JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.P. Mehrotra, J.—The present Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been filed by the petitioner, inter-alia, praying for quashing the order dated 6.3.2002 (Annexure-5 to the Writ Petition) passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No. 15, Kanpur Nagar, (hereinafter also referred to as “the Lower Appellate Court”). 2. It appears that a Suit being Suit No. 728 of 1987 was filed by the petitioner (Nanhey Lal Dubey) against the respondent No. 3 (Mahesh Prasad Gupta) and Smt. Saraswati Devi. It was, inter-alia, prayed in the said Suit that a decree for declaration be passed in favour of the petitioner that he was the sole owner and in possession of House No. 63/15, Harbansh Mohal, Kanpur Nagar, and the respondent No. 3 (Mahesh Prasad Gupta-defendant No. 1 in the said Suit) had no concern, right or share in the said House, and further, that the sale-deed dated 1.6.1979, executed by Smt. Saraswati Devi (defendant No. 2 in the said Suit) in favour of the respondent No. 3 (Mahesh Prasad Gupta-defendant No. 1 in the said Suit), was void, illegal and ineffective. 3. Copy of the plaint of the said Suit has been filed as Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition. 4. It appears from a perusal of the order-sheet of the said Suit (copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-2 to the Writ Petition) that on 28.11.1996, Issues were framed in the said Suit. 5. It further appears from a perusal of the said order-sheet that on 21.5.1997, the Trial Court passed an order directing the Suit to proceed ex-parte, and fixed 26.5.1997 for ex-parte proceeding. 6. On 26.5.1997, it appears from the order-sheet, the Advocates were on strike, and, therefore, 29.5.1997 was fixed for ex-parte evidence through affidavit. 7. On 29.5.1997, the petitioner gave evidence through affidavit. The Trial Court heard the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the said date, i.e., 29.5.1997, and fixed 30.5.1997 for judgment. 8. On 30.5.1997, the Presiding Officer was busy in inspection, therefore, 2.7.1997 was fixed for judgment. 9. On 2.7.1997, the Trial Court gave its judgment decreeing the said Suit ex-parte. 10. Thereafter, it appears that an Application being Application No. 3 Ga2 was filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3, inter-alia, praying for setting aside the ex-parte decree dated 2.7.1997. On 30.5.1997, the Presiding Officer was busy in inspection, therefore, 2.7.1997 was fixed for judgment. 9. On 2.7.1997, the Trial Court gave its judgment decreeing the said Suit ex-parte. 10. Thereafter, it appears that an Application being Application No. 3 Ga2 was filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3, inter-alia, praying for setting aside the ex-parte decree dated 2.7.1997. The said Application No. 3 Ga2 was registered as Misc. Case No. 114/74 of 1997. 11. The Trial Court by its order dated 28.4.1999 rejected the said Application No. 3 Ga2, filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3. 12. Copy of the said order dated 28.4.1999 passed by the Trial Court has been filed as Annexure-4 to the Writ Petition. 13. It was, inter-alia, held by the Trial Court that the respondent No. 3 remained absent on various dates after framing of Issues; and that the respondent No. 3 had never signed in English on the entire record, but the Medical Certificates, produced on behalf of the respondent No. 3, bore the signature of the respondent No. 3 in English which made it doubtful that the respondent No. 3 was ill on the dates fixed; and that the respondent No. 3 did not give any Application in his Office for medical leave in regard to the dates for which he submitted Medical Certificates before the Trial Court; and that it was evident that the Medical Certificates were wrongly got prepared by the respondent No. 3; and that the past conduct of the respondent No. 3 also showed that the respondent No. 3 was not interested in the disposal of the Suit, and his sole object was to delay the proceeding in the Suit. 14. Thereupon, it appears that the respondent No. 3 filed an Appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 277 of 1999. 15. By the judgment and order dated 6.3.2002, the Lower Appellate Court allowed the said Misc. Appeal, and further allowed the said Application 3 Ga2 on payment of cost of Rs. 500/-. 16. Copy of the said judgment and order dated 6.3.2002 passed by the Lower Appellate Court has been filed as Annexure-5 to the Writ Petition. 17. 15. By the judgment and order dated 6.3.2002, the Lower Appellate Court allowed the said Misc. Appeal, and further allowed the said Application 3 Ga2 on payment of cost of Rs. 500/-. 16. Copy of the said judgment and order dated 6.3.2002 passed by the Lower Appellate Court has been filed as Annexure-5 to the Writ Petition. 17. It was, inter-alia, held by the Lower Appellate Court that after the framing of Issues in the Suit on 28.11.1996, the respondent No. 3 got the Suit adjourned on a few dates subject to payment of cost; and that the Trial Court evidently found sufficient cause for adjournment on such dates, and, therefore, it adjourned the Suit on the said dates and fixed subsequent dates; and that, therefore, the past conduct or adjournment taken by the respondent No. 3 could not form the basis for drawing conclusion in regard to sufficiency of cause for his presence or absence; and that for deciding an Application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Trial Court was required to consider as to whether the respondent No. 3 had shown sufficient cause for his absence on the date on which the order for proceeding ex-parte had been passed. 18. 18. The Lower Appellate Court, inter-alia, further held that the respondent No. 3 had submitted two Medical Certificates dated 22.7.1997; and that one Medical Certificate showed the respondent No. 3 as suffering from fever on 21.5.1997 and 22.5.1997 while the other Medical Certificate showed the respondent No. 3 as suffering from dysentery from 26.5.1997 to 29.5.1997; and that the signatures of the respondent No. 3 on the said Medical Certificates were in English while on the dates of appearance before the Trial Court, the respondent No. 3 had been signing in Hindi; and that the Trial Court was not correct in disbelieving the Medical Certificates on the said ground while deciding in regard to the sufficiency of cause of absence of the respondent No. 3; and that the respondent No. 3 was an employee of Nagar Nigam, and he had knowledge of Hindi as well as English, and he must have been signing at some place in English and at other place in Hindi, and on the said basis, it could not be said that the signatures on the Medical Certificates were not those of the respondent No. 3 or that the Medical Certificates could not be believed. 