Judgment :- Oral Common Judgment: (D.S.R. Varma, J.) Heard both sides. 2. Since both these appeals are interrelated and arise out of the common order and decrees, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. The appeals C.M.A.No.3773 of 2004 and A.S.No.3602 of 2004 are directed against the common order and decrees, dated 18-08-2004, passed by the Judge, Family Court, Hyderabad, in O.P.No.764 of 2002 and O.S.No.74 of 2002, respectively. 4. By the impugned common order, the Court below dismissed O.P.No.764 of 2002, filed by the husband, seeking to grant a decree of divorce, and decreed the suit O.S.No.74 of 2002, filed by the wife, in part directing the husband to pay a sum of Rs.2,000/- per month towards maintenance to the wife from the date of filing of the suit. 5. Appellant is the husband and the respondent is the wife in both the appeals. 6. For the sake of convenience, in this common judgment, the appellant and the respondent will be referred to as “the husband” and “the wife”, respectively. 7. The factual matrix, in brief, is that the marriage was performed between the parties on 22.06.1997 and undisputedly they stayed together for three days and that after some gap (Aashada Masam), they stayed for another four days. It is the chief averment of the husband in the O.P., that the marriage was not consummated either in the first spell or in the second spell of their stay. 8. This Court, initially, by order, dated 25.10.2004, granted interim stay of execution of the decree, dated 18.08.2004, in O.S.No.74 of 2002, on condition of the husband paying a sum of Rs.2,000/- per month towards maintenance to the wife, in A.S.M.P.No.13976 of 2004, which came to be challenged by way of S.L.P.No.1797 of 2005 before the apex Court and Their Lordships were pleased to dispose of the matter with a direction to this Court to dispose of the main matter i.e., A.S.No.3602 of 2004, as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of six months, inasmuch, as the S.L.P., has been filed challenging the interim order passed by this Court. Hence, the appeal A.S.No.3602 of 2004 is before us now. Similarly, the appeal C.M.A.No.3773 of 2004 has been filed challenging the order passed by the Family Court dismissing the petition O.P.No.764 of 2002, filed by the husband for divorce. 9. Hence, the appeal A.S.No.3602 of 2004 is before us now. Similarly, the appeal C.M.A.No.3773 of 2004 has been filed challenging the order passed by the Family Court dismissing the petition O.P.No.764 of 2002, filed by the husband for divorce. 9. The learned Counsel appearing for the husband raised primarily three contentions: Firstly, the marriage had not been consummated, secondly, the wife filed criminal complaints against all the family members of the husband, i.e., the husband, his parents, brother and sister, for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 406 read with Section 34 I.P.C., and Sections 4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and consequent thereto, all of them were arrested and were imprisoned for some time. Hence, filing of the said criminal cases amounts to `cruelty’ on the part of the wife and thirdly, the wife deserted the husband. 10. The Court below, having appreciated the entire material, including the evidence, both oral and documentary, available on record, held that there were no valid reasons to grant decree for divorce; that non consummation was not established; that filing of criminal cases is not a ground for granting divorce; that the husband failed to establish desertion on the part of the wife and dismissed the O.P. As regards the suit O.S.No.74 of 2002, the same was decreed granting maintenance of Rs.2,000/- per month to the wife from the date of filing of the suit. 11. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the wife contends that when non-consummation and desertion, as alleged, were not established, no decree can be passed in favour of the husband granting divorce. He further contends that filing of criminal cases by itself cannot be treated as a ground for granting divorce. 12. In this connection, it is to be seen that, no doubt, in the O.P., filed by the husband, a specific ground had been taken that there was no consummation on either of the two spells -- three days in the first spell and four days in the second spell. It is further on record that the same has been denied by the wife in the counter. There is absolutely nothing on record to establish these contentions. Hence, we are compelled to observe that it is only an oath against oath, which is ipsi dixit statement made by both parties. 13. It is further on record that the same has been denied by the wife in the counter. There is absolutely nothing on record to establish these contentions. Hence, we are compelled to observe that it is only an oath against oath, which is ipsi dixit statement made by both parties. 