JUDGMENT M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J. 1. Challenging the order of acquisition of land belonged to the appellants under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, (hereinafter called as the Act) passed by the competent authority, the appellants filed appeal before the appellate authority, which was dismissed, and thereafter filed writ petition before this Court in CWJC No. 3347/1998R, which was also dismissed. Hence this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The short facts, which are relevant for disposal of this appeal, are as follows: The appellants are the descendants of one Nihar Prakash Ganguly, who, as a Karta of the family, purchased the property in question with buildings and orchard in the year 1912 comprising of 19123 sq.mts. of land. The said Nihar Prakash Ganguly died on 10.1.1980 leaving behind three sons -Nirodhi Prakash Ganguly, appellant No. 1, Arya Prakash Ganguly appellant No. 2, Nilay Prakash Ganguly appellant No. 3 and a married adult daughter, Mrs. Rita Chaterjee, as his heirs. Even before his death, the Act came into operation on 17.2.1976. So, Nihar Prakash Ganguly, as a Karta of the family, filed a statutory returns on 6.9.1976 under Section 6 of the Act regarding his property called "Sunny Nook" situated in Ranchi. As out of the said property, more than 3000 sq.mts. of land was sold much before the commencement of the Act, there remained 15942 sq.mts. of land with the appellants and their father (since deceased). In the year 1972 itself, existing buildings of the property were given for rent by the appellants and their father to a private College, respondent No. 4. In the statutory returns filed under Section 6 of the Act on 6.9.1976, the appellants claimed that they did not have any surplus land which could be acquired under the Act as the land in question consisted of three existing buildings and orchard. Even though such statutory returns was filed even when the appellants father was alive, no enquiry had been conducted in respect of the said statutory returns. On the date of commencement of the Act, the appellants were entitled to 5 units (father, three sons and one married daughter). In the city of Ranchi, one unit comprises of 2000 sq.mts. of land. The Act is applicable only in respect of surplus vacant land and buildings and orchard are categorically excluded. On the date of commencement of the Act, the appellants were entitled to 5 units (father, three sons and one married daughter). In the city of Ranchi, one unit comprises of 2000 sq.mts. of land. The Act is applicable only in respect of surplus vacant land and buildings and orchard are categorically excluded. In the meantime, in the year 1988 the College authorities, the lessees, entered into a sale agreement with the appellants, the land owners, to transfer the building in the property including standing trees and structures measuring 100 Khatas for a consideration of Rs. 6 lacs with an advance of Rs. 1 lac. As per the agreement, the vendee, the College authority, had undertaken to obtain in the name of the vendors the necessary permission for the sale from the Government under the Act for lawfully conveying the land and assured that the final sale would be completed within three months after permission. Admittedly the appellants were absentee landholders since their permanent addresses were at Calcutta. Thereupon the College authority sent a letter to the appellants that since already permission for sale of 100 khatas of land was accorded by the Chief Minister of the State, the appellants could wait for some more time as formal office order has to be passed by the Government. In the meantime, no intimation was received by the appellants in respect of U.L.C Case No. 12/1976. Since the College authority asked the appellants to wait for the formal order of the Chief Minister regarding permission, they were under impression that U.L.C Case No. 12/1976 had not been proceeded. In the year 1997, the appellants visited Ranchi and only then they came to know that the competent authority, respondent No. 3, commenced the hearing of U.L.C Case No. 12/1976 in June, 1992 itself and within a few months, concluded the preparation and publication of final statement under Section 9, notice of acquisition under Section 10 of the Act and ultimately passed ex parte orders holding that there is surplus land and issued notification for acquisition and took possession of the land in question without serving any notice on the appellants. Having shocked to know this, they collected further informations which revealed that the competent authority, respondent No. 3, passed various ex parte orders on 22.6.1992, 3.8.1992, 17.9.1992 and 23.11.1992 as if the notice was issued to the landholders and since there was no response from the appellants, the final declaration had been made and in accordance with the final declaration, notification of surplus land was published and on 23.11.1992 possession was taken. All these things had been done behind the back of the appellants. The moment they came to know about the illegal order having been passed without following the provisions of the Act, they filed an appeal before the appellate authority. The appeal was filed in time from the date of the knowledge since the order impugned were passed by the authorities long back. By way of abundant caution they also filed an application for condonation of delay also. The appellate authority, without going into the merits, simply dismissed the appeal on 27.4.1998, holding that the delay cannot be condoned. Thereupon they filed writ petition in CWJC No. 3347/1998R before the High Court, challenging the proceedings of U.L.C Case No. 12/1976 and ex parte orders passed therein as well as the order of the appellate authority and seeking for a direction upon the respondents to deliver back the vacant possession of the constructed buildings in favour of the petitioner-appellants. The said writ petition was heard by the learned Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition on 13.9.1999 holding that there is no illegality in the orders passed by the competent authority as well as appellate authority. Aggrieved by the same, this Letters Patent Appeal has been filed. 