The material facts giving rise to this writ petition may, in brief, be set out as follows : - (i) Petitioner was a workman of the A.O.D. Oil Co-operative Society Ltd., Digboi ('the said Co-operative Society') and he was also the Secretary of the AOC Indian Staff Co-operative Society Employees Union, Digboi ('the Employees Union'), the Employees Union being a Union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1928. The petitioner was served with a notice, dated 4.2.1994, by the General Secretary of the said Cooperative Society directing him to show cause as to why disciplinary action shall not be taken against him, for, it had been found that the petitioner had accumulated backlog of work and that there were serious irregularities and errors in the submission of Recovery List by him. Responding to the notice, so given, the petitioner submitted his reply, on 10.2.1994, wherein the petitioner denied that there was irregularity or error in his submitting the Recovery List or any negligence in carrying out the duties assigned to him. By a notification, dated 20.3.1994, the petitioner's service was terminated by the Chairman of the said Co-operative Society the ground of termination being that he had been absent from duty without leave from the authority concerned since 1994 till date and that the Management had no alternative, but to treat the petitioner's continued absence as voluntary relinquishment of service. On being served with the notice of termination of his service, the petitioner submitted epresentation, dated 24,3.1994, to the Chairman of the said Co-operative Society. In this representation, the petitioner contended to the effect, inter alia, that his service was terminated without any notice to him, he was not absent without leave, he had remained admitted in the hospital from 17.2,1994 to 22.3.1994 and upon his discharge from the hospital with a fitness certificate, when he had gone to join his duty, he was not allowed to join his duty by the authorities concerned. The petitioner's representation was followed by another representation made by the President of the Employees' Union, addressed to the Chairman of the said Co­operative Society, with a request to reconsider the issue of termination of the petitioner's service and, by order, dated 18.5.1994, the General Secretary of the said Co-operative Society allowed the petitioner to resume his duty without prejudice to the Management's right to take disciplinary action against the petitioner under the relevant Standing Orders. (ii) Before, however, the order, dated 18.5.1994, aforementioned was served on the petitioner, the petitioner had been served with a letter, dated 13.8.1994, issued by the General Secretary of the said Society directing him to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the misconduct, which the petitioner was alleged to have committed. The petitioner submitted his reply, on 15.8.1994, to the said notice of show cause. In his reply, the petitioner denied the allegation levelled against him. By letter, dated 17.8.1994, the General Secretary of the said Co-operative Society informed the petitioner that the Management was not satisfied with the explanation offered by the petitioner and had decided to conduct a domestic enquiry against him. By this letter, dated 17.8.1994, the petitioner was informed as to who would be the Enquiry Officer in the said domestic enquiry. The domestic enquiry was accordingly held and the same culminated into submission of Enquiry Report, dated 21.4.1995, with the finding that the petitioner had been found guilty of misconduct within the meaning of clause V(A) and (B) of the said Co-operative Society's Standing Orders. Having obtained the petitioner's comment on the said Enquiry Report, the Management passed an order, on 19.6.1995, dismissing the petitioner from service. (iii) The petitioner, then, lodged a complaint before the Industrial Tribunal, Dibrugarh, challenging his order of dismissal, dated 19.6.1995. The petitioner's complaint made before the Industrial Tribunal was registered as Case No. 01/1995. In his complaint lodged with the Industrial Tribunal, the petitioner had pointed out that he was a protected workman inasmuch as he, being the Secretary of the Employee's Union, was representing the case of the workmen in the industrial dispute, which had been referred to and was pending for adjudication, by the Industrial Tribunal and that the Management, without making any application to the learned Tribunal and without obtaining its permission/approval, as was required under the law, dismissed the petitioner from service and, thus, the petitioner had been victimized for his Trade Union activities. The Management resisted the complaint by filing their written statement, wherein they contended, inter alia, that the petitioner had been found negligent in performing his duties and that he had been dismissed from service after a domestic enquiry had found him guilty of the charges framed against him.. (iv) The learned Tribunal delivered its award, dated 27.10.1999. The Management resisted the complaint by filing their written statement, wherein they contended, inter alia, that the petitioner had been found negligent in performing his duties and that he had been dismissed from service after a domestic enquiry had found him guilty of the charges framed against him.. (iv) The learned Tribunal delivered its award, dated 27.10.1999. In its award, the learned Tribunal clearly held that the Management had contravened the provisions of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act by not taking approval of the Industrial Tribunal before dismissing the petitioner from service, though an industrial dispute