with the Household Demographic Survey (HDS) undertaken by the Govt. It may not be correct to hold that large scale errors and manipulation had escaped all these levels. It is also stated that in case of 9 Sub-Divisions that recorded high growth rates a detailed analysis was carried out using all available information including comparison with the Household Demographic Survey (HDS) undertaken by the Govt. of Manipur in 19 Sub-Divisions of 7 districts and also that respondent No. 5 (State Government of Manipur) may be in a position to substantiate in further. The respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 in their affidavit-in-opposition also stated that enumeration of population in the field is carried out by the State Govt. through its own machinery by drafting officers/officials for the purpose. 19. Procedural wrong and incorrect recording of information details later, is suggestive of the lapses on part of the officials/official-in-charge of the census operations in discharge of their duties. From the affidavit-in-opposition of the Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 it is clear that they themselves admitted that there are some mistakes while preparing the Census Report of India 2001 in respect of hill districts of the State of Manipur, but they are saying that procedural wrongs and incorrect recording of information details later, is suggestive of the lapses on part on the officials/officials-in-charge of the census operations in discharge of their duties. In the affidavit-in-opposition, they are not denying the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present writ petition/power of judicial review of this Court on the action taken up by the census authorities in exercise of their power under the provision of Census Act, 1948 and the rules framed there under and also power/jurisdiction of the judicial review of this Court over the Census Report of India 2001. 20. The respondent No. 4 i.e., the Delimitation Commission of India through the Secretary Delimitation of India filed affidavit-in-opposition in the present writ petition. In their affidavit-in-opposition it had been stated that as per Section 9(1) of the Delimitation Act, 2002 as amended vide Delimitation (Amendment Act, 2003), the Delimitation Commission is required to delimit the seats in the house of the people allocated to each State and the seats assigned to the Legislative Assembly of each State on the basis of census figures as ascertained at the census held in the year, 2001, having regard to the provisions of the Constitution and the Delimitation Act. It is also stated that the Delimitation exercise is based purely on 2001 census figures as provided by the RGI and Census Commissioner and also that as the averments made in petition entirely relate to defective census figures, it is for the RGI and the Census Commissioner to do the needful. As per the order of the High Court dated 14.12.05 all the works relating to delimitation for the State of Manipur including preliminary initial work has been totally stopped and will be restarted after obtaining final clearance from the High Court. 21. None of the counsel appearing for the respondents in course of hearing mentioned that this Court has no power of judicial review of the proceeding taken up by the census authority/authorities mentioned in the Census Act, 1948 and the rules framed thereunder for preparing the census report for the State of Manipur and the Census Report of India 2001 for the State of Manipur. But the learned Counsel appearing for the interveners submits that this Court has no power of judicial review or to entertain a writ proceeding under Article-226 and 227 of the Constitution. The learned Counsel appearing for the interveners further submits that because of the disputed question of fact, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. 22. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners Mr. V.N. Gaupula, by referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Haryana Rohlak [1999] 237 ITR 1 (SC) submits that intervener is not entitled to the relief, but the intervener would be entitled to address argument in support of one or other side. As there was no argument from the side of the respondents in the present writ petition questioning the power of judicial review of this Court in a writ proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India over the action and proceeding taken up by the census authority/authorities under the Census Act, 1948 and the rules framed thereunder and the census report under the Census Act 1948, the objection raised by the intervener questioning the power of judicial review of this Court in the present writ petition shall not be entertained. 23. 23. But for the ends of justice to all concerned, this Court is considering and discussing the power of judicial review of this Court, in a writ proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, over the action and proceeding taken up by the census authority/authorities under Census Act, 1948 and the rules framed thereunder. There is no provision in the Census Act, 1948 ousting the jurisdiction of the Court including the High Court over the matter relating with the preparation of the Census report under the Census Act, 1948. 24. Section 14 of the Census Act, 1948 provides that--no Court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the second class or in a Part-B State, a Magistrate corresponding to a Magistrate of the second class shall try whether under this Act or under any other law, any act or omission which constitutes an offence under this Act or any other law, any Act or omission which constitutes an offence under the Census Act, 1948. 25. Our Constitution is founded on a nice balance of power amongst three wings of the State, namely, Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. Judicial Review is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution. Under our Constitution scheme the Supreme Court and High Courts are the sole repositories of the power of judicial review. It is now well settled position of law that jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India respectively are sacrosanct and is indisputably a part of basic structure of the Constitution. The power of judicial review of the Constitutional Courts i.e., Supreme Court and High Courts include the power to pronounce upon the validity of statutes, action taken and order passed by the individuals and body falling within the ambit of the expression "States" under Article 12 of the Constitution. 