JUDGMENT Arun Mishra, J. These appeals have been preferred by Shri Ram Niwas Gupta aggrieved by dismissal of civil suits filed by him against the respondents claiming compensation on account of defamatory publications. The suits have been dismissed as barred by limitation by the trial Court while deciding the preliminary issue as to the limitation. The point agitated is the same in these appeals, as such appeals are being decided by common judgment. In F.A. No. 127/2001 the plaintiff-appellant Ram Niwas Gupta filed Civil Suit No. 3-A/99 against Dainik Sandhya Prakash news-paper, Surya Enterprises, the publisher and Surya Printers. The suit was filed on 11-7-1997. As per plaint initial defamatory publication was made on 15-10-1995, thereafter on 21-10-1995 and lastly on 26-8-1996 separate publications were made on the aforesaid dates. The plaintiff claimed compensation of Rs. 20 lacs against the defendants. In F.A. No. 658/2000, a Civil Suit No. 6-A/99 was filed claiming compensation of Rs. 20 lacs against daily newspaper "Dainik Jagran", its Editor Rajiv Mohan Gupta and Jagran Printers. The suit was filed on 28-10-1996, as per plaint the defamatory publications were made on 13-10-1995, 14-10-1995, 18-10-1995, 22-10-1995, 29-10-1995 and lastly on 19-11-1995. In F.A. No. 214/06, a Civil Suit No. 7-A/99 was preferred against Dainik Nai Duniya, its Editor Madan Mohan Joshi and publisher. The suit was filed on 18-10-1996. It was averred that initial defamatory publication was made on 13-10-1995 and thereafter it was published on 28-10-1995. A preliminary objection was raised by the defendants as to the suits being barred by limitation. It was submitted that limitation has to be computed from the date of initial publication made in each of the case, thus, the suits filed beyond the period of one year of the said date were barred by limitation. The trial Court has framed a preliminary issue as to limitation in each and has held that limitation has to be computed from the date of initial publication made in each of the case. In Civil Suit No. 3-A/99 cause of action arose on 15-10-1995. In Civil Suit No. 6-A/99 cause of action arose initially on 13-10-1995 and in Civil Suit No. 7-A/99 it arose on 13-10-1995. The suits presented beyond the period of one year from date of initial publications have held to be barred by limitation, consequently suits have been dismissed, hence, these appeals have been preferred by the plaintiff. In Civil Suit No. 6-A/99 cause of action arose initially on 13-10-1995 and in Civil Suit No. 7-A/99 it arose on 13-10-1995. The suits presented beyond the period of one year from date of initial publications have held to be barred by limitation, consequently suits have been dismissed, hence, these appeals have been preferred by the plaintiff. It was submitted by Shri Raghvendra Kumar, learned counsel for plaintiff-appellant, that the Court below has erred in law in dismissing the suits as barred by limitation as per Article 75 of the Limitation Act, 1963 each of the defamatory publication furnished independent and fresh cause of action. In all the three suits some of the publications were made within period of one year from the date of filing the suit, thus, Court below has erred in law in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation. Shri Neelesh Kotecha, learned counsel for respondents, has submitted that from the averments made in the plaint apparently the cause of action arose before one year, thus, the Court below is right in computing the period of limitation from the date of initial publication while ignoring the other publications which were made later on. The question for consideration is whether the trial Court is right in computing the period of limitation from date of first publication, even though subsequent publications were made. Article 75 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes the period of limitation to claim compensation for libel as one year when the libel is published. In our opinion, the right to sue for libel accrues from the date of publication of defamatory statement whenever it is published. It is not material when the plaintiff became aware of it. The date of publication is material. When the libel is published does not mean when the libel is first published. In our considered opinion each such publication is fresh cause of action. Thus, limitation for later publications could not have been computed w.e.f. fresh (sic : first) publication made even though contents of later publication may be the same. There is no room to entertain the said ground adopted by the trial Court for dismissal of the suits. In our considered opinion each such publication is fresh cause of action. Thus, limitation for later publications could not have been computed w.e.f. fresh (sic : first) publication made even though contents of later publication may be the same. There is no room to entertain the said ground adopted by the trial Court for dismissal of the suits. It is not in dispute that in Civil Suit No. 3-A/99 the suit was presented on 11-7-1997 and last publication was made on 26-8-1996, that publication was admittedly within the period of one year from the date of presentation of plaint. In Civil Suit No. 6-A/99 plaint was presented as an indigent person on 28-10-1996 and last two publications were made on 29-10-1995 and 19-11-1995, these publications were within the period of one year from the date of presentation