19. It was, inter-alia, further held by the Lower Appellate Court that as regards the ground mentioned by the Trial Court that the respondent No. 3 had not filed any document to show that he had taken leave from his Office on the dates in question, a Certificate issued by Sahayak Nagar Adhikari, Kanpur Nagar Zone-II was filed in the Misc. Appeal, which showed that the respondent No. 3 was on leave on 21.5.1997 and from 26.5.1997 to 29.5.1997 while 22.5.1997 was Holiday on account of Budhpurnima; and that the learned Counsel for the petitioner did not raise any objection regarding the said Certificate produced in the Misc. Appeal. 20. It was, inter-alia, further held by the Lower Appellate Court that a person suffering from fever or dysentery was normally not capable of performing his daily activities, and further, there was affidavit of the respondent No. 3 in this regard. 21. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition seeking the reliefs mentioned above. 22. I have heard Shri G.L. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner at length, and perused the record. 23. 21. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition seeking the reliefs mentioned above. 22. I have heard Shri G.L. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner at length, and perused the record. 23. Even though the case has been taken-up in the revised list, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 is not present. 24. It is submitted by Shri G.L. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 was required to establish that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing in the Suit on the dates in question. It is further submitted that the respondent No. 3 was required to show his bonafides and genuineness for non-appearance on the dates in question. On the material on record, the submission proceeds, the respondent No. 3 failed to establish any sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the dates in question, nor could the respondent No. 3 show his bonafides or genuineness for non-appearance on the said dates. 25. It is further submitted by Shri Tripathi that the material on record established that the respondent No. 3 was only lingering on the proceedings in the Suit, and his non-appearance on the dates in question was without reasonable cause. It is further submitted that the respondent No. 3 had been taking repeated adjournments in the Suit in order to delay the disposal of the Suit. 26. Shri Tripathi has placed reliance on the following decisions : (1) Vijay Kumar Durga Prasad Gojbi and others v. Kamla Bai and others, 1996 All CJ 146 (SC) (2) Intezar Ahmad and another v. Jumman and others, 1995 (26) ALR 264. 27. It is further submitted by Shri Tripathi that the findings recorded by the Lower Appellate Court in regard to the sufficiency of cause for non-appearance of the respondent No. 3 on the dates in question were not correct. 28. I have considered the submissions made by Shri G.L. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner. 29. Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down as under : “13. 28. I have considered the submissions made by Shri G.L. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner. 29. Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down as under : “13. Setting aside decree ex parte against defendants.—In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit : Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also : [Provided further that no Court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim.] [Explanation.—Where there has been an appeal against a decree passed ex parte under this rule, and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting aside the ex parte decree.]” 30. In view of the provisions of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is evident that in case a decree is passed ex-parte against a defendant, he may apply to the Court, by which the decree was passed, for an order to set it aside. In case, the defendant satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served of that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the Suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the Suit. 31. 31. In the present case, the question of non-service of summons was not involved. What was alleged by the respondent No. 3 in his application for setting-aside the ex-parte decree was that he was prevented by sufficient cause (namely, illness) from appearing on the dates in question. The Trial Court in its order dated 28.4.1999 did not accept the version of the respondent No. 3, and rejected the said Application No. 3 Ga2, filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3, inter-alia, praying for setting aside the ex-parte decree. However, the Lower Appellate Court, on a consideration of the material on record, did not accept the findings recorded by the Trial Court, and held that the respondent No. 3 had established sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the dates in question. 32. In my opinion, if two interpretations or constructions of the evidence on record are reasonably possible, and the Trial Court took one view of the evidence while the Lower Appellate Court took a contrary view of the evidence, then no interference can be made in the Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the said ground. 33. The High Court in exercise of its Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the Courts below on consideration of the material on record. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot act as an appellate Court, and it cannot like a Court of appeal re-appraise the evidence and examine the findings of fact recorded by the authorities below. Merely because, two reasonable interpretations of the evidence on record are possible, and the Trial Court takes one of such views of the evidence on record while the Lower Appellate Court takes the other view of the evidence on record, the same cannot provide a ground for interference by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 34. No illegality or perversity has been shown in the findings recorded by the Lower Appellate Court in regard to the sufficient cause shown by the respondent No. 3 for his non-appearance on the dates in question. 