13. However, it is recorded by the Court below that even in the second spell, i.e., for four days, the wife came to the house of the husband and at that time, the husband was not available at home and therefore, she left the house and thereafter she did not join him. This conduct also cannot be treated, in strict terms, as ‘desertion’. Basically, the wife came to the house of the husband and because of the non-availability of the husband, she left. The intention of the parties on these two occasions, whether to live together or not, or whether the marriage was consummated or not, are hard to be decided by this Court. Therefore, the reasoning accorded by the Court below, in this regard, cannot be accepted, because so many surmises and conjectures have been introduced in the reasons and it is not safe for this Court to introduce such surmises while arriving at any conclusion. 14. As regards ‘desertion’, the same reasoning, as above, is to be given, inasmuch as, the intention on the part of the wife to desert the husband is not absolutely evident. Again, the reason is very simple, inasmuch as, on the second spell, admittedly, the wife came to the house of the husband and as he was not available, she left the house, as recorded by the Court below. Therefore, we are of the view that even the aspect of ‘desertion’ is something, which cannot be decided either way by this Court, in the absence of any substantial material, either oral or documentary, on record. However, in the deposition, the husband stated that: - “It is true that the respondent joined me again on 14th August 1997. When the respondent joined at my house, I was not in the house, but the respondent left before my arrival to my house” 15. Therefore, it is obvious that the wife voluntarily came to the husband and, admittedly, when the husband was not available, she left. When the respondent joined at my house, I was not in the house, but the respondent left before my arrival to my house” 15. Therefore, it is obvious that the wife voluntarily came to the husband and, admittedly, when the husband was not available, she left. The intention of the parties, either on the part of the wife coming to the husband or non-availability of the husband in the house, cannot be treated as sufficient material to arrive at the conclusion that there was desertion on the part of the wife. Therefore, the above two aspects should be answered in favour of the wife and against the husband. 16. Now, the most important aspect that is to be considered is regarding filing of criminal cases under Sections 498-A and 406 read with Section 34 I.P.C., and Sections 4 and 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 17. In this regard, it is to be seen that the husband is a practicing advocate and, admittedly, there was a meeting between the spouses on two occasions, virtually, on the first occasion only, but on the second occasion, there was only an attempt to meet, without any actual meeting. 18. It is not in dispute that the wife had filed criminal cases against all the family members of the husband, including his parents, brother and sister. The sister of the husband at the time of the criminal complaint was aged 25 years and pursuant to the criminal complaints, immediately all the family members of the husband were arrested and were kept in judicial remand for a considerable period. This fact was in the notice of everyone in the surroundings and also to the knowledge of the relatives of the husband. 19. At this juncture, it is to be noted that, it is the specific averment by the husband that because of this judicial custody, the sister of the husband was not even married because nobody did come forward to marry a lady, who had been imprisoned on the ground of Section 498-A I.P.C., along with other offences. 20. In other words, implicating a lady under Section 498-A I.P.C., particularly, who is not married, amounts to stigmatizing that lady, bringing down the chances of her marriage in future. 21. 20. In other words, implicating a lady under Section 498-A I.P.C., particularly, who is not married, amounts to stigmatizing that lady, bringing down the chances of her marriage in future. 21. Most crucial factor to be noted is that the wife, having levelled the above charges against all the family members, not sparing even the parents and unmarried sister of the husband, did not adduce any evidence, either oral or documentary. 22. In other words, these allegations were not substantiated -- of course, perhaps, for the same reason, that case had ended in acquittal, the same is the situation in this case also-rather except the blanket averment, no evidence was adduced to substantiate the demand of additional dowry. 