was pending for adjudication between the Management, on the one hand and its workmen, represented the Employee's Union, on the other. Having, however, held that the Management was guilty of having contravened the provisions of section 33, the learned Tribunal nevertheless examined the fairness of the domestic enquiry and came to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry held was fair and proper. The learned Tribunal also found, on merit, that there were sufficient materials proving the petitioner's misconduct. On the basis of the findings, so reached the learned Tribunal held that the petitioner's dismissal from service was not a case of victimization inasmuch as a proved misconduct is antithesis of victimization. Based on the conclusions, so reached, the learned Tribunal held that it was not a case of misconduct and that it found no reason to interfere with the Management's action dismissing the petitioner from service. The petitioner has, now, put to challenge the award, dated 27.10.1999, aforementioned and also his dismissal from service. 2. Is it permissible, under the law, for the Management to dismiss or discharge its employee for misconduct during the pendency of an industrial dispute without having obtained approval from the authority before whom the proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, involving the workman, is pending? 2. Is it permissible, under the law, for the Management to dismiss or discharge its employee for misconduct during the pendency of an industrial dispute without having obtained approval from the authority before whom the proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, involving the workman, is pending? When the authority, before whom an industrial dispute is pending for adjudication, finds that without obtaining its permission or approval, a workman has been dismissed from service during pendency of the proceedings of the industrial dispute involving the workman, would such a finding amount to rendering the order of dismissal inoperative and non est in law or notwithstanding a finding that the Management has dismissed the employee during the pendency of the industrial dispute, whether it is still open to the authority, before whom the industrial dispute is pending for adjudication, to decide the workman's dismissal on merit. 4. I have heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner-employee and Mr. P.J. Saikia, learned counsel for the employer-respondent. I have also heard Mr. J Roy, learned counsel, who has appeared as amicus curiae in this writ petition. 5. Pointing out to the provisions of sections 33 and 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Mr. Sahewalla has submitted that sub-section (2) of section 33 makes it mandatory for the Management not to discharge or dismiss an employee during the pendency of an industrial dispute, which involves the employee and is being adjudicated upon, without obtaining approval of the authority before whom the industrial dispute is pending for adjudication. Mr. Sahewalla has also pointed out that during adjudication of an industrial dispute involving an employee or a group of employees, when the employer dismisses any such employee without obtaining approval from the authority before whom the industrial dispute is pending for adjudication, the employee concerned is entitled to make a complaint, in terms of section 33Aof the said Act, to the authority before whom the industrial dispute is pending for adjudication and if the adjudicating authority finds that the employer has really contravened the protections provided to the employee by section 33, the authority concerned must set aside the order of dismissal treating the same as inoperative and non est in law. 6. Challenging the legality of the award, Mr. 6. Challenging the legality of the award, Mr. Sahewalla has also submitted that in the present case, when the learned Tribunal had found that the employer had dismissed the employee without obtaining approval of its action from the learned Tribunal, when the industrial dispute was still pending for adjudication involving the employer and the Employees' Union with the present petitioner as General Secretary of the said Co-operative Society, the learned Tribunal ought not to have entered into the merit of the dismissal and ought to have directed re­instatement of the employee, for, an order of dismissal, passed in contravention of the provisions of section 33, is, according to Mr. Sahewalla, void and inoperative in law and once it has been found by, a Tribunal, on a complaint made by an employee, that the provisions of section 33(2) have been contravened by the employer, no further enquiry into the merit of the dismissal is, in the light of the provisions under section 33A, required and the Tribunal must, in such a case, direct re­instatement of the employee concerned. Support for his submissions is sought to be derived by Mr. Sahewalla from the decision, in Jaipur Zilla Safiakari Bhoomi Vikash Bank Ltd. v. Pran Gopal Sharma, reported in (2002) 2 SCO 244. 7. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the employee-petitioner, Mr. P. J, Saikia, learned counsel, submits that when an employer is found to have dismissed an employee without obtaining approval of the authority before whom an industrial dispute is pending for adjudication, this finding, in itself, is not sufficient to treat the dismissal as inoperative and the Tribunal, in such a case, cannot straightaway direct re-instatement of the employee concerned. It is rather, contends Mr. Saikia, a duty of the authority before whom the industrial dispute is pending for adjudication to determine, on merit, if the order of dismissal is justified and if, on such examination, the Tribunal finds that the employer has proved that the employee has been dismissed, because of misconduct, then, the breach of section 33 should be treated as a mere technical breach and except in compelling circumstances, no further relief is required to be given by the authority concerned to the employee. In support of his submission, Mr, Saikia places reliance on the case of Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmani Bala, AIR 1955 SC 258 and Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. Suresh Chand, (1978) 2 SCC 144 . 