35. 34. No illegality or perversity has been shown in the findings recorded by the Lower Appellate Court in regard to the sufficient cause shown by the respondent No. 3 for his non-appearance on the dates in question. 35. No interference is, therefore, called for with the findings recorded by the Lower Appellate Court in this regard. 36. Reference in this regard may be made to certain judicial decisions. 37. In M/s India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and another, AIR 1978 SC 45 , it was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the conclusions of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The findings on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord recorded by the Courts below by appreciating the entire evidence cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court opined as under (paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the said AIR) : “5. The limitation of the High Court while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution is well-settled. Power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts however erroneous those may be. It is well-settled and perhaps too late in the day to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, 1954 SCR 565 : ( AIR 1954 SC 215 ) where the principles have been clearly laid down as follows : (at page 217 of AIR) “This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal. 193 (SB) to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.” The same view was reiterated by another Constitution Bench of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, 1958 S.C.R. 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398 . Even recently in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte, (1975) 1 S.C.C. 858 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1297 ), dealing with a litigation between a landlord and tenant under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, this Court relying on its earlier decisions observed as follows : (at pp 1301, 1302 of AIR) : “If an error of fact, even though apparent on the face of the record, cannot be corrected by means of a writ of certiorari it should follow a fortiori that it is not subject to correction by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. The power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a Court of appeal. The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of appeal when the Legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate Court or tribunal final on facts.” 6. Whether the landlords requirement is bona fide and reasonable has been concurrently found by the two Courts below against the landlord by appreciating the entire evidence. After examining the reasons given by both the Courts it is not possible to hold that the conclusions are perverse or even that these are against the weight of evidence on record. It is a case of reasonably possible factual appreciation of the entire evidence and circumstances brought on the record. 7. It is possible that another Court may be able to take a different view of the matter by appreciating the evidence in a different manner, if it determinedly chooses to do so. However, with respect to the learned Judge (Vaidya, J.) that will not be justice administered according to law to which Courts are committed notwithstanding dissertation, in season and out of season, about philosophies. 8. We are clearly of opinion that there was no justification for interference in this case with the conclusion of facts by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 8. We are clearly of opinion that there was no justification for interference in this case with the conclusion of facts by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are also unable to agree with the High Court that there was anything so grossly wrong and unjust or shocking the Courts “conscience” that it was absolutely necessary in the interest of justice for the High Court to step in under Article 227 of the Constitution. Counsel for both sides took us through the reasoning given by the High Court as well as by the Courts below and we are unable to hold that the High Court was at all correct in exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with the decisions of the Courts below. In our opinion the High Court arrogated to itself the powers of a Court of appeal, which it did not possess under the law, and has exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.” 38. In Munni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, AIR 1978 SC 29 , it was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the finding on the question of comparative hardship of the landlord was finding of fact, and the same cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows (paragraph 1 of the said AIR) : “1...............There can be no doubt that a finding that the need of respondent 3, landlord was greater than that of the appellant/tenant is a finding of fact and when the High Court has refused to interfere with this finding of fact, we cannot find fault with the High Court, even if the findings were wrong on the evidence before the Court. It is not for the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority. We do not, therefore, see any reason to interfere with the decision of the High Court”. 39. We do not, therefore, see any reason to interfere with the decision of the High Court”. 39. In Ashok Kumar and others v. Sita Ram, 2001(2) ARC 1 : 2001 (43) ALR 783 (SC), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraphs 9 and 15 of the said ARC) : “9. The position is too well settled to admit of any controversy that the finding of fact recorded by the final Court of fact should not ordinarily be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, unless the Court is satisfied that the finding is vitiated by manifest error of law or is patently perverse. The High Court should not interfere with a finding of fact simply because it feels persuaded to take a different view on the material on record. 15. The question that remains to be considered is whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate Authority did not suffer from any serious illegality, nor can it be said to have taken a view of the matter, which no reasonable person was likely to take. In that view of the matter there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In a matter like the present case where orders passed by the Statutory Authority vested with power to act quasi-judicially is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. In exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the Statutory Authority unless the order suffers from manifest error and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another Appellate Court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case.” 40. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, 2003 All. L.J. 2057, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as under (paragraph 38 of the said All. L.J.) : “38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, 2003 All. L.J. 2057, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as under (paragraph 38 of the said All. L.J.) : “38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder : (1) Amendment by Act No. 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction—by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step into exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate Court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, orders or proceedings of the subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, orders or proceedings of the subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate Court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.” (Emphasis supplied) 41. As regards the past conduct of the respondent No. 3 in seeking adjournments in the Suit, I am of the opinion that the Lower Appellate Court took the correct view that the adjournments having been granted by the Trial Court after being satisfied regarding sufficiency of cause, the same ceased to be relevant for deciding the question of sufficiency of cause for non-appearance on a future date. 42. Reference may be made to the following decisions : In Ram Raj and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1988 RD 139 (LB), it was laid down as follows (at page 140 of the said RD) : “.........................In my opinion, the past conduct of the petitioners and previous negligence or want of diligence on their part to prosecute their case could not be made the basis for rejecting the application for restoration moved by the petitioners wherein sufficient cause was shown for non-appearance of petitioner No. 22, Ram Jiyawan, who had reached Court late due to his sudden illness while coming to Court................” (Emphasis supplied) In Phool Chand v. Vth Additional District Judge, Aligarh, 1983 A.R.C. 637, it was laid down by a learned Single Judge of this Court as follows (paragraph 1 of the said ARC) : “1................It is well-settled that in deciding the restoration application for setting aside an ex parte decree the merits of the case or conduct of the applicant should not be taken into account. And this error in deciding the application vitiates the finding.” 43. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Durga Prasad Gojbi case (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the facts of the said case were as follows : 44. And this error in deciding the application vitiates the finding.” 43. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Durga Prasad Gojbi case (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the facts of the said case were as follows : 44. One Ishwar Das Gojbi filed a Suit being Civil Suit No. 89 of 1985 after Civil Suit No. 82 of 1983 for eviction of the appellants was filed. When the Suits were part-heard on February 20, 1992, the Counsel for the appellants reported no instructions. Consequently, the Suits were set aside ex-parte. The appellants filed Application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the ex-parte order. The Trial Court dismissed the said Application by its order dated April 27, 1992. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case including the fact that the Suit was part-heard since last more than 3 years, the Trial Court by the said order dated April 27, 1997 rejected the said Application holding that there was no bonafides or genuineness on the part of the appellants for their non-appearance on February 20, 1992. 45. On Revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the Trial Court and confirmed the said order of the Trial Court. 46. Thereafter, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the findings recorded by the Trial Court, and held that it was not appropriate case for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 47. It will, thus, be seen that the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Durga Prasad Gojbi case (supra), is based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case. 48. In the present case, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, as established from the material on record, the Lower Appellate Court held that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance of the respondent No. 3 on the dates in question, and, therefore, the Lower Appellate Court allowed the Misc. Appeal, and further allowed the said Application No. 3 Ga2 filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3 for setting aside the ex-parte decree. 49. Appeal, and further allowed the said Application No. 3 Ga2 filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3 for setting aside the ex-parte decree. 49. In my opinion, the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Durga Prasad Gojbi case (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 50. In Intezar Ahmad case (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, an Original Suit No. 65 of 1982 was pending in the Court of IInd Additional Civil Judge, Moradabad between Jhumman and others and Smt. Raisa Khatun and others. On 4.11.1988 when the Suit was called on for hearing, the defendants Nos. 8 and 12 did not appear. The Court, therefore, ordered the Suit to be heard ex-parte under clause (a) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure. 51. Subsequently, two Applications, one on behalf of the defendant No. 8 and the other on behalf of the defendant No. 12, praying for recall of the said order dated 4.11.1988 were made under Rule 7 of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Applications were supported by two separate affidavits of a common Pairokar. The Court below by its order dated 2.12.1988 rejected the said Applications. The Court below disbelieved the cause for default in appearance on the date on which the Suit was called on for hearing on the ground that there was apparent contradiction in the cause shown in the two affidavits filed by the same Pairokar. 