23. Most significant factor is that the Court below totally erred in resting the burden of proving the innocence of wife on the husband and other members of his family. This course of action adopted by the Court below is most unsatisfactory. However, to the fortune of the husband, the criminal case ended in acquittal. The relevant observations of the Court below, for ready reference, are extracted hereunder: “There is no any other material also on record placed by the petitioner to prove that the respondent filed the above criminal case with false accusations”. 24. No doubt, filing of criminal cases per se cannot be treated as an important ground for granting divorce. Some times, to protect the rights, as and when the same are at peril, the wife may resort to lodge a complaint before the police. That does not necessarily mean that there has been personal antagonism against the husband or the members of his family. But, it is imperative for the Courts, while dealing with cases for divorce, to look all around and take stock of the whole situation and, basing on various facts and circumstances, to arrive at a conclusion whether or not to grant decree for divorce. 25. Again coming to the present case, it is not rebutted anywhere that the unmarried sister, against whom charges of Section 498-A and 406 I.P.C., and other charges were levelled about ten years ago, when she was young, still remained unmarried because of her judicial custody for a considerable period, which social stigma has been still haunting her. 26. 25. Again coming to the present case, it is not rebutted anywhere that the unmarried sister, against whom charges of Section 498-A and 406 I.P.C., and other charges were levelled about ten years ago, when she was young, still remained unmarried because of her judicial custody for a considerable period, which social stigma has been still haunting her. 26. The apex Court, time and again, stated that while implicating the family members, particularly, old people under Section 498-A I.P.C., the Courts have to scrutinize the matter more carefully since there is likelihood of the woman to make such allegations liberally while in emotional circumstances. 27. We are of the view that this is one such case where the wife had deliberately implicated all the family members of the husband under various charges, including Section 498-A I.P.C., for no reason except her blanket statement that her husband demanded more dowry and, as pointed out, having made such wild and serious allegations against all the family members, no iota of attempt had been made to substantiate the same. 28. From the above conduct on the part of the wife, we are of the view that filing of criminal cases actually made all the family members of the husband land in prison for a considerable time. Hence, we are of the view that this act by itself can be treated as an act of ‘cruelty’ on the part of the wife. 29. We cannot forget the fact that there was meeting between the husband and wife only for three days in the entire course of their marital tie. We failed to see any reason nor any actual reasoning is assigned by the wife to develop any personal animosity against each other nor could there be any occasion for all the family members of the husband to demand additional dowry and to commit offences, as indicated above. 30. Therefore, we are of the view that this is a deliberate attempt on the part of the wife to malign his character and social status and to see somehow her husband stoop to the lowest. 31. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal C.M.A.3773 of 2004, filed by the husband, is liable to be allowed, setting aside the common order and decree, dated 18-08-2004, passed by the Court below, in O.P.No.764 of 2002. 32. 31. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal C.M.A.3773 of 2004, filed by the husband, is liable to be allowed, setting aside the common order and decree, dated 18-08-2004, passed by the Court below, in O.P.No.764 of 2002. 32. As regards the appeal A.S.No.3602 of 2004, a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) would be reasonable amount to be paid by the husband to the wife towards permanent alimony. 33. In addition to this, since it is admitted that a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) is due towards arrears of maintenance, a total amount of Rs.1,25,000/- (Rupees one lakh and twenty five thousand only) has to be paid to the wife by the husband. 34. In view of the inability expressed by the learned counsel appearing for the husband as well as the husband to pay the said amount at a time, we feel it appropriate to permit the husband to pay the said amount in four equal monthly instalments, the first instalment to be paid within two months from today and the remaining instalments with regular intervals of two months each thereafter. 35. In the result, the appeal C.M.A.No.3773 of 2004, filed by the husband, is allowed and O.P.No.764 of 2002 is allowed by granting a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage between the husband and the wife and the appeal A.S.No.3602 of 2004 is disposed of with the above directions. However, there shall be no order as to costs.