8. Appearing as amicus curiae, Mr. J. Roy, learned counsel, has pointed out that though it has been the view of the Supreme Court right from Automobile Products of India Ltd. (supra) that if an employer is found to have dismissed an employee without having obtained requisite permission or approval from the authority before whom an industrial dispute, involving the employee, is pending for adjudication, the employee would not be entitled to re-instatement of service as a consequence of the breach of the provisions of section 33 and instead, in such a case, it is the duty of the authority, before whom the industrial dispute is pending' for adjudication, to determine if the employee's dismissal from service due to misconduct was, on merit, justified and if the authority concerned finds that the dismissal was, on merit, justified, no relief, not even of compensation, can be granted by such an adjudicating authority except in compelling circumstances. In fact, points out Mr. Roy, the law propounded in Automobile Products of India Ltd. (supra) was followed by the Supreme Court in its several subsequent decisions, namely, in Equitable Coal Co. Ltd. v. Algu Singh and Another, AIR 1958 SC 761 , Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. All India Punjab National Bank Employees'Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 , Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. (supra) and T.N. State Transport Coporation v. Neethivilangan Kumbakonam, (2001) 9 SCC 99 . 9. It is also submitted by Mr. Roy that the view, which the Supreme Court had propounded, on the scope of rules 33 and 33A, in Automobile Products of India Ltd. (supra) and approved in Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. (supra), has been overruled in Jaipur Zilla Sahakari Bhoomi Vikash Bank Ltd. (supra), wherein a Constitution Bench, having examined the scope of sections 33(2)(b) and 33A of the said Act, concluded that the views expressed in Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd, (supra), which had followed the decision, in Automobile Products of India Ltd. (supra), are not the correct views and that the view taken in Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Govind, AIR 1962 SC 1500 and Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Govind, AIR 1962 SC 1500 and Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Moda, (1965) 3 SCR 411 , is the correct view. 10. In the light of the submissions noted above, the questions, which fall for determination, in the present writ petition, are : - (I) Is it permissible, under the law, for a management to discharge or dismiss its employee for misconduct during the pendency of adjudication of an 'industrial dispute' without having obtained permission or approval from the authority before whom the proceeding in respect of the dispute involving the employee is pending ? (II) If it is not permissible to discharge or dismiss an employee from service without obtaining permission or approval from the authority before whom an 'industrial dispute', involving the employee is pending for adjudication, what would be the effect of an order of discharge or dismissal, which the employer may have made during the pendency of adjudication of such an 'industrial dispute' ? (III) If the authority, before whom the 'industrial dispute' is pending for adjudication, finds that the order of discharge or dismissal was made without obtaining its approval, would, in such a case, the order of discharge or dismissal become ipso facto inoperative and non est in law or would, notwithstanding such a finding, the authority, before whom the 'industrial dispute' is pending for adjudication, is still required to examine if the discharge or dismissal of the employee is justified on merit or not ? 11. The answers to all the questions posed above lie in section 33 read with section 33A of the said Act. The relevant provisions of sections 33 and 33A are, therefore, reproduced hereinbelow : - "33. Condition of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings. - (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer, or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall, -.... (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute the employer may... (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute the employer may... (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman : Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless she has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. 33 A. Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed during pendency of proceeding. - Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a conciliation officer, Board, an arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal an employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner, - (a) to such conciliation officer or Board and the conciliation officer or Board shall take such complaint into account in mediating in and promoting the settlement of, such industrial dispute ; and (b) to such arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint, the arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit his or its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly." 11. It, now, needs to be pointed out that under the ordinary law of master and servant, a master is entitled to dispense with the service of his servant without obtaining permission, in that regard, from any statutory authority. Section 33, however, introduces restrictions on the master's right to dispense with the service of his servant and lays down that so long as an industrial dispute is pending between the employer and his employee, the employer cannot discharge or punish, by way of dismissal or otherwise, any of his employees, involved in such a dispute, without requisite approval from the authority before whom the industrial dispute is pending for adjudication. Thus, section 33A aims at protecting the conditions of service of every employee during the pendency of the proceedings for adjudication of an industrial dispute and restrains the employer from discharging or dismissing the employee without obtaining the approval from the authority before whom the industrial dispute is pending for adjudication. Notwithstanding the protection, so given, to a workman, when a workman, during the pendency of adjudication of an industrial dispute, is discharged or dismissed by the employer without obtaining adjudicating authority's approval for its action, there is obviously breach of the protection, which has been provided to the employee under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 33. In such a case, section 33A gives a right to the affected workman to make a complaint to the adjudicating authority that he has been discharged or dismissed by his employer without obtaining requisite approval as is required under section 33(2)(b). If the adjudicating authority finds that the workman has been discharged or dismissed in contravention of the protection provided to him by the provisions of section 33, would it make the order of dismissal void or inoperative requiring the adjudicating authority to merely set aside the order of discharge or dismissal or would it be open to the adjudicating authority to enter into the merit of the discharge or dismissal and determine whether there was justification for discharge or dismissal of the workman concerned. 12. The question posed above has been a question of great debate not and was, therefore, raised in Automobile Products of India Ltd. (supra), wherein a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while considering the similar provisions, as we find now contained in section 33, held that if it is found that the employer has contravened the provisions, which protect the employment of a workman, such contravention would not be ipso facto make the discharge or dismissal wholly illegal warranting interference by the adjudicating authority, who may have been in seisin of the industrial dispute ; rather, it would be necessary for such an adjudicating authority to examine, on merit, the discharge or dismissal of the employee and if, on such examination, the adjudicating authority finds that on merit, the discharge or dismissal is not justified, the adjudicating authority may direct re-instatement of the employee. If, however, the order of discharge or dismissal is found to be justified on merit, then, the breach of section 22 (same as section 33) would be treated as a mere technical breach and it may not, in the absence of any compelling circumstances, justify any substantial order of compensation in favour of the workman. 13. The decision, in Automobile Products of India Ltd. (supra), was followed by three-Judge Bench, in Equitable Coal Co. Ltd, (supra).The relevant observations made, in Equitable Coal Co. Ltd. (supra), read as under: "4. The scope and effect of the provisions of sections 22 and 23 of the Act have been considered, by this court in the Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmani Bala. "The object of section 22", observes Das, J, as he then was, in his judgment, "like that of section 33 of the 1947 Act as amended is to protect the workmen concerned in disputes which form the subject-matter of pending proceedings against victimisation by the employer on account of their having raised industrial disputes or their continuing the pending proceedings". As the judgment points out, the grievance made by the employee under this section is two-fold. In the first place his grievance is that the employer has taken action against him without complying with section 22 and in the second place he has also the grievance on merits "which may be of much more seriousness and gravity for him', viz., that in point of fact he has been unfairly dealt with and his interest has really been prejudicially affected by the high-handed act of the employer. The right given to the workman to move the authority by lodging a complaint in this case is a distinct benefit given to him. Under the ordinary law of master and servant, a master would be entitled to dispense with the services of his servant without having to obtain permission in that behalf from any statutory authority. Section 22 of the Act, however, introduces restrictions on the master's right. So long as an industrial dispute is pending between the employer and his employees, the employer cannot discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any of his employees concerned in the said dispute, without the requisite permission from the Appellate Tribunal. Section 22 of the Act, however, introduces restrictions on the master's right. So long as an industrial dispute is pending between the employer and his employees, the employer cannot discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any of his employees concerned in