3. Mr. Vinod Kanth, the learned Sr. Counsel for the appellants, assailing the orders impugned, would make the following submissions: (A) From the perusal of the order dated 17.6.1992, 22.6.1992, 3.8.1992, 17.9.1992, 1.10.1992 and 23.11.1992 passed by the competent authority, it is clear that not a single provision of the Act was followed by the competent authority before passing those orders in acquiring 10000 sq.mts. of land and taking possession thereof. of land and taking possession thereof. All the orders impugned were passed behind the back of the appellants by the competent authority with the connivance of the College authority at the instance of the vested interest of the Government in order to grab the land of the appellants, even though the land in question contained three buildings and orchard which are to be excluded under the Act. (B) The appellants came to know in 1997 about the ex parte orders passed by the competent authority grabbing the entire land without giving any opportunity of hearing to them, even though the appellants in the year 1976 itself had filed statutory returns stating that there is no surplus land in the property in question and the said land consisted of buildings and orchard. The orders referred to above only indicate that the authorities passed ex parte orders by taking the stand that relevant provisions of C.P.C had been followed for issuance of notice and since the acknowledgment has not been returned after issuance of the notice, the authorities felt that there is valid service of notice as per the provisions of C.P.C and passed ex parte orders without following the special provisions contained in the Act and caused grave injustice to the appellants in order to grab the property and to help the College authority. (C) Even though the appellants filed the appeal immediately after coming to know about the ex parte orders passed by the competent authority, the appellate authority, without applying its mind to the main cause, simply dismissed the appeal on the ground that it is filed beyond the period of limitation. In the same way, the learned Single Judge also has simply rejected the writ petition on the ground that there is no illegality in the impugned orders passed by the competent authority as well as appellate authority. In fact, the learned Single Judge has called for the records and perused the same; even then the learned Single Judge, without giving any finding with reference to the non-service of notice, as per the Act or insufficiency of the cause shown by the writ petitioners for not having condoned the delay, simply rejected the writ petition without application of mind. Therefore, all the orders impugned have to be set aside and possession taken by the competent authority in pursuance of the orders passed on 17.3.1992, 3.8.1992 and 23.11.1992 has to be delivered back to the appellants who are admittedly the land owners. 4. In reply to the submissions made on behalf of the appellants, Mr. R.R. Mishra, the learned Counsel for the respondent-competent authority, who passed the orders, would submit that the required procedure as contemplated under C.P.C had been followed and in spite of several notices, the appellants did not choose to file objection and therefore, the impugned orders came to be passed and consequently, it cannot be said that those orders are illegal. However, the counsel for the respondents did not give any reason as to why the special provision under the Act has not been followed. 5. Ms. Ritu Kumar, the learned Counsel for the College authority, though would admit about the agreement of sale entered into between the college authority and the appellants, and also admit about the letters sent by the college authority to the appellants regarding the assurance that they would get the permission for sale from the Chief Minister of the State, she vehemently contended that they were not in hand in glove with the competent authority for acquisition or confiscation of the land in question and they were not a party to the acquisition proceedings under the Act. 6. In the light of the rival contentions urged by the counsel for the parties, let us now go into the main question that has to be decided in this case. Though it is vehemently contended on behalf of the appellants that the competent authority at the instance of the vested interest of the then ruling Government in collusion with College authority out of mala fide motive passed all the orders in favour of the college authority without hearing the appellants, we feel that we need not go into that question as sufficient adverse remarks have already been passed as against the College authority and the then Government in suo motu contempt taken against them during the pendency of the L.P.A. Therefore, we are now concerned with the question whether all the impugned orders were legally passed or not? 7. 