26. The Apex Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1973 SC 1461 had quoted the speech of Dr. Ambedkar, in the constitutional assembly on 9th December, 1948 while dealing with the draft Article 25 (corresponding to Article 32 of the Constitution) "if I was asked to name any particular Article in this Constitution as a most important--an Article without which this Constitution would be a nullity--I could not refer to any other Article except this one. Ambedkar, in the constitutional assembly on 9th December, 1948 while dealing with the draft Article 25 (corresponding to Article 32 of the Constitution) "if I was asked to name any particular Article in this Constitution as a most important--an Article without which this Constitution would be a nullity--I could not refer to any other Article except this one. It is the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it and I am glad that the House has realized its importance." The Apex Court in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) observed that: Para 87. It is the cardinal principle of our Constitution that no one howsoever highly placed and no authority however lofty can claim to be the sole judge of its power under the Constitution or whether its action is within the confines of such power laid down by the Constitution. The judiciary is the interpreter of the Constitution and to the judiciary is assigned the delicate task to determine what is the power conferred on each branch of government, whether it is limited, and if so what are the limits and whether any action of that branch transgress such limits. It is for the judiciary to uphold the constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional limitations. That is the essence of the rule of law, which inter alia requires "the exercise of powers by the government whether it be the legislature or the executive or any other authority, be conditioned by the Constitution and the law." The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system and without it there will be no government of laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. I am of the view that if there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial review and it is unquestionably, to my mind, part of the basic structure of the Constitution". 27. The Constitution Bench in Kaihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu reported in had considered the validity of Para 7 of the 10 the Schedule to the Constitution of India, which has excluded judicial review. 27. The Constitution Bench in Kaihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu reported in had considered the validity of Para 7 of the 10 the Schedule to the Constitution of India, which has excluded judicial review. The majority of the judgment delivered by Venkatachaliah, J. struck down the said offending provisions i.e., Para 7 of the 10th schedule by applying the doctrine of severability and held that Para 6(1) of the 10 the Schedule to the extent it seeks to impart finality to the decision of the Speaker/Chairman is valid. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in Para 6(1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in so far as infirmities based on violation of the constitutional mandate; malafide, non compliance with the Rule of natural justice and perversity, are concerned." 28. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India held that the power of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the basic structure of Constitution and cannot be excluded even by constitutional amendment by introducing Article 323A and 323 B and by enacting the statutes "Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (Act No. 13 of 1985 by the Parliament). Para Nos. 78, 90 and 99 of the SCC in L. Chandrakumar (supra) are quoted hereunder: 78. The legitimacy of the power of Courts within constitutional democracies to review legislative action has been questioned since the time it was first conceived. The Constitution of India, being alive to such criticism, has, while conferring such power upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. An analysis of the manner in which the Framers of our Constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were very greatly concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary. These attempts were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial review. While the Constitution confers the power to strike down laws upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court, it also contains elaborate provisions dealing with the tenure, salaries, allowances, retirement age of Judges as well as the mechanism for selecting Judges to the superior Courts. While the Constitution confers the power to strike down laws upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court, it also contains elaborate provisions dealing with the tenure, salaries, allowances, retirement age of Judges as well as the mechanism for selecting Judges to the superior Courts. The inclusion of such elaborate provisions appears to have been occasioned by the belief that, aimed by such provisions, the superior Courts would be insulated from any executive or legislative attempts to interfere with the making of their decisions. The Judges of the Superior Courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisage by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions rendered by those who man the subordinate Courts and tribunals do not fall foul of strict standards of legal correctness and judicial independence. The constitutional safeguards which ensure the independence of the Judges of the superior judiciary, are not available to the Judges of the subordinate judiciary or to those who man tribunals created by ordinary legislations. Consequently, Judges of the latter category can never be considered full and effective substitutes for the superior judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional interpretation. We therefore, hold that the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. 90. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Courts. We have already held that in respect of the power of judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded. It has been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issues are not raised. It has been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issues are not raised. We cannot bring ourselves to agree to this proposition as that may result in splitting up proceedings and may cause avoidable delay. If such a were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to directly approach the High Courts and thus subvert the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. Moreover, even in these special branches of law, some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large majority of cases involve an interpretation of Article 1, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes. While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter. 99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that Clause 2(d) of Article 323A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clause in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated. 29. The Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ramchander Rai and Ors. reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044 held that "by the amendment of CPC by enacting the Act called Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 cannot and does not in any manner affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Para 10 of the SCC in Surya Dev Rai (supra) is quoted hereunder: 10. Article 226 of the Constitution of India preserves to the High Court the power to issue writ of certiorari amongst others. The principles on which the writ of certiorari is issued are well settled. It would suffice for our purpose to quote from the seven Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque. The four propositions laid down therein were summarized by the Constitution Bench in Custodian of Evacuee Property v. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor as under AIR p. 1094, para 15. It would suffice for our purpose to quote from the seven Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque. The four propositions laid down therein were summarized by the Constitution Bench in Custodian of Evacuee Property v. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor as under AIR p. 1094, para 15. The High Court was not justified in looking into the order of 02.12.1952, as an appellate Court, though it would be justified in scrutinizing that order as if it was brought before it under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari. The limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing writs of certiorari was considered by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and the following four propositions were laid down. (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction; (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice; (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous; (4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision. 30. The Apex Court in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1988 CriLJ 158 had discussed the power of judicial review on the decision of the administrative authority, Para 25 of the SCC in Ranjit Thakur (supra) reads as follows: 25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the "decision-making process". The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the "decision-making process". The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationally and perversity are recognized grounds of judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for the Civil Service Lord Diplock said: Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognized in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community'... 31. We may also profitably refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Style (Dressland) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and Anr. reported in wherein it is held that the Courts are more concerned with the decision making process rather than the decision itself while exercising the power of judicial review. Para 11 of the SCC in Style (Dressland) (supra) reads as under: 11. Even the administrative orders and not (sic only) quasi-judicial are required to be made in a manner in consonance with the rules of natural justice, when they affect the rights of the citizens to the property or the attributes of the property. Para 11 of the SCC in Style (Dressland) (supra) reads as under: 11. Even the administrative orders and not (sic only) quasi-judicial are required to be made in a manner in consonance with the rules of natural justice, when they affect the rights of the citizens to the property or the attributes of the property. While exercising the powers of judicial review the Court can look into the reasons given by the Government in support of its action but cannot substitute its own reasons. The Court can strike down an executive order, if it finds the reasons assigned were irrelevant and extraneous. The Courts are more concerned with the decision-making process than the decision itself. 32. From the above discussions, we are of the considered view that this Court has the power for judicial review over the proceedings and steps taken up by the census authority/authorities in the Census Act, 1948 for preparing the Census report under the Census Act 1948 and the rules framed thereunder and also over the census report. 33. The Apex Court in Consumer Action Group and Anr. v. State of T.N. and Ors. reported in AIR 2000 SC 3060 held that--When such "a wide power is vested in the Government it is to be exercised with great caution. As discussed above, the census authority or authorities under the Census Act, 1948 and rules framed there under had not exercised the wide power vested to them with great caution while preparing the census report of India 2001 for the said 9 hill Sub-Divisions located in the 3 hill districts, namely, Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel but the authorities are simply blaming each other. The Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are also admitting in their joint affidavit-in-opposition that there are some irregularities in preparation of the census report. Over and above the stand taken by the respondent Nos. 1,2 and 3 in their joint affidavit-in-opposition are self contradictory and also that they cannot put up the conclusively and firmly that there was not at all any irregularities and illegalities in preparing the Census Report of India 2001 with the assistance of the State officials. On the other hand, respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 asserted that procedural wrong and incorrect recording of information detail will be suggestive of the lapses on the part of the official/official--incharge of the census operation in discharging of their duties. 34. On the other hand, respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 asserted that procedural wrong and incorrect recording of information detail will be suggestive of the lapses on the part of the official/official--incharge of the census operation in discharging of their duties. 