the said dispute, without the requisite permission from the Appellate Tribunal. If the employer contravenes the provisions of section 22, the employee is entitled to make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to the Appellate Tribunaland, on receiving such complaint, the Appellate Tribunal has to decide the complaint as if it is an appeal pending before it. The. breach of the provisions of section 22 by the employer is in a sense a condition precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Appellate Tribunal by section 23. As soon as this condition precedent is satisfied the employee is given an additional right of making the employer's conduct the subject-matter of an industrial dispute without having to follow the normal procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act. In an enquiry held under section 23, two questions fall to be considered : Is the fact of contravention by the employer of the provisions of section 22 proved ?//"yes, is the order passed by the employer against the employee justified on the merits ? If both these questions are answered in favour of the employee, the Appellate Tribunal would no doubt be entitled to pass an appropriate order in favour of the employee. If the first point is answered in favour ofthe employee, but on the second point the finding is that, on the merits, the order passed by the employer against the employee is justified, then the breach of section 22 proved against the employer may ordinarily be regarded as a technical breach and it may not, unless there are compelling facts in favour of the employee, justify any substantial order of compensation in favour of the employee. It is unnecessary to add that, if the first issue is answered against the employee, nothing further can be done under section 23. What orders would meet the ends of justice in case of a technical breach of section 22 would necessarily be a question of fact to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case. It is unnecessary to add that, if the first issue is answered against the employee, nothing further can be done under section 23. What orders would meet the ends of justice in case of a technical breach of section 22 would necessarily be a question of fact to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case. In view of the decision of this court in Automobile Products of India Ltd. (supra) it would be impossible to accept Mr. Sen's argument that the only order which can be passed in proceedings under section 23 is to grant a declaration that the employer has committed a breach of the provisions of section 22. In Atherton West & Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mill Majdoor Union this court has expressed a similar view in regard to the provisions of section 23 of the Act." (emphasis is supplied) 14. A different view was, however, expressed in Straw Board Manufacturing Company Ltd. (supra), wherein a three-Judge Bench,-speaking through Wanchoo,0, observed as follows : -ulfthe tribunal does not approve of the action taken by the employer, the result would be that the action taken by him would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the service of the employer. In Such a case no specific provision as to reinstatement is necessary and by the very fact of the tribunal not approving the action of the employer, the dismissal or discharge of the workman would be of no effect and the workman concerned would continue to be in service as if there never was any dismissal or discharge by the employer. In that sense the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer does not become final and conclusive until it is approved by the Tribunal under section 33(2)." (emphasis is supplied) 15. In tune with the views expressed in Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra), a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), held that discharge or dismissal of an employee, in contravention of the protection provided to him under section 33, would make the order of discharge or dismissal wholly invalid and inoperative. The relevant observations, made in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), held that discharge or dismissal of an employee, in contravention of the protection provided to him under section 33, would make the order of discharge or dismissal wholly invalid and inoperative. The relevant observations, made in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), read as under : "If is also settled that if approval is granted, it takes effect from the date of the order passed by the employer for which approval was sought. If approval is not granted, the order of dismissal or discharge passed by the employer is wholly invalid or inoperative and the employee can legitimately claim to continue to be in the employment of the employer notwithstanding the order passed by him dismissing or discharging him. In other words, approval by the prescribed authority makes the order of discharge or dismissal effective ; in the absence of approval, such an order is invalid and inoperative in law." (emphasis is added) 16. Thus, the decision in Automobile Products of India Ltd. (supra), Equitable Coal Co. Ltd. (supra) and Punjab National Bank Ltd. (supra) took the view that discharge or dismissal of an employee by an employer, while an industrial dispute, involving the employee is pending for adjudication, will be a mere technical breach of the provisions of section 33 and that such technical breach will not stand in the way of adjudicating authority determining if the discharge or dismissal is justified on'merit. But according to the Apex Court's decisions, in Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra) and Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), the order of dismissal or discharge would be wholly invalid and inoperative if the employer is found to have contravened the provisions of section 33 by discharging or dismissing an employee without obtaining approval of the adjudicating authority, while an industrial dispute, involving the employee, was pending for adjudication. Necessarily, therefore, the decisions, in Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (supra) and Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), were to the effect that the adjudicating authority need not enter into the merit of the discharge or dismissal if, on examination, the adjudicating authority finds the discharge or dismissal in contravention of the protection given to the employee under section 33. 