JUDGMENT Heard Shri V.B.S. Negi, counsel for the appellants and Shri I.S. Mehra, counsel for the respondents. 2. By the present second appeal filed under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, the appellants have prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 1.11.2006 passed in Civil Appeal No. 49 of 2004 passed by District Judge, Udham Singh Nagar. 3. Briefly stated, a suit was filed by the plaintiff before the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Udham Singh Nagar (Rudrapur) for a decree for declaration and permanent injunction. The suit was decreed. Against the said decree the defendants preferred the appeal. The appeal was dismissed by the appellate court. Hence, the present second appeal has been filed. 4. The second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law : "1. Whether the courts below have erred in law in treating the license as lease, on the basis of long permission to occupy the premises by the plaintiff?" 5. According to the plaint averments, the plaintiffs are the tenant of the shop and house, boundary of which are given below, on a sum of Rs. 20/- towards rent. Boundary of shop : Towards the North : After field, house of Sher Bahadur Towards the South : After Road, office of Khurpia Farm Towards the East : House of Shiv Dayal Towards the West : Road Boundary of House : Towards the North : Road Towards the South : House of Narendra Verma after garden Towards the East : House of Gopal Kishna Gandhi Towards the West : House of Baliram 6. It has been stated that a sum of Rs. 70/- each towrads electricity charges for the shop and for the house were being realized by the Khurpia Agriculture Farm by Sri Jeet Singh (since deceased). Sri Jeet Singh has paid total rent alongwith the electricity charges but the defendants have given the receipt for electricity charges only. The plaintiffs sent a notice on 21.8.1998 to the Khurpia Agriculture Farm, Kichha through its Farm Manager for correction in receipts. But, the electricity connections of the shop and the house were disconnected. Thereafter, the plaintiffs were threatened that they will be dispossessed by the defendants forcibly. The plaintiffs have prayed for a decree for declaration as well as for permanent injunction restraining the defendants to dispossess the plaintiffs except in accordance with law. 7. But, the electricity connections of the shop and the house were disconnected. Thereafter, the plaintiffs were threatened that they will be dispossessed by the defendants forcibly. The plaintiffs have prayed for a decree for declaration as well as for permanent injunction restraining the defendants to dispossess the plaintiffs except in accordance with law. 7. A written statement has been filed on behalf of the Birendra Singh Solanki and M/s Keshar Enterprises Limited Baheri, Bareilly submitting therein that defendant No. 2 M/s Kesar Enterprises Ltd. Baheri District Bareilly having its Head Office at 7 Jamshed Jee Tata Road, Bombay is a Registered Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. The defendant's company possess a sugar Unit and distillery at Baheri. The company also possess a Research and Development Farm known as Khurpia Farm situated at Village Khurpia Tehsil Kichha District Udham Singh Nagar. The defendant company is Bhumidhar of the entire land comprising of Khurpia Farm and the defendant company is the owner in possession of the entire buildings built in the said farm for residential purposes of its employees during the service period. The defendant company started a Canteen in the farm for providing better facilities to its employees and for smooth functioning of this Canteen the defendant allotted the plaintiff the house and the shop in question. It has been submitted that the allotment of the shop and the house were conditional and the plaintiffs were to pay the maintenance charges only. There was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the defendant and the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs agreed to the terms of the defendant and occupied the house and the Canteen with the permission of the defendant as a Licensee. The plaintiffs continued the Canteen till October, 1998. Thereafter, on receiving various complaints against the plaintiffs, they were asked to vacate the house as well as the Canteen within one month. The plaintiffs failed to pay the maintenance charges at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month and the Licence given to the plaintiff was revoked on 25.10.1998. A notice was served upon the plaintiffs on 14.1.1999 to vacate the premises on or before 14.2.1999 but the plaintiffs having received the notice did not vacate the premises in question. The plaintiffs are not entitled to occupy the said canteen and the house after revocation of the License under Section 630 of the 'Companies Act'. A notice was served upon the plaintiffs on 14.1.1999 to vacate the premises on or before 14.2.1999 but the plaintiffs having received the notice did not vacate the premises in question. The plaintiffs are not entitled to occupy the said canteen and the house after revocation of the License under Section 630 of the 'Companies Act'. The suit for prohibitory injunction filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable. The suit is not properly valued and insufficient court-fee has been paid. The suit is barred by the provisions of specific relief Act. 8. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed :- ß1- D;k oknh okni= esa of.kZr nqdku dk fdjk;snkj gS\ 2- D;k oknh okni= esa of.kZr pkSgnh Hkou dk fdjk;snkj gS\ 3- D;k okn dk ewY;kadu de fd;k x;k gS rFkk vnk dh x;h dksVZ Qhl vi;kZIr gS\ 4- D;k okn iks’k.kh; gS\ 5- vuqrks’k\ 9. On behalf of the plaintiffs, P.W.1 Tara Singh Negi, P.W.2 Chanchal Singh Manral and P.W.3 Prempal have been examined. Towards the documentary evidence, the plaintiffs have produced receipts paper no. 8 ga/1 to 8 ga/48. 10. On behalf of the defendants, Birendra Singh Solanki has been examined as P.W.1 and Narendra Verma has been examined as P.W.2. 11. While deciding as to whether the plaintiffs are the tenant of the shop in dispute and further as to whether the plaintiffs are the tenant of the house in dispute, the trial court has relied upon the statement of P.W.1 Tara Singh, P.W.2 Chanchal Singh and P.W.3 Prem Pal, who have deposed that the plaintiffs were the tenant of the disputed shop and house at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month and further a sum of Rs. 70/- each towards electricity charges for the disputed shop and the house. The controversy arose after the disconnection of the electricity. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 Birendra Singh Solanki and D.W.2 Narendra Verma have been examined and they have deposed that the plaintiff-respondents were licencees and the said license has been revoked on 25.10.1998. 12. Further, the trial court has relied upon the receipts of rent i.e. paper nos. 8 ga/1 to 8 ga/48 which were issued in favour of Jeet Singh. These receipts have proved the payment of rent and electricity charges by Jeet Singh as a tenant. 12. Further, the trial court has relied upon the receipts of rent i.e. paper nos. 8 ga/1 to 8 ga/48 which were issued in favour of Jeet Singh. These receipts have proved the payment of rent and electricity charges by Jeet Singh as a tenant. Further , since no evidence has been produced by the defendants with regard to commencement of license and termination of license, the trial court has disbelieved the statement of D.W.1 that the plaintiffs were licensee on the premises on dispute. 13. On the basis of aforesaid, the trial court has recorded the finding that the plaintiffs were the tenants on the premises in dispute. 14. So far as valuation of the suit is concerned, the trial court has recovered the finding by its order dated 16.1.2004 that the suit was properly valued. 15. While deciding with regard to maintainability of the suit, the said issue was not pressed by the parties and, therefore, was disposed of accordingly. 16. On the basis of aforesaid, the trial court has recorded the finding that the plaintiffs were the tenants on the premises in dispute and the defendants have failed to prove that the plaintiffs were licensees. The trial court, therefore, has decreed the suit. 17. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the defendants went in appeal. The appellate court, relying upon the oral as well as the documentary evidence i.e. paper nos. 8 ga/1 to 8 ga/48 which are the rent receipts issued in favour of the plaintiffs, has dismissed the appeal. 17. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the defendants went in appeal. The appellate court, relying upon the oral as well as the documentary evidence i.e. paper nos. 8 ga/1 to 8 ga/48 which are the rent receipts issued in favour of the plaintiffs, has dismissed the appeal. The appellate court has recorded the finding to the following effect :- ßi{kdkjksa dh ekSf[kd lk{; ds vfrfjDr i=koyh ij miyC/k dkxt la[;k 8 x@1 yxk;r 8 x@48 izfroknh daiuh }kjk oknh dks nh x;h jlhnsa egRoiw.kZ lk{; gSA ;g jlhn lu~ 1967 ls gS ftlls ;g lkfcr gksrk gS fd oknh fookfnr nqdku ij lu~ 1967 ls dkfct gSA bu jlhnksa esa lu~ 1967 dh jlhn esa fctyh dk ewY; 7-29 #i;s vkSj DokVZj vkSj nqdku dk fdjk;k 20@& #i;s vafdr fd;k x;k gS vkSj vafre jlhn fnukad 7-10-1998 dks tkjh dh x;h gS tks 160@& #i;s fctyh ds fcy ls lacaf/kr gS] blls iwoZ dh jlhn 8 x@47 fnukad 23-1-1998 dh gS] ftlesa fctyh dk fcy 140@& #i;s vkSj nqdku vkSj edku dk fdjk;k 20@& #i;s fn[kk;k x;k gS] blls igys dh lHkh jlhnksa esa nqdku dk fdjk;k fn[kk;k x;k gSA dkxt la[;k 8 x@48 tks fnukad 7-10-98 dk gS] mles a[kkyh fctyh dk pktZ fn[kk;k x;k gS] ftlls oknh ds bl dFku dks cy feyrk gS fd izfroknh }kjk vDVwcj] 1998 esa jlhn esa fdjk;s dk mYys[k u gksus ds laca/k esa mlds }kjk jlhn esa la”kks/ku djus gsrq uksfVl fn;k x;k] ftlls dqfir gksdj izfroknh }kjk oknh dh fctyh dkV nh x;hA bu jlhnksa dks izfroknh la[;k 2 }kjk tkjh fd;k tkuk Lo;a izfroknh lañ 1 ohjsUæ flag lksyadh us Lohdkj fd;k gSA