34. The last submission of the learned Counsel for the interveners that as there is disputed question of fact in the present writ petition, the writ petition is to be rejected at the threshold and also cannot be entertained in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case discussed above, The Apex Court in ABL International Ltd. and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 553 held that a writ petition involving disputed question of fact which requires consideration of evidence which is not on record, will not normally be entertained by a Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but there is no absolute rule that in all cases involving disputed question of fact the party should be relegated to a civil suit or writ petition is to be rejected and also that in a proper case writ Court has a jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving the disputed question of fact. Para 16, 19, 28 of SCC in ABL International Ltd. and another (supra) are quoted herein below: Para 16. A perusal of this judgment though shows that a writ petition involving serious disputed questions of facts which requires consideration of evidence which is not on record, will not normally be entertained by a Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This decision again, in our opinion, does not lay down an absolute rule that in all cases involving disputed questions of fact the parties should be relegated to a civil suit. In this view of ours, we are supported by a judgment of this Court in the case of Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda where dealing with such a situation of disputed questions of fact in a writ petition this Court held: (SCC p. 774, paras 14-16). 14. The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit-in-reply was filed by the State. 14. The High Court observed that they will not determine disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what facts were in dispute and what were admitted could only be determined after an affidavit-in-reply was filed by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition in limini. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of petition in limini will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons. 15. From the averments made in the petition filed by the appellants it is clear that in proof of a large number of allegations the appellants relied upon documentary evidence and the only matter in respect of which conflict of facts may possibly arise related to the due publication of the notification under Section 4 by the Collector. 16. In the present case, in our judgment, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on the ground that it will not determine disputed question of fact. 16. In the present case, in our judgment, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on the ground that it will not determine disputed question of fact. The High Court has jurisdiction to determine questions of fact, even if they are in dispute and the present, in our judgment, is a case in which in the interest of both the parties the High Court should have entertained the petition and called for an affidavit-in-reply from the respondents, and should have proceeded to try the petition instead of relegating the appellants to a separate suit. Para 19. Therefore, it is clear from the above enunciation of law that merely because one of the parties to the litigation raises a dispute in regard to the facts of the case, the Court entertaining such petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not always bound to relegate the parties to a suit. In the above case of Gunwant Kaur this Court even went to the extent of holding that in a writ petition, if the facts require, even oral evidence can be taken. This clearly shows that in an appropriate case, the writ Court has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition even if the same arises out of a.contractual obligation and/or involves some disputed questions of fact. Para 28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks). The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks). And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the Slate or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction. 35. The ratio laid down in ABL International (supra) is again followed by the Apex Court in Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Anr. reported in AIR 2006 SCW 5408 . Para 17, 18, 3.1 of Noble Resources Ltd. (supra) is quoted herein below: Para 17. It may, however, be true that where serious disputed questions of fact are raised requiring appreciation of evidence, and, thus, for determination thereof, examination of witnesses would be necessary; it may not be convenient to decide the dispute in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Para 18. On a conspectus of several decisions, a Division Bench of this Court in ABL International Ltd. (supra) opined that such a writ petition would be maintainable even if it involves some disputed questions of fact. It was stated that no decision lays down an absolute rule that in all cases involving disputes questions of facts, the party should be relegated to a civil court. Para 31. We, however, having regard to ABL International Ltd. (supra), do not accept Dr. Dhawan's contention that only because there exists a disputed question of fact or an alternative remedy is available, the same by itself would be sufficient for the High Court to decline its jurisdiction. 36. The Apex Court in Gurugayoor Devuswom Managing Committee and Anr. v. C.K. Rajan and Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 546 had laid down the broad guidelines for entertaining a PIL. 36. The Apex Court in Gurugayoor Devuswom Managing Committee and Anr. v. C.K. Rajan and Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 546 had laid down the broad guidelines for entertaining a PIL. In that case the Apex Court held that:- when the Court is prima facie satisfied about variation of any constitutional right of a group of people belonging to the disadvantaged category, it may not allow the State or the Government from raising the question as to the maintainability of the petition and issues of public importance, enforcement of fundamental rights of a large number of the public vis-a-vis the constitutional duties and functions of the State, if raised, the Court treats a letter or a telegram as a public interest litigation upon relaxing procedural laws and also the law relating to pleadings. On the administrative side of this Court, certain guidelines have been issued to be followed for entertaining letters/petitions received by this Court as public interest litigation and whereunder injustice is meted out to a large number of people, the Court will not hesitate in stepping in. Articles14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as well as the International Conventions on Human Rights provide for reasonable and fair trial. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee (supra), we are of the considered view that the present writ petition in the form of PIL is maintainable. For ready reference of the broad guidelines for entertaining the PIL as laid down by the Apex Court in Guruvayoor Devaswom "Managing Committee (supra) are quoted herein below: "Para 50. The principles evolved by this Court in this behalf may be suitably summarized as under: (i) The Court in exercise of powers under Article 32 and Article226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a petition filed by any interested person in the welfare of the people who is in a disadvantaged position and, thus, not in a position to knock the doors of the Court. The Court is constitutionally bound to protect the fundamental rights of such disadvantaged people so as to direct the State to fulfil its constitutional promises, (see S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, Union of India and Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary.) (ii). The Court is constitutionally bound to protect the fundamental rights of such disadvantaged people so as to direct the State to fulfil its constitutional promises, (see S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, Union of India and Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary.) (ii). Issues of public importance, enforcement of fundamental rights of a large number of the public vis-a-vis the constitutional duties and functions of the State, if raised, the Court treats a letter or a telegram as a public interest litigation upon relaxing procedural laws as also the law relating to pleadings. (See Charles Sobraj v. Sup. dt. Central Jail and Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secy., Stale of Bihar). (iii) Whenever injustice is meted out to a large number of people, the Court will not hesitate in stepping in. Articles 14and 21 of the Constitution of India as well as the International Conventions on Human Rights provide for reasonable and fair trial. (iv) The common rule of locus standi is relaxed so as to enable the Court to look into the grievances complained on behalf of the poor, the depraved (sic), the illiterate and the disabled who cannot vindicate the legal wrong or legal injury caused to them for any violation of any constitutional or legal right. (See Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, S.P. Gupta, People's Union for Democratic Rights, D.C. Wadhwa (Dr. v. State of Bihar and BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India). (v) When the Court is prima facie satisfied about variation of any constitutional right of a group of people belonging to the disadvantaged category, it may not allow the State or the Government from raising the question as to the maintainability of the petition, (see Bandhua Mukti Morcha) (vi) Although procedural laws apply to PIL cases but the question as to whether the principles of res judicata or principles analogous thereto would apply depends on the nature of the petition as also facts and circumstances of the case (See Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. and Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal Regd). (vii) The dispute between two warring groups purely in the realm of private law would not be allowed to be agitated as a public interest litigation. (See Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India). (viii). v. Prabhat Mandal Regd). (vii) The dispute between two warring groups purely in the realm of private law would not be allowed to be agitated as a public interest litigation. (See Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India). (viii). However, in an appropriate case, although the petitioner might have moved a Court in his private interest and for redressal of personal grievances, the Court in furtherance of the public interest may treat it necessary to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice. (See Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi). (ix) The Court in special situations may appoint a Commission, or other bodies for the purpose of investigating into the allegations and finding out facts. It may also direct management of a public institution taken over by such Committee. (See Bandhua Mukti Morcha, Rakesh Chandra Narayan v. State of Bihar and A.P. Pollution Control Board, v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu) (x) The Court would ordinarily not step out of the known areas of judicial review. The High Courts although may pass an order for doing complete justice to the parties, they do not have a power akin to Article 142 of the Constitution of India. (xi) Ordinarily, the High Court should not entertain a writ petition by way of public interest litigation questioning the constitutionality or validity of a statute or a statutory rule. Apex Court in Binny Ltd. and Anr. v. V. Sadasivan and Ors. 2005 (3) LLJ 738 SC held that-- "A writ of mandamus or the remedy under Article 226 is pre-eminently a public law remedy and it is available against a body or person performing a public law function and is not generally available as a remedy against private wrongs. It is used for enforcement of various rights of the public or to compel public/statutory authorities to discharge their duties and to act within their bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is wrongful exercise of power or a refusal to perform duties. This writ is admirably equipped to serve as a judicial control over administrative actions. This writ can also be issued against any private body or person, specially in view of the words used in Article 226 of the Constitution. It may be used to do justice when there is wrongful exercise of power or a refusal to perform duties. This writ is admirably equipped to serve as a judicial control over administrative actions. This writ can also be issued against any private body or person, specially in view of the words used in Article 226 of the Constitution. The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. The Courts always retain the discretion to withhold the remedy where it would not be in the interest of justice to grant it. The statutory duty imposed on the public authorities may not be of discretionary character". 37. For the reasons discussed above and also considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondents are hereby directed to re-count the heads of the population in the said 9 hill sub-divisions of the hill districts of Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel of the State of Manipur for publishing another Census Report of India 2001 in respect of the said 9 hill sub-divisions and the present final Census Report of India 2001 for the said 9 hill sub-divisions of the 3 hill districts of Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel shall not be taken as the Census Report of India 2001 for re-adjustment of number of seats and delimitation of constituencies of the State of Manipur under Sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Act 2002 by the Delimitation Commission. 38. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition stands allowed. Parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.