17. Ltd. (supra) and Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), were to the effect that the adjudicating authority need not enter into the merit of the discharge or dismissal if, on examination, the adjudicating authority finds the discharge or dismissal in contravention of the protection given to the employee under section 33. 17. Thus, there were clearly two views prevailing on the scope of sections 33 and 33A, While one view was that a breach of the protection, provided to a workman under section 33, is in itself sufficient to direct his re-instatement, the other view was that merely because there is breach of the protection so provided to a workman, the adjudicating authority would not interfere with the order of discharge or dismissal and that upon finding that the provisions of section 33 have been violated, it would be the duty of the adjudicating authority to examine the justification of the discharge or dismissal, on merit, treating the complaint made by the workman as a reference under section 10 and if, upon such examination, the discharge or dismissal is found to be justified on merit, then, the discharge or dismissal would not be interfered with, for, in such a case, the order of discharge or dismissal would be a mere technical breach. 18. The scope of section 33(2)(b) and section 33A fell for consideration, once again, before a three-Judge Bench in Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. (supra). Having pointed out that a statute must be read, as a whole, to understand the scope of any of its provisions, the court, in Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. (supra), having taken note of its earlier decisions on the subject, pointed out that the scope of enquiry under section 33A was no longer res integra. Having pointed out that a statute must be read, as a whole, to understand the scope of any of its provisions, the court, in Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. (supra), having taken note of its earlier decisions on the subject, pointed out that the scope of enquiry under section 33A was no longer res integra. It was held, in Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. (supra), that when the contravention of section 33 is proved, the adjudicating authority has the obligation to decide it the discharge or dismissal of the employee is, on merit, justified and if, on such examination, the order of discharge or dismissal is found to be justified, then, the breach of section 33 would be treated as a mere technical breach and in such a case, since the original order of discharge or dismissal would stand justified, it would not be open to the Tribunal or the adjudicating authority to make any substantial order of compensation in favour of the workman unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. When it was pointed out to the court, in Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. (supra), that such an interpretation of section 33A would defeat the protection accorded to the workman under section 33, the court observed that this apprehension is not well founded inasmuch as the employer's contravention of the provisions of section 33 would, independent of the ultimate result of the enquiry under section 33A, lead to his imprisonment, because he would be liable for punishment under section 31(1). Hence, the fear of imprisonment would work as a deterrent for the employer. 19. The controversy as to whether the contravention of section 33 would render the order of dismissal void and inoperative or, upon finding that there is breach of the provisions of section 33(2)(b) by an employer, whether it would remain open to the Tribunal to examine the justification of the dismissal, On merit, has been Set at rest in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikash Bank Ltd. (supra), wherein a Constitution Bench, having examined, at length, the scope of section 33 and section 33A, overruled, as incorrect, the decision in Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. (supra) and, having noticed the views expressed, in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), held as under : "13. The proviso to section 33(2)(b), as can be seen from its very unambiguous and clear language, is mandatory. Ltd. (supra), held as under : "13. The proviso to section 33(2)(b), as can be seen from its very unambiguous and clear language, is mandatory. This apart, from the object of section 33 and in the context of the proviso to section 33(2)(b), it is obvious that the conditions contained in the said proviso are to be essentially complied with. Further, any employer who contravenes the provisions of section 33 invites a punishment under section 31(1) with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000 or with both. This penal provision is again a pointer of the mandatory nature of the proviso to comply with the conditions stated