7. It is not disputed even by the counsel for the respondents that even though the special provisions are available under the Act for conducting enquiry in order to find out whether there is surplus land and if there is surplus land, whether it is liable to be acquired under Section 10 of the Act, they were not followed. Admittedly, there is no explanation for the same. 8. Let us now refer to the special procedures under the provisions of the Act. Section 8 is with respect to preparation of draft statement as regards surplus land held in excess of ceiling limit. Section 8(1) mandates an enquiry by the competent authority to prepare a draft statement. Section 8(2) mandates four particulars needed for statement - (i) name and address of person, (ii) particulars of vacant land plus land with building, whether or not dwelling, (iii) vacant land which he desires to retain and (iv) right, title and interest with respect to vacant land. Section 8(3) mandates the manner in which draft statement shall be served on the person along with the notice requiring him to file objection within 30 days of the service of notice. The manner of service of notice is under the Rules framed by the Central Government. The manner prescribed for service as contemplated under the Rules is as follows: (a) Notice under registered post addressed to the person concerned, (b) On the address given in the returns filed under Section 6(1) by him, (c) In case other persons at their known addresses, (d) Where the draft statement and notice are returned as "refused" by the addressee, it will be deemed a valid service, (e) If the "service" as "returned as refused" has not been successful for reasons other than that, i.e. postal peons report did not reach or the addressee was not found or for any other reason, the draft statement plus notice shall be served by affixing copies in a conspicuous place in competent authoritys office and also upon conspicuous part of the house where he last resided. Section 8(4) provides for an opportunity to file objection to the draft statement prepared under Section 8 after service of notice. 9. Section 9 speaks of final statement after disposal of the objection, if any, filed under Section 8(4). Section 8(4) provides for an opportunity to file objection to the draft statement prepared under Section 8 after service of notice. 9. Section 9 speaks of final statement after disposal of the objection, if any, filed under Section 8(4). It also allows the competent authority to make necessary alterations and also mandates for service of such alteration in the same manner as prescribed under Section 8(3). 10. Section 10 speaks of acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling land. Section 10(1) postulates that the State Government will come with notification only after the service of final statement under Section 9. Section 10(3) empowers the State Government to vest the vacant land unto itself. 11. Section 11 mandates the State Government to make payment to land holder after the Gazette notification under Section 10(3). 12. Admittedly, the procedure for initial service of notice as well as procedure for service of the other notices regarding preparation of draft statement on the land owners as detailed above has never been followed in this case. Admittedly, notices have never been served on the appellants. On the other hand, in the order dated 17.6.1992, it is stated that on draft statement under Section 8(1), Government Pleader was heard on 24.4.1992 and as the opposite party has not filed any objection under Section 8(1), 9942 sq.mts. of land is being finally ordered as surplus land under Section 9. 3.8.1992 order shows that in compliance of the order dated 17.6.1992, final draft under Section 9 of the Act was issued to the land holders but acknowledgment was not returned and therefore, service was deemed valid under C.P.C and under Section 10(1) of the Act, publication was made. 17.9.1992 order shows that publication of notification under Section 10(1) was made in Gazette and daily newspaper and directed that notification under Section 10(3) of the Act is ordered to be issued for acquisition of the surplus land measuring 9942 sq.mts. Order dated 1.10.1992 would show that the competent authority directed the Circle Officer to take possession of the acquired land. The order dated 23.11.1992 would reveal that Circle Officer informed the competent authority on 21.11.1992 that possession of acquired surplus 9942 sq.mts. of land has been taken by the State of Bihar on 18.11.1992. 13. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the learned Sr. The order dated 23.11.1992 would reveal that Circle Officer informed the competent authority on 21.11.1992 that possession of acquired surplus 9942 sq.mts. of land has been taken by the State of Bihar on 18.11.1992. 13. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the learned Sr. Counsel for the appellants, none of the provisions of the Act had been followed and no opportunity was given to the appellants before publication of the final statement. And no information was given to the appellants, who are residing in Calcutta address, the details of which were mentioned in the statutory returns filed by the appellants on 6.9.1976 itself under Section 6(1) of the Act. Admittedly, no steps were taken by the authority subsequent to the final order under Section 10(3) in the year 1992 in respect of the payment of compensation under Section 11 of the Act. So these things would make it clear that the competent authority has hurriedly passed orders without giving opportunity to the land holders as provided in various sections of the Act. Further it is quite shocking to note that even though under the notification possession of 9942 sq.mts. had been taken, there is nothing to show as to how the college authority was allowed to run the college in the land in question which was acquired and taken possession by the Government. 