52. Thereupon, a revision was filed before this Court. A learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the said Revision, and held as under (paragraph 4 of the said ALR) : “4. The Court below has disbelieved the cause for default in appearance on the date on which the suit was called on for hearing on the ground that there is apparent contradiction in the cause shown in the two affidavits filed by the same pairokar. In one affidavit the pairokar had pleaded that he was unable to prosecute the case as he was ill on account of cold, headache and fever. In the other affidavit the ailment pleaded was dysentery. Indisputably, there is apparent contradiction regarding the nature of illness pleaded by the pairokar. The Court below has rightly disbelieved the cause for default in appearance. In the other affidavit the ailment pleaded was dysentery. Indisputably, there is apparent contradiction regarding the nature of illness pleaded by the pairokar. The Court below has rightly disbelieved the cause for default in appearance. Had the plea of ailment been found to be true that may have been good cause for recalling the order directing the suit to be heard ex-parte and for allowing the defendant-applicants to be heard in answer to the suit as if they had appeared on the day fixed for their appearance. But in the instant case the cause itself has been disbelieved. Goodness of the cause for non-appearance envisaged in Rule 7 of Order IX of the Code and truthfulness of the cause for non-appearance are not synonymous. They are quite distinct. Once the cause for default in appearance is found to be untrue it cannot be held to be good cause and the prayer for setting aside the order directing the suit to be heard ex-parte cannot be allowed.” 53. Thus, this decision lays down that goodness of the cause for non-appearance envisaged in Rule 7 of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure and truthfulness of the cause for non-appearance are not synonymous. They are quite distinct. Once the cause for default in appearance is found to be untrue it cannot be held to be good cause and the prayer for setting aside the order directing the suit to be heard ex-parte cannot be allowed. 54. Hence, in view of this decision, if the cause shown for non-appearance by the defendant itself is found to be untrue, then there is no occasion for considering the goodness or the sufficiency of such cause. 55. This decision, in my view, has no application to the present case. 56. In the present case, the Lower Appellate Court has believed the cause for non-appearance shown by the respondent No. 3 (namely, illness) and has held the said cause to be sufficient cause. The question may be examined from another angle 57. It is well established that the Court should take a liberal view on the question of “sufficient cause”, and should lean in favour of giving hearing to both the sides. Reference in this regard may be made to the following decisions : (1) Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah and another, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 425. It is well established that the Court should take a liberal view on the question of “sufficient cause”, and should lean in favour of giving hearing to both the sides. Reference in this regard may be made to the following decisions : (1) Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah and another, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 425. (2) Ramji Dass and others v. Mohan Singh, 1978 A.R.C. 496 (SC). (3) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, 1987(1) A.R.C. 288 (SC). 58. In Sangram Singh case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said A.I.R.) : “16. Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is ‘procedure’, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends : not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to ‘both’ sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. 17. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.” 59. In Ramji Dass case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows : “An ex parte decree passed eight years ago was set aside by the Court which passed it and the order was confirmed in revision by the District Court. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 115, C.P.C., set aside on various grounds. After having heard Counsel, we are inclined to the view that, as far as possible, Courts’ discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 115, C.P.C., set aside on various grounds. After having heard Counsel, we are inclined to the view that, as far as possible, Courts’ discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing. Therefore, we think that the order of the High Court should not have been passed in the interests of justice which always informs the power under Section 115, C.P.C. We therefore, set aside that order and also the ex parte decree. We direct the trial Court to take back the suit on file and proceed forthwith to trial. The suit is very old and it should be disposed of within six months from the receipt of this order by the trial Court. We further direct that as a condition for setting aside the ex parte decree, the appellants shall pay to the respondent, within one month from today a sum of Rs. 250/- by way of costs.” 60. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was laid down as follows (paragraph 3 of the said A.R.C.) : “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice—that being the life—purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that : (1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) “Every days delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.................” 61. In the present case, the Lower Appellate Court believing the version of the respondent No. 3 regarding his non-appearance on the dates in question as having been on account of sufficient cause, has allowed the said Application No. 3 Ga2, filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3, and has directed for hearing of the Suit on merits. 62. In view of the propositions laid down in the above decisions, I am of the opinion that this is not a fit case for interference in exercise of Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 63. In view of the above, I am of the view that the present Writ Petition lacks merits, and the same is liable to be dismissed. 64. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. 65. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. ————