izfroknh }kjk bu jlhnksa dks Lohdkj fd;s tkus ds dkj.k vU; rjhds ls lkfcr fd;s tkus dh dksbZ vko”;drk ugha Fkh] tSlk fd vihykFkhZ ds fo}ku vf/koDrk us viuh cgl esa dgk gSA i=koyh esa miyC/k ekSf[kd ,oa nLrkosth lk{; ds fo”ys’k.k ls ;g Li’V gS fd oknh ;g lkfcr djus esa lQy jgk gS fd og fookfnr nqdku vkSj Hkou esa lu~ 1967 ls izfroknh dk fdjk;snkj gS vkSj izfroknh }kjk lu~ 1998 dks oknh dh fctyh vdkj.k dkV nh x;h] fo}ku voj U;k;ky; us bl laca/k esa fu.kZ; i=koyh esa miyC/k lk{; ds vuq:i gSA vr% vihy [kkfjt gksus ;ksX; gSA 18. A perusal of paper no. A perusal of paper no. 7 ga 1 to 7 ga 3 which are receipts of different years, there is no reason for doubt that late Sri Jeet Singh was admitted as tenant of the premises in dispute by Keshar Sugar Works Limited, Kichha. The aforesaid tenancy is also established from the statement of Birendra Singh Solanki, D.W.1 in the cross-examination of chief he has stated as under :- ßfookfnr nqdku o DokVZj esa thr flag esjs ls iwoZ dCts esa FksA edku o nqdku ds ,yksVesaV dh dk;Zokgh esjs lkeus ugha gqbZ esjs ls iwoZ esa gqbZ FkhAÞ ßeSaus odhy lkgc dks ;g ckr crkbZ Fkh fd thr flag gekjh dEiuh esa dk;Z djrs FksA lsokfuo`fÙk ds ckn mlds vPNs O;ogkj ds dkj.k fookfnr nqdku o edku dks iznku dh xbZ FkhA ;s ckr tokc nkos esa ugha dgh gS rks otg ugha crk ldrkAÞ 19. Since the occupation of the plaintiffs-respondents was not a part of employment and, therefore, the two courts below very rightly held late Shri Jeet Singh Manral to be the tenant of the premises. 20. The Apex Court has interpreted the terms lease and license in Khalil Ahmad Bashir Ahmad v. Tufel Hussain Samas Bhai Sarangpurwala ARC 1988 (a) SC 165. 21. It has been held by the Apex Court about the distinction of lessee and licensee in Khalil Ahmad Bashir Ahmad v. Tufel Hussain Samas Bhai Sarangpurwala ARC 1988 (a) SC 165. The Apex Court while dealing the question of lease and licence has observed as under : "This Court referred to the well-known decision in the case of Errington v. Errington 4 where Lord Denning reviewing the case law on the subject summarized the position as follows : "The result of all these cases is that, although a person who is let into exclusive possession is, prima facie, to be considered to be a tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy". The Court of Appeal in England again in Cobb. V. Lane 5 considered the legal position and laid down that the intention of the parties was the real test for ascertaining the character of a document. The Court of Appeal in England again in Cobb. V. Lane 5 considered the legal position and laid down that the intention of the parties was the real test for ascertaining the character of a document. Somervell L.J., had observed: "The solution that would seem to have been found is, as one would expect, that it must depend on the intention of the parties." Denning, L.J. also reiterated the same decision. Reviewing these decisions Denning, L.J. had observed at page 384 of the report (1) that to ascertain whether a document created a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form; (2) the real test was the intention of the parties - whether they intended to create a lease or a licence; (3) if the document created an interest in the property, it is a lease; but if it only permitted another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continued with the owner, it was a licence; and (4) if under the document a party got exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he was considered to be a tenant; but circumstances might be established which negative the intention to create a lease". 22. It is well settled that a person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession until he is evicted in due course of law. The Apex Court in Rame Gowda (Dead) By LRs. V.M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) By LRs. and another reported in (2004) SCC 769 has relied upon the passage from the Jurisprudence by Salmond (12th Edn.) to the following effect :- "few relationship are as vital to man as that of possession, and we may expect any system of law, however primitive, to provide rules for its protection.... Law must provide for the safeguarding of possession. Human nature being what it is, men are tempted to prefer their own selfish and immediate interests to the wide and long-term interest of society in general. But since an attack on a man's possession is an attack on something which may be essential to him, it becomes almost tantamount to an assault on the man himself; and the possessor may well be stirred to defend himself with force. The result is violence, chaos and disorder." (at pp. 265-66). "In English law possession is a good title of right against anyone who cannot show a better. The result is violence, chaos and disorder." (at pp. 265-66). "In English law possession is a good title of right against anyone who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first five up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law." (Salmond, ibid, pp. 294-95). "Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit)." (Salmond, ibid, p. 295). 6. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with the jurisprudential thought as propounded by Salmond. In Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. V. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy AIR 1924 PC 144 : 51 IA 293 Sir John Edge summed up the India law by stating that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession : they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court. 7. The thought has prevailed incessantly, till date, the last and latest one in the chain of decisions being Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjawani (2003) 7 SCC 350. In between, to quote a few out of several, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh AIR 1968 SC 620 : (1968) 2 SCR 203 this Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. In between, to quote a few out of several, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh AIR 1968 SC 620 : (1968) 2 SCR 203 this Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. The Court turned down the submission that under the general law applicable to a lessor and lessee there was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee. The court quoted with approval the law as stated by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohd. V. Lakshmi Das AIR 1959 All 1: 1958 All LJ 628 (FB) (AIR at p. 4) : "Law respects possession even if there is not title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause." (AIR p. 5, para 13) In the oft-quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. V. K.C. Alexander AIR 1968 SC 1165 : (1968) 3 SCR 163 this Court held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. The Court quoted Loft's maxim - "Possession contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (he that hath right against all but him that hath the very right)" and said (AIR p. 1175, para 20) "A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff's and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time." In M.C. Chockalingam v. V. Manichavasagam (1974) 1 SCC 48 this Court held that the law forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title. In Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao (1989) 4 SCC 131 it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law, but the peaceful possession is to be protected from the trespasser without regard to the question of the origin of the possession. When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. Such a suit will be founded on the averment of previous possession of the plaintiff and dispossession by the defendant. 8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned, the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully disposed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession of prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner. 9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions. Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi Ram v. Delhi Admn. AIR 1968 SC 702 : (1968) 2 SCR 455 : 1968 Cri LJ 806, Puran Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 518 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 608 and Ram Rattan v. State of U.P. (1977) 1 SCC 188 : 1977 SCC (Cr) 85 need not be multiplied. In Munshi Ram case it was held that one, including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But merely stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner." 23. In view of the aforesaid, question of law is decided against the appellants. 24. As already stated above, the evidence on the record, documentary as well as oral, fully establish the status of the plaintiff-respondents as lessee and not licensee. Therefore, the question of law is decided against the appellants. 25. Further, from time to time in various decisions, the Apex Court interpreted the scope of Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure view with regard to interference on the findings of fact. Therefore, the question of law is decided against the appellants. 25. Further, from time to time in various decisions, the Apex Court interpreted the scope of Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure view with regard to interference on the findings of fact. In Shah Mansukhlal Chhanganial (D) through LRs v., Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai (D) through LRs reported in [2007 (66) ALR 310], the Apex Court has held as under :- "Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh 2000 (3) SCC 708-2000 (39) ALR 484 (SC), this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads : "7. It is to be reiterated that under section 100, CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under section 100, CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter, the High Court did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact finding Courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into the possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was permissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two Courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings." 26. In Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi and another [2007 (03) RD 610], the Apex Court has observed as under :- "6. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last Court of facts, being the First Appellate Court. In Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi and another [2007 (03) RD 610], the Apex Court has observed as under :- "6. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last Court of facts, being the First Appellate Court. It is true that the Lower Appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the Trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the Appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the Lower Appellate Court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the Lower Appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 7. The question of law raised will not be considered as a substantial question of law, if it stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court. Where the facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. Mere appreciation of facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the First Appellate Court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the First Appellate Court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or procedure requiring interference in second appeal. Where the First Appellate Court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India V. Ramkrishna Govind Morey, held that whether the Trial Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference. See : Kondiba Dogadu Kadam v. Savitrivai Sopan Gujar and others 2000 (Suppl.) RD 265 - 1999 (36) ALR 218 (SC). 8. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended section 100 of the C.P.C. is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradiction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as section 109 of the C.P.C. or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta AIR 1928 PC 172, the phrase 'substantial question of law' as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing section 100 C.P.C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sri Chunilal's case (supra), the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rirnmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju AIR 1951 Mad. 969 : "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. 969 : "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to be particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." 9. This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial : "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 10. In Dy. Commnr. Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain AIR 1953 SC 521, also it was held that a question of law of importance to the parties was a substantial question of law entitling the appellant to a certificate under (the then) section 100 of the C.P.C. 11. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of ant lis. See : Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased by LRs. 2001 (92) RD 336 (SC) - 2001 (42) ALR 794 (SC). 12. The principles relating to section 100, C.P.C., relevant for this case, may be summarized thus : (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law is construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, 'involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. 13. The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where : (1) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to 'decision based on no evidence', it not only refers to ceases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding." 27. In Govindraju v. Martamman reported in AIR 2005 SC 1008, the Apex Court has held as under :- "16. As per settled law, the scope of exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in Second Appeal under Section 100 is limited to the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of the appeal or additional substantial questions of law framed as a later date after recording reasons for the same. It was observed in Santosh Hazari's case (supra) that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be a 'substantial' question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing as to the rights of the parties before the Court. As to what would be the question of law "involving in the case". To be a 'substantial' question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing as to the rights of the parties before the Court. As to what would be the question of law "involving in the case". It was observed that to a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by the court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision between the parties." 28. In view of the aforesaid, High Court has limited powers under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. Second appeal, therefore, is liable to be dismissed. 29. Consequently, second appeal is dismissed with costs.