14. It is the specific plea of the appellants through their statutory returns that there is no surplus vacant land and the land in question consists of buildings and orchard which are to be excluded from the purview of the Act. Admittedly, there is no enquiry whether those facts are correct or not by making spot inspection. All put together would indicate that the competent authority had hurriedly passed the order of acquisition and in pursuance of the said order of acquisition, issued notification for having taken possession. Why haste? What is the reason for unusual hurry? Why there is total failure to follow the Mandatory Procedures contemplated under the Act? There is no explanation. 15. It is a settled law that when a statue prescribed for a particular mode of service, service must be effected in that manner alone and not through the provision of general law. This is held by the Supreme Court in various decisions. There is no explanation. 15. It is a settled law that when a statue prescribed for a particular mode of service, service must be effected in that manner alone and not through the provision of general law. This is held by the Supreme Court in various decisions. Let us now refer to those decisions: (1) In case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills , the Supreme Court would make the following observations: 10. Applying this rule of construction that in cases of conflict between a specific provision and a general provision the specific provision prevails over the general provision and the general provision applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special provision.... (2) In the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. P. Kesavan and Anr. the Supreme has held as follows: 15. The maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant" meaning thereby that general things do not derogate special things, shall, thus, apply in the instant case and in that view of the matter, as admittedly, the appellant herein has expressed its desire to renew the lease, Sub-section (2) of Section 5 read with Sub-section (3) of Section 7 thereof shall be attracted. (3) In the case of Kunwar Pal Singh (Dead) By Lrs. v. State of U.P. and Ors. , the Supreme Court would make the following observations: 16. Section 6(2), on plain reading, deals with the various modes of publication and they are: (a) publication in the Official Gazette, (b) publication in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and (c) causing public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality. There is no option left with anyone to give up or waive any mode and all such modes have to be strictly resorted to. The principle is well settled that where any statutory provision provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, then, that thing or act must be done in accordance with the manner prescribed therefore in the Act. As indicated by the Supreme Court in the above decision, failure to follow the special provisions, which would prevail over the general provision, would invalidate the acquisition proceedings under the Act. (4) In the case of State of U.P v. Chhuttan and Ors. As indicated by the Supreme Court in the above decision, failure to follow the special provisions, which would prevail over the general provision, would invalidate the acquisition proceedings under the Act. (4) In the case of State of U.P v. Chhuttan and Ors. reported in (2000) 9 SCC 459 , which deals with reference to the validity of service of notice under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976, the Supreme Court held that the notice purportedly served through process server on the wife of the land owner is not a valid mode of service. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the order of acquisition under the Land Ceiling Act and remitted the matter to the competent authority to hear the parties after giving opportunity to them and pass orders. In this context, it would be appropriate to quote the relevant observations of the Supreme Court, which are as follows: The only point that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the notice under Section 8(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 was validly served upon the respondent who is the holder of the land.... The requirement of sending notice by registered post would arise when notice is tried to be served through post. In this case the notice was served upon the wife of the holder by a process server. Whether that amounted to valid service of notice or not was not considered by the competent authority before recording the finding that it was served. As this aspect was not considered by the High Court and also by the authorities below, we set aside the impugned orders passed by them, remit the matter back to the competent authority for deciding the question of valid service of notice afresh after hearing the parties. The above decision, in our view, would squarely apply to the present facts of the case. 16. Besides the above points, it is quite relevant to consider the