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2007 DIGILAW 606 (GAU)

Union of India v. State of Manipur

2007-09-11

B.D.AGARWAL, T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2007
JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. Heard Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned CGSC appearing for the appellants/writ petitioners as well as Mr. Th. Ibohal Singh, learned GA appearing for the respondents. 2. By this Writ Appeal, the appellants/writ petitioners are assailing the impugned judgment and order of the learned single Judge passed on 23-6-2003 in C.R. No. 1131 of 1997 whereby the learned single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition, wherein the appellants/writ petitioners sought for quashing the entire proceedings of FIR Case No. 37(3) 97 of Lamphel P.S. (Annexure-A/7 to the writ petition). 3. The short fact which would be sufficient for dealing with the present appeal is that one Kangujam Ojit Singh was arrested by the security personnel of the Assam Rifles, led by one Nb./Sub. N.B. Thakuri on 19-2-1997 at about 04.30 hrs. On the same day, the arrested person Kangujam Ojit Singh was handed over to the Officer-in-charge, Singjamei Police Station by the Personnel of Assam Rifles along with an FIR and a medical certificate. On receipt of the same, the Officer-in-charge, Singjamei Police Station had registered a Criminal Case being FIR Case No. 52(2)97 Singjamei P.S. immediately. On 20-2-1997 the said Kangujam Ojit Singh was taken to the J.N. Hospital, Porompat for treatment but he died on the same day, i.e. on 20-2-1997, at about 4.30 A.M. 4. On 20-2-1997, the Inspector O.C. of Lamphel P.S. lodged an ejahar to the Lamphel Police Station which was registered as FIR No. 39(3)97 of Lamphel P.S. under Section 302/34 IPC against the personnel of the Assam Rifles. 5. By filing a writ petition, i.e. C.R. No. 1131 of 1997, the appellants/writ petitioners sought for quashing the said FIR, i.e. FIR No. 39 (3)97 Lamphel P.S. Under Section 302/34 IPC. 6. The learned single Judge, on perusal of the writ petition as well as the affidavit in opposition and also after hearing the submissions of both sides passed the impugned judgment and order dated 23-6-2003, wherein the learned single Judge held that when the FIR disclosed cognizable offence, the investigation should continue to its logical conclusion. The Apex Court in a catena of cases held that the further proceedings of the FIR could only be quashed only when the allegations made in the FIR does not disclose any cognizable offence. The Apex Court in a catena of cases held that the further proceedings of the FIR could only be quashed only when the allegations made in the FIR does not disclose any cognizable offence. Regarding this point we need not refer to a number of decisions of the apex Court inasmuch as it is so well settled. 7. In the course of hearing of the present writ appeal, Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned CGSC appearing for the appellants/writ petitioners has strenuously submitted that the personnel of the Assam Rifles are protected by Section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 which reads as follows: Section 6. Protection to persons acting under Act.--No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act. 8. By referring to the Section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, the learned CGSC strenuously submits that the said FIR, i.e. FIR Case No. 39(3) 97 of Lamphel P.S. Under Section303/34, IPC should not have been registered without obtaining the previous sanction of the Central Government against the personnel of the Assam Rifles. The point agitated by Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned CGSC, according to our opinion, had already been answered by the Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India reported in AIR 1998 SC 431 .Para 52 of the AIR 1998 SC 431 reads as follows: 52. Under Section 6 protection has been given to the persons acting under the Central Act and it has been prescribed that no prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by the said Act except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The conferment of such a protection has been assailed on the ground that it virtually provides immunity to persons exercising the powers conferred under Section 4 inasmuch as it extends the protection also to "anything purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act". It has been submitted that adequate protection for members of armed forces from arrest and prosecution is contained in Sections 45 and 197, Cr. It has been submitted that adequate protection for members of armed forces from arrest and prosecution is contained in Sections 45 and 197, Cr. P.C. and that a separate provisions giving further protection is not called for. It has also been submitted that even if sanction for prosecution is granted, the person in question would be able to plead a statutory defence in criminal proceeding under Sections 76 and 79 of the Indian Penal Code. The protection given under Section 6 cannot, in our opinion be regarded as conferment of an immunity on the persons exercising the powers under the Central Act. Section 6 only gives protection in the form of previous sanction of the Central Government before a criminal prosecution or a suit or other civil proceeding is instituted against such person. In so far as such protection against prosecution is concerned, the provision is similar to that contained in Section 197, Cr. P.C. which covers an offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty". Section 6 only extends this protection in the matter of institution of a suit or other legal proceeding. In Matajog Dobey v.H.C. Bhari [1955] 28 ITR 941 (SC), the validity of Section197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (which was in pari materia with Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) was challenged on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and it was urged that it vested an absolutely arbitrary power on the Government to grant or withhold sanction at their sweet will and pleasure, and the legislature did not lay down or even indicate any guiding principles to control the exercise of the discretion. Negativing the said contention this Court observed: "It has to the borne in mind that a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official" (p. 932) (of SCR) : (at p. 48 of AIR). We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge to the validity of Section 6. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the challenge to the validity of Section 6. But, at the same time, we are of the view that since the order of the Central Government refusing or granting the sanction under Section 6 is subject to judicial review, the Central Government shall pass an order giving reasons. 9. On perusal of the decision of the Apex Court in Naga People's Movement of Human Rights, AIR 1998 SC 431 (supra), it is crystal clear that the previous sanction of the Central Government as contemplated in Section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 is not required at the time of registration of the FIR and the sanction could be obtained at the time of filing the charge-sheet or at the time of taking the cognizance by the concerned Court. 10. For the reasons discussed above, we are of the consider view that there is no material irregularity and illegality committed by the learned single Judge while passing the impugned judgment and order dated 23-6-2003 in C.R. No. 1131 of 1997. Accordingly this writ appeal is devoid of merit and dismissed. Appeal dismissed.