of the plaint. In Civil Suit No. 7-A/99 the plaint as an indigent person was presented on 17-10-1996 and admittedly last publication was made on 28-10-1995, that was within period of one year from the date of presentation of the plaint. With respect to the aforesaid last publications referred to in the plaints, it could not have been held to be barred by limitation by learned Trial Judge, thus, we have no hesitation in setting aside the judgment and decree passed in the aforesaid three suits. In 1888 RE Howard ILR (12) Bom 167, a complaint was filed, u/s 499 of the Indian Penal Code, against the proprietors, editor, and printer of a newspaper for publishing matter alleged to be defamatory. The Magistrate found that the publication complained was a mere reproduction or republication of what had been previously printed and published in another newspaper. He was, therefore, of opinion that, unless and until criminal proceedings had been taken in respect of the earlier publication, a charge of defamation could not properly be brought with regard to the later publication. He, therefore, dismissed the complaint, u/s 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the aforesaid factual matrix it was laid down that order of dismissal was improper. The Indian Penal Code makes no exception in favour of a second or third publication as compared to the first. If the complaint is properly made in respect of the publication which is prima facie defamatory, the Magistrate is bound to take cognizance of the complaint and to deal it according to law. The Indian Penal Code makes no exception in favour of a second or third publication as compared to the first. If the complaint is properly made in respect of the publication which is prima facie defamatory, the Magistrate is bound to take cognizance of the complaint and to deal it according to law. The Court laid down thus: It appears from the decision of the Magistrate in disposing of the case, though the matter is not brought out with absolute, clearness, that he was under the impression that when a previous publication of the alleged defamatory matter had occurred, the subsequent republication could not properly be made the subject of prosecution until that course had been taken with regard to the earlier publication. This, however, is not law. The Indian Penal Code makes no exception in favour of a second or third publication as compared with a first; and such an exception would obviously be made a means of defeating the principal provision of the law of defamation. In England it is not allowed to a defendant to prove that a statement, similar to the one for which he is indicted, has been previously published by persons who have not been prosecuted (see Reg. vs. Hol, 8 Cox. C.C., 411); and the repetition of a common rumour, however, prevalent, is not received as an excuse for its further promulgation (Waithman vs. Weaver, II Price, 257, Note.); nor, according to the English law, is the recovery of damages against one journal accepted even as mitigation in an action against another journal for a repetition of the libel (Reg. vs. Kerr, 8 C. and P., 177). It will be necessary, and we direct the Chief Presidency Magistrate to resume the consideration of the complaint in this case, directing his attention to the particulars thereof with reference to the principles we have indicated, and he will thereon give his decision on the complaint with regard to the following points :- 1, the veracity and good faith of the complaint; 2, as to the fact of publication; and, 4, with regard to the nature of the publication as penally defamatory or otherwise. The order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint is reversed, in order that he may proceed in the course we have thus prescribed. In Kapoor Chand Rikhi Ram Mahajan Vs. The order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint is reversed, in order that he may proceed in the course we have thus prescribed. In Kapoor Chand Rikhi Ram Mahajan Vs. Hakim Jagdish Chand Siripat Rai and Another, , it was held that a suit for compensation in respect of a particular publication of a libel filed within a year of such publication is within time under Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it is corresponding to Article 75 of the Limitation Act, 1963, thus, in our opinion, with respect to the publications made within period of one year from the date of presentation of the plaint before the trial Court, the suits could not have been dismissed as barred by limitation. We set aside the dismissal of the suits, with respect to subsequent publications made within one year of the filing of this suit. Trial Court is directed to examine the suit with respect to the aforesaid publications made within a period of one year from the date of presentation of the plaint and decide them after recording the evidence in accordance with law. The suits were barred by limitation with respect to publication made before one year of the date of filing of the suit. As the suits have staggered for a long time, we direct the trial Court to expedite the case and to decide the suit as far as possible within a period of 18 months. As prayed by respondents' counsel written statement be filed within two months from today. Resultantly, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments and decrees are hereby set aside. Parties to bear their own costs as incurred. Final Result : Allowed