therein. To put it in another way, the said conditions being mandatory, are to be satisfied if an order of discharge or dismissal passed under section 33(2)(b) is to be operative. If an employer desires to take benefit of the said provision for passing an order of discharge or dismissal of an employee, he has also to take the burden of discharging the statutory obligation placed on him in the said proviso. Taking a contrary view that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by an employer in contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso does not render such an order inoperative or void, defeats the very purpose of the proviso and it becomes meaningless. It is well-settled rule of interpretation that no part of statute shall be construed as unnecessary or superfluous. The proviso cannot be diluted or disobeyed by an employer. He cannot disobey the mandatory provision and then say that the order of discharge or dismissal made in contravention of section 33(2)(b) is not void or inoperative. He cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The interpretation of statute must be such that it should advance the legislative intent and serve the purpose for which it is made rather than to frustrate it. The proviso to section 33(2)(b) affords protection to a workman to safeguard his interest and it is a shield against victimisation and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of industrial dispute when the relationship between them is already strained. The proviso to section 33(2)(b) affords protection to a workman to safeguard his interest and it is a shield against victimisation and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of industrial dispute when the relationship between them is already strained. An employer cannot be permitted to use the provision of section 33(2)(b) to ease out a workman without complying with the conditions contained in the said proviso for any alleged misconduct said to be unconnected with the already pending industrial dispute. The protection afforded to a workman under the said provision cannot be taken away. If it is to be held that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer without complying with the requirements of the said proviso is not void or inoperative, the employer may with impunity discharge or dismiss a workman. 14. Where an application is made under section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the­ft action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimisation or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not, etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if the order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of the employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under section 33A, challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightaway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under section 33A. and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under section 33A. and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of the statutory protection given to him by the proviso to section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to section 33(2)(b), section 33A. would be meaningless and futile. The said section has a definite purpose to serve, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted. 15. The view that when no application is made or the one made is withdrawn, there is no order of refusal of such application on merit and as such the order of dismissal or discharge does not become void or inoperative unless such an order is set aside under section 33A, cannot be accepted. In our view, not making an application under section 33(2)(b) seeking approval or withdrawing an application once made before any order is made thereon, is a clear case of contravention of the proviso to section 33(2)(b). In our view, not making an application under section 33(2)(b) seeking approval or withdrawing an application once made before any order is made thereon, is a clear case of contravention of the proviso to section 33(2)(b). An employer who does not make an application under section 33 (2)(b) or withdraws the one made, cannot be rewarded by relieving him of the statutory obligation created on him to make such an application. If it is so done, he will be happier or more comfortable than an employer who obeys the command of law and makes an application inviting scrutiny of the authority in the matter of granting approval of the action taken by him. Adherence to and obedience of law should be obvious and necessary in a system governed by rule of law. An employer by design can avoid to make an application after dismissing or discharging an employee or file it and withdraw before any order is passed on it, on its merits, to take a position that such order is not inoperative or void till it is set aside under section 33-A. notwithstanding the contravention of section 33(2)(b) proviso, driving the employee to have recourse to one or more proceedings by making a complaint under section 33A. or to raise another industrial dispute or to make a complaint under section 31(1). Such an approach destroys the protection specifically and expressly given to an employee under the said proviso as against possible victimisation, unfair labour practice or harassment because of pendency of industrial dispute so that an employee can be saved from hardship of unemployment. 