question whether the appellate authority and the learned Single Judge have considered the point of limitation with proper perspective as laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions. The appellate authority has not given any finding with reference to insufficiency of cause to condone the delay. Similarly the learned Single Judge also simply dismissed the writ petition on the ground of limitation. The appellate authority has not given any finding with reference to insufficiency of cause to condone the delay. Similarly the learned Single Judge also simply dismissed the writ petition on the ground of limitation. Thus, both these forums have not taken care to look into the sufficiency of the cause for the delay in order to do substantial justice to the parties. Whenever a grave injustice is brought to the notice, the Supreme Court held that the refusal to condone delay would result in a meritorious case being thrown out at the very threshold and thereby defeating the cause of justice. 17. Let us now refer to some of the observations made by the Supreme Court on the point of limitation: (i) In the case of State of Karnataka v. Kuppu Swami , the Supreme Court would hold as follows: When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. (ii) In the case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao and Ors. , the Supreme Court would hold as follows: The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction (sic discretion) vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. (iii) In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy , it was held by the Supreme Court as follows: Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. (iii) In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy , it was held by the Supreme Court as follows: Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient. (iv) In the case of Ramesh B. Desai and Ors. v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Ors., the Supreme Court has observed as follows: 19. A plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. A plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact.... 18. In the light of above guidelines given by the Supreme Court, we are of the view that both the appellate authority and the learned Single Judge committed grave error by refusing to condone the delay without going into the reason for the delay and the merits of the matter. There is patent illegality when the competent authority passed orders ex parte in total violation of the provisions of the special statue and thereby resulted in grave injustice. As a matter of fact, the learned Single Judge has called for the records and perused the same, since it was contended by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioners that special provision has not been followed. Even then, no finding has been given with regard to non-service of the notice under the Act by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition. 19. So far as the College is concerned, it has been admitted by the college authorities in the counter-affidavit filed before this Court that they are neither the purchaser, nor settlers of the land. Even then, there is no explanation as to when and how the State allowed them to continue in the said premises, even though it has taken possession under the Act. 20. Even then, there is no explanation as to when and how the State allowed them to continue in the said premises, even though it has taken possession under the Act. 20. Under the above circumstances, we feel that it would be appropriate to set aside all the orders dated 22.6.1992, 3.8.1992, 17.9.1992 and 23.11.1992 passed by the competent authority and also the order passed by the appellate authority in the appeal as well as learned Single Judge in the writ petition and remit the matter to the competent authority to commence the proceedings afresh under the Act from the provision of Section 8 of the Act and give full opportunity to the appellants and pass final orders after conducting thorough enquiry and after taking into consideration the plea made by the appellants in the statutory returns filed in 1976 before the appellate authority, learned Single Judge and also in this appeal contending that the Act is not attracted since the land in question cannot be considered to be surplus vacant land inasmuch as there are buildings and orchard. Accordingly, all the orders impugned are set aside and the matter is remanded to the competent authority for fresh enquiry as indicated above. 21. The competent authority shall commence the enquiry by strictly following the provisions of the Act and finish the same within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Since the competent authority itself admitted that in pursuance of the orders dated 1.10.1992, the authority took possession of the land through Circle Officer on 18.11.1992, which is reflected in the order dated 23.11.1992, it would be appropriate to direct the competent authority to deliver back the possession of the land in question to the appellants, who are admittedly the land owners without any delay. Accordingly it is ordered. Since it is stated that the college authority already entered into sale agreement, it is open to the College authority to invoke other remedies available in regard to the specific performance of the said agreement for sale by initiating appropriate proceedings as against the appellants in the appropriate forum. With these directions and observation, this appeal is allowed. Amareshwar Sahay, J. 22. I agree.