16. Section 31 speaks of penalty in respect of the offences stated therein. This provision is not intended to given any remedy to an aggrieved employee. It is only to punish the offender. The argument that section 31 provides a remedy to an employee for contravention of section 33 is unacceptable. Merely because penal provision is available or a workman has a further remedy under section 33A to challenge the approval granted, it cannot be said that the order of discharge or dismissal does not become inoperative or invalid unless set aside under section 33A. There is nothing in sections 31, 33 and 33A to suggest otherwise even reading them together in the context. These sections are intended to serve different purposes. 17. There is nothing in sections 31, 33 and 33A to suggest otherwise even reading them together in the context. These sections are intended to serve different purposes. 17. As already noticed above, the Constitution Bench of this court in P.H. Katyani v. Air France, Calcutta has referred to Straw Board Mfg. Co. v. Govind and approved the view taken in the said decision as regards the requirements of the proviso to section 33(2)(b). Unfortunately in Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand the earlier two cases of Straw Board and Tata Iron & Steel Co. were not noticed touching the question. It is true that in S. Ganapathy v. Air India there is no reference to Punjab Beverages. But the view taken in two earlier decisions of Strawboard and Tata Iron & Steel Co. is followed on the question and rightly so in our opinion. 18. In view of what is stated above, we respectfully agree with an endorse the view taken in the case of Strawboard and Tata Iron & Steel Co. and further state that the view expressed in Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. on the question is not the correct view. The question raised in the beginning of this judgment is answered according." 20. From what have been observed and held in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikash Bank Ltd. (supra), it becomes transparent that the proviso to section 33(2)(b) is mandatory in nature and it an employer discharges or dismisses a workman, without obtaining approval of its action, from the adjudicating authority, while an industrial dispute, involving the workman is pending for adjudication, it would render the order of discharge or dismissal void and inoperative. The effect of the Constitution Bench decision, in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikash Bank Ltd. (supra), is that on a complaint made to it by a workman under section 33A, when a Tribunal finds that the employer, has discharged or dismissed the workman without obtaining the Tribunal's approval, the Tribunal is bound to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct the reinstatement of the workman treating the order of discharge or dismissal as non est in law. It further becomes clear, in the light of the law laid down in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikash Bank Ltd. (supra), that if a Tribunal finds that an employer has contravened the protection provided to a workman by the proviso to section 33(2)(b), the question of examining as to whether the employee's discharge or dismissal is, on merit, justified, does not arise at all. 21. In the light Of the law laid down in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikash Bank Ltd. (supra), it becomes clear that the decisions, in Automobile Products of India Ltd. (supra). Equitable Coal Co. Ltd. (supra), Punjab National Bank Ltd. (supra) and Punjab Beverages (P.) Ltd. (supra), are no longer good law. In fact, in the backdrop of the law laid down in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikash Bank Ltd. (supra), a two-Judge Bench, in Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. v. Prabhakar H. Manjuare, (2003) 1SCC 320, has held that once the breach of section 33(2)(b) is found to have been committed by an employer, it would make the order of discharge or dismissal void and inoperative and, hence, in such a case, the employee would be deemed to have continued in service as if no order of dismissal was passed. 22. In the light of the law laid down in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikash Bank Ltd. (supra), when I revert to the facts of the case at hand, I notice that it is the clear finding of the learned Tribunal that the employer had contravened the provisions of section 33. In the face of such a clear finding. It was, no longer open to the learned Tribunal to examine if the petitioner's order of dismissal was, on merit, justified. The learned Tribunal could not have, therefore, declined to interfere with the impugned order of dismissal on the ground that the order of dismissal is justified and does not warrant interference. 23. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, there can be no escape from the conclusion that in the light of the findings ofthe learned Tribunal reached in its award, dated 27.10.1999, the impugned order of dismissal, dated 19.6.1995, cannot survive. 24. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ petition a succeeds and the impugned order of dismissal, dated 19.6.1995, passed against the present petitioner, is hereby set aside. 24. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ petition a succeeds and the impugned order of dismissal, dated 19.6.1995, passed against the present petitioner, is hereby set aside. To the extent that the impugned award declined to interfere with the petitioner's dismissal, the same is also set aside. It is further directed that the order of dismissal, dated 19.6.1995, shall be treated as non est and the petitioner shall be treated to have continued to remain in service without any break and shall also be entitled to back wages and all the benefits, which he would have, otherwise, been entitled to under the law. 25. With the above observations and directions, this writ petition shall stand disposed of. 26. No order as to costs.